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FOREWORD

The present publication contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments in 1975 and is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. The work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1975 is described in its 15th annual report (see Bibliography).

The papers are arranged in chronological order, following a topical list of documents and lists of abbreviations and conferences. Other reference aids may be found at the back of the volume. These include a bibliography, a list of persons, and an index. The papers were compiled by Robert W. Lambert and R. William Nary with the assistance of Jean Mayer and Ruth Ihara. Useful suggestions were also received from other officers of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The Editorial Services Branch of the Publishing and Reproduction Division, Department of State, was responsible for the technical editing of this volume.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/ — General Assembly [1]
AABNCP — advanced airborne command post
ABM — anti-ballistic missile
ABNCP — airborne command post
ABRES — advanced ballistic reentry systems
ACDA — United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Add. — addendum [1]
AEC — Atomic Energy Commission
AFB — Air Force Base
AFSATCOM — Air Force Satellite Communications (system)
ALCM — air-launched cruise missile
ANG — Air National Guard
ANMCC — Alternate National Military Command Center
ASW — anti-submarine warfare
AV — air vehicle
AWACS — airborne warning and control system
BMD — ballistic missile defense
BMEWS — ballistic missile early warning system
BUIC — back-up interceptor control
BW — biological (bacteriological) weapons (warfare)
BWA — biological (bacteriological) warfare agents
C — Congress
C.1/ — First Committee [1]
CANSAM — Canadian Seismic Array Monitor
CCD — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [1 2]
CC CPSU — Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CCMS — Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CEP — circular error probability
CONUS — continental United States
CPSU — Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB — comprehensive (nuclear weapons) test ban
CW — chemical weapons (warfare)
CWA — chemical warfare agents
DC — Disarmament Commission [1]
DEW — distant early warning
DOD — United States Department of Defense
DSCS — Defense Satellite Communications System
ECM — electronic counter-measure(s)
ELF — extremely low frequency
EMP — electromagnetic pulse
ENDC — Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [1 3]
ERDA — United States Energy Research and Development Administration
EURATOM — European Atomic Energy Community
EXIM — Export-Import (Bank)
FAA — Federal Aviation Agency
FAO — Food and Agriculture Organization [1]
FBIS — Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FLTSATCOM — Fleet Satellite Communications (system) (U.S. Navy)
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
FY — fiscal year
G.A. — General Assembly [1]
GAC — General Advisory Committee (ACDA)
GAO — United States General Accounting Office
GDR — German Democratic Republic
GPO — United States Government Printing Office
H.R. — House of Representatives (U.S. Congress)
IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency [1]
ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
INFCIRC — information circular [1]
IRBM — intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRPTC — International Register for Potentially Toxic Chemicals [1]
IRS — International Reference Service (U.N.); Internal Revenue Service (U.S.)
JCC — Joint Control Center

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

L./ — document of limited distribution, working document [1]
LD — lethal dose
LTB — limited test ban
MaRV — maneuverable reentry vehicle
MBFR — mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV — multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MRBM — medium-range ballistic missile
MRV — multiple-reentry vehicle
MSR — missile site radar
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA — National Command Authority
NEACP — National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NEPA — National Environmental Policy Act (of 1969)
NMCC — National Military Command Center
NNWS — non-nuclear-weapon state(s)
NORAD — North American Air Defense Command
NPT — non-proliferation treaty (Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
NSC — National Security Council
NWS — nuclear-weapon state
OMB — Office of Management and Budget
oper. — operative
OTH-B — over-the-horizon backscatter (radar system)
par. — paragraph
PAR — perimeter acquisition radar
PBV — post boost vehicle
PNE — peaceful nuclear explosive (explosion)
PRC — People's Republic of China
prov. — provisional [1]
pt. — part
PTB — partial (limited) test ban
Pu — plutonium
pub. — publication
R&D — research and development
RDT&E — research, development, test, and evaluation
Rep. — Republic
ROCC — Regional Operations Control Center
RPV — remotely piloted vehicle
RSFSR — Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RV — reentry vehicle
S — Security Council [1]
SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM — surface-to-air missile
SCAD — subsonic cruise armed decoy
SCC — Standing Consultative Commission
SCRAM — special criterial for retrograde of Army materiel
sec. — section
Sess. — session
SLBM — submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile
SNM — special nuclear material
SRAM — short-range attack missile
SSBN — United States nuclear missile submarine
SSR — Soviet Socialist Republic
Stat. — statute
SURVSATCOM — survivability enhancing satellite communications (system)
TACMAR — tactical multifunction array radar
TAI — total active inventory
TIAS — Treaties and Other International Acts
TOA — total obligation authority
TTBT — threshold test ban treaty
UE — unit equipment
U.K. — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNTS — United Nations Treaty series
USC — United States Code
UST — United States Treaties [and Other International Agreements]
USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU — Western European Union
WHO — World Health Organization [1]
WMO — World Meteorological Organization [1]
WP — working paper

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[1] Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences served by the United Nations Secretariat.
[2] Title changed from Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969.
[3] Title changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Ad Hoc **Committee on the Indian Ocean**

Established by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII), Dec. 15, 1972; extended and enlarged by subsequent resolutions in 1973 and 1974. Held seven meetings between June 5 and October 7, 1975. *Members:* Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia.

Ad Hoc **Committee on the World Disarmament Conference**

Established by General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII), Dec. 18, 1973; extended by resolution 3260 (XXIX), Dec. 9, 1974. Held 12 meetings between Apr. 1 and Aug. 27, 1975. *Members:* Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. France, United Kingdom, and USSR participated in work of the Committee; United States and People's Republic of China maintained contact with the Committee through its Chairman.

Ad Hoc **Group of Qualified Government Experts to Study Nuclear-weapon-free Zones**

Established by General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX), Dec. 9, 1974. Study carried out under the auspices of the CCD. Held six meetings in Geneva from Apr. 7–10, 1975, and 25 formal meetings and 34 informal meetings from June 23–Aug. 18, 1975. *Participants:* Experts from 16 states members of the CCD (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and Zaire) and five from other States (Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Finland, and Ghana).

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1969– (formerly Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament)

Announced at the United Nations, Dec, 13, 1961, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), Dec. 20, 1961. Name changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Aug. 26, 1969. 27th session, Mar. 4–Apr. 10, 1975; 28th session, June 24–Aug. 28, 1975. *Membership:* Argentina,[1] Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt,[1] Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany,[2] France,[3] German Democratic Republic,[2] Hungary,[1] India, Iran,[2] Italy, Japan,[1] Mexico, Mongolia,[1] Morocco,[1] Netherlands,[1] Nigeria, Pakistan,[1] Peru,[2] Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.K., USSR, Yugoslavia,[1] and Zaire.[2] *Permanent Co-Chairmen:* U.S. and Soviet representatives.

Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic States

Sixth conference, in Jeddah, July 12–15, 1975.

Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nonaligned Countries

Fifth conference, held in Lima, Peru, August 25–30, 1975

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

First stage, Foreign Ministers of 35 European nations, July 3–7, 1973, in Helsinki; *second stage,* meetings held during 1973, 1974, and 1975, in Geneva. *Participants:* 35 nations, including Western and Eastern European countries, U.S. and Canada. *Final summit meeting,* July 30–Aug. 1, 1975, in Helsinki.

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[1] Admitted in 1969.
[2] Admitted in 1975.
[3] France has not participated.

Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts

Held under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross; invited by General Assembly resolution 3076 (XXVIII) to consider the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons that might cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. First session held in Geneva, Feb. 20–Mar. 29, 1974; second session, Feb. 3–Apr. 18, 1975.

Disarmament Commission, 1952–

Established by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Since 1959 the Commission has comprised all U.N. members. It did not meet in 1975.

General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL)

Fourth session, in Mexico City, Apr. 15–Apr. 18, 1975.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1956–

Established by statute of Oct. 26, 1956. *Membership:* 109 nations as of March 1976. Nineteenth session of General Conference, Sept. 22–26, 1975, Vienna.

International Conference for a Nuclear-free Pacific

Met in Suva, Fiji, Apr. 1–6, 1975. Attended by delegates from 22 countries, including South Pacific nations, Canada, the United States, Japan, and France.

Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Eruope

Preparatory talks held in 1973 in Vienna. Negotiations begun in Oct. 1973, continuing to present. Three rounds of talks held in 1975: Jan. 26–Apr.18, May 12–July 17, Sept. 26–Dec. 18. *Regular participants:* NATO—Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.; Warsaw pact—Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, and USSR. *Special status participants:* Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania, and Turkey.

Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3184 B (XXVIII), Dec. 18, 1973. Held two sessions in Geneva in 1974; third session, Feb. 3–Feb. 14, 1975. *Participants:* Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Met in Geneva, May 5–May 30, 1975. Attended by 56 nations.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Between the United States and the Soviet Union (SALT)

Announced July 1, 1968. *First phase:* Nov. 1969–May 1972; *Second phase* began in Nov. 1972. Sessions held in 1975: Jan. 31–May 7, July 2–Dec. 18. *U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).* Established Dec. 21, 1972. Met twice in 1973 and twice in 1974, in Geneva. Three meetings in 1975: Jan. 28–Feb. 13, Mar. 24–May 6, Sept. 22–Oct. 29.

United Nations General Assembly

Seventh special session, Sept. 1–16, 1975; 30th regular session, Sept. 16–Dec. 17, 1975. *Total membership:* 142 nations.

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Television Interview with Secretary of State Kissinger: Détente and Strategic Arms Limitations [Extract], January 15, 1975 [1]

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Mr. Moyers: On the word "détente," I wish you would define it for us.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the problem of détente is often put as if the United States were making concessions to the Soviet Union in order to achieve peace. Basically the problem of détente, the necessity of détente, is produced by the fact that nuclear war in this period is going to involve a catastrophe for all of humanity. When the decision of peace and war involves the survival of tens of millions of people, you are no longer playing power politics in the traditional sense. And for this reason, every American President in the postwar period, no matter how different their background, no matter what their party, has sooner or later been driven to making the problem of peace the central preoccupation of his foreign policy. This is the case also, obviously, in this administration.

We would like to leave a legacy of having made the world safer than when we found it, as must every administration. To conduct confrontation politics where the stakes are going to be determined by nuclear weapons is the height of irresponsibility. This is what we mean by détente. We have sought systematically to improve political relations, to increase trade relations in order to produce a maximum number of links between us and the Soviet Union, and to create a cooperative environment to reduce the dangers of war.

Mr. Moyers: But in the 20 years immediately after World War II there was nuclear peace, one could say. Every Secretary of State has said "That is my objective—not to have a nuclear war." What are the special reasons for détente as a systematic policy? What have we got from it, beyond nuclear peace?

Secretary Kissinger: What we have got from détente is—first of all, the situation in Europe is more peaceful than it has ever been. As late as the Kennedy administration, in the 1960's, there was a massive confrontation over Berlin between the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the sixties there was a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the question of nuclear arms, over the question of the ultimate shape of the European arrangements, and over the whole evolution of world policy.

In the last three years, European issues have been substantially, if not settled, I think substantially eased. In all parts of the world except the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union have pursued substantially compatible and, in some cases, cooperative policies. A trade relationship has developed for the first time that would give both countries an incentive—and especially the Soviet Union—an incentive

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 10, 1975, pp. 174–177.

to conduct moderate foreign policies. And most importantly, two major steps have been taken to arrest the nuclear arms race. For the first time, agreed ceilings exist to reduce the danger—to eliminate the danger, in fact, or at any rate to substantially reduce it—that both sides will be raising or conducting an arms race out of fear of what the other side will do.[2]

I think these are major steps forward which must be built upon and which I am confident will be built on, no matter who is President in this country.

Mr. Moyers: I would like to come back in just a moment to the Vladivostok agreement. But before we leave détente, we seem to be leaving it on very precarious legs, with the announcement this week—if trade is important—that the Soviet Union was not going to fulfill the recent agreement on trade.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think it is correct to say that the Soviet Union will not fulfill the recent agreement on trade. Unfortunately, the Congress has seen fit to pass legislation that imposed on the Soviet Union special conditions which were not foreseeable when the trade agreement was negotiated in 1972 and which the Soviet Union considers an interference in its domestic affairs.

We warned against this legislation for two years. We went along with it only with the utmost reluctance. And I think that this event proves that it is absolutely essential for Congress and the executive to work out a common understanding of what is possible in foreign policy and what can be subject to legislation and what must be subject to other forms of congressional advice and consent.

Mr. Moyers: Did Congress kill the agreement by imposing too strict a limitation?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to assess blame. I believe that the legislative restrictions, coupled with the restriction on Exim credits, had the effect of causing the Soviet Union to reject the agreement. We shared the objectives of those in Congress who were pushing this legislation. We differed with them as to tactics and as to the suitability of enshrining these objectives in legislation. We were prepared to make them part of our executive negotiations, and we had in fact brought about an emigration of 35,000 before this legislative attempt was made, and the emigration now is lower than this.

But I repeat, as I said yesterday, that we will go back to the Congress with the attitude that both sides should learn from this experience and with the recognition that as a coequal partner they must have an important part in shaping American foreign policy.

Mr. Moyers: Is détente on precarious legs as a result of the events this week?

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207.

Secretary Kissinger: I think détente has had a setback. But I think the imperative that I described earlier—of preventing nuclear war, which in turn requires political understanding—will enable us to move forward again, and we will immediately begin consultations with the Congress on how the legislative and executive branch can cooperate in implementing this.

Mr. Moyers: What is the proper relationship between Congress and the conduct of foreign policy? If I were a member of Congress, I would be very wary, after the Bay of Pigs and after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, of giving the administration a blank check.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Congress is absolutely correct in insisting on legislative oversight over the conduct of foreign policy. And I would say that no President or Secretary of State, if he is wise, would ask for a blank check, because the responsibility is too great and in a democracy a major foreign policy requires public support. You cannot have public support if you do not have congressional support. So it is in our interests to work in close partnership with Congress.

What we have to work out with Congress is the degree of oversight that a body that, after all, contains over 550 members, or over 500 members, can properly exercise. I think on the major directions of policy, congressional oversight, even expressed in legislative restrictions, is essential. We disagree with those in the Congress who want to cut off or limit aid to Viet-Nam, but we do not challenge that this is a legitimate exercise of congressional supervision.

The difficulties arise when the Congress attempts to legislate the details of diplomatic negotiations, such as on the trade bill, on Vladivostok, and other matters. There we have to work out not a blank check but an understanding by which Congress can exercise its participation by means other than forming legislation.

VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS

Mr. Moyers: We have just a few minutes left, Mr. Secretary. You raised the Vladivostok agreement that puts a ceiling on the number of launchers and MIRV'ed missiles that both the Soviet Union and the United States can have.[3] *The question being raised is what you have done is escalate the equilibrium, the military equilibrium, at what appears to many people to be an unnecessarily high level. Why couldn't we just stop?*

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say that the people who say "unnecessarily high" have never negotiated with the Soviet Union. The level at which that has been set is 200 delivery vehicles below what the Soviet Union already has. And therefore I find it difficult to understand how they can say it was escalated.

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[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746–747.

If we were willing to live with our present forces when the Soviet Union had 2,600 missiles and bombers, then we should be able to live with our present forces when the Soviet Union will have under the agreement only 2,400 missiles and bombers.

So there is nothing in the agreement that forces us to build up. And there is something in the agreement that forces the Soviet Union to reduce. Whether we build up or not is a strategic decision which we would have to make in any event and which would face us much more acutely under conditions of an arms race.

So we put a ceiling on the Soviet arms deployment below their present level, and therefore it enables us to consider our ceilings with less pressure than would be the case otherwise.

Secondly, once a ceiling exists, both military establishments can plan without the fear that the other one will drive the race through the ceiling, which is one of these self-fulfilling prophecies which has fueled the arms race.

Thirdly, once you have ceilings established, the problem of reductions will become much easier. The reason reductions are so difficult now is when both sides are building up, you never know against what yardsticks to plan your reductions. And I am confident that if the Vladivostok agreement is completed, it will be seen as one of the turning points in the history of the post-World War II arms race.

Mr. Moyers: What is the next step?

Secretary Kissinger: The next step is to complete the Vladivostok agreement, on which only a general understanding exists up to now. Once that is completed, we will immediately turn to negotiations on the reduction of armaments—

Mr. Moyers: The reduction of the ceilings?

Secretary Kissinger: The reduction of the ceilings, both of MIRV's and of total numbers, and actually I believe this will be an easier negotiation than the one which we have just concluded at Vladivostok, because it is going to be difficult to prove that when you already have an enormous capacity to devastate humanity, that a few hundred extra missiles make so much difference.

Mr. Moyers: The Vladivostok agreement would run until 1985. Is it possible that reductions in the ceilings could begin many years before that?

Secretary Kissinger: In the aide memoire that has been exchanged between us and the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that reduction in—that the negotiations on reductions can start immediately upon the completion of the other agreement. They can start at any time before. They must start no later than 1980, but they can start at any time before then.

Mr. Moyers: To set aside the figures for a moment, and put it in the way that laymen ask me, why do we keep on? This is going to mean, even if it does have a ceiling, more money for defense—we are going ahead with—

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me. The agreement doesn't mean more money for defense. More money for defense was inherent in the arms race. The question that the agreement poses is whether more should be spent on top of what was already planned. I do not believe that the agreement will make it easier to reduce the spending.

Mr. Moyers: Do you see any end in the foreseeable future to the arms race, both nuclear and conventional?

Secretary Kissinger: One of my overwhelming preoccupations has been to put an end to the arms race. And the reason I have been such a strong supporter of the SALT negotiations is to turn down the arms race. And I believe that the Vladivostok agreement will permit over the 10 years—will lead to reductions that could involve substantial savings. And that will be our principal objective.

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Statement by President Ford on the Geneva Protocol and the Biological-Weapons Convention, January 22, 1975 [1]

I have signed today the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 [2] and the Biological Weapons Convention,[3] to which the Senate gave its advice and consent on December 16, 1974.

With deep gratification, I announce the U.S. ratification of the Protocol, thus completing a process which began almost 50 years ago when the United States proposed at Geneva a ban on the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases."

While the ratification of the Protocol has been delayed for many years, the United States has long supported the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

The Protocol was submitted to the Senate in 1926 and, again, in 1970.[4] Following extensive Congressional hearings in 1971, during which differing views developed, the executive branch undertook a thorough and comprehensive review of the military, legal, and political issues relating to the Protocol. As a result, we have defined a new policy to govern any future use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. While reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the Protocol as not extending to riot control agents and chemi-

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 27, 1975, p. 74.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[4] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 445–446.

cal herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce as a matter of national policy:

(1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters,

(2) first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives, such as, use of riot control agents in riot situations, to reduce civilian casualties, for rescue missions, and to protect rear area convoys.

This policy is detailed in the Executive order which I will issue today. The order also reaffirms our policy established in 1971 that any use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents must be approved by me in advance.[5]

I am very pleased to have signed a second international agreement, entitled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. This is the first such agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons. As you may recall, the United States had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the Convention was negotiated.[6] Our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has been destroyed, and our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

The Convention provides that it will come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the three depositaries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR—and at least 19 other countries. Thirty-seven countries have already ratified the Convention. The United Kingdom has completed the parliamentary procedures for ratification, and the Soviet Union has announced its intention to ratify very soon. While I have signed the U.S. instrument of ratification today, its deposit will be deferred until we have coordinated that action with the United Kingdom and the USSR.

It is my earnest hope that all nations will find it in their interest to join in this prohibition against biological weapons.

Address by President Ford Before the Congress: Ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological-Weapons Convention, January 22, 1975 [1]

Members of the Congress, Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests:

This is a very auspicious occasion. I am signing today the Instruments

[5] *Post*, pp. 97–98.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 592–593.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 27, 1975, pp. 73–74.

of Ratification of two important treaties that limit arms and contribute to lessening the horror of war.

The first, the Geneva Protocol, prohibits the use in war of lethal and incapacitating chemical and bacteriological weapons. Its ratification completes the process, I should say, which began nearly 50 years ago in 1925, when the United States proposed and signed the protocol.[2]

The United States, I am glad to say, has always observed the principles and objectives of the protocol. The ratification today marks our formal commitment.

Although it is our position that the protocol does not cover riot control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce their use in war as a matter of national policy, except in a certain, very, very limited number of defense situations where lives can be saved. This policy is detailed in the Executive order that is being issued today.[3]

The second treaty that I am signing is the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons.[4]

It is the first international agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, biological agents and toxicants.

As evidence of our deep commitment to the objectives of this Biological Weapons Convention, we have already destroyed our entire stockpile of biological toxicant agents and weapons. Our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

The final act in the process of ratifying this convention requires the deposit of the Instruments of Ratification in Washington, London, and Moscow, which will be done when the United Kingdom and the USSR complete their respective ratification procedures.

Finally, I believe that these acts of ratification demonstrate the desire of our Nation to create and to contribute to a more peaceful world, and I pledge to you that I will continue in the search for new measures to promote that cause.

I congratulate the Members of the Senate, the Members of the House, and the American people for backing and supporting action of this kind. So, I will sign both.

Television Interview With Ambassador Johnson on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, January 29, 1975 [1]

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, the SALT talks resume at the tail end of January in Geneva. What would you say is the prime aim of this session?

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[3] *Post*, pp. 97–98.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 17, 1975, pp. 224–227.

Ambassador Johnson: Well, we have been given the mandate by the leaders on both sides—by President Ford and by General Secretary Brezhnev—to conclude, or to write, an agreement which will implement the agreement which they entered into and agreed upon in Vladivostok in November.[2]

They agreed upon, you might say, the broad outlines of the agreement; and the job that the Soviet negotiator, Minister Semenov, and I will be having, together with our delegations, will be to translate this into the specifics of an agreement which can be signed by both governments.

Mr. Sisco: Well, now, obviously you enter these talks optimistic, but are you optimistic that something concrete will come out of this particular session?

Ambassador Johnson: I certainly am, because I think that the agreement that was entered into at Vladivostok is so concrete and contains such constructive elements in it that I feel that it is going to be possible for us to write an agreement which will commend itself to both governments.

Now, this doesn't mean it is going to be easy. Vladivostok did not seek to answer all the questions, but it does mean that we have a more solid basis now than we have ever had in the past for writing a new agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Of course, I am sure you are aware of certain criticisms of the Vladivostok agreement, that the 2,400 nuclear missile total many people thought far too high. How do you feel about that? Is there a chance that that can be reduced when we get down to the fine print?

Ambassador Johnson: I have no inhibitions or reservations whatsoever about the validity, importance, and desirability of the Vladivostok agreement. The Vladivostok agreement, to my mind, represented a very significant breakthrough, as the term has been used, and I agree, given my own background, that it was a breakthrough.

Since I entered the negotiations, we have been talking over the past few years about reductions; and we, the United States, have been taking the position that in order to negotiate reductions, it was first necessary for the two sides to arrive at a common level and then reduce from that level.

Well, up to now, the problem has always been the difficulty of arriving at an agreement on a common level. The Soviets have insisted upon there being compensations, they call it—that is, their having a somewhat higher number because of various factors—and thus they would start from a higher figure than we would start from.

The big breakthrough at Vladivostok was that the Soviets agreed with us on starting from a common level. Now, having reached that common level, I think it will facilitate negotiations in the future on

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

reductions. In fact, that Vladivostok agreement says that we will enter into negotiations on reductions.

Now, the agreement has been criticized because it doesn't include reductions, also. However, you have to start some place. And I think that the Vladivostok agreement is a very important breakthrough toward starting on a further path that will lead both sides toward reductions.

Mr. Sisco: Well, you don't believe that that 2,400 figure was just arbitrarily set too high. One part of that criticism, if I may add—some people say the Russians actually wanted a lower figure. Is that right? Is that true?

Ambassador Johnson: I never heard that statement made.

Mr. Sisco: That was in some press clippings I have seen.

Ambassador Johnson: As a matter of fact, the 2,400 figure is a figure somewhat in between what we have and what the Russians have. So it is a compromise figure, you might say.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you feel that your job in the last few weeks has become harder because of the Russian's rejections of the trade treaty, apparently a little bit cracking of this U.S.-Soviet détente. Do you think perhaps they are going to be a little tougher?

Ambassador Johnson: I don't want to predict what their attitude is going to be, except that I go into these talks with the conviction that both sides want them to succeed. No matter what other problems there may be in our relations, it seems to me that both countries have an overwhelming interest in preventing the holocaust of a nuclear war. And I am going into these talks with the idea that they are going to succeed. I hope and expect that my Soviet colleague will be doing the same.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, on the same plane, sort of, the United States and Soviets are at least talking to limit nuclear weapons. What about the proliferation of nuclear weaponry for other nations? I am thinking really of the Mideast where obviously the Arabian countries are going to have the money, at least, perhaps to get into the nuclear race. Is there something that the United States and the Soviets together can do to limit the spreading of nuclear weapons?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, as you know, both countries have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and both countries have supported the Nonproliferation Treaty.[3] And, as you know, also an NPT review conference will be taking place in the course of this year.[4] So both countries are still supporting the principles involved in the Nonproliferation Treaty. We in the SALT talks do not directly deal with this matter.

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[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] See *post*, pp. 146–157.

Mr. Sisco: What are some of the nuts and bolts of this talk? How long do you expect to be there, and something along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, that's a question my wife asks me. I am not able to answer it that firmly. I expect to be there as long as it is necessary to do the job.

Mr. Sisco: Looking way down the road, and a bit philosophically, can you foresee a time when perhaps there will be no nuclear weaponry, and we don't have this big thing hanging over our shoulders and minds?

Ambassador Johnson: I wish I could say that, but I don't see the possibility at the present time.

In this connection, Mr. Sisco, in connection with this agreement, I think people understandably keep searching for some magic formula that will dispose of this whole question once and for all—eliminate all nuclear weapons—or there be a definitive agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union that will last for a long time, last indefinitely into the future.

I just don't think that there is such a formula. I think that, given the growth of technology, given the developments in both countries, between the two countries as well as elsewhere in the world, I think this whole question of arms limitation, and particularly the limitation of strategic arms, is going to be something that both countries are going to have to deal with on a continuing basis now and into the future.

I think this is one of the advantages of this present agreement at Vladivostok. It was agreed that we will not try to write something that will last indefinitely into the future. It was agreed that we will try to write something that will have a life of 10 years. Ten years is a span in this field that it is possible to foresee and anticipate developments, and thus I think that we have brought this into a framework which makes it manageable.

This agreement isn't going to end all problems. This agreement, as I said, is simply, I think, the beginning of—or let's say, a further step in this process of negotiating and reaching understandings between ourselves and the Soviet Union in this very dynamic field.

Mr. Sisco: If I may touch on something that you touched on earlier, I am wondering whether perhaps the decline of Mr. Brezhnev—you mentioned Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford signed the agreement—and there is a strong feeling that perhaps he lost some influence in the Soviet Union. Do you think this makes your job harder, or do you know anything that might go along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: I just don't think it would be useful for me to speculate. I deal with the representative of the Soviet Government. He deals with it as a representative of that government.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, just on another philosophical note, do you feel that perhaps it might have been better not to have nuclear weaponry at all in the last 25–30 years?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes, I would certainly agree, if it had been possible. And you will recall that the United States, when it had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry, made a proposal, the Baruch proposal, wasn't it, back in 1946, that nuclear weapons be outlawed, in effect, and that all nuclear energy be brought under international control. And you will recall that that was turned down at the time.[5]

Now, as long as nuclear weapons exist, I think it is important that the United States maintain its deterrent posture. And of course the Soviet Union has been seeking parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.

As long as deterrence can be maintained, I have hopes that nuclear war can be averted between the two powers, and that, in effect, is what the SALT talks are all about. The SALT talks are not about eliminating all nuclear weapons. The SALT talks are establishing a relationship between the two countries on the level of weapons such as not to encourage either side to initiate nuclear war.

The theme of the talks, if you will, as far as I am concerned, in many ways, is stability; that is, that our weapons systems and our strategic nuclear forces are not such as to bring about instability, particularly in a crisis situation, so that deterrence can be maintained and stability can be maintained in relationships between our two countries.

Mr. Sisco: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Report by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the Congress: Strategic Forces [Extract], February 5, 1975 [1]

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II. STRATEGIC FORCES

The strategic nuclear forces are the foundation of our military strength. Given our primary objective of deterring attack on ourselves and our allies, it is essential that we remain on equal footing with the Soviet Union in regard to these forces. The Vladivostok understanding not only clearly establishes the principle of equality by setting equal numerical ceilings on the strategic offensive forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also provides a point of departure from which

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[5] *Ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

[1] *Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976–1980 Defense Programs*, pp. II–1 to II–57.

we can work toward equitable reductions in the two forces. That is the direction in which we propose to go, once the Vladivostok understanding has been negotiated into treaty form.[2]

Despite its importance, the Vladivostok understanding still does not relieve us of the burden of unilateral planning. Within the ceilings set by the agreement, we must continue to determine what specific objectives we want our strategic forces to serve and what constitutes the most efficient and effective mix of forces for those purposes.

A. THE BASIS FOR THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

It should be clear that deterrence must depend on a capability to respond effectively against the enemy, even after absorbing a first strike. A prospective opponent must, therefore, be aware of that capability, i.e., the ability of our forces to survive his attack and penetrate to their targets. Beyond that, he must be persuaded that in the face of a sufficient provocation, we will actually execute the retaliatory attacks. And we, in turn, must be fully prepared both physically and psychologically to launch those attacks; otherwise the effectiveness of the deterrent will be undermined.

While we tend to talk of deterrence as though it were in continuous operation, it is doubtful that the leaders of the great nuclear powers ask themselves on a daily basis whether they feel deterred. It is only in circumstances of confrontation and crisis that the credibility of the deterrent comes under test; at that point, what may have seemed like a plausible threat under normal conditions may appear grossly inadequate or inappropriate to the situation at hand. For better or for worse, the scientist in the lecture hall who announces that, in response to a Soviet attack on our nuclear forces, we should destroy a hundred Soviet cities and their populations, is unlikely to implement that threat should the situation arise. In addition, theorizing about these matters tends to be too abstract, and does not easily capture the agonizing nature and complex context of these fateful decisions, should they ever arise.

Since we have been fortunate enough never to have undergone such an experience in the thirty years of the nuclear age, the reaction of the policymaker in the face of such an attack cannot be foretold. But he and his advisers will have been exposed to a number of paper wars—i.e., hypothetical cases in which deterrence has collapsed and our opponent has launched some kind of a nuclear attack. They will know from these exercises that in many circumstances the most suicidal course for the United States—and hence the least credible course—would be to strike the population in the opponent's cities. Thus, they quickly come to understand the desirability of being able to retaliate in other ways than by a massive attack against cities.

While the exercises may be hypothetical, the problem is not. The Soviet Union, for example, now deploys a strategic nuclear capability

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

that goes far beyond anything required by the theories of minimum or finite deterrence. Her peripheral attack forces are such as to be able to take under attack every significant target in Western Europe. Her central strategic systems are sufficiently large in number so that she could strike at a substantial number of military targets in the United States, and elsewhere in the world, and still withhold a very large force whose future use we would have to consider in responding.

In addition, the People's Republic of China is slowly but steadily developing a strategic attack force of her own. And, as a result of the Indian nuclear detonation, we are once more aware that the danger of nuclear proliferation is still with us.

Another problem is the difficulty faced by our European and Asian allies. Most of them have no nuclear capabilities; those who do are dwarfed by the immensity of the Soviet strategic and peripheral nuclear attack forces. They still must look to the United States, as they have for thirty years, for some assurance that they cannot be blackmailed into submission by nuclear threats.

The problem is complicated still further by the range of nuclear contingencies that could arise. For planning purposes we have been conditioned to assume as the only contingency a massive surprise attack which comes, usually without motive or warning, as a bolt-out-of-the-blue. The case undoubtedly has its uses, but I would speculate that other contingencies are much more likely. The United States and the Soviet Union have exercised great care in the deployment and control of their nuclear weapons. Other nations may not do as well, and the concern with accidents and unauthorized acts may be with us again. Despite the increasingly stringent measures that we are taking, we cannot totally preclude the seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon and the need for countermeasures. In short, we face a wide range of possible actions involving nuclear weapons, and no single response is appropriate to them all.

There is also the ever present possibility that a conventional conflict might escalate into a tactical or even strategic use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, one of the minor ironies of recent polemics against current defense spending is that the polemicists manage to argue more or less simultaneously that:

—the nuclear threshold must be kept high;
—nuclear options will lower the nuclear threshold;
—long-war conventional capabilities (for antisubmarine warfare, as one example) are unnecessary because conventional conflicts either will be short or will somehow turn nuclear.

I will not attempt to untangle the peculiar logic of this particular position. But it should be evident that the problems on our agenda, both today and in the future, make some of the earlier views of nuclear deterrence totally obsolete. Clearly, our requirements in this realm are for strategic forces capable of providing more than the simple response of a limited or wholesale destruction of cities.

This is not to say that a highly survivable force which can be withheld for substantial periods of time, if need be, and targeted against an enemy's major economic and political assets is irrelevant. Most of us can agree on the need for such a force to serve, at a minimum, as a deterrent to attacks on the cities of the United States and its allies. But to treat such a reserve force as an all-purpose deterrent, as a sovereign remedy for the problems we face, would be the height of folly. To threaten to blow up all of an opponent's cities, short of an attack on our cities, is hardly an acceptable strategy, and in most circumstances the credibility of the threat would be close to zero, especially against a nation which could retaliate against our cities in kind. Granting the need for such a withheld force in order to deter coercive attacks against our cities, we must surely go on to something else if our deterrent is to be credible over a wide range of contingencies.

Last year I pointed out that in addition to such a force, we needed a capability for more limited response options and for rapid retargeting so as to provide the President with the maximum feasible amount of flexibility in a nuclear emergency. In reviewing that requirement, it is worth emphasizing again that:

—Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is capable of a disarming first strike against the other; in fact neither side has a high confidence capability of destroying a large fraction of the other's fixed, hard ICBM silos.

—Neither side, for the foreseeable future, is likely to acquire a disarming first strike capability against the other, even if the fixed, hard ICBM forces become more vulnerable in the 1980s.

—Because of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,[3] neither side can deploy a combination of counterforce and damage-limiting capabilities that will have any serious prospect of success; barring carelessness, each side should be able to count on large surviving forces that it can use or withhold for substantial periods of time.

In these circumstances, one may ask, has nuclear strategy not reached a dead-end? As far as the massive attacks that preoccupied us in the 1960s are concerned, that may well be the case. Unfortunately, however, there remain a number of more limited contingencies that could arise and that we should be prepared to deter. I have already mentioned the danger of accidents and unauthorized acts. Our allies have good grounds for asking how we would respond to threats against them from intermediate and variable range nuclear systems. And we cannot rule out the possibility that a desperate or reckless enemy might engage in a nuclear "shot-across-the-bow" by firing at one or more of our military installations.

There is, moreover, another contingency about which we must remain concerned. Since both we and the Soviet Union are investing so much

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[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

of our capability for flexible and controlled responses in our ICBM forces, these forces could become tempting targets, assuming that one or both sides acquire much more substantial hard-target kill capabilities than they currently possess. If one side could remove the other's capability for flexible and controlled responses, he might find ways of exercising coercion and extracting concessions without triggering the final holocaust.

I mention these contingencies—and no doubt there are others—for several reasons. First, we have to assume that, despite the appearance of strategic nuclear stalemate, others continue to explore their strategic and tactical possibilities just as they do their technological opportunities. Second, while many of the contingencies may seem bizarre and of extraordinarily low probability, the consequences of their occurrence could prove catastrophic.

Accordingly, I believe that it is our duty to drive the probability of these contingencies even lower by developing and displaying the capability and the doctrine of flexible strategic response. No potential enemy should believe that we are so rigid, so lacking in capability, or so fearful of the consequences that we cannot respond appropriately (according to our best interests) to any nuclear provocation on his part.

The Command Data Buffer System will help ensure this flexibility by substantially improving our capacity for rapid retargeting of the Minuteman force. As national policy, we shall continue to acquire and be prepared to implement a number of more limited response options. No opponent should think that he could fire at some of our Minuteman or SAC bases without being subjected to, at the very least, a response in kind. No opponent should believe that he could attack other U.S. targets of military or economic value without finding similar or other appropriate targets in his own homeland under attack. No opponent should believe that he could blackmail our allies without risking his very capability for blackmail. Above all, no opponent should entertain the thought that we will permit him to remove our capability for flexible strategic response.

As I pointed out last year, the flexibility that we are developing does not require any major change in the strategic capability that we now deploy. Some modifications in command, control, and communications are necessary and are underway. I believe that our very modest civil defense program should continue; it makes clear to a prospective opponent contemplating a limited strike that, since we can protect our citizens against fallout, we have a credible choice between an all-out response and no response at all.

In addition, I believe that our response options would be enhanced by increased accuracy and a greater flexibility in the yields of the nuclear weapons available to us. In some circumstances, we might wish to retaliate against non-collocated, small soft targets, or facilities near large population centers; high accuracy and a low-yield, air-burst weapon would be the most appropriate combination for those targets. In other

cases, we might wish to respond with attacks on a limited number of hard targets such as ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The desired combination for these latter targets, especially as long as we have to depend on all-inertial guidance systems, is high accuracy and a higher-yield warhead than we now deploy.

Since any discussion of hard-target kill capability inevitably arouses controversy, I must stress that we are not now seeking to develop the capability to destroy the Soviet ICBM force. We have, as I pointed out last year, a limited hard-target kill capability in our missile forces at the present time, as do the Soviets. Our own capability against ICBMs is modest—partly because our missiles lack the proper combination of warhead yield and accuracy, and partly because of the complications introduced by the phenomenon known as fratricide. I believe that we should improve our hard-target kill capability so as to have higher confidence of executing limited hard-target attacks. To destroy all of the very hard components of the Soviet ICBM force that are now being constructed or upgraded would require not only major qualitative improvements on our part, but also a large number of high-yield and very accurate reentry vehicles. I am not proposing any such deployment programs here.

A number of other and more general concerns about our response options have arisen during the last year, and I believe that they deserve serious consideration. Accordingly, I will try to address the most salient issues.

One of the most serious allegations is that, with limited response options, we are *promoting* warfighting rather than deterrence. But such a charge stems, in fact, from an erroneous *conception* of deterrence. This Administration is no less interested in deterrence than its critics; we recognize that the United States has more to lose from a nuclear war than any other country. But we also believe that our conceptions of deterrence must adapt to the large and growing capabilities of our rivals. Our objective remains deterrence, but modern deterrence across the spectrum of the nuclear threat. And that requires us to be prepared with credible responses to a variety of contingencies. Considering all the risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons, this kind of preparation does not in any way imply an effort to substitute limited nuclear response options for other instruments of military power. It is intended to make nuclear war of any kind less, not more, likely. I cannot help but add, in this connection, that nobody suggests that contingency plans, increased accuracy, or the avoidance of attacks on cities makes either non-nuclear or tactical nuclear war more probable. Why, then, should they make strategic nuclear war more probable?

A somewhat related charge is that, however good our intentions, limited response options will result in a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The fact is, as I pointed out last year, that we have had nuclear options for more than twenty years without their having notably affected the probability of nuclear war. Indeed, to believe that the develop-

ment of contingency plans (which, after all, is what the search for options is all about) will increase the probability of nuclear use is to underestimate seriously the gravity of the decision to go to war, especially nuclear war. What is more, to the extent that concern about the nuclear threshold is more than hypothetical, the most effective way of keeping the threshold high is to increase the effectiveness and readiness of our non-nuclear forces. History, I believe, will show that on those rare occasions when the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered in the past thirty years, it was because of the impression that adequate conventional forces were not available to achieve the desired objectives.

Another allegation (not quite compatible with the first two) is that limited response options are illusory because any nuclear exchange would rapidly escalate and that its results, even if the war were confined to military targets, would be indistinguishable from attacks on cities. The implication of this argument is that limited response options are worthless and harmful and that we should bow at least to the rhetoric and the force requirements of minimum deterrence.

Certainly it would be foolhardy to preclude the possibility that a nuclear conflict could escalate to cover a wide range of targets, which is one more reason why limited response options are unlikely to lower the nuclear threshold. But I doubt that any responsible policymaker would deliberately want to ensure escalation, and forego the chance for an early end to a conflict, by refusing to consider and plan for responses other than immediate, large-scale attacks on cities. Surely, even if there is only a small probability that limited response options would deter an attack or bring a nuclear war to a rapid conclusion, without large-scale damage to cities, it is a probability which, for the sake of our citizens, we should not foreclose.

Furthermore, all of the evidence available to us suggests that very limited and quickly terminated nuclear exchanges could result in fatalities and casualties much lower than from some of the traditional conflicts we have experienced. And even if a nuclear exchange were to expand to all strategic nuclear targets in the United States, we would probably suffer at least 100 million fewer fatalities than if our cities were attacked. Approximately similar results would hold true for the Soviet Union as well.

None of this is to argue that a strategy of limited response options is a panacea, or that it solves all the problems that we face in this realm, any more than previous strategies of deterrence have done. However, I believe that the Soviet leaders understand quite clearly why we have adopted this strategy in an era of approximate mutual deterrence, and I see no evidence that they regard as destabilizing these efforts to strengthen our own deterrent. Accordingly, I continue to consider the capability for limited response options as one of the essential requirements of deterrence under current conditions.

An equally essential requirement of deterrence is parity with the Soviet Union in strategic offensive forces, as perceived by friend and

foe alike. Not only does Public Law 92-448 (the Jackson Amendment) require us to achieve equality with the USSR in central strategic systems but such equality is also important for symbolic purposes, in large part because the strategic offensive forces have come to be seen by many—however, regrettably—as important to the status and stature of a major power. Clearly the Soviet Union places a very high value on achieving parity, at the very least, with the United States.

What is perhaps even more important, the lack of equality can become a source of serious diplomatic and military miscalculation. Opponents may feel that they can exploit a favorable imbalance by means of political pressure, as Hitler did so skillfully in the 1930s, particularly with Neville Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden. Friends may believe that a willingness on our part to accept less than equality indicates a lack of resolve to uphold our end of the competition and a certain deficiency in staying power. Our own citizens may doubt our capacity to guard the nation's interests.

Fortunately, the question of perceptions may to a large extent have been resolved by the understanding at Vladivostok, which so firmly establishes the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in central strategic systems. Assuming that the Soviet leaders exhibit restraint in the application of the agreement's principles, we are prepared to exercise restraint as well. However, until we obtain solid evidence of Soviet restraint, we shall plan for deployment of approximately 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,320 MIRVed missiles. How we proceed on these accounts will depend essentially on the actions of the Soviet Union. They currently have the initiative, and it is up to them to decide how much additional effort the two sides should put into these programs. In making their decision, they should remember that the tortoise won because the hare did not try very hard very often. This hare may be different.

A further requirement of deterrence that I should stress again is what has been called essential equivalence. Let me elaborate on what I mean by that term. Despite the accomplishments of the Vladivostok understanding and the further agreements that might be reached in the future, we will continue to face many uncertainties about the long-term evolution of the strategic forces—and about which technologies and which components of these forces will be considered most important. Under the circumstances, I believe that it would be a mistake to allow any major asymmetry to develop between the United States and the Soviet Union in the basic technological and other factors that shape force effectiveness.

We must continue to think flexibly about the strategic forces and their deterrent functions. We must be sure to keep pace with the Soviet Union in the design of new offensive and defensive systems, in such areas as accuracy and reliability, and, if necessary, in throw-weight and its management. We may need to maintain an offsetting advantage in some areas to compensate for Soviet advantages in others. For

example, the United States should seek to stay ahead in accuracy to offset the large and apparently growing Soviet advantage in throw-weight. I should stress in this latter connection that the Soviet Union has made more rapid strides in accuracy than is generally appreciated and has shown an intense interest in various applications of terminal guidance.

Progress by both sides in this latter area of technology will take time. Meanwhile, we in the United States must accept the fact that while our test-range accuracies with all-inertial guidance systems have shown marked improvement over the years, there remain considerable uncertainties about the extent to which accuracies will degrade on operational trajectories, especially since the world is not a perfect sphere. The Soviets face comparable uncertainties, but can compensate to an important degree for degradations in accuracy by using the high yields that the large throw-weights of their missiles permit. We are in a less advantageous position in this regard because of the severe constraints on our own missile throw-weights. Accordingly, I believe that we should both increase the yield-to-weight ratio of our warheads and—regardless of past preferences—be prepared to expand the throw-weight of our missiles, however we may decide to base them in the future.

Despite these concerns for the future, we continue to deploy a highly effective second-strike strategic force. As matters now stand, we are able to fulfill the four requirements of deterrence that I have articulated in the first section of this Report. We currently possess:

—A powerful and survivable force capable of being withheld for a substantial period of time;
—A capability for limited response options, including some precision damage-avoidance and hard-target kill capability and a modest ability to provide our citizens with protection from radioactive fallout;
—Perceived equality with the Soviet Union, even though our forces differ from hers in certain important respects;
—Momentum in our program of strategic initiatives, to maintain essential long-term equivalence with the USSR and, to the extent necessary, with the PRC.

Since we do not seek a disarming first strike capability against the Soviet Union, there is no reason why she cannot have a capability comparable to ours, thus ensuring the mutual deterrence that is the foundation of equality, respect, and stability.

Despite these hopes and prospects, there remain two major problems on the horizon against which it is particularly important that we carry insurance. The first is that the new generation of Soviet ICBMs, if fully deployed, would carry a throw-weight exceeding that of the MINUTEMAN force by a factor of as much as five or six. The second problem is that this throw-weight, combined with several thousand high-yield MIRVs and accuracies that are well within the reach of the Soviets by

the early 1980s, could come to jeopardize the survival of our fixed-based ICBM silos.

While such a development would not give the Soviet Union anything approximating a disarming first strike capability, it would:

—bring into question our ability to deter limited and selective attacks;
—give the Soviets a capability for damage and disruption that we ourselves would lack;
—cause precisely the fears and suspicions that our arms control efforts have been and are designed to dispel.

Here, in fact, is a case where unilateral planning, as I indicated earlier, might have to support and supplement our arms control programs.

We cannot expect, in all candor, that arms control agreements—any more than domestic laws—will solve all problems or close all loopholes. Those who hold such high expectations are doomed to disappointment. Where the possibility of loopholes exists, we should not insist on perfection as the price of agreement. Rather we should attempt to close the loopholes, by further negotiation if possible, by unilateral action if necessary.

You will recall in this connection, when I submitted a program of strategic initiatives last year, that I did so on three grounds. First, great uncertainty then existed as to the nature of any successor to the Interim Offensive Agreement that we might achieve. Second, essential equivalence would constitute a fundamental criterion in the future design of our strategic offensive forces. And third, how far we would proceed within these initiatives should depend on the evolution and pace of the ongoing and maturing Soviet strategic programs.

As a result of the understanding at Vladivostok, there now are fewer uncertainties about the shape of a successor to the Interim Offensive Agreement. But the other reasons for continuing with our program of strategic initiatives remain strong.

Until the Soviets decide to make a more stable distribution of their strategic offensive resources, we must take account of the heavy emphasis that they are giving to their ICBM force. Accordingly, we should keep open the option to replace some or all of the force with a larger throw-weight, less vulnerable system. We should continue with our accuracy improvement programs, whether to acquire a more efficient hard-target kill capability or to improve our overall effectiveness against soft point targets. Pending ratification of a threshold nuclear test ban, we should also diversify our warhead prototypes—particularly with the improvement of yield-to-weight ratios—so that we can exercise options in the future on how we load our missiles and bombers. It does not follow, for example, that more MIRVs are always better or that we might not want single-warhead replacements for the current POSEIDON missile and its successors. Finally, I believe that we must

continue to explore the potentiality of long-range cruise missiles, evaluate the costs and performance of smaller ballistic missile submarines, and assess the practicality of developing an aircraft that can convert from a transport to a tanker.

With these initiatives, and the other programs that I shall discuss in detail later in this section, I am confident that we can maintain a highly credible, modern, second-strike strategic deterrent within the framework of the Vladivostok understanding and any future SALT agreements. Without them, I can give no such assurance.

B. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

The strategic forces of the Soviet Union constitute by far the major external strategic capability which the forces of the United States must be designed to counterbalance. The strategic forces of the People's Republic of China, while growing slowly in size, are still significant only in a regional context. Hence, the following discussion deals principally with the Soviet forces.

1. THE SOVIET UNION

Last year I reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union was in the midst of an ICBM development program which was unprecedented in its breadth and depth. Four new ICBMs—the "light" solid fuel SS-X-16, the "medium" liquid fuel SS-17, the "medium" liquid fuel SS-19 and the "heavy" liquid fuel SS-18—were being flight tested simultaneously. But of far greater importance with regard to the strategic balance, all four of those missiles employed a post boost vehicle (PBV), i.e., a bus type dispensing system, and all except the SS-X-16 were being flight tested with MIRVs.[4] Now, a year later, I must report to the Congress that this most impressive development program is nearing completion and that we have evidence that all four of these new ICBMs have started, or soon will start, operational deployment. What remains to be ascertained at this time is simply the extent, composition and pace of that deployment.

Of the four new ICBMs being flight tested, the SS-19 is clearly the most successful. This new missile's throw-weight is about three to four times greater than the SS-11. In contrast to the SS-17 and the SS-18, the SS-19 has been flight tested solely with MIRVed payloads and probably will be deployed with six RVs.

CEPs are difficult to estimate with any degree of precision, especially when they are relatively small. We are convinced, nonetheless, that the SS-19 is clearly intended to achieve high accuracy; the Soviet designers have done everything right to attain that goal. The SS-19 missile itself probably has started deployment.

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[4] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 25.

The SS-18, which is comparable in volume to the SS-9, is being flight tested in both a single RV and a MIRV mode. The single RV version has been designated the Mod 1, and the MIRVed version the Mod 2. The SS-18 Mod 1 has a computer aboard and is believed to be more accurate than the SS-9. With its large warhead yield, this missile would have a good hard target capability.

The SS-18 Mod 2 can carry as many as eight RVs or alternative MIRV payloads. Like the SS-19, it has several features which indicate that accuracy is a prime objective. We can assume that the accuracy of this system could also be improved in time by a series of refinements in the current guidance system.

Flight testing of the SS-18 Mod 1 is further advanced than that of the Mod 2. Consequently, we believe the Mod 1 is now operational, and will be followed later by the Mod 2.

The SS-18, like the SS-17, is designed to be cold-launched, i.e., the missile is boosted out of its silo by a gas generator before the main booster motors are ignited. The other two new ICBMs (the SS-X-16 and the SS-19) are hot-launched in the conventional manner, i.e., their main booster motors are ignited in the silos as in the case of the earlier Soviet ICBMs and all of the current U.S. ICBMs. The SS-18 will be deployed in the new type silos.

The SS-17 has certain features that are technologically more advanced than the SS-19, but high accuracy does not appear to be a prime objective at present. The SS-17 is not much larger in volume than the SS-11, but it carries four times the payload of the SS-11 Mod 1. We believe that the SS-17 will be deployed with four RVs. This missile would not have as good a hard target capability as the SS-19.

The SS-X-16 may be slightly smaller in volume than the SS-13, but it carries about twice the throw-weight over about the same range. Although equipped with a bus, the SS-X-16 has thus far been tested only with a single RV. However, we cannot preclude the possibility that the SS-X-16 will be deployed in a MIRV, as well as a single RV, mode.

A land-mobile version of the SS-X-16 may be under development. Although the Interim Agreement itself does not restrict the development of land-mobile systems by either side, the U.S. Government has unilaterally declared that it would consider the deployment of such missiles, during the period of the Interim Agreement, inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. Under a new SALT agreement, based on the Vladivostok summit meeting, any mobile ICBMs would be counted against the aggregate limits. In any event, we believe the SS-X-16 would be deployed first in silos, and only thereafter in a land-mobile mode.

Speculation as to the rate of deployment of the new Soviet ICBMs and as to the buildup of its SLBM force are complicated by the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement which were to govern until mid-1977 and the ongoing negotiations to achieve a new agreement within the general outlines worked out at Vladivostok. The discussion

here assumes that the provisions of the Interim Agreement will hold for the period up to mid-1977.[5]

In order to allow for deployment of newer delivery systems, we assume that the Soviet Union will eventually phase out most, if not all 209 of the old SS-7s and SS-8s as long as the Interim Agreement remains in effect. The SS-7s and SS-8s will probably be phased out in favor of modern SLBMs in nuclear-powered submarines, which is permitted under the Agreement. Substitution of SLBMs for all of the 209 SS-7s and SS-8s would reduce the Soviet ICBM ceiling to about 1,400 launchers, excluding mobile ICBM launchers. If the new family of ICBMs is deployed along the lines we consider likely, these approximately 1,400 launchers could have a throw-weight of about 10,000,000 lbs.

This most impressive Soviet ICBM program, as I pointed out last year, appears to have three main objectives—expanded target coverage (particularly countermilitary) with MIRVs, improved pre-launch survivability with the new hard silo designs, and the attainment of a significant hard-target kill capability. The full deployment of the force I have just described would unquestionably permit the attainment of the first two objectives. The attainment of the last objective would depend upon the accuracy achievable with the SS-18 and the SS-19. We believe the CEPs of both of these missiles could be improved significantly. The sizeable force of SS-18 Mod 2s and SS-19s which is projected, given their estimated warhead yields, could then pose a threat to our ICBMs in their silos, which threat, though limited by our silo upgrade program, would become increasingly serious as Soviet CEPs were improved. That force, with a balanced deployment of SS-17s, SS-16s and SS-11 Mod 3s, could be operational by the early 1980s.

The Soviet SLBM program during the past year has also produced some interesting new developments. The new model of the D-class submarine, which I discussed last year, is now under construction. This new submarine is apparently a longer version of the original D-class which in turn is a longer version of the Y-class. The new D-class submarine will probably have more tubes than the original D-class; both are designed to carry the 4,200 nm SS-N-8 SLBM. The Y-class submarine has 16 smaller tubes for the SS-N-6.

Production of the Y-class submarine has apparently ended with completion of the 34th unit (last year we thought it would end with the 33rd unit). Eight of the 12-tube D-class submarines have been launched. The Soviet Union probably intends to exceed the Interim Agreement's "base line" ceiling of 740 SLBM launchers and move toward the maximum limit of 950 "modern" SLBM launchers and 62 "modern ballistic missile submarines".

When the SSBN with the 741st or larger number of launchers enters sea trials, the Soviet Union is required to begin dismantling an equal

[5] For text, see *ibid., 1972*, pp. 202–204.

number of SS-7 or SS-8 launchers and/or SLBM launchers on older submarines and, under the Interim Agreement, to notify the U.S. of its actions. In any event, it seems clear that the Soviet Union intends to expand its SLBM force up to the limit set in the Interim Agreement. An agreement in accordance with the general terms discussed at Vladivostok would allow the Soviet Union to further expand its SLBM force with compensating reductions in ICBMs or bombers within the 2,400 limit. Many of the detailed scheduling and counting problems would not exist.

Last year I noted that the Soviet Union was flight testing a new version of the SS-N-6 with MRVs. It is now clear that there are actually two new versions of the SS-N-6—the Mod 2 with a single RV and the Mod 3 with MRVs—both with a slightly greater range than the range of the Mod 1. Having mastered the MIRV technology in its ICBM program, there is no reason why the Soviet Union could not deploy MIRVs in its SLBMs as well. Should it do so, which it could under the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet Union could exceed the United States in numbers of strategic missile RVs, as well as in total throw-weight, numbers of delivery vehicles, and megatonnage. The Vladivostok agreement is very important for the reason that it would not allow either the U.S. or Soviet Union to achieve superiority in all of these important measures of strategic offensive forces.

The Soviet strategic bomber program is progressing just about as anticipated last year. The BACKFIRE B bomber is clearly designed for air-to-air refueling. It is now generally agreed that with this refueling capability, staging through arctic bases and flying a high altitude subsonic profile all the way, the BACKFIRE B could cover virtually all targets in the U.S. and return to the Soviet Union. On one-way missions, recovering in non-hostile territory in the Western Hemisphere, the BACKFIRE B, flying subsonically, could operate from its home bases without any tanker support. The extent to which BACKFIREs will be assigned missions against the continental United States, however, remains an open question. We must await evidence from basing, operational and training patterns, or tanker development before we can confidently judge whether the Soviets intend the BACKFIRE for intercontinental missions and, if so, to what extent.

We have yet to identify a new tanker for the BACKFIRE, however. The tankers now compatible with the BACKFIRE are converted BISON bombers, and while it is possible that all 85 BISONS still in the bomber force might eventually be converted to tankers, a new tanker may be developed to increase intercontinental bomber capabilities. The best prospect for this tanker role appears to be the IL-76 CANDID jet transport and, indeed, there is some evidence that a tanker version of that aircraft may be under development.

If a small force of BACKFIRE B bombers, plus an appropriate number of tankers, is eventually deployed, we do not believe that the U.S. air defense problem would be substantially altered. However, if a

large force of BACKFIRE B bombers were to be deployed, then we would have to consider which increased CONUS bomber air defense programs we would wish to undertake.

The number of older bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation, particularly the intermediate range BADGERS, continues to decline, albeit at a relatively slow rate. Inasmuch as the BACKFIRE B is expected to initially enter the force at a moderate rate and be assigned first to the peripheral mission, we can assume that the older intercontinental long range bombers, the BISON and BEAR, will be continued in the force for some time to come.

With regard to strategic defensive forces, there is still no evidence of any additions to the 64 ABM launchers now deployed around Moscow, even though the ABM Treaty (with the 1974 Protocol) permits the deployment of 100 ABM launchers in that national capital area. This failure to deploy the full number of ABM launchers permitted under the Treaty, however, does not mean that the Soviet Union has lost interest in ABM research and development. Quite the contrary, the Soviet Union is continuing to pursue a very active R&D program at its principal ABM test base. Research and development on improved ABM systems is permitted under the Treaty.

Modernization of Soviet air defenses is continuing along the lines I described last year. The number of active SA-2 sites is declining, but additional SA-3 low altitude and SA-5 high altitude SAMs are being deployed.

Similarly, new and more capable aircraft are entering the interceptor forces, but at a slower rate than the older aircraft are being phased out. A significant number of FLAGON E interceptors were added to the force last year. This aircraft has a moderately good intercept capability at low altitude and up to about 65,000 feet. The FOXBAT force continues to grow, but there is still no evidence that the Soviet Union has developed an advanced AWACS or a "look-down, shoot-down" system for its air defense interceptors. Should such systems be developed and deployed, we would have to counter them with new penetration devices and techniques such as the cruise missile, bomber defense missiles, and improved ECM. Without a "look-down, shoot-down" capability, the Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft are not likely to offer a serious obstacle to our bomber force, although the fact that improvements are being made requires continued efforts to maintain and improve our bomber forces.

2. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In contrast to the Soviet strategic forces program, the PRC strategic forces program in the last year or two appears to be losing some of its momentum, at least in part as a result of technical difficulties. A MRBM, which became operational in 1966, and an IRBM, which became operational in 1971, are progressing as expected. Their limited range ICBM, however, presents something of an enigma; its pace of de-

velopment has been considerably slower than had been expected. While this missile could reach targets in European USSR, it cannot reach the United States, except for the western tip of Alaska. Hence, from our point of view it is also a regional missile.

The strategic missile program of most direct concern to the United States is the PRC full range ICBM. We believe that this ICBM is considerably larger in volume than either the Soviet SS-9 or the U.S. TITAN II and clearly could carry a multi-megaton warhead over a range of at least 7,000 nm, which, of course, would pose a direct threat to the United States. The PRC is expected to continue to develop this missile both as a satellite launcher and as an ICBM, with a number of these missiles possibly becoming ready for deployment in silos by mid-1980. We also believe that the PRC is determined to develop a submarine launched ballistic missile and a modern nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The PRC would require a minimum of four years to achieve even a token operational SLBM capability.

Production of the BADGER medium-range bomber apparently ceased or was suspended in 1973, with a total of about 60 aircraft. Similarly, production of the BEAGLE light bomber (except for a small number to maintain inventory) apparently ended in mid-1973, after a total of some 400–450 had been produced.

The PRC strategic air defense program has also displayed a loss of momentum. Production of the PRC version of the MIG-21 ended about three years ago. We must conclude, therefore, that this program was a failure. Production of the PRC version of the MIG-19 clear-weather interceptor is continuing, and its continued production probably is intended to compensate for the failure of the MIG-21 program until a new interceptor is available for production. The new all-weather, long-range interceptor, which we thought last year might soon be placed in production, is apparently still in development. Production of the PRC's SA-1 surface-to-air missile (the PRC version of the Soviet SA-2) has also declined from earlier levels.

It is, of course, very risky to draw any firm conclusions from these trends. The apparent loss of momentum may simply reflect our past inflated expectations, or it may reflect a period of transition to a new, reoriented defense program, or quite possibly a major reassessment of national priorities in favor of economic development. In any event, it is clear that some important PRC programs have encountered technical difficulties, and that other programs have been deferred or curtailed far short of what we would consider to be a reasonably sized force.

C. U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND PROGRAMS

Pending the completion of negotiations on the final details of the Vladivostok agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive forces, we have continued to plan our forces within the general bounds of that agreement, as well as within the more specific limitations of the earlier

agreements signed in Moscow in 1972 and 1974. We have assumed for purposes of intelligence estimating that the Soviet Union will also continue to plan its forces within the bounds of those agreements. A comparison of the projected U.S. and USSR strategic force levels through mid-1975 is shown on the following page.

1. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES AND PROGRAMS

I noted last year that well diversified strategic offensive forces are essential to our national security as a hedge against both foreseeable and unforeseeable risks and to enable us to make available to the President a reasonable range of strategic options. It is also worth noting that well planned force diversification greatly enhances deterrence because it severely complicates Soviet attack planning, thereby increasing the uncertainties and the risks confronting the initiator of an attack.

For example, the presence of both bombers and ICBMs in our forces virtually precludes the Soviet Union from destroying them both in a surprise attack. To pose a threat to our alert bombers the Soviet Union would have to station its ballistic missile submarines close to our shores. But that would place their submarines at risk to our antisubmarine warfare forces. Furthermore, to attack our alert bombers by surprise the Soviet Union would have to withhold the launch of its ICBMs until the SLBMs were launched. But this would mean that the first SLBM warheads would detonate over our bomber bases 15–20 minutes before the first ICBM warheads reached our MINUTEMAN silos. Whether our National Command Authorities would, under these circumstances, choose to launch some or all of our MINUTEMAN missiles before they were struck, no one, including the Soviet planners, can foretell in advance of the actual decision. Hence, that is a risk the Soviet decision makers would have to take in launching a nuclear attack against our land-based strategic forces.

Conversely, if the Soviet Union were to launch its ICBM forces first in order to achieve simultaneous arrival of the ICBMs and the SLBMs, our alert bombers would have ample time to clear their bases before the Soviet warheads arrived at their targets. Implicit in this statement, of course, is the assumption that our tactical warning systems can assuredly provide that time, and I will have more to say about this problem when I discuss the strategic defensive forces.

Finally, making the reasonable assumption that some fraction of each element of our mix of strategic systems would survive a Soviet first strike regardless of how it was carried out, each element would enhance the potential of the other in a retaliatory blow, a potential that would have to give the Soviets pause in their calculations. Missiles, for example, could help clear the way for bomber penetration, and bombers, in turn, could help to fill the gap of those important targets missed by missiles.

U.S. AND USSR STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

	Mid-1974		Mid-1975	
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
OFFENSIVE				
ICBM Launchers [1]	1,054	1,575	1,054	1,590
SLBM Launchers [2]	656	660	656	700
Intercontinental Bombers [3]	500	140	498	160
Force Loadings Weapons	7,650	2,500	8,500	2,800
DEFENSIVE				
Air Defense				
Surveillance Radars	67	4,000	67	4,000
Interceptors [4]	539	2,600	405	2,500
SAM Launchers	—	10,000	—	10,000
ABM Defense				
Launchers	—	64	—	64

[1] Excludes launchers at test sites.
[2] Excludes launchers on diesel-powered submarines.
[3] Excludes bombers configured as tankers and reconnaissance aircraft.
[4] These numbers represent Total Active Inventory (TAI).

It is this mutually supporting deterrent capability, in addition to the reasons I enumerated last year, that strongly commends to us the continued retention in our strategic offensive forces of both ICBMs and bombers as well as SLBMs. The cost of maintaining this diversified strategic capability is considerable. Consequently, we must emphasize the mutually supporting characteristics of the TRIAD, rather than just the independent capabilities of each of the components.

a. ICBMs

Given the continuing growth in Soviet strategic offensive capabilities, albeit within the bounds of the Vladivostok and earlier agreements, we believe that the U.S. must now move forward in an orderly and deliberate manner with the qualitative improvements initiated last year for the ICBM forces. This action is unavoidable if essential equivalence in strategic power between the U.S. and the USSR is to be preserved through the 1970s and beyond.

In the near term (through the early 1980s), the only way in which we can achieve a major improvement in our ICBM capabilities, particularly in expanding our options and keeping pace with growing Soviet hard-target kill capabilities, is through the modification of the MINUTEMAN III. For the long term (mid-1980s and beyond), we can provide an option to develop an entirely new ICBM, namely what has now been designated the MX.

The principal options to improve the MINUTEMAN III are the refinement of the existing guidance system and the new higher yield warhead, the MK 12A reentry vehicle. The terminally-guided maneuvering

reentry vehicle, which I associated last year with the MINUTEMAN III, will continue to be developed as a potential payload for the MX or the TRIDENT II. The time required for the development of this technology will place this reentry vehicle in the time frame of the MX and TRIDENT II, rather than the MINUTEMAN III.

As I pointed out last year, this improved MINUTEMAN III system would be heavily dependent upon accuracy for its hard-target kill capability. Consequently, even a small degradation in accuracy could greatly reduce its effectiveness in that role. The MINUTEMAN III therefore, is not a system that we would pursue if we were interested in developing a disarming first-strike capability. Inasmuch as we are interested in the improved MINUTEMAN III for its deterrent value, that is, to deter the Soviet Union from launching a first strike against some or all of our ICBM silos, this uncertainty about its accuracy should not negate its usefulness for our purposes. This is so because the Soviet planners would also be faced with uncertainties about both the size of the surviving force and the particular targets that the MINUTEMAN III, with its improved accuracy and increased yield, would be programmed to attack.

Further improvements in our strategic missile capabilities must await the development of the MX and the TRIDENT II. How we proceed with the development of the MX and the TRIDENT II will depend upon future developments in the Soviet strategic missile forces. We should not deprive ourselves at this particular time of a reasonably wide range of ICBM and SLBM development options. Accordingly, we plan to pursue, at a pace closely linked to future developments in the Soviet strategic missile forces, the ICBM and SLBM force improvements initiated last year.

MINUTEMAN

First, we propose to continue the production of the MINUTEMAN III at the rate of five missiles per month—the lowest feasible rate—through the first ten months of the FY 1976 procurement period. The MINUTEMAN III is the only U.S. ICBM still in production; the USSR currently has at least three or four. It would be imprudent, in my judgment, to close down that production line before we have a more definitive assessment of how many of each type of the new MIRVed ICBMs the Soviet Union intends to deploy under the Vladivostok agreement.

The $270 million required to procure another 50 MINUTEMAN III missiles and initial spares is included in the figures shown on the MINUTEMAN line of the Acquisition Costs table beginning on the following page. These 50 missiles would fulfill our requirements for follow-on flight testing and also preserve the option to deploy more MINUTEMAN IIIs, if that should be deemed necessary.

Second, we propose to complete the engineering development of the new higher yield warhead for the MINUTEMAN III, the MK 12A RV. The AEC test program for this weapon has been accelerated so that it

can be completed before the end of March, 1976, the proposed effective date of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[6] The new arming and fusing mechanism and the reentry vehicle as a whole will be flight tested on MINUTEMAN III missiles already procured for the operational test program, as well as on the boosters to be procured specifically for the flight testing of the guidance refinements.

ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS[1]

(Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1974 Actual Funding	FY 1975 Planned Funding	FY 1976 Prop'd Funding	Trans. Period Prop'd Funding[2]	FY 1977 Prop'd for Authorization
Strategic Offense					
Continued Procurement of MINUTEMAN III Missiles, MINUTEMAN Silo Up-Grading and Other Related Programs	720	728	780	105	485
Advanced ICBM Technology, including MX	4	37	41	15	70
Development of Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems and Technology (ABRES)	90	112	101	29	125
Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON Configuration, Continued Procurement of POSEIDON Missiles and Associated Effort	323	183	91	7	35
Development, Procurement and Military Construction — TRIDENT Submarines and Missiles (TRIDENT II not included in total)	1,433	2,030	2,142 (3)	622 (1)	3,438 (10)
SSBN Subsystem Technology	—	—	2	1	4
B-52D Modifications	38	95	43	—	—
B-52/HARPOON Modification	—	—	10	7	18
Continued Development of New Strategic Bomber, B-1	449	445	749	196	1,652
Acquisition of Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM)	133	2	3	2	35
Initial Development of Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft	—	2	5	1	50

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS [1] (Continued)

(Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1974 Actual Funding	FY 1975 Planned Funding	FY 1976 Prop'd Funding	Trans. Period Prop'd Funding [2]	FY 1977 Prop'd for Authorization
Strategic Offense—Continued					
Development of the Bomber Launched and Submarine Launched Version of the Strategic Cruise Missile	13	98	153	55	296
Strategic Defense					
Continued Development of the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Back-Scatter Radar	3	10	8	6	14
Continued Development of Site Defense	110	115	140	38	160
Development of Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology	62	92	105	30	111
Continued Improvements in the Defense Support Program	88	118	68	9	55
Development and Acquisition of the SLBM Phased Array Radar Warning System	—	38	50	2	17
Command and Control					
Development and Procurement of Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP)	50	78	43	192	26
Development and Procurement of AFSATCOM I and Development of AFSATCOM II	22	13	51	14	96
Development of SANGUINE ELF Communications System	12	8	18	4	24
Acquisition and Modification of the TACAMO Aircraft System	29	9	41	10	23
Civil Defense					
Continued Support of the Civil Defense Program	80	87	88	20	94

[1] Includes cost of RDT&E, procurement of the system and initial spares, and directly related military construction.
[2] July 1 to September 30, 1976.

As I pointed out last year, the new warhead, plus the more advanced, (i.e., miniaturized) arming and fusing mechanism, can be retrofitted into the existing MINUTEMAN III MK 12 RV without any changes in

its weight, balance, or other flight characteristics. Accordingly, flight testing of the MK 12A RV can be limited to checkout of the new arming and fusing components and verification that flight characteristics of the RV have not changed.

The MK 12A development contract has been placed and design work started. Flight testing is expected to be completed in the summer of 1977; hence, production could be started in FY 1977. A total of about $46 million has been included in the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets and another $31 million in authorization only is requested for FY 1977 to continue this development program. In addition, an authorization of $37 million in procurement funds is requested for FY 1977 to initiate production of the MK 12A RV.

The total development cost (DoD only) for the MK 12A is now estimated at about $107 million, compared with $125 million estimated last year. This reduction resulted from the elimination of the additional boosters which were to have been procured specifically for the MK 12A flight test program. No final decision has been made as to the number of MINUTEMAN III that ultimately will be equipped with the MK 12A RV. It is interesting to note, however, that the cost of producing sufficient MK 12A RVs for 550 MINUTEMAN III missiles is estimated at about $335 million. This does not include AEC costs for development and procurement of the MK 12A RVs.

Third, we propose to complete the development of the refinements in the existing MINUTEMAN guidance system and incorporate these refinements in all of the MINUTEMAN III missiles in FY 1978. Once the new guidance programs have been developed, incorporation of the refinements in the missiles simply involves the insertion of ground and flight software changes.

The total development cost of this program is now estimated at about $131 million, compared with the $100 million estimate presented here last year. The bulk of this cost, $108 million, is for the flight testing of the refined guidance system, including the cost of 10 boosters to be specially procured for this purpose. In order to maximize the return on these 10 boosters, some flight test missiles will carry two guidance systems. And, as noted earlier, these boosters will also be used to flight test the MK 12A RV.

The contracts for this project have been placed and the first flight test is expected to take place in the summer of 1976. Some $32 million was allocated to this program in FY 1975. Another $53 million is included in the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, and the remaining $46 million is requested for authorization in FY 1977.

Fourth, we plan to continue work on the terminally-guided MaRV, but on a new, extended schedule, as indicated earlier. Since this is essentially a technology development project, it will be continued in the Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) program which I will discuss later.

Fifth, we plan to complete the flight testing of two MINUTEMAN III missiles, each with several smaller RVs. This payload, if successfully demonstrated, would give us the option to expand the target coverage of the MINUTEMAN force without any increase in the number of missiles deployed. The additional capacity would be useful as a hedge against large losses in the MINUTEMAN force, as a means of increasing our coverage of relatively soft point targets of value that are not collocated with population, for suppression of expanded Soviet defenses and as a hedge against unexpected failures in the bomber or SLBM forces. Even if only 50 MINUTEMAN so equipped were to survive an enemy first strike, they could deploy a large number of RVs for attacks on such targets. The $18 million provided in FY 1974 and FY 1975 plus the $2 million requested in FY 1976 will be enough to complete this program. The first flight test is scheduled in May, and the second in August, 1975. No significant problems have been encountered in this project thus far, and the tests are expected to be completed successfully.

The amounts shown in the Acquisition Costs table for the MINUTEMAN program in FY 1976, the transition period, and in FY 1977, also include funds for the continuation of the Silo Upgrade effort and for the installation of the Command Data Buffer System. This system permits the MINUTEMAN III missiles to be retargeted remotely from the Launch Control Centers and reduces the time for retargeting a single missile from 16 to 24 hours to about 36 minutes.

All MINUTEMAN silos are included in the upgrading program, which is expected to be completed by the end of FY 1979. Only the MINUTEMAN III missiles, however, will be provided the Command Data Buffer System since their MIRVs can make the most effective use of the retargeting feature. Installation of the new system is being accomplished simultaneously with the upgrading of the silos. Deployment of the previously planned 550 MINUTEMAN III missiles will be completed on schedule by the end of FY 1975. But silo upgrading and installation of the Command Data Buffer System for the 550 MINUTEMAN IIIs will not be completed until sometime later.

Advanced ICBM Technology and the MX

Last year we requested $37 million to continue the development of new technology leading to the development of an entirely new ICBM. We did so in order to ensure the availability of a realistic option for the modernization of our ICBM forces in the 1980s and beyond. I noted at the time that this effort would be focused primarily on three problem areas—the selection of the preferred basing mode, the unique guidance requirements for mobile missiles (both air-launched and ground-launched), and the technology required for more efficient rocket motors.

These three problem areas reflect our principal concerns with regard to the kind of an ICBM we ought to have available for deployment in the period beyond the early or mid-1980s. By that time, MINUTEMAN silos may become increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet ICBM forces; hence our interest in new basing modes. Air-mobile ICBMs, utilizing unaided, all inertial guidance, are inherently less accurate than fixed-based ICBMs, hence our interest in more capable guidance systems which would be needed to maintain the desired degree of accuracy.

Furthermore, the MINUTEMAN III, as compared with the new family of Soviet ICBMs, has a relatively small throw-weight. If the Soviet Union decides to replace all of its existing ICBMs with this new family of ICBMs, it could acquire an ICBM throw-weight advantage of 5 or 6 to 1—i.e., 10 to 12 million pounds for the Soviet Union versus 2 million pounds for the U.S. Such a great disparity in throw-weight, in my judgment, would be very destabilizing. It would give the USSR a distinct advantage in one of the basic parameters that shape the future effectiveness of the strategic offensive forces. Hence our interest in new rocket motor technology, which would give us a greater amount of throw-weight per pound of propellant.

By far the most difficult problem which must be resolved in this new ICBM program is the selection of the basing mode. Fixed silos may become vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce attack, but they have some very important advantages, namely, accuracy, good two-way communications up and down the chain of command, general responsiveness to control by the National Command Authorities, and low operating costs. These are very important considerations in context with our efforts to expand our range of response options (i.e., increase our targeting flexibility), and we want to preserve them to the greatest extent feasible should we find it necessary to shift to a new basing mode in the future.

A large part of the Advanced ICBM Technology Program investigations concern alternate basing modes. We have a great deal of experience in the operation of fixed-based ICBM systems but virtually no operational experience with air- and land-mobile systems and thus the reason for their emphasis.

There are several types of air- and land-mobile options under consideration. One of the leading land-based candidates is the so-called shelter system. This sytem depends for its survivability on deception, that is, the missile mounted on a transporter-launcher would move from one relatively hard shelter to another within a complex. The attacker would have to target all of the shelters, since he would not know in which shelter the missile was deployed. Thus, the cost to us per emergency shelter and the cost to him per reliable RV needed to destroy that shelter would be the critical factors driving the cost-exchange ratio of the shelter system. While this system would retain the accuracy of a silo-based system, its costs and operating problems are immediately apparent.

The air-mobile system would be the most expensive to acquire and to operate. It would require the acquisition of a fleet of suitable aircraft which could be modified wide-bodied jets or new low cost aircraft. To ensure pre-launch survivability, aircraft with the missile aboard preferably would be kept on airborne alert, and this we know is a very expensive operation. Alternatively, the aircraft with the missile aboard could be kept on ground alert, but then it would have the same pre-launch vulnerabilities as the bomber/tanker force.

Finally, as previously mentioned, the air-mobile system with unaided navigation is inherently less accurate than any of the land systems since without navigation aids it is difficult to precisely determine aircraft velocity and heading. An in-flight position fixing system for the aircraft or a terminal homing system for the missile would help to alleviate this problem. We have the potential solution to the position fixing problem in a new high precision satellite navigation system now under development, called the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. However, both NAVSTAR and the terminal homing system are still in early stages of development.

Given the many problems that still have to be resolved, we now propose advanced development of an ICBM that could be deployed interchangeably in the existing MINUTEMAN silos, in a land-based shelter or random deployment mode, or in an air-mobile mode. The new MX ICBM would have new, more efficient rocket motors and a new, more accurate guidance system. The MX could be designed to be cold-launched from a cannister in a silo or on a transporter-launcher. In the air-mobile system, the missile could be pulled out of the cannister by parachute and fired when vertical stability had been achieved.

The MX could be deployed in the existing MINUTEMAN silos, since that is the least expensive mode, until such time as the threat to those silos has been definitely ascertained. At that point, we could commence deployment of the missile in one of the mobile modes.

Meanwhile, we propose to continue advanced development of the key components of the mobile systems. A series of air drops has already been conducted from the C-5A, including three "Bathtub" drops (concrete slabs of increasing size and weight), three "mass simulation" drops (to investigate missile shape stability), one inert but instrumented MINUTEMAN I, one fueled but unfired MINUTEMAN I (the "dress rehearsal" test), and one "short burn" MINUTEMAN I (the final test of the series). These tests have proved the feasibility of air-dropping an ICBM, but many other problems remain to be solved before the technical feasibility of the air-mobile system as a whole can be demonstrated. The MINUTEMAN I, moreover, weighs about 75,000 pounds; the MX will weigh about 150,000 pounds.

Some work has also been done on the land-mobile systems. The problem here is not so much the technical feasibility of these systems as it is their operational feasibility. And the economic feasibility of all three mobile systems needs a great deal of additional study.

Accordingly, we are requesting for the Advanced ICBM technology program (i.e., MX and related projects) a total of $41 million in FY 1976, $15 million in the three month transition period, and $70 million for authorization only in FY 1977. Most of these funds would be devoted to guidance, control and propulsion. The cost to completion of the MX development is estimated at about $2.5 billion.

ABRES

Last year I noted that while the Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems program (ABRES) is managed by the Air Force, the work being done also supports Navy and Army projects. Consequently, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering has been charged with the general direction of the program. He is responsible for defining the scope and priorities of the program and for providing the necessary guidance to the Air Force in order to ensure that the needs of the several Services are satisfied with a minimum amount of duplication.

The ABRES program has been the source of much of the advanced reentry technology incorporated in our strategic missile programs. Although the Soviet Union has made great advances in this area of technology in recent years, we still enjoy a distinct lead. But given the Soviet Union's great advantage in strategic missile throw-weight, we must ensure that we maintain our lead in this critical area of reentry technology.

We are requesting for this program about $101 million in FY 1976, $29 million in the three month transition period, and $125 million for authorization only in FY 1977. About one quarter of these funds will be devoted to the pre-prototype development of maneuvering reentry vehicles, including the terminally-guided MaRV I discussed earlier. Also included in this program is work on a large advanced ballistic reentry vehicle; penetration aids; optical, radar and electronic countermeasure technology; and supporting technology such as nosetips, heatshields and arming and fusing components.

b. SLBMs

The portion of the SLBM force at sea is still the least vulnerable element of our strategic TRIAD; and as far as we can see ahead, it is likely to remain so. It behooves us, nonetheless, to take whatever measures may be necessary to ensure the continued survivability and operational effectiveness of that force.

The existing fleet of POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines eventually will have to be replaced, if for no other reason, because of aging. We believe that these submarines can be operated safely and effectively through their 20th year of service, and possibly longer. Since the last of the existing SSBNs went into service in 1967, we should plan on replacing the entire fleet by the late 1980s or the early 1990s.

In order to ensure the future survivability of the SLBM force, both a quieter submarine and a longer range missile are deemed necessary. The TRIDENT submarine is designed to meet the first requirement and the TRIDENT I missile the second, at least in the near term, i.e., through the early 1980s. A still longer range missile, the TRIDENT II, which would more fully utilize the volume of the TRIDENT submarine missile tubes, may be needed in the long term, i.e., beyond the mid-1980s. This longer range missile would permit us to increase our SLBM throw-weight.

Accordingly, we propose to complete the POSEIDON conversion program, continue the TRIDENT submarine construction program, complete the development and commence production of the TRIDENT I missile for the TRIDENT submarines, and pursue our studies of the TRIDENT II missile. Beyond these programs, we also propose to backfit the TRIDENT I missile into ten of our 31 POSEIDON SSBNs.

The last three of the 31 POSEIDON conversions and the last one of the four submarine tender conversions were funded in FY 1975, except for outfitting and post-delivery costs. Because of the impact of inflation, however, another $85 million will be required to complete the funding of the last three submarine conversions. We plan to finance $33 million of that amount through reprogramming; the balance of $52 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget. The $98 million requested for POSEIDON in the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets will provide for completion of the POSEIDON conversions, outfitting and post-delivery costs, the support of POSEIDON missiles, and the POSEIDON Modification Program. The total authorization requested in FY 1977 is $35 million which will provide for post-delivery costs, support of POSEIDON missiles, and the POSEIDON missile modification program.

Of the 31 POSEIDON conversions, 23 have been completed and 22 are currently deployed, and six are undergoing conversion. The 30th submarine will start conversion in April, 1975, and the last in FY 1976.

The POSEIDON Modification Program is an outgrowth of the deficiencies encountered in the POSEIDON Operational Test (OT) program in 1973. The corrections discussed here last year have been made. By December, 1974, 8 operational flight tests, with the fixes installed in whole or in part, were completed.

The latest series of POSEIDON operational tests supports the judgment that the deficiencies identified last year were minor in nature and could be successfully corrected. The tests will continue, using improved missiles selected at random from POSEIDON submarines returning from patrol, to determine the best estimate of true missile reliability possible.

As indicated last year, improved missiles will be installed in the 21st through the 31st converted submarines; the first 20 submarines, which had already been deployed when this problem arose, will be retrofitted with the improved missiles over a period of about 4 years. The entire modification program is expected to be completed by 1978.

TRIDENT (Excluding TRIDENT II Missile)

To ease the financial strain on the Defense Budget and to relax the pressure on the shipbuilder, we have again slowed the TRIDENT submarine construction schedule from a two-a-year to an alternating 1–2–1–2 a year rate. The lead submarine was funded in FY 1974 and two follow-on submarines in FY 1975. Accordingly, only one submarine is included in the FY 1976 Budget and two submarines are requested for authorization in FY 1977.

We are still planning for an FY 1979 IOC for the TRIDENT submarine and TRIDENT I missile. Also, we still plan to retrofit the TRIDENT I missile in ten of the POSEIDON submarines.

Of the $2,142 million requested in FY 1976, about $817 million is for RDT&E ($84 million for the submarine and $733 million for the missile), $1,130 million is for procurement ($290 million additional to cover the cost increase projected for the three ships funded in FY 1975 and prior years as a result of abnormal inflation, $560 million to complete the funding of the fourth ship, $43 million for advance procurement of long lead time components for the fifth, sixth, and seventh ships, and $237 million for TRIDENT I missile production start-up costs), and about $195 million is for military construction and construction planning (mostly for the TRIDENT support facility).

The $622 million in the Transition Budget would provide $184 million for RDT&E ($12 million for ships and $172 million for missiles), $437 million for procurement ($253 million for ship advanced procurement, $1 million for submarine outfitting, and $183 million for missile production start-up costs) and $1 million for military construction planning. The $3,438 million for the FY 1977 authorization request includes $547 million for RDT&E, $2,708 million for procurement ($1,221 million to complete funding the fifth and sixth ships, $166 million for advance procurement of long lead time components for the seventh through tenth ships, $6 million for submarine outfitting, and $1,315 million for 98 missiles) and $183 million for military construction and construction planning including $8 million for POSEIDON SSBN backfit.

In compliance with the requirement in the FY 1975 Military Construction Authorization Act that funds be authorized for community impact assistance in conjunction with TRIDENT-related community growth, we are including, in addition to the funds discussed above, $7 million in the FY 1976 Budget and $11 million in the FY 1977 authorization request for this purpose.

The TRIDENT system, it should be borne in mind, represents a great advance over the POLARIS/POSEIDON system. The submarine will have a submerged displacement of about 18,700 tons, compared with 8,250 tons for the POSEIDON submarine. It will carry 24 missiles, compared with 16 for the POLARIS/POSEIDON, and each TRIDENT missile tube will have a greater volume than that of the POLARIS/POSEIDON. Moreover, it will be considerably quieter than POLARIS/

POSEIDON. It will also have a much more efficient command and control system, and a more capable sonar system.

The TRIDENT I missile will have a range of 4,000 nm, compared with the POSEIDON which has a range of about 2,500 nm. Moreover, the TRIDENT I at 4,000 nm is planned to be as accurate as the POSEIDON at 2,500 nm.

The TRIDENT program thus far is moving along close to its planned schedule. The lead ship contract was awarded in July 1974, and the contractor's physical plant rearrangements and the production of detailed design drawings are now well underway. Indeed, the formation of hull sections has already been started. The shipbuilder's labor force and facilities are being greatly expanded to accommodate the TRIDENT program on top of the already on-going shipbuilding programs, notably the 688 class SSNs. Development of new subsystems are receiving special attention. These are proceeding on schedule and special facilities have been established to provide the step-by-step testing of these subsystems.

The development contract for the TRIDENT I missile also has been awarded and the first flight test is expected in 1976. Four supplemental flight tests of the TRIDENT I MK 4 RV using ATLAS/MINUTEMAN boosters have already been successfully completed. Flight test on a TRIDENT I missile of the MK 500 MaRV Evader will be carried through advanced development only.

In view of our experience with the POSEIDON operational tests, we plan to conduct a larger proportion of such operational tests early in the TRIDENT program. For these tests to be valid, however, missiles which actually have been operationally deployed must be used. Thus the OT flight tests cannot be conducted prior to operational deployment. Assuming that the desired submarine delivery dates are met, we would have the first TRIDENT I missiles deployed by the end of FY 1979.

TRIDENT II Missile

To provide an option to deploy a higher throw-weight, more accurate SLBM in the late 1980s, if such a system should be needed at that time, we propose to continue our studies of the TRIDENT II. The new missile would be designed to utilize more fully the available volume of the TRIDENT submarine launch tubes.

We plan to proceed with the TRIDENT II effort at a very moderate pace. Only about $3 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget for this purpose, plus $1 million more in the Transition Budget. An authorization of about $10 million is requested for FY 1977.

SSBN Subsystem Technology

As indicated earlier, we must continue our search for technology that will provide less expensive alternatives for use in future SLBM systems. Accordingly, we have established a new program element,

"SSBN Subsystem Technology", to focus attention on this essential effort. About $2 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget and $1 million in the Transition Budget for this purpose. In addition, we are requesting an authorization of about $4 million in FY 1977.

c. BOMBERS

As I indicated at the beginning of this discussion of strategic offensive forces and programs, we believe the retention of bombers in our forces for the foreseeable future is essential to a well balanced U.S. strategic posture. The current bomber force, particularly the B-52Gs and Hs, should be able to fulfill this need into the 1980s. But if we are to maintain an effective bomber force beyond that time, a new aircraft will have to be procured. While we can continue to modify and improve the B-52Gs and Hs for some time to come, and even equip them with stand-off cruise missiles, these aircraft may well become less effective during the next decade.

The principal potential threat to the pre-launch survivability of our current bomber force is the rapidly growing fleet of Soviet SSBNs which, if equipped with depressed trajectory missiles and operated close to our shores, could catch many of our alert B-52s before they could escape from the vicinity of their bases. While we still have no evidence of a Soviet depressed trajectory SLBM development program, such a system is clearly within their technical competence. We have already taken some steps to hedge against that potential threat, e.g., the satellite basing and the quick engine start modification programs. But beyond these measures we need a bomber which has both increased hardening to nuclear effects, and a significantly faster airfield escape time than the B-52.

With regard to penetration at very low altitude, the currently preferred U.S. mode, the principal potential threat to our current bomber force is the deployment of a Soviet AWACS/fighter air defense system with a good look-down, shoot-down capability. We have no evidence as yet that the Soviet Union has such a system under development but as we ourselves have already demonstrated, such a system is technologically feasible. Effective penetration at low altitude against an AWACS/fighter air defense system would require a faster bomber with a smaller radar cross section which is much more difficult to "see" against the ground clutter, and which is more difficult to intercept in a tail chase.

A B-52 force armed with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) could attack targets within the Soviet Union without the B-52 penetrating the air defenses. But a bomber force limited to stand-off operations would have far less capability and flexibility than a force which includes penetrating aircraft. A pure stand-off bomber force could not provide reconnaissance or attack targets of opportunity as could a penetrating bomber force.

For these reasons, a bomber force which includes penetrating air-

craft is much to be preferred over a pure stand-off bomber force, providing that the cost of the former is reasonably commensurate with the benefits to be gained. The difference in costs, we feel, would be modest in comparison to the difference in gain. Accordingly, we believe the B–1 development and test program should be continued to provide us the option to modernize our bomber force with that aircraft in the 1980s.

A bomber force is not only expensive to acquire and keep modern, it is also expensive to operate. Accordingly, we have carefully reexamined our operational plans and procedures to determine where savings can be made with minimum additional risk. As a result of this reexamination, we are now making two major changes in the operation of the bomber force.

The first change involves a reduction in the proportion of the force to be maintained on day-to-day ground alert. When this pre-launch survival technique was first introduced in the late 1950s, the ground alert objective was 33% of the force, i.e., 33% of the UE aircraft. In the early 1960s, this objective was raised to 50%, but in more recent years it was reduced to 40%.

Inasmuch as we consider a Soviet surprise attack "out of the blue" to be quite unlikely under the current circumstances, we believe that a further modest reduction in the proportion of the force to be maintained on day-to-day ground alert would be acceptable. A nuclear attack on the United States, even one which is limited to our strategic offensive forces, would most likely be preceded by a series of crises, and certainly by a sharp deterioration in our relations with the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, we would have the time to place virtually the entire force on ground alert.

Moreover, during the last few years we have greatly increased the number of strategic missile warheads on line; by June 1975 we will have more than 500 MINUTEMAN III missiles and more than 350 POSEIDON missiles deployed. With the large number of RVs these strategic missiles provide, we believe we can prudently take the additional risk entailed in the reduction of the bomber forces on day-to-day ground alert.

We calculate that a ratio of 1.29 crews per UE bomber and 1.27 per UE tanker would provide an adequate number of crews to generate the entire force in a relatively short time and maintain it on a fully generated ground alert for an extended period. This same number of crews would permit us to maintain about 30% of the bomber/tanker force on day-to-day ground alert, a reduction of about 10 percentage points.

The second major action involves the transfer of 128 UE KC–135 tankers from the active force to the Air Reserve Components. These 128 aircraft will be formed into 16 squadrons of eight UE aircraft per squadron. Each Reserve Component squadron will maintain at least one of its eight aircraft on day-to-day alert in support of active force alert bombers. Also, the Reserve Component units will be afforded the

same number of flying hours per aircraft as the active forces. Since reservists can devote only part-time to their military activities, these Reserve Component squadrons will be provided with a higher crew ratio than the active forces—1.5 vs 1.27.

This transfer to the Reserve Components, and the phaseout of seven F-101 interceptor squadrons and nine KC-97 tanker squadrons for which we no longer have an urgent need, will result in overall cost savings while at the same time helping us to meet the Congressional mandate to maintain 91 flying units in the Air National Guard.

The reduction in the bomber crew ratio from 1.64 to 1.29 will permit us to reduce the number of bomber crews from 622 to 472. The reduction in the active force tanker crew ratio from 1.5 to 1.27, together with the transfer of KC-135s to the Reserve Components, will permit us to reduce the number of KC-135 crews in the active force from 925 to 585. The first four squadrons of KC-135s will be formed in Reserve Components in FY 1976 and the remaining 12 squadrons by FY 1979. These two actions, when fully implemented, will produce a savings of about $272 million per year in operating costs.

B-52D Modifications

Included in the FY 1976 Budget is about $43 million to complete the installation of structural modification on 80 B-52D aircraft to extend their safe service life into the 1980s. A total of 79 B-52Ds are being structure-tested prior to modification and retention. Including the cost of the test program, the total cost for the modification of 80 aircraft is now estimated at about $237 million. The program is expected to be completed by the fall of 1976.

B-52/HARPOON Modification

In keeping with our major effort to ensure a greater degree of mutual support among the Services, the Air Force will undertake prototype development of a B-52/HARPOON system, using two modified B-52Ds. These HARPOON-equipped B-52s would supplement the Navy's capability to search out and destroy maritime targets. The project will require about $10 million in FY 1976, $7 million in the three month transition period, plus an authorization of $18 million in FY 1977. Most of these funds will be devoted to the development and flight testing of the two HARPOON-equipped B-52D aircraft, including engineering studies, prototype drawings, specifications, instrumentation and component testing. In addition, we are requesting an authorization of $41 million in FY 1977 to initiate procurement of 90 HARPOON missiles for use by B-52s.

B-1 Bomber

Given the need to strengthen and to modernize the bomber force

sometime in the 1980s, I see no better alternative to the continued development of the B-1 bomber, notwithstanding its high unit cost. We have again examined the entire bomber modernization problem and the results of that study have been provided to the Congress. Of the six "equal cost" alternative forces examined against the estimated threat in the late 1980s, those including the B-1 appear to be the most cost-effective. Because of its greater speed and greater ability to withstand the effects of nuclear detonations, it will have a distinctly shorter air-field escape time than the B-52; and because of its smaller radar cross-section and its ability to fly at very low altitudes at high subsonic speed, it should have a much better capability to penetrate improved Soviet air defenses. Moreover, because of its wider range of air speed options and larger number of internal weapon spaces, the B-1 will provide considerably greater employment flexibility than the B-52, thereby enhancing our ability to execute a wide range of attack options in response to potential enemy actions. In short, the B-1 provides us with a weapon system which is least sensitive to potential increases in the threat.

Before we commit this aircraft to production, however, we want to be sure that it will be able to perform satisfactorily the mission for which it is designed, and that its cost will be commensurate with its expected capability. These assurances, with regard to both performance and cost, can be obtained only by extensive flight testing. Accordingly, we are allowing a period of about two years for flight testing before a production decision is scheduled to be made. By that time we should have a total of 250 flying hours on Air Vehicle (AV) No. 1, which began flight tests late last year, 30 hours on AV No. 2, and 85 hours on AV No. 3.

AV No. 1 will be used primarily to demonstrate the flight characteristics of the aircraft, including take-off and landing, low-level and high-level penetration, aerial refueling, and range/payload. AV No. 2 will be used initially to demonstrate structural integrity in static tests (i.e., proof loading), and then be assigned to the flight test program. AV No. 3 will be used primarily for flight testing the offensive avionics.

We have already informed the Congress that the crew escape module is being eliminated from the B-1 program. Instead, the aircraft will be equipped with ejection seats. The crew escape module has presented the most troublesome engineering problem in the entire program. The elimination of this feature will reduce the airframe weight by a few thousand pounds, but it will entail some additional risk to the flight crew. Considering the difficulties, delays and additional costs involved in trying to perfect this module, the Air Force has decided to take that added risk. It should be noted, however, that AVs 1, 2, and 3, which are already equipped with this crew escape module, will be flight tested as currently configured.

In order to place ourselves in a position to initiate production in late CY 1976, if such a decision is appropriate, certain actions must be taken beforehand. These actions include the commencement of construction of AV No. 4, the pre-production prototype, and the procurement of advanced materials for the six production aircraft tentatively planned for FY 1977. AV No. 4 would reflect all of the lessons learned from the fabrication and initial flight tests of the first three aircraft, as well as the elimination of the crew module. That vehicle would help us to maintain continuity between RDT&E and production should we decide to produce and deploy the aircraft.

The approximately $749 million requested for the B-1 in FY 1976 includes $672 million for RDT&E (of which about $70 million will continue the 4th aircraft) and $77 million for advanced materials. The comparable figures for the three month transition period are $165 million for RDT&E (including $22 million for the 4th aircraft) and $31 million for advanced materials. In addition, we are requesting an authorization of $1,652 million for FY 1977, including about $433 million for RDT&E and $1,219 million for the procurement of the first six production aircraft. While none of the FY 1977 procurement funds would need to be committed prior to the production decison, we would need some advance material funds in FY 1976 and the transition period if the results of the flight test program warrant a limited commitment of funds to facilitate the initiation of production in FY 1977. Without these funds, the cost of a production program would increase due to the necessity of reconstituting the work force and inflation.

SRAM

I noted last year that the acquisition of the SRAM would be essentially completed with FY 1974 funds. The amounts requested for SRAM in the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, a total of about $5 million, is for the development of a new motor for that missile. The missile itself was designed for a ten year life, but the motor was designed for only a five year life. While it is still not clear how long these solid fuel motors will actually retain their effectiveness, the first SRAMs entered the force in FY 1972, and we should be prepared to begin the replacement of the existing motors by as early as FY 1977. However, the chemical process involved in the manufacture of the solid propellant is now unacceptable from a pollution control point of view; hence, the motor must be redesigned to accommodate a new propellant and liner, and then thoroughly tested.

Of the approximately $35 million requested for authorization in FY 1977, $15 million is included for completing development of the new motor and about $20 million for tooling and startup costs for production of missiles for the B-1. As in the case of the FY 1977 procurement

funds for the B–1 aircraft, the use of these SRAM funds would be contingent on the decision to produce the B–1.

Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft

We are continuing to study the requirement for additional refueling support of our strategic and general purpose forces. Alternative approaches which are being examined include commercial wide body candidates as well as modification of existing refueling aircraft. Preliminary study results indicate that additional tankers to support general purpose forces, including airlift aircraft, may be required. Accordingly, we are requesting $5 million in FY 1976 and $1 million in the transition period to initiate development if the final study results warrant such action. In addition, we are requesting an authorization of $50 million in FY 1977 to continue the proposed development.

Cruise Missiles

Last year the Congress was informed of the DoD's decision to proceed with a joint Air Force-Navy Cruise missile technology program. The Air Force was to concentrate on the development of a small turbofan engine suitable for both an air-launched and sea-launched cruise missile, and the Navy was to pursue the development of guidance technology which was also to be common to both missile systems. The Air Force was to commence engineering development of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in FY 1975, making maximum use of the previously terminated SCAD engineering program for air vehicle design and engine development, while the Navy was to continue with advanced development of a Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) in both a strategic and tactical variant.

The Congress expressed concern about these cruise missile programs, and we share that concern. As a result, we have completely reappraised the programs, examining in detail both the need and the technical considerations. The major conclusions which evolved from this reappraisal are as follows:

—An ALCM would enhance the capability of the pure penetrating bomber in advanced threat environments; however, the extent of the need for ALCM depends on how the threat evolves.

—A SLCM would provide a desirable augmentation of our strategic capabilities and a unique potential for unambiguous, controlled, single-weapon response from relatively invulnerable submarines as well as from other surface platforms.

—Both ALCM and SLCM, because they are designed for use on existing carrier vehicles, would have a relatively low incremental cost, but they would impose on the Soviet Union large additional expenditures for air defenses to counter them.

—A tactical cruise missile variant of the strategic version could provide the Navy with a highly effective over-the-horizon antiship capability.
—There is a potential for improving management and the allocation of scarce RDT&E resources by restructuring the ALCM and SLCM programs.
—Cruise missile technology, though well in hand, has not yet been integrated into a functional whole which could demonstrate proof of concept.

Of these conclusions, the last is the most crucial. While the separate pieces of technology required for the development of a cruise missile are well in hand, the problem of integrating them into a useful cost-effective system has not been solved. Consequently, it would be premature to consolidate the cruise missile efforts into a single, integrated engineering development program at this time. It is in the engineering development phase that expenditures begin to reach high levels. By keeping the two systems in the advanced development stage where expenditure levels are relatively low, we can afford to keep all viable options open.

Accordingly, we propose to keep the ALCM in advanced development until the cruise missile concept has been satisfactorily demonstrated. We also propose to continue the SLCM program in advanced development but on a revised schedule that would permit important milestones to be reached concurrently with ALCM. Both programs would be scheduled for first flight in early 1976 and for an engineering development decision (DSARC II) in early 1977. Both programs would continue to emphasize commonality of major components.

This proposed program would enable us to proceed toward our IOC with a more deliberate pace in the earlier years. We are requesting for the development of the ALCM $51 million in FY 1976, $13 million in the transition period, and an authorization of $104 million in FY 1977. For the SLCM development, the amounts are $102 million in FY 1976, $42 million in the transition period, and $192 million in FY 1977. SLCM funding is higher because of the Navy's competitive contractor approach and because both a strategic and a tactical variant of the missile are being developed.

2. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES AND PROGRAMS

The strategic defensive forces include the air defense and ballistic missile defense forces, the bomber and strategic missile surveillance and warning systems, and the space surveillance system. These components of the strategic defensive forces are not only interrelated with one another but also with the strategic offensive forces.

As I noted last year, without effective ABM defenses, air defenses are of limited value against potential aggressors armed primarily with strategic missiles. That is to say, if we cannot defend ourselves against

strategic missiles, there is little to gain from trying to defend ourselves against strategic bombers. With reduced emphasis on active defenses, however, we become more dependent on warning for the survival and, hence, the deterrent effectiveness of our strategic offensive forces, particularly in the case of bombers, which are very vulnerable when on the ground. Consequently, as we proposed at that time, a basic readjustment in our air defense program and some major improvements in our tactical warning systems should be made.

a. AIR DEFENSE

With regard to air defense, the reasons that led us to propose a major realignment of our forces last year are even more compelling this year. The level of ABM deployment has been further limited by agreement between the U.S. and the USSR. Thus, the utility of air defense in a major attack on the United States is further restricted. More importantly, the high rate of inflation experienced during the past year has compelled us to excise from the Defense Program forces and activities that we no longer need or can no longer afford in relation to more urgent requirements.

Both of these developments reinforce the need to move forward promptly with the realignment of our air defense forces in support of their current primary mission, namely, to ensure the sovereignty of our air space in peacetime. This mission requires three related capabilities—surveillance to detect and warn of intruders, forces to deter intrusion, and command and control to coordinate the two.

The major impact of this realignment is on the second of these capabilities, the interceptor and surface-to-air missile forces. Given the very tight constraints on the defense budget, I have no choice but to propose again the phaseout of the Air National Guard F-101 units which, in my judgment, are no longer worth their cost to operate and maintain. As noted earlier, the 91 flying units mandated by the Congress would be retained, if that mandate is continued, but the composition of the force would be changed. The seven F-101 units (including one Combat Crew Training Squadron) would be replaced by other types of aircraft, notably the KC-135.

Thus, by the end of FY 1977 the dedicated interceptor force would consist of F-106 squadrons in both the Active Force and in the ANG. These F-106 squadrons, operating at peacetime alert rates, could support various alert locations around the periphery of the 48 contiguous states. Additional alert locations, mostly in the South, could be provided by CONUS-based general purpose forces to enhance coverage along that periphery. These additional sites would be located on Air Force tactical bases and manned by F-4s (two aircraft each) drawn from the Air Force tactical units on the bases. The tactical aircraft, while on air defense alert, would operate under the control of the North American Air Defense Command, and the necessary communication

links would be provided for that purpose. General support of the detachments would continue to be provided by the parent organizations.

We believe this application of the principle of mutual support and force interdependence is completely feasible and, indeed, desirable. The F-4 is currently our primary theater air defense aircraft and its tactical air-to-air capabilities have been well demonstrated not only in Vietnam but also in the Middle East. Moreover, service with our dedicated air defense forces in peacetime would provide very useful training for the F-4 crews involved. The main disadvantage is that a major war abroad, particularly in Europe, would require a prompt decision on the allocation of the available air defense resources between our needs at home and our needs abroad. But, this is the kind of military risk we must be prepared to take in a Defense Budget as tightly constrained as that proposed for FY 1976.

Although the air defense forces are being sized to perform their primary mission—surveillance and control of U.S. air space in peacetime—a force adequate for that mission would have an inherent capability in times of crisis to inflict attrition on penetrating bombers or reconnaissance aircraft, thus precluding them from having a "free ride" over the United States. In a crisis we would expect at least some strategic warning, which would give us time to increase the readiness of our air defense forces and augment them with appropriate general purpose forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services have prepared detailed plans for this contingency.

Portions of the strategic air defense force could also perform air defense missions on a worldwide basis should contingencies requiring air defense arise. It should be noted in this connection that many of the AWACS aircraft, which we now propose to acquire for the tactical air mission, normally would be stationed in the U.S. Hence, AWACS would be available to train with the Continental Air Defense forces in peacetime and to take over the mobile command and control function in wartime. The older EC-121 airborne radars will be phased out by end FY 1977 as previously planned, consistent with the planned introduction of AWACS.

Last year we had planned to phase out in FY 1975 all of the remaining Continental Air Defense NIKE-HERCULES (both active and reserve) and their Fire Coordination Centers. Pressure on both personnel and funds, however, caused the Army to phase out these units in FY 1974.

We also planned last year to phase out over a period of years all of the existing CONUS Air Force regional command and control centers—the Regional Control, BUIC Control and Manual Control Centers—and replace them with 13 USAF/FAA Joint Control Centers (JCCs). I noted at the time that a new command and control plan tailored specifically to the revised air defense structure and missions was under development by the Air Force, and that the JCC plan could change.

This plan has now been completed. The principal change concerns the

joint use of the 13 FAA Control Centers. Further study has convinced us that the command and control of the interceptor forces from 13 separate JCCs would be inefficient in peacetime and unworkable under actual combat conditions. Accordingly, we now propose to establish four Regional Operations Control Centers (ROCCs), one in each of the four regions into which the forty-eight contiguous states would be divided. Each ROCC would be able to handle the input from as many as 15 surveillance radars and would be able to control all of the interceptors stationed in its region. All four ROCCs, of course, would be tied into the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

Under the new plan, 43 military/FAA joint-use surveillance radars will be required. However, five military radars would have to be retained to cover areas in which FAA has no requirement for radar coverage.

The total investment cost of this new command and control system is estimated at about $95 million, of which $80 million would be for procurement (including installation and check-out) and $15 million for military construction. As shown in Table 2 of the Appendix,[7] the first two ROCCs would become operational in FY 1977 and the last two in FY 1978. The realignment of the surveillance radars would be completed in FY 1978, and all of the existing CONUS Regional, BUIC, and Manual Control Centers would be phased out by end FY 1979.

I noted last year that the Air Force was investigating the feasibility of modernizing the Alaskan air defense system. In view of the new ROCC program proposed for CONUS, the Air Force has developed a plan to establish such a control center in Alaska. This ROCC, which would also be tied in to NORAD, would replace the existing Regional Control Center and Manual Control Centers in Alaska by end FY 1979.

Inasmuch as Canada is a partner in NORAD, discussions have been held with the Canadian authorities concerning realignment of the North American Air Defense system. These authorities have indicated that the proposed changes in the NORAD structure, particularly the establishment of two regions in Canada, will meet their national air space surveillance and control requirements.

In addition to the DEW Line radars in northern Canada, there are a number of surveillance radars in southern Canada which are part of the NORAD system. Moreover, Canada operates several squadrons of CF-101s to ensure the sovereignty of its own air space as well as to contribute to the defense of the North American continent.

Along with the CONUS air defense forces, we will also continue to maintain one active Air Force air defense squadron (F-4s) and three active Army NIKE-HERCULES batteries in Alaska, and one ANG air defense squadron (F-102s converting to F-4s in FY 1976) in Hawaii. We will also continue in-place the active Army general purpose forces NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK batteries now operational in Florida.

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[7] Not printed here.

We will continue, of course, to have options to improve our F-106s, deploy a follow-on interceptor (e.g.- F-15, ACF or F-14), or to deploy a new SAM system (e.g., SAM-D) for CONUS air defense, since these programs are being pursued in any event for the general purpose forces.

CONUS OTH-B Radar

As I indicated earlier, with the sharp reduction in active defenses which has taken place in recent years, tactical warning assumes even greater importance than in the past. Consequently, I believe that we should continue our efforts to develop the CONUS Over-The-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar. This radar promises to extend our surveillance and early warning capability against bombers (or any other aircraft) to more than 1,000 nautical miles from our coasts, at both high and low altitudes. The detection range of our current surveillance radars out over the oceans is about 200-250 nm at high altitude and about 30-50 nm at low altitude.

Although the technology required for this radar has been under development for more than a decade, some technological risks still remain to be resolved. Therefore, we propose to pursue this program in two steps—first, the development of a limited coverage prototype radar; and second, if the first step is successful, the deployment of a full two-site coverage system. The prototype radar would be used to validate system concepts, develop operational procedures for wide area surveillance, and establish performance and cost parameters prior to the commitment of funds for operational sites. It would be designed initially to cover a reduced azimuth, but would be designed to be expansible to full coverage if the decision is made to deploy the system.

The currently planned program involves two OTH-B radars—one near Cutler, Maine (the prototype) looking northeast, and one in Washington or Oregon looking northwest. With regard to the northern approach, we now plan to retain the 31 DEW Line radars until such time as we can perfect an OTH radar, or some other system, which can operate successfully in the presence of the intense electrical disturbances which characterize the northern auroral zone. The need for a south-looking radar will be considered later. About $10 million has already been appropriated for this prototype program, and another $14 million is requested for FY 1976 and the transition period. In addition, an authorization of about $14 million is requested for FY 1977.

b. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The R&D portion of our ballistic missile defense (BMD) effort is comprised of a restructured Site Defense program and an Advanced Technology program. The third element of our BMD program, SAFEGUARD, will successfully complete its R&D phase on schedule and begin its operational phase early this year. We have significantly reduced and streamlined our BMD management structure concurrent

with the reduction in overall BMD funding as the SAFEGUARD system approaches completion. All elements of our BMD program are now controlled in the Army by a single program manager.

I believe we must continue a BMD effort of significant breadth and depth to ensure that we can keep pace with the continuing Soviet BMD efforts and improvements that I discussed earlier. Our continued effort is essential not only as a hedge against a sudden abrogation of the ABM Treaty, but also because our demonstrable competence in this field will continue to motivate the Soviet Union to negotiate additional limits on strategic arms. In addition, R&D in this strategic area assists in the design and evaluation of our strategic offensive systems by providing data on their ability to penetrate missile defenses. It also assists our intelligence agencies in the assessment of Soviet BMD capabilities by providing a core of expertise in this complex technology.

Our overall BMD program provides operational experience with a deployed system, SAFEGUARD, the advancement of system technology in the Site Defense program and research on the more futuristic technologies and concepts in the Advanced Technology program.

SAFEGUARD

Last year I informed the Congress that we planned to bring the SAFEGUARD site near Grand Forks, N. D. up to full operational capability. I also noted at the time that the Army was working out the details for a SAFEGUARD operating plan.

The operating plan for FY 1976 has now been completed. The Equipment Readiness Date of 1 October 1974 for the Grand Forks site, which was set in April, 1970, was met on schedule. The Missile Site Radar (MSR) and the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) are operational and the missiles are undergoing installation.

No additional R&D funds will be required for the SAFEGUARD program after FY 1975. R&D flight tests were completed in August 1974 and no further upgrading of the system is planned. Production verification flight tests will be completed in April 1975. The cost of the Army's Meck Island R&D installation at the Kwajalein Missile Test Range will be reduced by closing down and storing the interceptor launch facilities in the spring of 1975 and the MSR at the end of that year. Until that time the MSR will support (and be funded by) the Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Programs as the SAFEGUARD activity is phased out. The $2 million in acquisition costs shown for SAFEGUARD in FY 1976 is for replenishment of spare parts.

Site Defense

In conformance with the desire of the Congress, the Site Defense program, which had been directed toward the demonstration of a prototype ABM system specifically designed for the defense of MINUTEMAN, now has been reoriented to a systems and component technology

and validation effort. This system-oriented technology effort is important because the integration of complex components such as phased-array radars and large digital computers into a smoothly working system is still the most demanding challenge in missile defense. The new program will be pursued in two phases—(1) a validation phase to prove that our solutions to technical problems associated with the Site Defense concept of terminal defense are adequate, and (2) a second phase which will incorporate advances in technology into the Site Defense design and thereby keep the system concept abreast of newly emerging offensive and defensive capabilities.

The first phase will seek to validate the technical solutions to five key problem areas—bulk filtering of tank fragment radar returns, discrimination of warheads in the midst of clutter, effective operation in a nuclear environment, prompt activation of the system from a peacetime dormant posture, and software required to permit real time engagement. Since these technical areas involve the radar, data processor and the software, the new effort will be concentrated on those three components of the system. The missile portion of the program—i.e., the development of the SPRINT II—will be de-emphasized; no flight tests will be conducted. We will, however, pursue improvements in interceptor performance by incorporating recent advances in the state-of-the-art into the improved interceptor design.

To test and verify our solutions to the key technical problem areas, it is critical that we conduct a limited number of field tests at the Kwajalein Missile Test Range. The new Site Defense Radar is scheduled to be installed at Kwajalein by the summer of 1976.

The total cost of the validation phase of the reoriented Site Defense program (including the $115 million appropriated for FY 1975 but excluding the $275 million appropriated for FY 1974 and prior years) is now estimated to be less than $600 million. The second phase will be a continuing introduction of advanced technology to better solve systems problems. It will enter the program gradually, beginning in FY 1976. We are requesting for this combined effort $140 million in FY 1976 and $38 million in the transition period, plus an authorization of $160 million in FY 1977.

BMD Advanced Technology

In the strategic world of the future we cannot continue our leadership or even remain competitive without a sound understanding of the new emerging technologies. The BMD Advanced Technology Program keeps us abreast of new defensive techniques and radically new concepts, and thereby reduces the likelihood that we would be caught technically unaware of BMD advances by the USSR. To achieve this, the program maintains an aggressive search for new ideas, and conducts additional research to prove the feasibility of the most promising ideas. BMD Advanced Technology concentrates in five major areas of technology—discrimination, data processing, optics, radar, and interceptors.

The ability of an ABM system to discriminate between RVs and other objects such as decoys and tank fragments is absolutely essential to its effectiveness against a sophisticated opponent. Although a great deal of progress has already been made in this area, much more data on the radar and optical signatures of tank fragments and other non-RV objects is needed for more efficient designs to improve performance and reduce the cost of future systems.

Data processing software is generally the largest single cost item in the development of an ABM system and requires the longest lead time to develop. Consequently, more efficient methods for designing, planning and managing the development of this critical component will be pursued in this program. Moreover, improvements in data processing hardware also appear feasible, and these are being developed.

Optics technology appears to hold great promise for overcoming some of the shortcomings in radar sensors. Much remains to be learned, however, about target signatures and the application of optical sensors in a typical target environment.

Current ABM radars are very expensive to acquire. New approaches to antenna design, such as the dome shaped antenna, show promise of large reductions in construction costs. Similarly, solid state power amplifiers, if they can be economically produced, would improve radar performance and permit further economy in radar design and operation.

Improvements in interceptors beyond the SPRINT class of vehicles will require faster burning propellants, harder missile structures, electronic components which can stand the shock of high acceleration, and new guidance and flight control techniques. The development of a much faster burning propellant which can be produced economically in large quantities is currently being emphasized.

These five areas of technology, in our judgment, are the most critical at this stage of our knowledge and experience. A reasonable degree of success in these areas should enable us to maintain our lead in ABM technology, provided that the current pace of the Soviet R&D effort in this field is not accelerated. To continue this important basic technology program at a relatively constant level of effort, we are requesting $105 million in FY 1976 and $30 million in the transition period, plus an authorization of $111 million for FY 1977.

Ballistic Missile Attack Warning Systems

Because of the importance of high confidence warning to our overall strategy, we have adopted the policy of ensuring coverage of all relevant strategic missile launch areas by at least two different types of sensors (sensing different phenomenology). Such an approach minimizes false alarms and potential natural interference, and insures critical areas are always covered.

With regard to ICBMs, first warning of a Soviet (or PRC) launch would be provided by the Satellite Early Warning System satellite maintained on station over the Eastern Hemisphere. Previously, this

warning would have been verified first by the forward scatter Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radar system and then by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). But, as I pointed out last year, the forward scatter OTH System is very sensitive to atmospheric disturbances and hence considerably less reliable than the satellite and BMEWS systems. We, therefore, had planned to phase out this system with its four transmitters and five receivers, in FY 1976. At the urging of the House Appropriations Committee, however, the system is being phased out in FY 1975 to achieve an additional year of savings in operating costs. We are quite confident that the remaining two systems, together with available intelligence sources, will continue to provide highly credible warning of ICBM attack.

Our surveillance and early warning capability against SLBM attack, however, leaves much to be desired. First warning of SLBM launches against the United States is provided by the early warning satellites maintained on station over the Western Hemisphere. Complementary warning coverage is provided by the 474N SLBM Detection and Warning System consisting of seven FSS-7 radars—three on the East Coast, three on the West Coast, and one on the Gulf Coast. However, as I explained to the Congress last year, the FSS-7 radars have low reliability and can be bypassed by the Soviet SS-N-8 and SS-N-6 Mod 2 SLBMs. Moreover, there are occasional gaps in our satellite coverage caused by natural phenomena, i.e., solar reflections.

Accordingly, we had proposed last year to replace those seven "dish" radars with two new SLBM phased array early warning radars—one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. These much more reliable and capable radars, together with the Western Hemisphere satellites, would provide highly credible warning of a Soviet SLBM launch against the United States. The new SLBM radars would not only corroborate the warning received from the satellites, but would also fill in any gaps that may occur in satellite coverage as a result of solar reflections.

Now, at the urging of the House Appropriations Committee, we propose to make three further changes in the plan presented last year in order to effect some reduction in operating cost in this area. First, the standby radar at Moorestown, New Jersey was phased-out in December, 1974, instead of maintaining it until the East Coast SLBM phased array radar is available.

Second, we will phase out the FSS-7 site at Laredo, Texas later this year when the modification of the Space Track radar at Eglin AFB, which will give it an SLBM warning capability, is completed.

Third, in line with an understanding with the House Appropriations Committee, we plan to close down the BMEWS radar at Clear, Alaska when the ability of COBRA DANE and the new West Coast SLBM phased array radar to take over Clear's warning functions has been determined.

The first SLBM phased array radar would replace the three East Coast FSS-7 dish radars. The second phased array radar would re-

place the three West Coast FSS–7 dish radars. The acquisition cost of the two SLBM phased array radars still is estimated at approximately $118 million.

We are requesting about $50 million in FY 1976 and $2 million in the transition period, plus an authorization of about $17 million in FY 1977, for the acquisition of the second of the two SLBM phased array radars. For the acquisition of the satellite system and its ground segments, we are requesting about $68 million in FY 1976 and $9 million in the transition period, plus an authorization of about $55 million in FY 1977. The FY 1976 amount includes funds for the procurement of ground elements which are intended as a backup for the existing ground stations to enhance survivability through redundancy of this satellite warning system.

3. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL

The system devised for the command and control of the strategic forces, both in peace and in war, is part of a larger system designed for the control of all of our forces worldwide. This more comprehensive system of command, control and communications is discussed later in this Report. This section deals specifically with the new elements of the system that would be of particular importance to the command and control of the strategic forces during and after a nuclear attack on the United States. These include the Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP) aircraft, the Air Force Satellite Communications System (AFSATCOM), and the SANGUINE extremely low frequency (ELF) radio system.

AABNCP (E–4)

The heart of our national level command and control system is the National Military Command System through which the National Command Authorities (NCA) issue their orders to subordinate commands and receive information in return. The command facilities of this system include the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon; the underground Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC); and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) primarily based at Andrews AFB, Maryland.

Normally, national level command and control is carried out in the NMCC. As the threat increases, however, control can be transferred to the ANMCC or to the NEACP. This system of command centers maintains connectivity to the ICBMs, the manned bombers, and to the sea-based strategic missile forces by means of a deliberately redundant system of communications.

High confidence in the continuity of command and control throughout the spectrum of conflict is an absolute necessity if the NCA are to maintain control of the forces during a conflict. If this confidence is to be ensured, a major improvement in the most survivable command post, the Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) must be achieved. Thus,

we have undertaken the development of the Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP) aircraft, the E-4, because of limitations in capacity, endurance, and survivability of the current ABNCP, the EC-135.

The survivability of the E-4 will be substantially increased over the current EC-135 airborne command posts by virtue of two factors. First, it will have a satellite communications capability and, therefore, it will not be geographically constrained by line-of-sight communications to ground stations as in the case of the EC-135. Second, its protection against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects is expected to be much greater than the EC-135.

The E-4 design allows sufficient room for the NCA and their close advisors. It should be stressed, however, that the validity of the airborne command post concept does not depend on the presence of the NCA on board the aircraft as long as communications can be maintained with them or their authorized successors.

As indicated last year, the AABNCP program is divided into "blocks". The current Block I program is further divided into three phases, A, B, and C. Phase IA, the equipping of the first three aircraft with C^3 packages from three existing EC-135s to provide an interim NEACP, is nearly complete. The first aircraft was operational in December, 1974, and the final operational capability with three aircraft is expected in the near future.

Phase IB provides for the acquisition of a test bed aircraft, development of an advanced C^3 package consisting of new and more powerful communications equipment, including terminals for interface with the AFSATCOM satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS), and procurement of three additional operational E-4s, complete with the new C^3 package. The more powerful communications equipment will be resistant to degradations caused by a nuclear environment and jamming. The new C^3 package will include an automated message switching capability, a computer terminal for interfacing with the ground command and control computer system, and consoles to display data to the battle staff.

Phase IC involves the retrofit of the first three E-4 aircraft with the new C^3 package.

Future Blocks will continue the definition and development of the airborne computer system and studies of additional improvements. For example, one of the important objectives of Block II is expected to be a substantial increase in the capability of the E-4 to support flexible nuclear response.

In FY 1974 Congressional guidance stated that the procurement of the last three aircraft and the six production C^3 packages should be deferred until completion of threat level EMP testing. This deferral would not only delay the program but would also increase the cost by an estimated $35 million, since the Air Force would not be able to take advantage of the option in the existing Boeing contract for the procurement of the last three E-4s. That option expires in July, 1976. In our

judgment, deferral of procurement of the last three E–4s is unnecessary. The aircraft itself is a low risk item and it already has been subjected to a lower level EMP test. Moreover, a great deal of attention has been given to EMP protection in the design of the system.

The $43 million requested for FY 1975 would provide $36 million to continue development of the Block IB C^3 and $7 million for the Block II program. The $192 million in the Transition Budget would provide $173 million for the procurement of the last three aircraft (including their C^3 packages), $11 million for initial spares, and $8 million for RDT&E ($2 million for the Block IB C^3 package and $6 million for Block II). The $26 million requested for authorization in FY 1977 includes $4 million for Block IB C^3 package development, $12 million for Block II, and $10 million to initiate construction of hangar facilities for the E–4 at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

The total cost of the Block I program is now estimated at about $560 million, provided that we are permitted to procure the last three aircraft in July, 1976. Otherwise, the total cost would be about $593 million.

AFSATCOM/SURVSATCOM

The AFSATCOM system consists of a combination of special communications transponders and channels carried on board "host" satellites placed in orbit for other missions (e.g., Navy FLTSATCOM satellites) plus numerous ground and air terminals. This deliberately redundant satellite system will not only provide greater assurance that essential NCA instructions reach our forces, it will also enable the forces to report back the data needed by the NCA to maintain sure control and to execute a variety of nuclear options.

Service test models of the various terminals have been acquired and are now in test and evaluation. The production of terminals is scheduled to begin in late 1975. Host satellite launches are also scheduled to begin in 1975.

AFSATCOM II is now in program definition. The principal objective of AFSATCOM II is to achieve a major upgrade in ECCM capability over AFSATCOM I, and to enhance further the physical survivability of the space segment. AFSATCOM II consists of the AFSATCOM I earth terminal segment, modified to give it a much higher antijamming capability, and a new space segment (SURVSAT I) to be installed in upgraded host, or possibly dedicated, satellites. The LES 8 and 9 experimental satellites, which are scheduled to be launched in late 1975, will demonstrate new technology for improvements in the physical and ECCM survivability of satellites. The results of these experiments are expected to influence significantly the definition and design of the SURVSAT I system.

The $51 million requested for FY 1976 would provide for AFSATCOM I development and initial procurement. The $14 million requested in the Transition Budget also supports AFSATCOM I procurement and integration development. The $96 million requested for authorization

in FY 1977 would provide $42 million for AFSATCOM I and $44 million for AFSATCOM II development and support.

SANGUINE

As noted last year, the SLBM force, when at sea, is the element of our strategic offensive forces least vulnerable to sudden nuclear attack. The prospect of maintaining effective command and control of that force in a nuclear war environment, however, is the least satisfactory, because the communication links from the NCA to the individual ballistic submarines are less survivable than the submarines themselves. This shortcoming is a matter of deep concern with regard to our ability to deter aggression, to maintain stability in a nuclear crisis, and to deter escalation of a strategic nuclear war, especially before cities are struck. Therefore, we must make every effort to ensure reliable and survivable communications with the SLBM force under all foreseeable circumstances, without increasing the vulnerability of our SSBNs to Soviet ASW forces.

The SANGUINE system holds the best promise of providing a survivable communications link with our ballistic missile submarines, and possibly with our other strategic forces. In addition, the SANGUINE signals would decrease susceptibility of our communications to atmospheric disturbances and enemy jamming, and improve the survivability of our submarines by permitting them greater operational flexibility in depth and speed.

Our funding requests—$18 million in FY 1976, $4 million in the transition period, and the $24 million requested for authorization in FY 1977—would permit the continued development of the SANGUINE system. Design validation activities are being conducted at existing facilities. Propagation validation experiments will be conducted to provide measured propagation data using operational submarines for data collection. Environmental compatibility activity will be continued to study the biological and ecological effects of extremely low frequency radio waves.

Although accomplishment of the FY 1976 program is not dependent on any particular site, it is recognized that site selection is of critical interest to the Congress and the public. Over the past several months the Navy has investigated a number of sites in the United States that may be suitable for construction of the SANGUINE transmitter complex. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will lead an in-depth review of the entire SANGUINE program in February, including the results of the site investigation. We will then select a site which will best accommodate the overall objectives of the program. The Congress will be advised of the site selection well before full-scale development is scheduled to start. The Navy will also work with the federal, state and local government agencies in the area of the site to ensure their understanding of the system.

The need for a more survivable communications link to our ballistic missile submarines is clear, and the technical feasibility of the SANGUINE system has been reasonably well demonstrated during the years of work at the Wisconsin test site. Moreover, notwithstanding some fears to the contrary, the SANGUINE system would pose no known environmental, ecological, or biological dangers to the area in which it is installed. I, therefore, strongly urge the Congress to support this program.

TACAMO

At the present time, our primary communications to our Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines are by means of several fixed, low and very low frequency radio stations located in various parts of the world. The TACAMO airborne radio relay system, which consists of ED–130 aircraft, is the more survivable emergency back-up to those fixed stations. The Navy now has a total of 11 of these aircraft; however, we believe this number should be increased to 14.

Two additional aircraft have been funded but not yet delivered, and we now propose to buy one more in FY 1976. The $41 million requested for FY 1976 would permit the procurement of the additional aircraft, the continuation of the ongoing major modification program to improve TACAMO operational capabilities, and some minor development work. The $10 million requested for the transition period and an authorization of $23 million in FY 1977 will continue the improvement programs.

4. CIVIL DEFENSE

Our Civil Defense Program is, and has always been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture. Hence, one would expect that the recent shift in emphasis towards a more flexible strategic response policy, which I discussed earlier in this section of the Defense Report, would be reflected in our Civil Defense Program. That is indeed the case. We are seeking to reflect in our civil defense planning the wider range of response options that we are now introducing into our military planning.

The Soviet Union for many years has given a great deal of attention to civil defense, including not only the construction of shelters and the training of civilians but also the preparation of plans for evacuation of the bulk of the population from its major cities in the event of a crisis. Thus, the Soviet leaders have the option to evacuate the cities or to shelter the population in place, depending upon their assessment of the situation at the time.

We believe that the United States should have a similar option for two reasons: (1) to be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Union attempts to intimidate us in a time of crisis by evacuating the population from its cities; and (2) to reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appears imminent.

Similarly, this nation should have the option in the event of an intense crisis to evacuate the civilian population from hish risk areas near such military installations as SAC bases, ICBM fields, SLBM support facilities, etc., to less hazardous areas while protecting the rest of the population against fallout. As noted last year, a Soviet counterforce attack which deliberately avoids our cities would still produce a large amount of nuclear fallout which could drift over areas that are downwind from strategic military installations. This civil defense option would complement the military response options that we are now introducing into our planning to strengthen deterrence against a Soviet counter-force attack.

Accordingly, we propose to continue our efforts, within the limits of the resources available, to improve our ability to protect the population in place against fallout and to develop in an orderly way two major options for the relocation of the population in a crisis. The first option, which would be designed against the threat of a Soviet counterforce attack, would involve the relocation of the population from high risk areas near key military installations and the protection of the rest of the population against fallout. This option could reduce nationwide fatalities due to fallout from a limited Soviet counterforce attack to relatively low levels—well under one million—provided that the people in the communities that would be most exposed to fallout from such an attack make effective use of the shelters available.

The second option, which would be designed against an all-out Soviet nuclear attack, would involve the evacuation of the population from cities, as well as from areas near key military installations. Repeated studies have shown that the evacuation of the bulk of the population from our major metropolitan areas could save some 70 million lives in an all-out Soviet attack on the United States, over and above those saved by in-place protection options.

Pilot-project work undertaken in areas near some of our important military installations during fiscal years 1974-75, has established the feasibility of developing plans to allocate risk area populations to surrounding host areas, including the development of standby public information (for publication during a crisis) on "where to go and what to do" should relocation be implemented. Public officials at state and local levels in the pilot areas accepted the need for this type of contingency planning but pointed out that federally-supported planning assistance would be needed.

Other studies indicate that it would be feasible to relocate population from cities over a period of several days, and to provide for their reception and care in host counties for a period of up to two weeks. Specially-tailored solutions, however, would have to be developed for the most densely-urbanized parts of the U.S., such as the Northeast. It would also be feasible to redirect the distribution of food and other essentials to support evacuees in host areas, provided adequate state-level planning is done with industries concerned. Pilot-project experience with a

"host area survey" indicates that local plans in host areas can provide for protecting evacuees from fallout radiation by use of best available existing protection, plus crisis action to improve fallout protection in existing buildings and to construct expedient shelters.

In fiscal year 1976, we propose to move that work forward by training a group of planners, hired under contracts with the states, to work with additional states and cities in developing allocations of risk area population to host areas, and in the preparation of standby instructions for the public. Concurrently, we will continue our research and development efforts, with emphasis on development of special solutions for densely urbanized areas such as the Northeast. We will also conduct host area surveys in counties near selected high risk areas and the "all-effects" shelter survey in selected areas. The latter identifies the best protection available from fallout in existing structures in all areas of the U.S. In high risk areas, it also identifies best available protection from the direct effects of nuclear weapons. Should the bulk of the population be relocated from the high risk areas, the direct effects protection facilities would be used by "key operating personnel", i.e., persons who would commute into cities from nearby host areas to keep the most essential industries and services in operation during the relocation period.

Developing flexible-response capabilities for use in case of a severe crisis or nuclear attack requires that local jurisdictions throughout the United States be able to conduct emergency operations to support and assist their citizens. This in turn generates, as a highly desirable bonus, improved readiness to conduct coordinated local operations in peacetime emergencies or disasters. Such peacetime capabilities are accordingly a secondary, but important, objective of the Civil Defense Program.

The Department of Defense (through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency) provides to state and local governments shelter surveys which identify inherent protection against fallout and other weapons effects in existing structures. It provides radiological detection instruments and training on their use under attack conditions and in peacetime emergencies involving radiological hazards, as well as periodic maintenance and calibration for the instruments. It provides the National Warning System, through which attack warning can be disseminated in less than two minutes, from the primary National Warning Center at Cheyenne Mountain to over 1,200 warning points throughout the United States (this system is also used to disseminate severe-weather warnings, based on inputs from the National Weather Service).

In addition, the Civil Defense Program provides matching funds to assist state and local governments to weld the elements of emergency readiness into an all-hazard civil preparedness capability to conduct lifesaving operations during peacetime emergencies or in the event of war. These funds support the construction of Emergency Operating

Centers, the procurement of warning sirens, communications equipment and other hardware, and the basic management structure—the Civil Defense Directors and their staffs.

To fulfill these civil defense responsibilities of the Defense Department and to make a modest start on the relocation planning effort, we are requesting a total of $88 million in the FY 1976 Budget and $20 million in the Transition Budget. The $88 million requested for FY 1976 would provide $8 million for the shelter program, $43 million for financial assistance to state and local governments, and $37 million for other programs such as attack warning, emergency operations, research and development and program management. The $20 million requested for the transition period would provide $2 million for shelters, $11 million for financial assistance, and $7 million for the other programs.

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Anglo-Soviet Declaration on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, February 17, 1975 [1]

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will do all in their power to strengthen international peace and security, to avert the danger of war, including nuclear war, to end the arms race and to attain general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Both sides emphasize the importance and necessity of serious and urgent efforts directed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. They are convinced that this is in the interests of all mankind.

In this connexion, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union reaffirm the great importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[2] The two sides are resolutely in favour of the strict observance of the Treaty to which the majority of States are already parties. They are also in favour of the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

The two sides, considering that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has created a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, will continue to work together for such co-operation in accordance with the Treaty. They are convinced that further measures could be undertaken to provide nuclear materials, equipment and information for peaceful uses in non-nuclear-weapon States. However, such measures should be under effective safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and should not in any way contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. It is their hope that all suppliers of nuclear material and

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[1] A/10060, Mar. 21, 1975.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

equipment will observe the safeguards applied by IAEA to meet article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The two sides, conscious of their obligation to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures, will continue to co-operate within the framework of IAEA in this field.

The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union welcome the progress achieved in recent years in limiting strategic arms and nuclear-weapon tests. The two sides aim at the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. In the meantime, till the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose, they will work for agreements limiting the number of underground nuclear-weapon tests to a minimum.

The two sides share a common concern that nuclear materials should be carefully protected at all times and that adequate safety measures should be applied by all countries to radio-active waste.

The two sides attach great importance to the Conference which is to meet in Geneva in May 1975 in order to review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They believe that this review should strengthen the effective implementation of the Treaty; and it will be their joint purpose to make a success of the Conference.

The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declare their common intention to work out means of giving effect to the objectives expressed above. They will continue to strive with a sense of urgency to further the cause of disarmament at appropriate international fora, including the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

MOSCOW, *17 February 1975.*

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

(Signed) H. WILSON
Prime Minister

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Signed) L. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of CC CPSU

Letter From President Ford to Speaker Albert: Appropriation Legislation for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, February 18, 1975 [1]

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I transmit herewith for consideration of the Congress proposed legislation to extend the appropriation authorization for the Arms Control

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 24, 1975, p. 199. An identical letter was sent to the President of the Senate.

and Disarmament Agency,[2] together with a letter from the Director of the Agency in support of this legislation.[3]

The negotiation of effective arms control arrangements, especially in the area of strategic arms, continues to be a priority objective of this Administration. To that end, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will continue in Geneva with a view to implementing the Vladivostok accords [4] and reaching a new strategic offensive arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. This agreement would cover the period through 1985 and include both quantitative and qualitative arms limitations. Additional efforts in the field of arms limitation and disarmament will be devoted to the negotiation of an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to the development of sound international approaches to the problems of nuclear non-proliferation, to the continuation of efforts to reach agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, and to international discussions of the problems of chemical and environmental warfare.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency plays an effective and major role in all of these activities. By continuing these negotiations and by seeking solutions to the many complex and difficult problems involved, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities.

The attached draft bill would authorize $23.0 million in appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal years 1976 and 1977. Current authorization and appropriations expire June 30, 1975. The draft bill would also permit the Director of the Agency to grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees on the basis of security clearances granted by the Department of Defense. This amendment would eliminate many unnecessary, expensive and time-consuming investigations in cases where the Agency would require the services of contractors whose officers and employees have already been cleared by the Department of Defense.

I urge early enactment of this measure.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

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[2] Identical with H.R. 4265, 94th Cong., 1st sess. For text, see *Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 1550 . . . and H.R. 4265 The ACDA Authorization Bill for Fiscal Years 1976–77*, p. 1.

[3] Not printed here.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

Message from President Ford to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 4, 1975 [5]

As the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament begins its 1975 deliberations, I would like to extend my best wishes and express my fervent hope that its work this year will add new achievements to the Committee's substantial record.

The accomplishments of previous sessions have earned the respect of nations throughout the world. The General Assembly of the United Nations has entrusted to the Committee some of the most important and complex problems of our time. The dedication and seriousness of purpose that have characterized the work of the CCD have made it a most effective multilateral forum for dealing with arms control and disarmament questions.

The Committee's work resumes this year at a significant moment. One of its accomplishments, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,[6] is about to enter into force. The Convention is a positive measure of the progress that can be made through responsible and constructive international negotiation.

A great many tasks—some continuing, some new—face the CCD. Few have simple solutions. No one can guarantee that agreed solutions can be achieved for every issue. For its part, the United States will do all in its power to promote agreement wherever and whenever possible.

I am confident that this Committee, through the constructive dialogue that is its hallmark, will continue to make its valuable contribution to the promotion of peace and security through effective arms control measures.

(Signed) GERALD R. FORD

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 4, 1975 [1]

First of all the USSR delegation would like to welcome the representatives of the new members of the Committee on Disarmament: the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire. We should like to wish our new colleagues success in this important and responsible endeavour, the struggle to advance towards the goals of disarmament. The enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament and the participation in it of five new members have

[5] CCD/447, Mar. 4, 1975.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[1] CCD/PV.655, pp. 11–19.

great political significance. They demonstrate the unremitting interest of many States in the problems of disarmament, and the desire of those States to contribute actively to the positive solution of these problems. We express the hope that the participation in the Committee on Disarmament of these five new States, which play an important role in current international affairs, will make an important contribution to the activities of the world disarmament forum, dealing with problems directly linked to the strengthening of international peace and the ensuring of the peoples' security.

The 1975 spring session of the Committee on Disarmament opens in the atmosphere of the progress achieved in the last few years, in the development of détente and peaceful co-operation among States with different political, economic and social systems. At the same time the overwhelming majority of countries are deeply convinced that further improvement in the international situation and the active efforts of all States towards this end are needed for these favourable changes in international affairs to become irreversible and for the relaxation of international tension to become universal and to cover all regions of the world. In this connexion it is necessary for the measures of political détente to be supplemented by measures of military détente through specific steps in disarmament and in the limitation of arms and armed forces. To advance successfully in that direction, such steps must be worked out in full conformity with the principle of undiminished security for either side.

We may note with satisfaction the progress made on certain issues bearing on the limitation of arms. During recent years a number of important bilateral agreements have been concluded between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments and underground nuclear tests, and others.

In these years there have also been concluded a number of important international agreements concerning arms control and disarmament. Among them, of particular significance in the present circumstances, is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),[2] which tomorrow will have been in force five years. This Treaty is the most important international instrument of our time, for its purpose is to prevent growth of the nuclear threat.

The wide use of nuclear energy, and especially the increasing number of nuclear power reactors, are causing a tremendous increase in world plutonium production. Alongside the great improvement of the peoples' well-being due to the ampler use of nuclear energy, they increase under certain conditions the potential danger of nuclear proliferation. In order to ward off this danger it is necessary to develop a comprehensive international co-operation both in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and in prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Strengthening of the international non-proliferation régime is an

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

international measure aimed at countering this danger and brooking no delay. For the fulfilment of this task it is first of all necessary for all States to exert effort to make the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forms the basis of the non-proliferation régime, internationally universal, including all "near-nuclear" States. We note with satisfaction that a number of such countries which are members of the Committee on Disarmament are now taking steps to ratify the Treaty. We call on them to expedite that process, and so contribute to progress in ensuring a lasting peace and setting up a reliable international security system.

In early May a conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be held here in Geneva to review the Treaty's operation. The Soviet side attaches great importance to this Conference, for it holds the view that the purpose of the Conference is to increase the effectiveness of the Treaty's implementation and consequently to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

The USSR views solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a highly important task of the present day, for it considers that the destinies of the peoples hinge on the success of the Conference. Speaking on 14 February at a luncheon in honour of Mr. Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said:

> Concerning the ways of strengthening universal peace, one cannot fail to mention that the task of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, of increasing the effectiveness of the international treaty on this matter, and of enlarging the number of its participants to the utmost, is assuming increasing significance.[3]

The negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom resulted in a joint declaration stressing the urgent need for serious efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and reaffirming the great importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The declaration emphasizes that the sides resolutely pronounced themselves in favour of a strict observance of the Treaty, to which the majority of States are Parties, and in favour of its wider acceptance by States. The Declaration notes that the Treaty has created favourable conditions for the expansion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that the sides will contribute further to this co-operation in conformity with the Treaty. At the same time it states that nuclear material, equipment and information for peaceful application by non-nuclear-weapon countries should be made available under effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and should not contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the hope that all exporters of nuclear material will comply with the safeguards applied by the IAEA under Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[4]

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[3] For text of speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXVII, no. 7 (Feb. [Mar.] 12, 1975), pp. 1–3.

[4] *Ante*, pp. 62–63.

In emphasizing the urgent need for a comprehensive strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, which is based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we deem it necessary that this matter should receive the highest possible priority in the Committee on Disarmament, and that its discussion in the Committee should promote the aim of non-proliferation of the most devastating and destructive type of modern weaponry, and at the same time the establishment of a lasting peace.

The General Assembly, which discussed at its twenty-ninth session a wide range of disarmament problems and adopted many important decisions on this issue, desired the Committee on Disarmament to consider some of these problems.

One of the problems the Committee on Disarmament is to consider is that of

> Prohibiting the use of influence on the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes incompatible with the ensuring of international security, human well-being and health.[5]

Scientific and technological progress has created vast opportunities of influencing the environment and climate both for the benefit of people and to their detriment—for military and other hostile purposes. The possible use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes has a wide range. As the USSR delegation explained at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, there are means of causing and stimulating precipitation to the point where it results in destruction of communications, landslides, destruction of dams and so forth. Destructive sea waves harmful to coastal States can also be caused. There are many other means of using techniques of environmental modification to the detriment of human beings. The sum of these means represents a new and highly dangerous instrument of war, the application of which might entail incalculable calamities for mankind.

In this connexion there arises a need for measures to prohibit the use of techniques modifying environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with human interests. In order to make such prohibition practical, the Soviet Union proposes that an international convention on this matter be concluded. A draft Convention was submitted to the General Assembly by the Soviet delegation and is now before the Committee on Disarmament.[6]

The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, which discussed that question, requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to agree on the text of a convention on the question, and to report the results to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

We intend during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament to give the necessary explanations of the substance of the Soviet

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[5] G.A. res. 3264 (XXIX), which see, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 517–521.

proposal to prohibit the use of techniques of environmental and climate modification for military purposes.

The Committee on Disarmament has for a number of years been considering the important problem of the prohibition of all nuclear tests. At this session the Committee is to continue consideration of this problem.

Attaching great importance to its solution, the Soviet Union is in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests everywhere and by all, including underground tests. The 1974 Soviet-United States Treaty providing for the cessation of underground nuclear tests with yields over 150 kilotons, and the limitation of the number of other such tests to a minimum, represents an important step towards the solution of this problem. The exercise of control over the observance of this Treaty by national technical means is of great importance. The special protocol contains a comprehensively-elaborated system of such control.[7]

At present we face the task of making further efforts to implement fully the solution of the problem of the cessation of underground nuclear tests. We are of the opinion that, in order to verify their termination, a form of control may be established on the basis of experience of the elaboration of the control system used in the Soviet-United States Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests. This approach does not require international inspection, which is well known still to be obstructing solution of the problem of cessation of underground nuclear tests.

Of great importance is fulfilment of the task of ceasing nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Consideration and implementation of disarmament measures have shown that these measures cannot be fully implemented until all the nuclear Powers have made efforts to that end.

The problem of cessation of nuclear tests is linked to that of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Committee on Disarmament is to consider the question of these explosions in its aspects relating to disarmament. That consideration should take into account the views of the IAEA as envisaged by General Assembly resolution 3261 (XXIX).[8]

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions is now assuming increasing significance because of the elaboration of practical steps to implement the provisions of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with measures to ensure that the potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

The use of such explosions is at present a subject of scientific and experimental research. Their practical use is being studied. As scientific and experimental research on this complex scientific and technological problem progresses, new opportunities will open for the expansion of international co-operation in this field.

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[7] The texts of the treaty and its protocol appear *ibid.*, pp. 225–229.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 806.

The working document prepared by the IAEA for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT demonstrates that the Agency has so far carried out considerable preparatory study of the possibilities of realizing the Treaty's provisions relating to peaceful nuclear explosions. We express our satisfaction with the active exploration by the IAEA of technical and international legal problems pertaining to peaceful nuclear explosions. The examination of these problems by the IAEA will provide a highly important and useful basis for solution of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions in accordance with Article V of the NPT.[9] In this connexion we should like to observe that the IAEA is a competent international body which should be entrusted with the functions of "an appropriate international body" as provided by that Article.

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions was also on the agenda of the bilateral Soviet-United States talks held under the 1974 Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests. This Treaty provides that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by a special agreement now being negotiated by the two sides. These negotiations are directly linked with the execution of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We hope that the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to arms control and disarmament will be fruitful and useful.

The General Assembly considered at its last session a number of questions relating to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world. The consideration by the General Assembly of these questions reflected the international concern at the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the desire of States to put up a barrier to the spread of these weapons to certain regions of the globe. In so doing, States seek to protect themselves from the danger of nuclear war by renouncing possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons, on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States will undertake not to use these weapons in certain regions of the world.

The General Assembly decided, by its resolution on nuclear-free zones adopted on the initiative of Finland, to undertake a comprehensive study of this question by an *ad hoc* group of qualified government experts under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament. It requested the Committee to transmit a special report of the study to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

As we have already stated more than once in the Committee on Disarmament and at the General Assembly, the Soviet Union takes a positive position on the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and pursues the course of promoting the establishment of such zones. In so doing it proceeds from the idea that this course of action consolidates the non-proliferation régime and fulfils the task of

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[9] For annex to report dealing with feasibility, utility, and health and safety aspects of PNEs, see IAEA *Annual Report, 1 July 1974–30 June 1975* (GC[XIX]/544), pp. 57–65.

narrowing the danger of nuclear war and consequently of strengthening world peace. For those reasons the Soviet side supported at the General Assembly the resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Africa,[10] the Middle East [11] and South Asia (the one proposed by India),[12] and on a comprehensive study of these zones.[13]

At present the question arises of preparation of a report to the General Assembly, in accordance with its request, on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[14] It is necessary to solve the problem of the composition and procedure of the *ad hoc* group of governmental experts. Our delegation intends to hold in the near future consultations with the Committee on this matter.

The Committee is also facing the task of continuing, as a matter of high priority, negotiations with a view to reaching an early agreement on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction.

In the past the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its position on this question. This position was reflected in the draft convention submitted in the Committee by the socialist countries in 1972. However, owing to the unpreparedness of some Western States with chemical weapons in their arsenals to renounce these weapons of mass destruction, the negotiations on this problem in the Committee on Disarmament have not made any progress in the last several years.

At the same time some significant events can be noted in the efforts that have been made during the last fourteen months to fulfil the task of prohibiting chemical weapons. In July 1974 the USSR and the United States reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. To this end they agreed to consider moving together in the Committee on Disarmament to conclude, as a first step, an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal forms of chemical warfare.[15] Steps have now been taken to implement that agreement.

In the opinion of the Soviet side, the CCD should do its utmost to intensify consideration of the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation holds the view that the discussion of this problem in the CCD should be continued on the basis of existing proposals. As is well known, the Committee is considering, in addition to the draft convention of the socialist countries, the Japanese draft convention on a phased-out prohibition of chemical means of warfare [16] and the Working Paper of the 10 non-aligned States members of the CCD.[17]

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[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 807–808.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 811–813.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 816–817 (pt. A).
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 808–809 (pt. F).
[14] For report, see *post*, pp. 321–349.
[15] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 236.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 99–106.
[17] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 206–209.

The ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction is a recent important event.[18] When this Convention has been ratified by the third Depositary, it will join—we hope in the near future—the existing international acts on disarmament.

Mention should also be made of the ratification by the United States of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.[19] The Committee is known to have repeatedly called upon the United States to accede to this important convention. At the present time practically all the States possessing chemical means of warfare have become parties to this important international instrument.

The Soviet side is hopeful that the consideration by the Committee of the problem of chemical weapons will soon allow a further advance which will make prohibition not only of their use but also of their development, production and stockpiling a rule of international law, and result in the elimination of stocks of these weapons.

The disarmament questions referred to the CCD by the General Assembly are directly connected with the scientific and technological progress of our days. The development of nuclear physics, geophysics, chemistry and natural science has armed mankind with powerful means of using nature for its benefit. But we cannot fail to see that scientific progress gives birth to various types of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore the major task of our time is to develop comprehensive co-operation among the peoples to prevent scientific progress from being used to their detriment.

The Soviet Union builds its policy on international détente and the development of all-round co-operation among States and peoples. This purpose is being served by the negotiations on limitation of strategic arms, European security and co-operation, and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and also by the very important Soviet proposals on arms control and disarmament, on the holding of a World Disarmament Conference, on renunciation of the use of force in international relations, on the prohibition for ever of the use of nuclear weapons, and on reduction of the military budgets of the States permament members of the Security Council by 10 per cent; by the proposal mentioned earlier on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes, and by others. Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev pointed out in his statement of 14 February to which we have already referred, that—

> The peoples of the world expect an early translation of international détente into specific measures contributing to improvement of the lot of millions of people. These measures include curbing of the arms race, reduction of military preparations and military expenditures of States, and expansion of peaceful economic and other co-operation. It

[18] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[19] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

appears that, with many Western countries facing serious economic difficulties, progress in these matters is becoming in the eyes of the public a more and more pressing task.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the current session of the CCD will make a useful and effective contribution to fulfilment of the task of limiting and bringing to an end the arms race and disarmament.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 4, 1975 [1]

Before commencing my formal remarks I want to say how pleasant it is to be back in Geneva among so many old and new friends and colleagues. It is a privilege to join in greeting the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire, whose Governments are participating in the work of this Committee for the first time. I extend the warmest of welcomes to their representatives, Ambassador Schlaich, Minister Moldt, Ambassador Fartash, Ambassador Alzamora and Ambassador Kasasa. I look forward to working with each of them, and I am confident that they will contribute in an important way to the advancement of our common tasks in the Committee.

In the same spirit I should also like to welcome Ambassador Soyak of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Domokos of Hungary, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, Ambassador van der Klaauw of the Netherlands, Ambassador Yunus of Pakistan and Ambassador Allen of the United Kingdom, all of whom have been recently given the important assignment of leading their Governments' delegations to the CCD. I am certain that we will all continue to have the same friendly and co-operative relationship with them that we enjoyed with their predecessors.

In addition to these many new associates, I am also delighted to greet my old colleagues who have returned again this year. I am very happy too that we will have the continued valuable assistance of Mr. Björnerstedt, and of Mrs. Gill, our extremely competent interpreters and the other able members of the Secretariat staff.

The President of the United States has directed me to convey to the CCD the following message, which I request be made a Conference document:

[Printed *ante*, p. 65.]

We are resuming our work at a time when disarmament efforts are receiving increasing attention in the search for a more stable and secure world. Convincing evidence of the growing interest in arms-control solutions to national and international security problems can be found in the extensive treatment of disarmament questions at the

[1] CCD/PV.655, pp. 19–25.

twenty-ninth United Nations General Assembly. It is also reflected in the unprecedented number of international meetings which are currently dealing with the subject.

Here in Geneva, Soviet and American negotiators are working out the specific provisions of a second-stage SALT Agreement, the broad outlines of which were agreed at the Vladivostok Summit.[2] In Moscow, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in discussions aimed at reaching the agreement governing peaceful nuclear explosions that is called for in Article III of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty.[3] In Washington, representatives of the two countries have been considering the question of effective measures of restraint on environmental modification techniques. In Vienna, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are continuing their efforts to reach agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the focal point for international examination of safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and of various aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Finally, two months from now the conference to review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [4] will begin in Geneva.

The CCD occupies a unique and important position in this over-all effort. In 1975 our newly-enlarged Committee can expect a heavier workload than it has had in several years. The twenty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, in addition to urging the CCD to continue its work on a comprehensive test ban,[5] and chemical weapons limitations,[6] called on the Committee to examine questions that have so far received relatively little attention in this forum—namely, environmental modification for military purposes,[7] nuclear-free zones,[8] and the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.[9] My delegation welcomes these new responsibilities and is confident that the CCD can make a valuable contribution in each of these fields.

Among the large number of items on the international disarmament agenda, the most pressing, in our view, concern non-proliferation and related nuclear issues. My Government was gratified that at the twenty-ninth United Nations General Assembly many nations recognized that there is serious cause for concern in the prospect of the further spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities. The United States feels that the wide support given to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the many calls for broader adherence to that treaty were constructive developments.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–227.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 792–793.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 790–792.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 814–816.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 808–809.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 803–806.

At the same time, a large number of delegations recognized that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities cannot be taken for granted, and that a broad and determined international effort is needed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. My Government is urgently considering what courses of action would contribute most effectively to achieving a more universal, reliable system of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes. It is also considering what would be the most promising steps to increase the political and economic incentives which could lead a country to forego the nuclear explosive option. My Government looks to the NPT Review Conference to assess how well the Treaty has functioned in the first five years of its existence, to consider how the Treaty can be more effectively implemented, and to provide an impetus for the broadly-based effort that will be essential if we are to avoid a proliferation of nuclear powers.

The Review Conference will be concerned not only with the operation of those provisions of the NPT that deal directly with the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities, but also with the implementation of those provisions that were designed to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, notably Article VI. In this connexion I am pleased to note that, since the CCD last met, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken another major step to curb their competition in nuclear arms. At Vladivostok President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev set firm and equal numerical limits on the strategic forces of both sides. Specifically, they agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers for each country. They also agreed on a maximum number of 1,320 launchers for missiles that could be armed with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). With the agreement to place all these strategic delivery vehicles under the ceiling and to set an additional limit on MIRVs, this general framework for a new SALT accord goes well beyond the scope of the Interim Agreement concluded in 1972.

Because of this breakthrough at Vladivostok, for the first time in the nuclear age each side's strategic calculations and force planning will not be motivated by fear and uncertainty about a possible open-ended strategic build-up by the other side. Instead, they can be based with confidence on firm, established parameters. This can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the stability of the strategic relationship. Of perhaps greater long-range importance, the ceilings worked out by the leaders of the two countries will provide a solid foundation for negotiating future arms reductions. While many details remain to be settled before this general framework can be transformed into a new agreement, the United States is confident that such an agreement can be concluded this year and that further negotiations on reducing the force ceilings can follow soon thereafter.

My Government is aware of the importance attached internationally to a comprehensive test ban as a means of curbing the nuclear arms race. The United States remains firmly committed to seeking an adequately-verified CTB. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, is not only a step toward that objective but will be in itself a significant constraint on the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the USSR.

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions has recently become a major topic in international disarmament discussions. We must start from the facts that a number of uncertainties about the feasibility and practicability of PNEs have yet to be resolved, and that the use of PNEs is a highly complicated matter both politically and legally. Recognizing these facts, the United States delegation at the recent General Assembly called for thorough international consideration of the PNE question. We accordingly supported the Assembly's request in resolution 3261 D that the CCD consider the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.[10]

Those implications have two aspects: implications for the development and testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, and implications for the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among non-nuclear-weapon States.

With respect to the first of these categories, it is clearly important to ensure that nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes are not used to gain weapons-related information in circumvention of agreed limitations on weapons testing. This is the central task of the bilateral negotiations now under way in Moscow, where the two sides are discussing criteria to ensure that PNEs are consistent with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. An analogous question arises with respect to any form of international test ban agreement. Indeed, this question would be particularly crucial with a comprehensive test ban—since, in the absence of any authorized weapons testing, there would be a greater incentive to seek weapons information in the course of a PNE programme.

With respect to PNE implications for the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities, my Government's firm conviction remains that it would be impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon State to develop a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device that could be used as a nuclear weapon. It has been argued that the critical factor is not the capability to produce nuclear devices but the intention of the country producing the device. However, this is not the issue. The critical question is not whether we can accept the stated intentions of any country, but whether a world in which many States have the capability to carry out nuclear explosions—and in which all therefore fear the nuclear-weapons capability of others—would not be

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 803-806.

vastly less secure than a world that has successfully contained the spread of nuclear explosive technology.

A notable development at the last General Assembly was the heightened interest in nuclear-free zones. Resolutions were adopted dealing with nuclear-free zone proposals for South Asia,[11] the Middle East,[12] and Africa,[13] and with the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.[14] Reflecting this renewed interest, and motivated in part by the diversity of the regional initiatives and the complexity of some of the issues involved, the General Assembly requested that an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts, under CCD auspices, undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free zones in all its aspects.[15]

My delegation welcomes this step and hopes it will contribute to a better understanding of the wide range of issues relating to nuclear-free zones. Given the differences that exist from region to region, we think it would be unrealistic to expect the experts to reach agreement on requirements for nuclear-free zone arrangements that could be applied universally. One useful purpose of the study might be to identify issues where standardized provisions could be feasible, and others where they would not.

Unlike earlier studies undertaken under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the study of nuclear-free zones will involve issues that are by nature primarily political rather than technical. This is the first such study to be carried out under the auspices of the CCD, and it was entrusted to this body with the understanding that a number of States not represented in the Committee would participate. My delegation has developed a number of ideas on the organization of this project which we will be discussing with members of the Committee in the next few days.

Turning to the area of restraints on chemical and biological weapons, I am pleased to be able to report two important actions recently taken by the United States Government. On 22 January President Ford signed the United States instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[16] I should point out that, although not party to the Protocol in the past, my Government has always observed its principles and objectives.

The President also signed on 22 January the United States instrument of ratification on the Biological Weapons Convention, a product of the expert and painstaking efforts of this Committee. As members of the CCD are aware, this Convention is the first agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely biological agents and toxins. With ratification proce-


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[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 816–819.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 811–813.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 807–808.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 793–795, 809–811.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 808–809.
[16] *Ante*, pp. 5–7. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

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


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dures already completed by the three depositary Governments and by many more than the required 19 additional Governments, we expect the Convention to enter into force in the very near future. It is our hope that this will prompt many other Governments to adhere to the Convention.

As members of the Committee are aware, Article II of the Biological Weapons Convention requires parties to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force, all agents, equipment, and means of delivery prohibited in Article I.[17] In this connexion I would like to state that the entire United States stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed, and our former biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses. My delegation, and I am sure other members of the Committee, would welcome similar confirmations of implementation of Article II from parties to the Convention.

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the ratification and entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention are viewed by my Government as significant steps toward our common objective of the effective prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. My delegation is prepared at the current session to participate in the active examination of possibilities for further effective restraints on chemical weapons. An important element in this examination should continue to be a thorough analysis of the verification question in relation to the possible scope of any prohibition.

The United States interest in overcoming the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was reflected in the United States-Soviet Summit Joint Statement of 3 July 1974, in which both countries advocated the most effective measures possible to accomplish that objective.[18] At the United Nations General Assembly last fall my Government indicated that it would be ready at the CCD to consider this subject further. We pointed out that little is known about the scientific and technological aspects of environmental modification, and that many of the applications posed for discussion are at present only hypothetical. At the same time we stressed that we were prepared to participate actively and positively in further discussion of this matter.[19] We would expect to contribute to the Committee's deliberations in that spirit.

In my statement today I have discussed a number of new responsibilities to be assumed by the Committee. There is another issue I think should be added to the list: the question of restraints on conventional arms. This Committee has always given the highest priority to the control of weapons of mass destruction. While my delegation regards this as entirely appropriate, we see no reason why possible controls on

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[17] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[18] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 231–232.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 585–586, 738–739.

conventional weapons, which account for the largest share of world military expenditures, cannot be considered concurrently. I plan to return to this subject in a later intervention.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Verification of Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, March 6, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, you have asked me today to address three related SALT issues: Soviet compliance with the 1972 SALT agreements,[2] verification issues arising out of turning the Vladivostok Aide-Memoire into a formal agreement,[3] and our experience of monitoring the SALT I agreements and what we have learned to form a basis for verification provisions of a follow-on SALT agreement.

As I understand it, I am the second witness in the current series of hearings before this Subcommittee on Arms Control. I am familiar with the presentation on intelligence provided by Mr. William Colby who appeared here on February 11, 1975. His presentation supplied you with much of the detail on the subjects we will address today, particularly in regard to those ambiguous intelligence situations related to SALT compliance.

On the question of Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements, President Ford indicated [deleted] that the United States was not aware of any violations, but there were some ambiguities which needed to be resolved. We believe that the Soviet Union has been, and today is, in compliance with the terms of the SALT agreements. There are, however, some ambiguities in certain activities currently underway in the Soviet Union which need clarification.

[Deleted.]

Secretary Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, I believe you are familiar with these issues, so I will just pass over them.

THE III-X SILOS

1. The United States is concerned that there are new large silos; that is, III-X silos, under construction in the western USSR, which could be used for launching ICBM's. Though the intelligence community believes that the intended purpose of these new silo-type facilities is for

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[1] *Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, March 6, 1975*, pp. 2–5.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–205.

[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746–747.

launch control, the United States is concerned that these silos may have the capacity to launch ICBM's.

CONCEALMENT FROM VERIFICATION

2. Examples of the type of concealment measures which concern the United States were provided to the Soviet side. These involved activities at the ballistic missile test ranges at [deleted] and at [deleted] shipyards. [Deleted] our primary concern in this regard is with the expanding pattern of concealment measures being undertaken in the USSR which would impede or lessen the confidence we currently have in verifying the provisions of the two current SALT agreements.

"LIGHT" VERSUS "HEAVY" MISSILES

3. You will recall that in one of its unilateral statements, the United States declared that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM then operational on either side—that is, the SS-11—to be a heavy ICBM.[3] In 1972 former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird expressed his view during the hearings on SALT agreements that he would interpret this statement such that an increase of more than 30 percent in volume would be significant.[4] The United States has considered the issue of agreement to the definition of a heavy ICBM. Its concern stemmed from the fact that the volume of a new Soviet ICBM, the SS-19, is about 50 percent greater than the volume of the currently deployed SS-11, which was defined by the U.S. to be the largest light ICBM operationally deployed by either side at the time of the U.S. unilateral statement of May 26, 1972.

TESTING THE SA-5 IN AN "ABM" MODE

4. The fourth ambiguous activity is the possible Soviet testing of an air defense radar, [deleted] in an ABM mode. There are at least three possible explanations for this radar testing: (1) use of the radar in an instrumentation role to collect diagnostic data on reentry vehicles, (2) collection of data for use in modifying the SA-5 system to achieve an ABM intercept capability or (3) collection of data for use in developing a new, perhaps dual-role SAM and ABM system. [Deleted.]

In general:

We should strive for more specificity in the provisions and more comprehensive collateral constraints; and

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[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 284–286, 559–560.

[4] *Military Implications of The Treaty on The Limitations of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems and The Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session*, p. 548.

We should not make unilateral statements in association with future agreements.

VLADIVOSTOK AND VERIFICATION

Let me turn now to the more important verification issues arising from the Vladivostok Accord. The provisions of the Vladivostok Aide-Memoire are familiar to members of the subcommittee.[5]

Both sides are to be limited to no more than 1,320 ICBM's and SLBM's equipped with MIRV's. Under this provision, it will be necessary to agree to definitions and counting rules for ballistic missiles equipped with MIRV's.

The MIRV provisions pose a special verification problem as a result of the following uncertainties:

Is it possible to verify which version of a particular missile is deployed when such missile has been tested with both a single RV and MIRV'ed payloads?

Is it possible to verify which SLBM launcher in a particular SSBN class contain MIRV'ed missiles when there exist both MIRV'ed and un-MIRV'ed missiles compatible with these launchers?

Is it possible to verify whether a particular ICBM or SLBM launcher contains a MIRV'ed missile if it has been modified, for example, through changes to length or diameter and therefore made compatible with a known MIRV'ed missile?

Is it possible to determine whether a launcher which once contained a MIRV'ed missile, and has been converted to an unMIRV'ed launcher, no longer contain MIRV's?

Although we will probably have difficulty in negotiating provisions which give us 100 percent certainty that the Soviets are in compliance with the MIRV limits, I do believe that provisions which result in acceptable uncertainty are realizable.

III

Finally, turning to the last point [deleted] it is premature to draw a firm conclusion on how our experience in monitoring SALT I agreements should affect our approach to the verification provisions of any follow-on SALT agreement. One could expect the Soviets to tread at the limits of the provisions of the SALT agreements. If unchallenged, we then should expect them to overstep and go beyond the limits. If such activities are challenged as they occur, the strategic risk might be regarded as acceptable.

It is important to note that in the general area of verification, there is an asymmetry favoring the Soviet Union—the United States is an open society with weapons systems subject to constant public scrutiny

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[5] For a gist of provisions, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 848–849, or *14th Annual Report* of the ACDA.

from their R. & D. phase to actual deployment. The Soviet Union should, therefore, have higher confidence in American compliance with the SALT agreements without insisting on measures additional to national technical means to adequately assure compliance. As a result, in the negotiations, the United States carries the main burden of pressing for agreement for such additional verification provisions.

Mr. Chairman, I think that a very critical issue is raised by the third paragraph of your initial remarks, in which you say: "Confidence in the process of arms control cannot survive in an atmosphere in which agreements previously entered into are subject to multiple instances of ambiguous behavior even as new agreements are being negotiated." [6]

I think that there are two points that I would make here. First, that there are different classes of ambiguities, one of which I will call inherently ambiguous situations. I think the III-X silo may fall in this category, that there are things that are just not understood. On the other hand, there might be another category of ambiguity which we will call questionable ambiguity. And I think that your statement goes to the latter kind of ambiguity, in which one discerns that one's negotiating partner may be deliberately pressing the limits in order to create ambiguities as opposed to these circumstances in which ambiguities naturally arise.

The second observation that I would make is that we take some care in our own thoughts not to pitch our expectations too high. I say this for two reasons. First, the Soviet Union has a particular style. It has a long history over time of not precisely abiding by agreements, and in fact at many points breaking agreements. And that makes the Soviet Union difficult partner to work with in these agreements.

Moreover, there is the fact that it is going to become increasingly difficult to verify, as we go beyond a fairly simple silo counting operation to more complex phenomena, which might include possible missiles, and which will include MIRV'ed missiles. These are more difficult problems. [Deleted.]

I would observe, Mr. Chairman, that I do not enter these negotiations with an ingenuous view about the Soviet Union. I would say that I expect the Soviets to press to the limit in many areas, and that if one starts with a pessimistic interpretation regarding the Soviets, there has been a degree of compliance which is at least to date reasonably reassuring.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my initial observations.

American-Soviet Communique on Environmental Modification Talks, March 7, 1975 [1]

The second meeting of representatives of the United States of Ameri-

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[6] See p. 1 of source cited in *note 1*, above.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 14, 1975, p. 495.

ca and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the question of measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was held in Washington from February 24 to March 5. The American delegation was headed by Thomas D. Davies, Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Academician Y. K. Fedorov headed the Soviet delegation.

The first meeting of representatives of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow in November 1974.

The discussions are being conducted in accordance with the U.S.-USSR Joint Statement signed on July 3, 1974, at the Moscow summit meeting,[2] and also on the basis of the understanding to continue an active search for a mutually acceptable solution to this question established in the joint U.S.-USSR communique of November 24, 1974, on the results of the Vladivostok summit meeting.[3]

In the course of the discussions conducted in the United States, the exchange of opinions on the most effective measures possible which could be undertaken to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was continued. The examination of scientific and technical questions related to environmental modification and the familiarization with laboratories working in this area, which were begun in Moscow, were also continued.

The representatives of the U.S.A. and the USSR consider that these meetings facilitate better understanding of the points of view of the sides on the questions discussed.

The sides intend to participate actively in the discussion of this question in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which reconvened in Geneva this week, with the aim of achieving positive results.

Interview of ACDA Director Iklé by Oswald Johnson: Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 12, 1975 [1]

Question: At the time of India's nuclear explosion last May there was great alarm in the arms control community that the Indian bomb might seriously, perhaps fatally, undermine the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Do you think today that those fears were exaggerated or do you share them still?

Iklé: The situation if anything has become more serious. The right way to look at this next step in proliferation, the Indian explosion, is not that India is number six in a so-called nuclear club, but in a way it's number one among a great many countries to come, maybe 10, 20 countries. The Indian development is associated with the ambition to devel-

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 231.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 747-750.
[1] *Washington Star*, Mar. 12, 1975.

op technology in a less industrialized country and to hitch on to nuclear technology as being a means to advance a general industrialization of a country.

Q: Do you have some objective evidence of this? Do you have some candidates in mind as possible countries that might be next in line after India?

A: Well, we can all witness the intensity with which a great many countries, at the industrial development level of India or perhaps even less developed, are anxiously trying to obtain nuclear technology. To be sure, they stress that they want this technology for peaceful purposes, reactors, desalination plants. But of course, with the acquisition of nuclear technology, inevitably, over time you acquire also the ability to build nuclear weapons. Peaceful technology provides the possession of the materials that could be used for manufacturing weapons. And, over time, peaceful technology or a major capability of peaceful technology brings with it the personnel and the general understanding of nuclear matters that could be used to build weapons.

Q: Could you name some of these candidates?

A: Among the countries that are interested in building up their nuclear technology potential are Egypt, Iran, Argentina, Brazil, perhaps other countries in the Middle East and other countries in Asia.

Q: The Indian case was a clear case of diversion of plutonium for a rather small reactor, wasn't it?

A: The Indian development of the explosive device, of course, did take advantage of the fact that India had reactors, had built up a very sizable and very significant capability in the general field of nuclear technology. India got some important outside assistance in the late 50s, assistance which was given not to help India build a bomb but to help India move ahead in peaceful technology.

Q: How might the Indian reactor have been safeguarded?

A: Well, the Indian government to begin with did not make a clear enough undertaking to Canada that a nuclear explosion such as they have prepared last year was inconsistent with the assistance given by Canada. They take the position that this was a peaceful use and that agreement did not prohibit nuclear explosions as long as they weren't declared to be weapons. So, for one thing, an attempt is now being made in the International Atomic Energy Agency to very explicitly prohibit nuclear explosions of any kind, whether called peaceful or not. Second, the monitoring, the inspections which the agency provides furnish a certain check, a certain reassurance, or they could serve as a warning system if indeed materials were being diverted.

Q: Isn't this potentially an almost unmanageable problem as reactors proliferate all over the world—as you have these things producing weapons grade plutonium on a rather large scale?

A: It is an enormously difficult problem, a problem that will tax our ingenuity, the ingenuity of the international community, to be properly managed. But we must not call it an unmanageable problem. If that should be the case, then the international environment in which we would have to live would be unmanageable. We better see to it that we get on top of this problem and provide the proper international organization and the technical equipment where this might help, to come to grips with the danger of diversion of nuclear material to weapons purposes.

Q: Are there international programs now in development that could do this?

A: Perhaps not enough is being done. We in the arms control agency are trying to help the International Atomic Energy Agency by developing technical devides [devices] which can facilitate the safeguards system. In addition, we also have to strengthen the organization of the IAEA and perhaps build on it or add to it organizational capability that can manage the international transportation and flow of materials among a great many countries that anticipate for the future.

Q: At one level, it's actually a police matter, isn't it? There has been talk of criminals or terrorists getting their hands on plutonium. Isn't that possible?

A: It is a nightmare, of course, but it's not a completely unrealistic one for the long term future. Clearly, the first task for all the countries involved with nuclear technology is to protect the materials that might be diverted to weapons purposes from being stolen, from being hijacked and then used for criminal or terrorist purposes. And that job in itself is a job of monumental proportions, because we cannot tolerate a single failure. Beyond that, of course, we would like to reduce the competition among nations and governments in developing nuclear explosives—that's what the non-proliferation treaty is all about. And these two efforts will interact and mutually reinforce each other.

Q: The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is five years old this year.[2] *After the Indian bomb, as now drawn and constituted, is it a realistic check on further development or would something else be needed?*

A: It is not enough. It can provide mutual reassurance. It is particularly significant for the industrially capable countries that are parties to the treaty. There are a number of countries which have signed the treaty and many which have ratified it, that could build a large number

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

of nuclear bombs in a short time. I think it's all important beyond that—in areas that are less industrialized. There are other efforts that are needed to control the export, the flow of the transportation, the physical security.

Q: Should additional international treaties be drawn for that, or can that be done on an agency level, through the U.N., on a bilateral or multilateral level?

A: As the United States announced in the United Nations last fall, we are thinking of making proposals for a convention on the physical security of nuclear installations, and we are working on that. The proper forum for working out the details on that problem is the International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical discussions are now going on in that agency on the question of physical security.

Q: And this would be to deal with the terrorist or criminal threat?

A: Right. This is to help national governments to preserve full and secure control over these dangerous materials.

Q: Do you have a timetable for this effort?

A: No very sharp calendar of events, but I would say we hope to move ahead within the next 6 to 12 months.

Q: Under the original terms of the NPT, after five years, and that would be this May, there is to be a review conference in Geneva. Is there any countervailing danger that this conference might become an arena at which existing signatories to the treaty might declare their intention to change their minds and go their own way because of this apparent precarious drift towards nationalism?

A: No, we don't expect that. What we would like to see happen, however, is progress on some of the outstanding ratifications. And it is not clear whether there is enough time for some of these important ratifications to be completed. A number of signatories, such as Japan and Italy, have not completed the process of ratification.

Q: But they're not the real problems, are they? Aren't the problems powers—such as India on the one hand, Pakistan on the other, Egypt on the one hand, Israel on the other—that have declined to sign and ratify, and still more major nuclear powers, such as France and China, who have refused to cooperate at all.

A. The countries that are determined not to become parties to the treaty of course cannot be brought into the treaty. For those situations the treaty is not the answer. The treaty is helpful in areas and regions among countries that are willing to make this kind of commitment. As to China and France, they are clearly nuclear weapons states under the

definition of the treaty. China and France, if either one of the countries decided to join the treaty, they would be classified there as nuclear weapons states the same way as the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

Q: By which you mean they would have nothing to lose?

A: We think they would have something to gain.

Q: What?

A: Lending support to an international undertaking that will help to secure world order where mutually agreed measures can progress for the security of all states, and a better chance than in a kind of a world with nuclear anarchy.

Q: Is there a realistic prospect that they will see things your way?

A. France and China? At this time these two nations have indicated that they do not wish to become part of the treaty.

Q: The French have been talking to both the Egyptians and the Pakistanis haven't they, about supplying sizeable reactors?

A: Almost all nuclear industrial countries are talking to almost all potential customers. The important question is that the supplier states should work together and not let the question of safeguards become a battleground for commercial advantage.

Q: But, in fact, isn't there a danger as the world becomes energy poor, that the need for nuclear energy will simply supercede the prudence of maintaining safeguards?

A: Safeguards and protective measures do not stand in the way of providing reactors for electric power. We must recall that we do have so much nuclear technology around the world, so many reactors, so much progress in the field precisely because our country, the United States, has been so generous in providing peaceful nuclear technology. So it's putting the question the wrong way around, saying that the interest in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would get in the way of efforts for non proliferation.

Q: Another area of peaceful nuclear technology, is the peaceful explosion, something the Russians want to retain and, of course, the Indians call their explosion a peaceful explosion. Is this potentially a serious issue in this field?

A: This is a very important issue. There is a varying degree of interest in the idea that nuclear explosives can be used for peaceful purposes—for stimulating natural gas, creating underground storage areas or even for excavation. And of course, what distinguishes a nuclear explo-

sive from a weapon is primarily the intent and location where it was exploded. For countries highly advanced in nuclear weapons technology, it is conceivable to develop arrangements so that no further advances are made in their weapons technology, even though they go ahead with peaceful nuclear explosives. But for a country that is beginning with a nuclear program, the distinction does not hold up.

Q: Because any explosion has the value of a test?

A: It has the characteristics of being a device that can destroy a city.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Nisibori) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, March 25, 1975 [1]

In my statement today, I would like to present the views of the Japanese delegation on the question of banning chemical weapons, an important item pending in this Committee.

As representatives well know, my delegation submitted a draft convention [2] on this question in the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament last year. Since then, especially in the informal meetings with the participation of experts on this question, which were held in the summer session last year, various comments have been made on this draft convention by many delegations. The interest expressed by so many countries—Western, socialist or others alike—shows that there is an earnest desire for a solution to this question. I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for these comments.

Now, in the statement that follows, I intend to try to offer some explanations in response to the questions and observations posed in the aforementioned comments.

First of all, I recall that a question was raised by the Swedish expert about the possible use of the expression "chemical warfare agents" instead of the term "chemical agents" which is stipulated in our draft convention.[3] Also, proposals on the definition of chemical warfare agents were made by the Swedish, Yugoslav and Polish experts. As for the definition, I suggested

> it would be desirable to decide on this at the time of concluding the treaty in order to avoid unnecessary disputes in future as to what is prohibited,[4]

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[1] CCD/PV.661, pp. 6–8.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 99–106.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 224–225.
[4] *Ibid., 1973*, p. 532.

when I submitted the Japanese working paper to this Committee at its summer session of 1973.[5] I am pleased that I have had such early responses to my suggestion. In my statement on 16 July last year, I said that our intention on this point was that the "chemical agents" mentioned in article I of our draft convention should be interpreted to mean the agents specified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[6] This implies that the term "chemical agents" in article I means toxic chemical agents available for military purposes. Consequently, such chemical agents are not basically different from the chemical warfare agents which the Swedish expert might have had in mind. Therefore, we have no objection to introducing in our draft convention the expression "chemical warfare agents" instead of "chemical agents". My delegation is prepared to submit a working paper to this Committee in due course concerning the modification of this wording used in our draft convention. However, since the expression "chemical agents" or "chemical warfare agents" defines the scope of chemical agents which are eventually to be prohibited under the convention, it cannot be formulated in an abstract manner. For the purpose of defining these chemical agents, my delegation considers it would be useful to adopt such concrete criteria as the "lower threshold" which is proposed in the Canadian working paper.[7]

Next, with reference to the chemical agents which are to be prohibited first according to our draft convention, the Soviet expert pointed out that binary toxic substances were not referred to at all in the Japanese working paper which suggests one example of super-toxic organophosphorous compounds to be listed in annex I (B) to our draft convention.[8] By the same token, the Polish expert suggested that binary toxic substances should be included in the chemical agents listed in the initial ban.

My delegation shares the same views that the binary agents should hopefully be included in the chemical agents which are to be prohibited from the outset, since they become super-toxic chemical compounds at the stage of use. However, as the Swedish delegate stated on 15 August last year, "from a realistic point of view, a convention without provisions for international verification cannot be regarded as having greater value than would equivalent unilateral declarations".[9] It is necessary to ensure an effective means of verification for the chemical agents to be prohibited in order to decide the scope of chemical agents which are to be prohibited from the beginning. Therefore, if an effective means of verifying the binary components could be found and its application to them be agreed upon, it would be quite possible to prohibit these binary components from the beginning.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 520–524.

[6] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 346. For text of Protocol, see *ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[7] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 526–528.

[8] For the working paper, see *ibid., 1974*, pp. 306–325. Records of informal meetings are not published.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

In the meetings with the participation of experts last summer, the Swedish expert suggested that if annex I (B) to our draft convention be adopted, it should have a list of chemical agents exempted from the ban in addition to a list of chemical agents obligatorily banned. Referring to this statement, the Swedish delegate suggested on 15 August last year that the two different lists provided for in the proposed alternative annexes of our draft convention might be put together in one annex, and that such an annex would thus include the two lists both of agents obligatorily banned and of those exempted from the ban and, in this way other unknown agents could be generally forbidden under the convention. She stated further that another advantage would be that no newly developed or recently discovered agents could be produced as chemical warfare agents until explicitly suspended from the ban.[10]

The idea of annex I (B) to our draft convention is, in principle, based on the recognition that the prohibition of chemical agents which are to be prohibited from the beginning must be secured by effective verification measures. As for unknown chemical agents, when their existence has become generally known, we would examine whether any effective verification measures could be available for them or not; then, we would proceed to study, at the review conference, whether they could be included in the list of chemical agents obligatorily banned. However, following this idea, I cannot but admit the defect that new chemical warfare agents, which are clandestinely developed, produced and stockpiled, might be left free from the control.

In this connexion, the idea suggested by Sweden—to put the two different lists of obligatorily prohibited agents and of suspended agents into one annex, and then temporarily prohibit, even though without available verification measures, the group of agents not falling into either list but belonging to the so-called twilight zone between the said two groups of agents—would deserve full consideration since this formula might work as a moral restraint for a State which is going to develop new chemical agents, and furthermore this certainly meets the purpose of our draft convention which aims at a comprehensive ban.

As for the so-called joint initiative promised by the United States and the Soviet Union last July,[11] the Polish representative, Mr. Wyzner, stated on 18 March that

> we welcome the information that measures have now been taken to implement the Soviet-American Agreement concerning a joint move in the CCD to conclude, as a first step, an international convention.[12]

Although I wish to associate myself with him in extending my heartfelt welcome to such information, yet at the same time I earnestly hope to listen to further concrete views from the two States concerned on the information referred to by the Polish representative.

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 413.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[12] CCD/PV.659, p. 12.

In concluding my statement, I wish to express the hope that I shall have another chance to take the floor on this subject.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, March 25, 1975 [1]

As we all know, the *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts provided for in General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 will very shortly be starting work in Geneva with a view to carrying out, under the auspices of CCD,

> a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.[2]

My delegation therefore considered it appropriate in this statement to express a few general considerations about this question, to which Mexico attaches particular importance, as is evidenced by the part which it had the privilege of playing in the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). By virtue of this Treaty there already exists in the world a nuclear-weapon-free zone whose area covers approximately 8 million square kilometres and whose constantly growing population at present numbers about 150 million.[3]

Even though we fully realize that many of the "aspects" which the group of experts will be called upon to study will vary according to the zone dealt with in each case, we also believe that there are other aspects which are of a general nature and about which a number of conclusions may be reached, on the basis of the conscientious preparatory work and lengthy negotiations undertaken for approximately three years in connexion with the Treaty of Tlatelolco—conclusions which it would, in our opinion, be useful to consider.

By way of introduction, I should like to say a few words about the various types of militarily denuclearized zones which may in principle be envisaged.

Firstly, there may be a zone of the size of a continent, sub-continent or region with geographic continuity, which is intended to comprise all the States included therein. This is undoubtedly the ideal type of zone.

However, since geographic continuity is not, and indeed, should not be an essential element for the establishment of a militarily denuclearized zone, a second type of zone would be one which comprises several

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[1] CCD/PV.661, pp. 9–15.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

States, albeit not coterminous, which in the exercise of their sovereignty wish to undertake to keep their respective territories free of nuclear weapons.

Lastly, there is no objection to a militarily denuclearized zone comprising the territory of only one State, whose Government has reached the conclusion that it is in the interests of its people to promulgate a law or decree by which it gives a similar undertaking.

The observations which I shall make in my statement concern the first of the three types of zone which I have defined, although many of these observations may, of course, be applicable to the other two types.

I shall begin by noting that the experience gained from the nuclear-weapon-free zones established in Latin America and Antarctica,[4] in outer space,[5] and on the sea-bed and ocean floor [6] shows that the appropriate procedure for the establishment of such zones is the conclusion of a multilateral treaty or convention. This observation is confirmed by the case of the proposed denuclearization of Africa since, although there are so far only three General Assembly resolutions on the question and a solemn declaration made in 1964 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity,[7] the authors of that declaration announced their readiness to undertake, in an international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons, and requested the General Assembly of the United Nations "to take the necessary measures to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement to that effect". It is undoubtedly in the light of this intention that one should interpret the inclusion, in the provisional agenda for the thirtieth session of the Assembly, of an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", as agreed in resolution 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974.[8] There is, therefore, every reason to believe that the next step towards the military denuclearization of Africa will probably be the drafting and conclusion of a treaty, as was the case in Latin America.

If one agrees, as it appears one should, that a treaty—or a convention—constitutes the appropriate instrument for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, one of the principal problems that may arise is the problem of its entry into force. Although it would be wrong to exclude the possibility of a uniformity of views on this matter, it may also happen, as was the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, that there is no such uniformity. In such a situation, the important point would appear to be to ensure that the unity of all the States of the region, or at least of all those which are undertaking the preparatory work, should be maintained through the adoption of a formula of a

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[4] *Ibid., 1945–1959*, Vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.
[5] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[6] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[7] *Ibid., 1964*, pp. 294–295.
[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 807–808.

kind which, without imposing the treaty on any State against its will, will at the same time prevent any State from enjoying a kind of veto which would make it impossible for the treaty to enter into force for those States which are willing to accept forthwith the obligations which it entails.

A solution of this kind might very well entail, as was the case with the Latin American Treaty (articles 4 and 28), the need to agree that there should be two zones of application of the treaty: one with immediate effect, as soon as the number of ratifications provided for in the treaty has been attained, and the other which would enter into effect only when specific requirements have been fulfilled.

Another point which will have to be dealt with in any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone concerns the régime to which the zone shall be subject and the obligations which the States parties will consequently have to assume. Perhaps the most appropriate definition of such a régime is that which was formulated in 1964 by the Preparatory Meeting for the Denuclearization of Latin America (REUPRAL), namely that "denuclearization" should be understood to mean the "absence of nuclear weapons".

On the question of obligations, the main point is that they should be defined in a precise and comprehensive manner which allows no possibility of evasion. Thus, for example, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco the Contracting Parties, after committing themselves "to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction", specifically undertake "to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories", not only "the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons", but also "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons", whether by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else, by anyone on their behalf, or in any other way. As if this was not sufficient, the Parties also undertake "to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon".

It would appear extremely advisable that any treaty that may be concluded on this question should include an objective definition of nuclear weapons. In this connexion it is worth recalling the definition incorporated in article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which reads as follows:

> For the purposes of this treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.[9]

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[9] *Ibid., 1967*, p. 72.

It should also be specified in the treaty that, for the purposes of the treaty, the term "territory" shall be construed as including the territorial sea, the air space and any other area over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.

The establishment of an inspection and control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations assumed will be an essential provision of any treaty of this type. Such a system should, as a minimum, comprise the full application of the IAEA safeguards to all the nuclear activities of the parties. In the light of experience with the Tlatelolco Treaty, it would be very desirable that, whenever possible, the parties should make provision, in addition to the safeguards which I have just mentioned, for specific regional procedures, such as those established in articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Latin American Treaty which, in particular, permit special inspections to be carried out if necessary.

Apart from special clauses designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on conditions advantageous for the developing States, and apart from clauses dealing with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—a subject which will undoubtedly be among those requiring particular attention by the experts in the preparation of their study—treaties for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should contain general rules such as those in article 17 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which reads:

> Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress.[10]

In the preparation of any of the treaties of the kind I am discussing, the provision in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be constantly borne in mind. It reads as follows:

> Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.[11]

This provision will be of particular relevance because it invalidates any claim that the conclusion of treaties for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should in any form whatever be made conditional upon the States of the zone in question being parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In this connexion, it should in our view be remembered that any treaty possessing the features I have described will be greatly superior to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, the basic purpose of the kind of treaty to which I have referred is to guarantee the complete absence of nuclear weapons in the territories to which it applies whatever the State under whose authority or control such weapons may be. The Non-

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[11] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 464.

Proliferation Treaty, on the other hand, merely aims at ensuring that the number of States possessing or controlling nuclear weapons does not increase; but it does not in any way restrict the capacity of States possessing nuclear weapons to install or place such weapons in the territory of other States with the consent of the latter.

In the case of future nuclear-weapon-free zones in which situations exist which are similar to that obtaining in Latin America—where, it will be remembered, in addition to the territories of sovereign States, there are in the zone defined in the Treaty of Tlatelolco territories for which the Governments of States outside the zone are *de jure* or *de facto* internationally responsible—one appropriate solution might be that which has been applied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco through the elaboration of a protocol—Additional Protocol I—which was opened for signature and ratification by the Governments in question.

As regards the obligations which States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake with respect to any nuclear-weapon-free zone and to States and territories situated in that zone, a model already exists—namely, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has been repeatedly and unequivocally approved without reservation by the General Assembly.

The obligations which nuclear-weapon-States parties to that Protocol undertake are as follows:

(a) To respect "in all its express aims and provisions" the "status of de-nuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth" in the Treaty of Tlatelolco;
(b) "Not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article I of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies", and
(c) "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty".[12]

The General Assembly has declared on a number of occasions that such obligations

> are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.[13]

It should also be remembered in this connexion that the General Assembly has emphatically and on several occasions expressed the conviction that

> for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol.[14]

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[12] *Ibid., 1967*, p. 83.
[13] See *ibid., 1970*, p. 690.
[14] *Ibid., 1970*, p. 690; *1971*, p. 899; *1972*, p. 848; *1973*, p. 853; *1974*, p. 794.

The claim advanced in the past by one of the nuclear Powers that a simple unilateral declaration would be sufficient should therefore be rejected.

One last aspect on which I wish to comment very briefly is the question as to who should decide whether in a particular region and at a given moment there already exists a nuclear-weapon-free zone—established of course by the States of the zone—which is entitled to be respected as such by all States. As we see it, in the context of the present organization of the international community, this power or prerogative belongs solely and exclusively to the United Nations General Assembly. The decision of the Assembly, the most representative and authoritative organ of the international community, should be regarded as final in the matter, whatever the effects of the establishment of the zone may have on the so-called "strategic balance" for one of the great Powers or for any other State. This is what happened in the case of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, when, as will be remembered, the Assembly, in resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, welcomed that Treaty "with special satisfaction" and, after stating that it "constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security", called upon "all States to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it".[15]

I venture to hope that the very general considerations which I have advanced on little more than a dozen of the principal aspects of the question of nuclear weapon-free zones may be of some use to the group of experts which is to begin its study here next month.

As an end-piece, I would merely add two points.

First, one of the most important lessons to be derived from the successful Latin American initiative culminating at Tlatelolco is that the most efficient procedure for the completion of such a task is the establishment, by the States directly interested, of an *ad hoc* body whose sole duty is to carry out all the preparatory work which is necessary for the conclusion of the proposed Treaty. Thus, the key to the success of the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America must be sought in the fruitful work undertaken for about two years by the Preparatory Commission for the De-nuclearization of Latin America.

Secondly, any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone should take care to set forth clearly, either in its preamble or in the appropriate substantive articles, certain fundamental truths of special relevance, such as these:

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and the civilian population

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[15] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 620-621.

alike constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable;

That the existence of nuclear weapons in the territory of a State, far from contributing to its security, converts it inevitably into a target, a magnet which is bound to attract "first strikes" with those terrible instruments of mass destruction;

That nuclear-weapon-free zones do not constitute an end in themselves, but a means of achieving, in a subsequent stage, general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which, in the terrifying situation created by the existing gigantic nuclear arsenals, is now a vital demand of all the peoples of the world.

Executive Order 11850: Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, April 8, 1975 [1]

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions, in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 14, 1975, p. 350.

of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD

The White House,
April 8, 1975.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, April 8, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Findley, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you in support of my Agency's legislative program.

The President, in his letter transmitting the bill now before you,[2] pointed out that the negotiation of effective arms control arrangements, especially in the area of strategic arms, continues to be a priority objective of this administration. To that end, the strategic arms limitation talks are continuing in Geneva with a view to implementing the Vladivostok accords.[3]

Additional agreements are in the process of negotiation: On underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, on nuclear nonproliferation, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe.

As the President said in his letter,

> By continuing these negotiations and by seeking solutions to the many complex and difficult problems involved, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities.[4]

CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE COOPERATION IS IMPERATIVE

To move ahead on arms control, strong and effective cooperation between the Congress and the executive branch is imperative. Fortunately both the legislative and executive branches generally agree today that

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[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on HR 1550 and HR 4265*, pp. 6–8.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 63–64.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

[4] *Ante*, p. 64.

verifiable arms control is essential for our national security. Were it not for this shared outlook, the prospect for continuing progress in arms control would be poor.

Consequently we seek to inform this committee on the Agency's needs, to express our gratitude for your backing in the past, to keep you and other Members of Congress informed about our work, and we seek to request your advice and guidance.

With this in mind, in 1974 I made approximately 75 visits to Members of Congress and, during the year, I and other Agency officials testified before congressional committees a total of 18 times.

It has been my privilege to testify before this subcommittee and its predecessor on several occasions. During the year since my Agency's legislative program was last presented to the Congress, I first appeared before this committee on May 14, 1974, when you were considering our country's chemical warfare policy—very important and effective hearings.

Subsequently my Agency welcomed the thorough review of our activities and role in the formation of U.S. arms control policy which you conducted during the summer and fall of 1974. We cooperated in the committee staff preparations which preceded the extensive hearings in September and October and I testified at the October 3, 1974, hearing.

More recently, on March 5, 1975, I gave a presentation before this committee about current arms control developments and answered many questions from members of the committee.

Because of these recent hearings, I have intentionally limited my prepared remarks today to my Agency's legislative program. I will, of course, be happy to answer your questions about other matters of interest to the committee as to the legislative program.

INCREASED RESOURCES REQUIRED IN AUTHORIZATION

Slightly increased resources are required for each of the next 2 years for the Agency, compared with the appropriations for the current fiscal year 1975. We are requesting a total authorization of $23 million for the 2-year period of fiscal years 1976 and 1977. Of this $23 million total, $10,690,000, plus $360,000 for estimated pay increases and other unprogrammed costs, will be needed for fiscal year 1976; the balance will remain for fiscal year 1977.

In addition, we are requesting a small change in our act so that we can grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their employees on the basis of security clearances granted by the Department of Defense. This amendment would eliminate the time-consuming investigations in cases where the Agency requires the services of contractors already cleared by the Department of Defense.

The $23 million authorization which we are requesting for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 is $1 million more than the $22 million authorized

by Congress for the 2-year authorization period of fiscal years 1973 and 1974 and is also an increase on an annual basis from the $10.1 million authorized for the current fiscal year.

GREATEST INCREASE IN PROGRAM OPERATION

Approximately two-thirds of the increase for fiscal year 1976 is for program operation and one-third for research. The increase in program costs is primarily to cover rising costs, both in Washington and at the site of the SALT negotiations in Geneva. Maintaining support for these negotiations is quite expensive.

The increase also serves to cover the new negotiations with the Soviets on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [5] and on environmental modification. The increase in external research will go mainly to finding solutions to nuclear proliferation problems. Of the additional increase for fiscal year 1977, approximately half would also be used to build up the external research program.

In sum, the current request will permit the Agency to fulfill the President's goal that the Agency "play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities."

I respectfully request the committee to approve the authorization bill as submitted by the administration. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Modifications in the Japanese Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 8, 1975 [1]

The Japanese delegation wishes to make the following modifications to the wording used in the Japanese draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, document CCD/420, which was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on April 30, 1974.[2]

1. To substitute the words "chemical warfare agents" for "chemical agents" stipulated in Article 1 (a) and Annex 1 (Alternatives A and B) of the above draft convention,
2. And also substitute the words "chemical substances" for "chemical agents" stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIV of the above draft convention.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225 ff.
[1] CCD/452, Apr. 8, 1975.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 99–106.

Address by ACDA Director Iklé to the Arms Control Association: Nuclear Proliferation, April 9, 1975 [1]

It seems particularly appropriate that we should meet here on Capitol Hill to discuss nuclear proliferation. Congress has shown leadership on this issue since the first Atomic Energy Act, the McMahon Act of 1946. And Congress provides the necessary continuity and long-term concern. U.S. efforts to negotiate the Nonproliferation Treaty [2] were given strong impetus by the Pastore resolution of 1966.[3] Of the 56 original sponsors of that resolution, half continue to serve in the Senate today.

To prepare a new arms control initiative can take months; to negotiate it can take years. If agreement is reached, its effects may be felt for decades. The history of the Nonproliferation Treaty has already spanned the Administrations of three Presidents. Next month's Review Conference involves the fourth.

The role of Congress is also critical in backing up our policies, such as through legislation in behalf of export controls and financial support for international safeguards. Congress understands full well why it must give continuing attention to nuclear proliferation. The way this problem is managed will have the deepest impact on America's future. Our political system, our open society, could not survive in a world where the threat of nuclear destruction would be an everyday tool for political ends.

Now that I have pleaded for your active participation, I want to be frank and open with you. The news on nuclear proliferation is bad.

Several countries not now nuclear-weapons states appear to be making determined efforts to acquire a capability that would enable them to build their own atomic bombs. How far they will go, and how many others will join them, are still open questions. And in the future we will have to face the fact that some governments might not be able to defeat all attempts of criminal groups to acquire the materials to make bombs. Unless we find new ways to cope with this risk, it will increase because of the growing spread of peaceful uses.

Indeed, today the spread of nuclear-weapons capability is riding on the wave of peaceful uses of the atom. The world's first five nuclear-weapons states clearly started out with a military program. Now it is peaceful technology that provides not only the means but also the cover in all cases where we fear that a new weapons program might be on the way. At the same time, we must of course recognize that beneficial uses of the atom will legitimately expand.

Many advanced industrial countries, because of their competence in technology, could have embarked on nuclear-weapons programs some

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 5, 1975, pp. 578–580.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Ibid., 1966*, pp. 306–307.

time ago. Yet they held on to their decision not to do so. Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan are conspicuous examples. Capability did not automatically produce intent. But now we suspect that the intent to make nuclear weapons exists in several places even though the capability is not yet there.

We can slow down the spread of nuclear-weapons capability from country to country. We cannot stop it by ourselves. In a way, the United States has contributed to this spread, starting in 1954 when we abandoned the strict secrecy and tight controls on nuclear technology and began to help other countries acquire nuclear reactors and know-how.

Today we have to rely mainly on political incentives and political constraints to prevent nuclear arms competition from infecting country after country—to preserve a world in which nuclear weapons will not be used. This fact is what makes the Nonproliferation Treaty so important.

What does this treaty do?

It is true that the treaty does not include all the critical countries. For example, India, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina have indicated that at this time they will not be parties. Further, any party to the treaty could legally withdraw in three months if its supreme national interests are jeopardized, or a government could simply violate the treaty. But any arms control agreement can be abandoned by a determined, independent nation. The Nonproliferation Treaty is about as binding as most other treaties and is adequately verifiable. In this treaty, a common vision unites over 80 countries: they all look to a world so ordered that man's most destructive invention will threaten no one.

However, some have argued that the benefits of the treaty are unconvincing to non-nuclear-weapons states, since the principal nuclear powers have so far failed to undertake genuine nuclear disarmament. The treaty, they say, is merely a device for the superpowers to maintain their dominance.

This argument is wrong. While progress in nuclear arms control has been much slower than one would wish, the two major nuclear powers have imposed important arms limitations upon themselves. Indeed, through the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972,[4] the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to build armaments precisely in the area where their worldwide monopoly was beyond dispute; no other country could build an ABM system in the foreseeable future.

Another criticism of the Nonproliferation Treaty (pressed mostly by less industrialized countries) is that the nuclear-weapons states have not been sufficiently forthcoming in providing peaceful nuclear assistance and that the controls on proliferation hinder peaceful development.

This charge is totally false. The less industrialized countries have reached their present level in peaceful nuclear technology only because

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[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

of the assistance they received from nuclear-weapons states or from certain nuclear-industrial countries, such as Canada, that are strong supporters of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Our efforts to prevent the export of nuclear technology from spreading nuclear arms does not infringe on any right of any country. On the contrary, the only universal treaty obligation to export technology, that I know of, is the obligation created by the Nonproliferation Treaty—the obligation to contribute to the development of peaceful nuclear applications in non-nuclear-weapons states. The importing countries can't have it both ways, no matter how rich or poor they are; they cannot denounce the Nonproliferation Treaty and yet claim the right to nuclear assistance that was created solely by this treaty.

Other objections are that the treaty is inadequate to deal with one or another of the many problems of nuclear weapons—the control of nuclear technology through export restrictions and safeguards, the management of nuclear-waste disposal, and above all, the security of nations who agree to give up nuclear arms. The answer is not to discount the value of the treaty, but to supplement it.

We must continue efforts to separate nuclear exports that safely serve peaceful purposes from those that will proliferate weapons capabilities. But the U.S. Government cannot do this alone. The International Atomic Energy Agency must play a critical role here. We should give this Agency our fullest political and financial backing. It faces a gigantic task with quite limited means. As a contribution to this end, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has developed a number of instruments to assist international inspectors in detecting theft or diversion of dangerous materials.

Unhappily, shortsighted commercial interests sometimes militate against the application of effective controls. It is essential that supplier nations agree not to undercut each other on nuclear safeguards. You would think that all nations willing to export nuclear materials or equipment would be anxious to prevent proliferation. Even the largest nations would suffer grievously if nuclear explosives became widely available, and the welfare and independence of medium-sized or smaller industrial nations might be even more threatened. Thus, I hope all the exporters of nuclear technology will keep their own long-term self-interest in mind.

Another problem we face is that of nuclear wastes. At the present time, these wastes—spent fuel from reactors—are simply accumulating, and of course they will accumulate increasingly as more reactors come into use. They are dangerous now from the standpoint of possible permanent contamination of the environment; but they might become far more dangerous still if there were a widespread effort to reprocess them and thus extract plutonium which could be used for weapons as well as for reactor fuel. Several imaginative solutions have been suggested, which seem promising on technical and economic grounds. But there are still great gaps in our knowledge.

The big question remains: Will nations agree not to acquire nuclear weapons?

The answer is this: A country will agree if, in its judgment, its security is served by doing so. The Nonproliferation Treaty, basically, ties together many countries into a multilateral commitment not to start nuclear arms competition with each other. Many nations understand that such competition would exacerbate existing conflicts in their area, raising new instability and the chances of nuclear war. Yet these countries will also consider whether their self-denial of nuclear arms might not adversely affect their security from nuclear blackmail, or from armed attack, by the present nuclear powers.

Given the ideological and national conflicts in the world, nations forgoing nuclear weapons for defense will naturally seek protection by other means. Protection through a strong alliance, for many nations, is now the alternative to a desperate search for security by getting their own nuclear bombs. And let us face this fact squarely: Alliances protecting most of these countries at this time would not survive without continuing American support.

So we are presented with two choices. One is to prepare for an autarkic America, which, by terminating alliances, has in effect resigned itself to further nuclear proliferation, an America that tries to rely on its own resources only, an America that tries to protect itself behind barriers of air and missile defenses and a tightly guarded border. Our standard of living would be lower and our personal freedoms severely curtailed. But we could claim to be free of foreign entanglements, without troops and bases overseas, and no demands from allies to worry about.

The second choice hopefully open to us is to play a leading role in maintaining a worldwide security structure that will give non-nuclear nations the confidence to forgo their own nuclear forces. Unless we play this role, we will lose both our right and our capability to act against nuclear proliferation.

We can't have it both ways; we can't be free from foreign involvements and be effective against nuclear proliferation.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, April 10, 1975 [1]

The 1975 spring session of the Committee on Disarmament closes today. It has been comparatively short because of the forthcoming conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] which will deal with the important problem of

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[1] CCD/PV.665, pp. 22–28.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

today, that of eliminating the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. As was to be expected, this problem received considerable attention during the Committee's spring session.

Like other delegations, we should like to stress the great importance which attaches in our time to the task of strengthening the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime. To avert the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to work out specific measures aimed at removing all obstacles to the implementation of a lasting nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime. The biggest obstacle to the implementation of this régime is the fact that a number of "near-nuclear" States are still outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forms the basis of the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime. A series of measures are therefore needed which would increase the number of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby conferring on it a universal character.

A number of delegates who spoke in the Committee on the problem of non-proliferation pointed to the need for strengthening the international security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion we should like to note that it is precisely this task which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is called upon to resolve. In conjunction with Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968,[3] this Treaty significantly enhances the security of all States, including that of the non-nuclear States Parties to the Treaty. For this reason we should like to emphasize that the entry of the NPT into effect meets the vital interests of all States. There is no doubt that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously weaken the security of all countries throughout the world and lead to increased international tension. The likelihood of nuclear war would be much increased, since there would be a greater danger of international conflicts developing into a nuclear war. The danger of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war resulting from miscalculations or defective technical function would grow as the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons increased.

The above-mentioned Security Council resolution is an important supplement to the NPT, and should be read with the identical statements made by the three nuclear Powers—the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom—on the safeguarding of the security of non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty.[4] Those statements confirm the intention of the USSR and of the two other nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT to seek, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or a threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, immediate action by the Security Council to support, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 444.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 439–440.

The Security Council resolution recognizes that such aggression would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all the nuclear-weapon States which are its permanent members, would have to act immediately to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The Council's resolution also welcomes the intentions expressed to that effect in the aforementioned statements of the three nuclear Powers.

Speaking of the security factors connected with the NPT, it is necessary to stress that the utmost importance attaches in this respect to those provisions of the Treaty which set forth the obligations of its Parties to pursue negotiations on further steps of disarmament. Those provisions form a basis for the disarmament efforts of States and thus for the security of States as well, since any agreement on disarmament measures will complement and strengthen international peace and security.

In this connexion it may be noted that important steps are being taken to implement those Treaty provisions. Thus a few days ago, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [5] came into force. It may also be noted that the 1925 Geneva Protocol [6] for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare has become a universal international instrument embodying a generally-recognized rule of international law. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,[7] which also has entered into force, has placed important limitations on the use of the marine environment for military purposes.

The agreements reached between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1972 and 1974 on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic arms,[8] on the limitation of underground nuclear tests [9] and on the prevention of nuclear war [10] must also be considered as directly linked to the implementation of the provisions of the NPT dealing with disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union and the United States are negotiating in those fields further steps which, we hope will contribute further to the fulfilment of the tasks envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That same goal is pursued by the Soviet Union-United States arrangement on joint steps to be taken to limit chemical means of warfare [11] and prohibit the influencing of the environment for military purposes.[12] The agreements and understandings reached

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[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[6] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[7] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[8] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–207; *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231, 746–750.
[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[10] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 634–640.
[11] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 236.
[12] *Ante*, pp. 82–83.

between the two Powers on arms control and disarmament represent a considerable contribution to the development of international co-operation aimed at improving the international situation, easing international tension and resolving problems caused by the development of mass-destruction weapons.

We have merely touched in very general terms on the problems of strengthening the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime. At the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT to be held this May, the delegations of the Soviet Union and of other countries will fully consider and elucidate all these questions. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the main object of such consideration should be the all-round strengthening of the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime. All other tasks facing the Conference should be subordinated to that particular goal, which in present-day conditions must determine the direction in which international co-operation for arms control and disarmament must develop.

Owing to its brevity this session of the Committee has been confined to an exposition in general terms of the views of Committee members on the most pressing disarmament issues, and to agreement on organizational questions relating to the consideration of some problems referred to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly. At today's closed meeting of the Committee on Disarmament we should like to express some ideas on the discussion of disarmament problems in the Committee.

We note with satisfaction the interest shown by many delegations in the prohibition of influencing the environment for military purposes. We have listened with keen interest to the statements made by delegates on this problem and in particular, to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Allen, who put a number of questions on the draft convention proposed by the Soviet side. In this connexion we should like to observe that the draft convention [13] and the clarifications thereof given by the Soviet delegation at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly [14] constitute a necessary basis for the discussion of this problem. By proposing that the prohibition of influence on nature for military purposes be discussed in international forums and by introducing a corresponding draft convention, the Soviet side has made a definite contribution to the solution of that problem. We call upon all members of the Committee to contribute in every possible way, during the summer session of the Committee, to a constructive consideration and solution of this problem, and thereby make their contribution towards implementing the prohibition of influencing nature for military and other hostile purposes.

During the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament, considerable interest has been displayed in the study of problems of creat-

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[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 517–521.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 514–515, 549–556, 707–710.

ing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We note with satisfaction the consensus reached in the Committee on the question of organizing a group of experts to carry out such a study. A number of delegations have stated their countries' positions on the substance of the problem of creating such zones. For our part, we should like to note that the Soviet Union's basic position on this question consists in promoting the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Proceeding from this position of principle on the question under consideration, the Soviet side has supported the decision to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of creating nuclear-free zones, bearing in mind that such a study will help to strengthen the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation régime, which is based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Considerable interest has also been shown during the session in the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Committee is confronted with the task of negotiating an agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. Unfortunately, it has failed to make progress in this direction at the present session. During the summer session the Committee will have to try to break the stalemate and solve this important disarmament problem.

A number of delegations have asked for information on the prospects for implementing the joint Soviet-United States initiative of 3 July 1974 concerning the conclusion, as a first step towards the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.[15] In this connexion we should like to state that appropriate steps have been taken to implement the joint initiative. We believe that those steps will advance the solution of the problem of banning the most dangerous types of chemical weapons.

Apart from the questions we have touched upon, the Committee will consider at its summer session the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of arms control, as envisaged in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX).[16] It will have to take into account the results of the studies carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the peaceful application of nuclear explosions, their utility, feasibility, and legal, health and security aspects. In considering this problem it will be necessary to keep in mind also the results of the discussion on this question at the forthcoming conference to review the operation of the NPT. The Soviet side attaches great significance to this problem and hopes that its consideration by the Committee will be useful, both for solution of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions itself and fulfilment of the wider tasks of arms control and disarmament.

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 803–806.

In setting the task of solving a wide range of disarmament problems, it seems necessary to intensify the efforts to convene a world disarmament conference. The convocation of such a conference would contribute to the development and consolidation of the favourable trend which has prevailed in the last few years in international relations as a result of the efforts made to ease international tension and the conclusion of a number of important multilateral and bilateral agreements on the problem of arms control and disarmament. At present it is important to seek and employ all ways and means of giving a new impetus to the further development and deepening of that trend.

The arms race, which eats up huge resources, is detrimental to all States, including those which do not directly take part in it. All countries without exception are interested in bringing it to an end.

In emphasizing the need to convene a world disarmament conference, it is necessary to note that the overwhelming majority of States have expressed themselves in favour of it. Such a conference should be a forum where all countries could state and compare their views on the entire range of disarmament questions, relating both to weapons of mass destruction and to conventional armaments and armed forces. A detailed exchange of views at the Conference would clarify the positions of all States on various aspects of the disarmament problem and enable, by joint effort, the most effective ways and means to be found for its solution. The work of the conference would undoubtedly contribute to making the activity of States negotiating disarmament measures more purposeful. It would help to determine the most topical aspects of the disarmament problem which call for immediate solution, and to outline practical ways and means of limiting and stopping the arms race.

It would be necessary for the conference to discuss ways of ensuring progress on further measures to put an end to the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, to prohibit other types of weapons of mass destruction and to reduce conventional arsenals.

The discussion of these questions at the Conference should not, of course, replace those forms of disarmament negotiations which have justified themselves, in particular the Disarmament Committee. An important objective of the conference would be to bring all major militarily-significant States to the disarmament negotiations.

The convocation of a world disarmament conference has become a necessity. It would help to consolidate and deepen the détente which now exists in the world, to make it irreversible and complement it by a military détente.

We should like to express the hope that, during the forthcoming break in Committee's work, the questions on its agenda will be carefully and thoroughly considered in the capitals of States members of the Committee, and that this will create more favourable conditions for achieving progress in the negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and on disarmament.

Before ending my speech I desire to thank Mr. Björnerstedt, the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General, and all his colleagues in the Secretariat, for the great help they have given this Committee in fulfilling its duties. We should also like to express our gratitude to all the interpreters and translators who have done so much to lighten and facilitate the work of the delegations.

As the Committee's spring session ends, we should also like to express our sincere appreciation and sympathy to our colleague Ambassador El-Erian, the head of the Egyptian delegation to this Committee, who is leaving that post to become the Ambassador of Egypt in Berne. We would stress his constructive contribution to the work of the Committee, of which he is an original member. We wish him the fullest success in his new post, and express the hope that the nearness of Berne to Geneva will enable us to maintain with him our close and friendly association.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, April 10, 1975 [1]

Today we are bringing our spring session to a close. Before addressing the principal topic of my statement, I would like to take a brief look at where we stand on a number of the current issues before the Committee.

We are pleased that agreement was reached during the session on the basic questions involved in organizing the *Ad Hoc* Experts' Group study of nuclear-free zones.[2] The arrangement limiting the Group's size while permitting interested governments to submit their views should accommodate the twin objectives of assuring an orderly approach to the study and allowing the expression of a broad range of views on a subject that is clearly of widespread interest. Judging from the constructive approach that delegations have taken toward this project, I am confident that the experts will be able to prepare a useful document responsive to the wishes of the General Assembly and reflecting credit on this Committee's discharge of its responsibilities.

A number of delegations, among them those of Sweden, Canada and the United Kingdom, have referred to basic conceptual problems inherent in the subject of limitations on military environmental modification activities. There appears to be widespread recognition that several key questions will have to be answered as we proceed. Most fundamental, perhaps, is the question of how to define clearly the subject of our discussions; this poses particular problems in that some of the activities we are discussing are still largely speculative and may remain so.

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[1] CCD/PV.665, pp. 28–39.
[2] *Post*, pp. 321–349.

In considering effective restraints in this area we will need an understanding of the subject both flexible enough to allow for future developments and clear enough to enable us to distinguish between potential peaceful uses of environmental modification techniques and the use of such techniques as weapons. The question has also been raised—I am thinking here in particular of Mr. Allen's thought-provoking remarks of 18 March—of how we can distinguish between methods of warfare whose purpose is directly to pervert or use natural phenomena as agents of damage or destruction, and those which might have the incidental effect of modifying the environment. Yet another question, this one too raised by Mr. Allen, is that of defining hostile intent in connexion with the use of environmental modification techniques. My delegation agrees that these are important questions. We shall have to give them careful and detailed consideration when we return this summer.

As several speakers have observed, the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the ongoing work of the International Atomic Energy Agency should put us in a better position during the summer session to fulfil the Committee's mandate to examine the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. My delegation supports the view, expressed by a number of other delegations, that our deliberations on this complex subject could benefit from the participation of experts. We therefore look forward to informal meetings with experts during the summer session, and we are prepared to send experts to such meetings.

Since the opening of our current session the Biological Weapons Convention [3] has entered into force with the deposit of the instruments of ratification of the three depositary Governments on 26 March. At the Washington ceremony marking this event, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, expressing satisfaction on the occasion—satisfaction that this Committee can certainly share—observed that the Convention makes "a solid contribution to man's freedom from fear." Some forty countries are now parties to this Convention, and I hope many more will join their ranks in the near future.

The Biological Weapons Convention affirms the commitment of its parties to continue negotiations toward the achievement of agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In addition, my Government has also undertaken to consider with the Soviet Union a joint initiative in this body with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.[4] As members of the Committee are aware, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at their summit meeting at

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 236.

Vladivostok last November noted that initial contacts had been made between representatives of the two Governments in this connexion.[5] I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the seriousness with which the United States views these commitments and our determination to carry out our responsibilities under them.

Let me now turn to the main topic of this statement. Conventional arms have a central place in the military planning of virtually every country of the world, a daily and almost commonplace role in national and international affairs, and a profound long-term impact on the security of us all. Despite—or perhaps more realistically because of—these factors, the subject of conventional arms control has occupied the efforts of the CCD only rarely in recent years.

My Government has long stressed the importance of giving serious and detailed consideration to the question of possible restraints on conventional weapons. In this Committee we have often stated our belief that suitable restraint in the conventional arms field could make a major contribution to the security and well-being of all States. In interventions over the last several years we have emphasized the United States' willingness to explore all practical approaches to the problem and have urged other delegations to express their views.

One of the approaches the United States delegation has discussed in the Committee is that of regional arms control. In 1966 we presented six principles which could be used as a basis for regional agreements in the conventional arms field.[6] In 1970 we recommended three additional steps that States could take unilaterally—"steps which, in their cumulative effect, even without formal binding agreements, could constitute reliable arms limitations on a regional basis." [7]

There are several reasons why my delegation believes it may be useful to consider restraints on conventional arms in a regional context. First, in most cases the relationship of the size and character of a country's armed forces to the armed forces of other States within its region is in most cases much more relevant to its security than the relationship between its forces and those of more distant Powers. Second, States near one another have generally tended to acquire similar and comparable military capabilities. Third, in several areas of the world there already exist regional co-operative arrangements which could serve as useful precedents for arms-control initiatives as well as regional institutions which could most conveniently take action on such initiatives.

Although these factors suggest in general terms why the regional or subregional approach to conventional arms control might be practicable and effective, prospects for actual arms-control arrangements obviously vary widely from one region to another. In several areas of

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 748.
[6] *Ibid., 1966*, pp. 226–230.
[7] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 420–426.

the world the prevailing political climate may not permit the successful negotiation of such arrangements for some time to come.

Nevertheless, we should be encouraged that in two regions of the world significant efforts in the area of conventional arms control have recently taken place. In Europe, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been actively seeking a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in the central region of the continent. In Latin America eight governments of that region agreed, in the Declaration of Ayacucho of 9 December 1974,[8] to create conditions which permit effective limitation of armaments, to put an end to the acquisition of arms for offensive warlike purposes, and to dedicate all possible resources to the social and economic development of Latin American countries. Representatives from several Latin American governments subsequently met in Lima, Peru, to discuss possible means of achieving arms limitations. The United States supports the efforts of these Latin American countries and hopes they will be successful in reaching solutions that further the worthy goals outlined at Ayacucho.

My Government continues to regard the regional approach to conventional arms control as a particularly promising one. In addition to the direct value of regional arrangements, the development of workable measures in one region may provide useful insights for solving arms-control problems elsewhere. A sound principle for the development of regional arrangements—one which we have endorsed on several previous occasions—is that the initiative should come from within the region concerned. This principle reflects the view that, in order that a regional arrangement may be effective and durable, it must be firmly grounded in the desires and concerns of the local parties, who are obviously the most directly affected.

At the same time, we have also pointed out that States outside the region concerned can play an important, perhaps essential, supportive role in the success of a regional arms-control arrangement. The willingness of outside Powers—particularly potential arms suppliers—to respect regional arrangements can operate as a strong inducement to develop local initiatives. Such willingness can provide assurance both to local parties and to other outside Powers that their efforts will not be undermined. Outside Powers might respect a regional arrangement in a variety of ways. They would presumably be expected to agree not to take action inconsistent with the restrictions worked out by the local States. This would reinforce the obligations assumed by regional parties and creating a double guarantee of compliance. Another way of respecting the arrangement might be to provide local parties with military equipment not proscribed and to render other types of support and assistance that might be important in satisfying those parties that their interests are adequately protected by the arrangement.

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[8] *Ibid.*, 1974, pp. 819–822.

The United States stands ready to assist and co-operate in the development of regional and subregional arrangements in ways desired by the local participants. We are prepared to respect such arrangements in an appropriate manner provided, of course, that the measures do not impinge upon the legitimate security needs of the participants or undermine existing security arrangements contrary to their wishes, and also provided that other outside Powers respect the arrangements.

While pursuing the possibilities of regional arrangements, we believe it is important to explore ways of making progress in the conventional arms field in a broader context as well. We are convinced that this Committee—in which countries from all regions of the world are represented—can make an important contribution by examining approaches to conventional arms control that are not limited in geographical scope and that could complement regional arrangements.

Today I would like to suggest one such approach. My delegation believes it would be useful for the CCD to identify and discuss principles of conduct that could be applicable on a world-wide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms. Before outlining some ideas about the content of such principles, I would like to discuss a number of factors which in our view should underlie conventional arms principles of this type.

Any practical attempt to deal with the question of restraints on conventional arms must be based on the assumption that, in today's world, States will be determined to acquire the means necessary to safeguard their national independence and territorial integrity. Indeed, the acquisition of conventional arms may indeed reinforce the stability of a local military balance and therefore reduce the likelihood of tensions and conflict.

All of us recognize, however, that there is another side to the impact of conventional arms. We live in an interdependent world—with a panoply of modern weapon systems, an increasing ability of most States to manufacture or otherwise acquire virtually all the arms they desire, and a system of rapid communications media which often alert States to the conventional arms activities of others. In such a world, the continuing accumulation of conventional arms does not necessarily guarantee increased security. Efforts to provide for one's own defence needs may often affect the security of others. Moreover, the acquisition of arms by one State may lead to competitive reactions, or over-reactions, by others. This process can result in a decreased sense of security for all concerned.

Any principle of conduct must take into account both of these sides of the conventional arms issue. In the light of the legitimate and often pressing security requirements of States, it would hardly be realistic to develop guidelines that would prevent the acquisition of arms altogether or would impose limits making it impossible for States to meet those requirements. Instead, the primary objective of such principles should be to encourage States to limit arms acquisitions to essential

security requirements and thereby reduce the likelihood that those acquisitions of arms will appear threatening to others and increase tensions among States.

Another important consideration relates to the nature of the restraints that would be called for in principles of conduct. Formal and legally-binding restraints are often desirable in the arms-control field, and may be particularly appropriate in the case of regional conventional arms arrangements. However—considering the very early stage of international efforts in the conventional arms area and the vastly differing perspectives on the problem held by countries throughout the world—it would be premature to expect States to accept firm obligations that would be applicable on a world-wide basis. At least initially, therefore, any universally-applicable principles of conduct should rely largely on the self-restraint of States. Such principles should encourage governments to be fully aware that their actions affect the security concerns of others. They should also encourage them to exercise appropriate restraints in order that such actions will not have adverse consequences, not only for other States but for their own security as well.

My delegation believes that such an approach could have a significant damping effect on the competition in conventional arms. Self-restraint by one would create incentives for self-restraint by others. However, I wish to emphasize that such a voluntary guidelines approach could not succeed if the willingness of some States to abide by the guidelines were not matched by the self-restraint of others whose co-operation is deemed important. Thus it would be unrealistic to expect one arms supplier to continue to restrain his shipments if other suppliers were determined to take up the slack. Likewise, we could not expect continued self-restraint in the acquisition of arms if such restraint were not reciprocated.

A third consideration is the wide variation not only in the types and military missions of the weapons systems currently in existence, but also in the effects they are likely to have in differing regions of the world. The political and military implications for regional stability of a particular arms acquisition depend on many factors. Among these are the quantities involved, the extent to which the acquisition provides the acquiring State with a new military capability; the relationship of the acquiring State's armed forces to those of other States whose security calculations might be affected; the perceptions by leaders of these other States of how the acquisition affects the balance of forces; and the compatibilities of the new weapon systems with the acquiring State's technical and support capabilities, climatic and terrain conditions, and other weapon systems already in its inventory.

These are, of course, only a few of the many factors that determine the effects of arms acquisitions internationally. They demonstrate, however, that the impact of arms acquisitions on stability depends as much on the political and military context in which arms are acquired as on the characteristics of the weapons themselves. It would rarely be

possible to single out specific weapons or categories of weapons that would be likely to have the same impact on stability in all situations throughout the world. In some regions the acquisition of small arms and ammunition might contribute more to insecurity than the acquisition of advanced jet aircraft. In other areas, of course, the reverse could be true.

Because of the diversity of local circumstances, we think that conventional arms guidelines applicable on a world-wide basis should encourage individual States to exercise judgment in making the determination whether, in a certain political and military context, the acquisition of weapons in certain types or quantities would be likely to have an adverse impact on regional or international security. Since such a determination inevitably has a subjective component, the guidelines would have to provide governments with flexibility in making arms acquisition decisions.

A final consideration in developing practical guidelines concerns the relationship between conventional arms acquisitions and economic and social development. In my delegation's view, such guidelines should call on governments to think of security as more than a strictly military concept; in particular, to recognize that real security lies not only in adequate defence capabilities but also in economic and social progress.

The foregoing considerations suggest the types of restraints that might appropriately be embodied in principles of conduct in the conventional arms field. One principle might call on States to assume responsibility for making the judgment that the arms they acquire or transfer will not have adverse effects on regional or international security. As I mentioned earlier, the requirements for stability may differ markedly from one situation to another. Accordingly this principle would involve a careful determination by States as to whether certain types or quantities of weapons would be destabilizing in a particular context.

Another principle might be based on the assumption that the acquisition of arms by one State may be a legitimate concern of those other States whose security is affected. Such a principle might indicate that consultations among interested States on possible effects of arms acquisitions could be useful in preventing or alleviating regional or international tensions. "Interested" States might include neighbouring countries as well as others outside the region. The consultations could be held in the event of a potential or officially-acknowledged arms acquisition of particular concern to others; and they might also be arranged from time to time without reference to a particular acquisition. The result could be to allay fears that might otherwise lead to competitive and possibly destabilizing actions by other States.

Another principle could be formulated to reflect the view that the concept of security cannot, and should not, be based solely on political-military criteria but must also encompass progress in the social, economic, and cultural fields. Such a principle might, for example,

encourage States to limit their acquisition of arms to those deemed indispensable for their security so that resources would not be unnecessarily diverted from economic and social development. States themselves must be the judge of their national priorities and of what is indispensable for their security. However, acceptance of a principle along these lines by a significant number of States, and real efforts to abide by it, could increase the incentives for others to act in accordance with it.

Another principle could apply to the transfer of arms-production capabilities rather than to the transfer of arms themselves. It might recommend that the export of technical data and equipment used for the manufacture of arms should be subject to the same effective governmental review and authorization procedures as arms exports themselves. All arms exporting countries require licences or their equivalent for the export of weapons. Not all of them, however, require government authorization for the export of technical know-how and equipment for the manufacture of arms.

In some cases, therefore, there are fewer legal barriers against the transfer of an arms-production capability than against the provision of the arms themselves. Observance would not restrict the ability of suppliers and recipient governments to engage in transfers of technology. It would, however, reduce the risk of unauthorized transfers that could lead to the creation of arms-production capabilities in areas of potential conflict, thus heightening tensions.

We believe that if a wide number of States supported principles such as the ones I have just suggested, and acted in accordance with them, this would have a marked favourable impact on the world-wide competition in conventional arms. Broad acceptance of the view that international security can be enhanced by practising appropriate restraints could favourably affect the way governments approach decisions on arms procurement. Implementation of such principles by a significant number of States would constitute an important first step leading to more favourable conditions for arms-control arrangements on a regional basis and for more binding restraints on a broader geographical basis.

The illustrative principles I have described this morning are of course not meant to be an exhaustive set of policy guidelines in the conventional arms area; nor should they be regarded as proposals in any formal sense. They are intended to provide a basis for further discussion, to focus attention and hopefully constructive efforts on an area of arms control that has so far not been amenable to effective solutions.

We hope that other delegations will comment on the approach suggested today and possibly recommend principles of their own. We would also be interested in any alternative approaches for developing restraints on conventional arms that delegations may propose. Because the subject of conventional arms control is one which touches upon the vital interests of us all, it is essential that the needs and desires of all

States be fully expressed and taken into account in our effort to find effective solutions.

In concluding, I should like to express my appreciation to Mr. Björnerstedt, Mrs. Gill, the interpreters, and all the members of the Secretariat staff for the great help they have given the Committee in its work this session. They have worked hard and well and we are most grateful to them.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot terminate this long intervention without expressing my feeling of sadness at the departure of the distinguished representative of Egypt and my good friend, Ambassador El-Erian. In the short time that we have been together here, I have come to admire and respect him. We have had a warm friendship with him and his charming wife. I hope that this relationship will continue and I wish him every success in his important new assignment.

Letter from ACDA Director Iklé to Senator Sparkman: Comments on S. 1170, A Bill to Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, April 16, 1975 [1]

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1975.

HON. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your letter requesting comments on S. 1170, a bill "To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and for other purposes." Because of the broad impact of the bill and the significance of the changes which it would make, extensive coordination within the Executive Branch has been necessary in the preparation of this reply. I sincerely regret the delay in the submission of this report.

The Administration opposes the enactment of S. 1170 in its present form. The Administration's specific comments and suggestions for modification are set out below.

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[1] *Foreign Relations Authorization, Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Session, April 29, May 1, and May 5, 1975,* pp. 152–156. Similar letters were sent to Congressman Morgan, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Congressman Zablocki, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House International Relations Committee.

PURPOSES OF THE ACT

Section 101 of the bill amends Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") so that instead of describing the capabilities of ACDA it constitutes an affirmative grant of authority to the Agency to carry out, under the direction of the President, a number of specific functions. The Administration is opposed to Section 101.

The Administration believes the distinction in the present law between the description of functions in Section 2 regarding purposes of the Act and the explicit statements of the Director's authority set out in subsequent Sections (such as 22, 31, 33 and 34) was deliberate. In its view, Section 2 of the Act should remain a statement of purposes, and the substantive authorities of the Director of ACDA and his relationship to the President and Secretary of State should continue to be set out in the succeeding provisions of the Act.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Section 102 of the bill would name the Director of ACDA as a member of the National Security Council. The Administration is opposed to Section 102 in its present form. It is unnecessary because the Director of ACDA presently attends those meetings of the National Security Council dealing with arms control and disarmament issues. Also it would be undesirable for the Director to have responsibility for participation in National Security Council matters other than those concerning arms control.

However, if it is desired to give legislative backing to the Director's existing relationship to the National Security Council, the Administration would have no objection to an amendment establishing a relationship for the Director similar to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Section 211(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (10 U.S.C. 141(b)) which provides that "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." This could be accomplished by striking out the words "shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters" in the first sentence of Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) and inserting in lieu thereof "shall serve as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament matters".

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Section 103 of the bill would amend Section 26 of the Act to require the President to appoint the General Advisory Committee (the President "shall" appoint). It would also require him to include members of

Congress on the Committee and would expand the role of the General Advisory Committee so that it would be an advisory body to committees of Congress. The Administration is opposed to Section 103.

The requirement that members of Congress be included would severely alter the relationship of the Committee to the Executive Branch. The mandatory inclusion of several members of Congress on the Committee, the requirement that they be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the further requirement that the Committee furnish advice to the Congress raise issues of appropriate Executive/Congressional relationships and also would cause practical problems affecting the usefulness of the Committee. These changes would detract from the Committee's present non-political orientation and purely advisory role and would complicate the existing relationship between the Agency and the substantive committees of the Congress which traditionally have exercised oversight in this area.

The deletion of the discretionary language concerning the appointment of the Committee would require the President to appoint a General Advisory Committee and would alter the Committee's present status of being authorized by law and established by the President. The change from the President "may appoint" to "shall appoint" is undesirable because of its inflexibility. It could result in the President being required to appoint an advisory committee at a time when none was needed. This would be contrary to the declaration of Congress in the Federal Advisory Committee Act that the number of such committees be kept to the minimum necessary and that they should be terminated when no longer needed.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

Section 104 of the bill would require any agency proposing an authorization for a program exceeding $250 million or an annual appropriation exceeding $50 million for armaments, ammunition, implements of war or military facilities to prepare and submit to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency an impact statement. The statements and ACDA reports thereon would be furnished to the NSC, OMB, and the Congress, and the Director would be required to make recommendations to the Congress with respect to any of the programs covered. The Administration is strongly opposed to Section 104 as presently written.

While the Administration supports the goal of effective communication of information to the Congress, it strongly holds that the examination of arms control issues in substantive hearings before the committees of Congress and a more analytic ACDA annual report as envisaged by Section 107 of the bill are preferable to the burdensome and costly process which would be required by Section 104.

Within the Executive Branch, the Agency is already playing a role in

the planning of programs having arms control implications through its participation in the National Security Council process and through the day-to-day interagency process whereby the Agency's viewpoint on arms control matters is considered. The current practice of the Director's involvement in the National Security Council process makes the Director a de facto advisor to the National Security Council on arms control issues. The proposed amendment in Section 102 concerning the National Security Council would with the change described in our comment make the Director of the Agency a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. In this way the intended reach of the bill is achieved while the unnecessary burdens of Section 104 are avoided.

The proposed amendment is also likely to establish a formalized adversary relationship between the Department of Defense and ACDA and might interfere with the day-to-day flow of vital information.

A serious objection to Section 104 of S. 1170 is that it may be productive of litigation which would interfere with arms control and disarmament efforts and impede vital national security programs. The problem is not so much one of the likelihood of litigation under the Freedom of Information Act for disclosure of arms control and disarmament impact statements and the Director's reports on his review and appraisal which is, of course, a significant concern, but rather one of extensive litigation of the type engendered by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).

Section 104 of S. 1170 is patterned to a large extent after Section 102 (2) (C) of the NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4332(2) (C)) which has been productive of literally hundreds of lawsuits. Neither the NEPA nor Section 104 of S. 1170 provide for lawsuits by private persons or organizations to challenge compliance by Government agencies with the impact statement preparation and review process, but the absence of such provision has not prevented private parties from successfully establishing a right to bring suit to enforce the NEPA. Such litigation can result in major Federal actions being delayed for years.

Although standing to sue may be more difficult to establish under Section 104 of S. 1170 than under the NEPA, the groundwork has been laid in the NEPA litigation and there is no certainty that the NEPA experience will not be repeated with private parties challenging the absence or the adequacy of arms control impact statements and their review. The NEPA litigation has shown that such challenges might well come from opponents as well as advocates of arms control and disarmament efforts and national security programs. In either event the result would be to involve the courts in an area which heretofore has been the domain of the Executive and the Congress.

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN CONSULTANTS

Section 105 of the bill would permit the Director of ACDA to dispose of the requirement for security clearances of those ACDA consultants

who will not have access to classified information. The Administration favors enactment of Section 105; however, since there is already a subsection (c) to Section 45, the new subsection requires renumbering and changes in the cross references.

It is estimated that approximately $750 in investigation costs would be saved for each unnecessary investigation of an ACDA consultant which is not performed. However, the main importance of the proposed amendment is in the saving of time rather than money since there is only an occasional need for the authority granted by this amendment.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Section 106 of the bill would amend Section 49(d) of the Act to make clear that ACDA is not precluded from using appropriated funds for the dissemination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament. The Administration favors enactment of Section 106.

The proposed amendment makes clearer the Agency's responsibility in carrying out its statutory mandate concerning dissemination of information on arms control and disarmament and, as such, is a desirable change.

REPORT TO CONGRESS

Section 107 of the bill would amend Section 50 of the Act to require the annual report by ACDA to Congress to include an analytical statement and appraisal regarding goals, negotiations, and activities.

The Administration has no objection to making the annual report more analytical in format. At the same time the requested information can also be provided in testimony before relevant Congressional Committees.

The ACDA annual report has traditionally been prepared on a calendar year basis. If the scope of the annual report is handled as proposed in this amendment, it is questionable whether the January 31 submission date presently contained in Section 50 provides sufficient time for the preparation of a calendar year report which includes an Executive Branch "posture statement" on arms control. Since Section 50 of the Act does not specify the period to be covered by each report, the January 31 reporting date would not be a problem if the Committee would indicate in its report the acceptability of reporting on a fiscal year basis. Such a change would allow sufficient time to develop an adequate initial expanded report for FY 1976 and, after the change in the fiscal year pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, would provide a reasonable time for the preparation of subsequent reports.

AMENDMENTS TO THE OTHER ACTS

Sections 201, 202, and 203 of the bill would amend the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Foreign Assist-

ance Act of 1961 to require coordination with ACDA and consideration of the Director's opinion as to the arms control implications as to each of the following activities:

(1) all decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States Munitions List;

(2) all evaluations of proposed sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act; and

(3) all decisions to furnish military assistance under Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The Administration opposes these amendments as being unnecessary for appropriate ACDA participation in arms transfer decisions. Section 35 of the Act authorizes the President to establish procedures for cooperation, consultation, and a continuing exchange of information between ACDA and other affected Government agencies in all significant aspects of United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters. Under this authority, the President has issued Executive Order 11044,[2] concerning interagency coordination of arms control and disarmament matters. In addition, Executive Order 11501,[3] concerning the administration of foreign military sales, requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to consult with the Director of ACDA on matters pertaining to his responsibilities.

Under these arrangements, the offices in the Department of State responsible for munitions export control and military assistance and sales are in frequent contact with ACDA on an informal basis. The Office of Munitions Control and ACDA have jointly identified types of munitions control cases which should be, and are, referred to ACDA for comment. In addition, the Director of ACDA is a member of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee, which participates in the formulation of country programs under the Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts.

The bill would discard these informal arrangements in favor of a formal ACDA review of each of the more than 20,000 munitions control export licenses and additional thousands of military assistance and sales transactions each year. These formal procedures would require the application of ACDA's resources to many cases having no arms control consequences and would, by imposing rigid mechanism, tend to impair harmonious internal relationships within the Executive Branch.

The Administration is fully in accord with the objective of assuring due consideration to arms control aspects of arms transfers. We believe the initiative taken by the sponsor of this legislation has been most helpful in prompting us to reexamine existing procedures for the attainment of that objective and we are seeking to identify areas where greater emphasis should and can be given to the issue of arms control and

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, pp. 788–791.
[3] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 29, 1969, p. 1781.

where the participation of ACDA in decisions relating to arms transfers can be strengthened and improved. We are convinced that the objective of Sections 201, 202, and 203 can best be met by cooperative efforts to promote ACDA's participation in Executive Branch processes within the framework of existing laws.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Congress.

I very much appreciate the support and understanding which ACDA has received from you and the members and staff of your Committee in the past, and I look forward to continuation of this fine relationship.

Sincerely,

FRED C. IKLÉ

Press Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (De Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, April 17, 1975 [1]

Negotiations have now been going on for approximately a year and a half. It seems appropriate at the end of this fifth round to take stock of where the talks now stand.

I cannot report that the outlines of an agreement are in sight. But we remain hopeful. The tone of the negotiations continues to be businesslike, and we are confident that all participants continue to be seriously interested in reaching agreement.

The discussions which have taken place over the past year and a half have demonstrated that the East and West have different approaches. This was not unexpected and it is no surprise that it has proved difficult to make progress.

Throughout these negotiations, the Western participants have sought to work constructively toward an agreement which meets the agreed goals of enhanced stability and strengthened security in Europe at lower force levels in the area of reductions. The basic destabilizing factor in the security situation in Central Europe is the Eastern superiority in ground forces. The East has about 150,000 more soldiers and about 9,500 more tanks than the West in the area. At the outset of these negotiations we put forward a concrete program which would eliminate or reduce these disparities in two successive phases of negotiations leading to a common ceiling for overall ground force manpower, which we have suggested could be set at 700,000 men for each side. The first phase would include reductions by United States and Soviet forces only, and in the second phase remaining participants with forces in Central Europe would participate in reductions. We have also proposed that

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[1] From MBFR Vienna, telegram 0194, Apr. 17, 1975. For a statement of the Eastern position on the MBFR talks, see *infra*.

the common ceiling should be of a collective character, so as to avoid interference with NATO integrated defense cooperation or prejudice to the future organization of Western European defense.

Over the past eighteen months, we have proceeded to develop our position in the interest of finding a mutually acceptable basis for agreement.

First of all, we have given the Eastern side key data on ground force manpower and tanks in Central Europe. We have also offered to exchange data on air manpower levels. We have invited Eastern representatives to reciprocate by putting forward their data on ground and air forces and enter into a discussion of these data. Our purpose has been to arrive at a common understanding of the facts of the situation about which we are negotiating.

Next, we have added certain new elements to our proposals in order to meet expressed Eastern concerns about the key issue of whose forces should be reduced from the outset. Our position remains that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree to substantial reductions and implement them before other participants with forces in the area agree on the specific details of their reductions. But in order to provide reasonable assurance to the Eastern side on the second stage, we have proposed commitments on the timing of second phase negotiations and the subsequent review of their progress. Naturally, if as we propose, all participants will undertake in the first phase a commitment to a common ceiling, this in itself will constitute a commitment to the second phase.

We have put forward specific proposals, not only on reductions, but also on certain other essential aspects of the subject matter. The subject of these negotiations, agreed during the preparatory talks two years ago, includes not only the "mutual reduction of forces and armaments" but also "associated measures". We consider that these two important aspects of the subject matter complement each other. Agreed force reductions would constitute a major change in the circumstances under which both sides act to preserve their security in Central Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union would have accepted certain contractual limitations on their freedom of action to increase their forces in the area to respond to ambiguous situations. Thus, it will be important to agree on measures limiting exercises and force movements so as to reduce the risk that ambiguities in the activities of forces remaining after reductions are carried out create concern, misunderstanding and instability.

Most importantly, the Western participants have demonstrated their flexibility by making important substantive changes in their proposals to meet certain Eastern requirements. The East has continued to insist that all direct participants should undertake specific reduction commitments together from the outset—that is, in a first agreement. In the interest of achieving progress in the negotiations, we decided to meet the East half way. First, we have offered a commitment that all the

remaining non-U.S. Western direct participants will participate in reductions to an agreed common ceiling in the second phase. And second, we have offered a mutual commitment not to increase the overall level of ground force manpower on each side between the two phases in order to complement a satisfactory first phase agreement providing for substantial U.S. and Soviet withdrawals.

We have changed our original approach in another important respect as well. We continue to believe that these negotiations should focus on reducing ground forces. The existing imbalance in ground forces is the main source of instability in the area. Approximate parity in ground forces is the only basis for a stable and enduring agreement. The totals of air manpower on both sides are in any event nearly equal, though with a slight superiority on the side of the Warsaw Pact. Nonetheless, in order to meet frequently expressed concerns on the Eastern side regarding air forces, we have offered a mutual commitment not to increase the overall level of air force manpower in the area of reductions in connection with a first phase agreement.

The Eastern response to these Western moves over the last eighteen months has not been what we would have hoped for. The East so far has not taken up our offer to exchange data. While Eastern representatives dispute the accuracy of our figures, they have provided none of their own, and they have even refused to tell us what they think is wrong with our data. Eastern representatives have put forward no proposals of their own for associated measures, and they have not so far been willing to enter into a dialogue with us on the stabilizing measures we have proposed.

On other points, the Eastern representatives have not only been unwilling to acknowledge the changes and additional commitments we have offered to make in our original position in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, but they have also not made any changes in the main substantive elements of their own original position.

It has been suggested that recent Eastern proposals go some way toward meeting the Western position on the question of whose forces should be reduced from the outset. In fact, however, these variations of their original proposal affect only certain modalities of implementation of reductions. They constitute only procedural modifications without substantive content.

Of particular importance also, the Eastern side is still unwilling to deal with the problem of the disparities in ground forces in the area. Instead, it continues to adhere to an approach which would have the effect of contractualizing the present unequal relationship of ground forces in Central Europe, even if at lower levels. The West cannot agree to being frozen into a position of enduring inferiority in ground forces. Moreover, the East is also unwilling to take into account the fact that, under any agreement, it would also have gained an important new advantage. This is that, whereas the total size of forces of East and West in Central Europe will have been reduced and limited, the total

size of Soviet forces located on its territory which is immediately adjacent to Central Europe will not have been limited. It is true that the total size of U.S. forces will not be under limitation either, but the United States is 5,000 kilometers away. It is our position that the agreed principle of undiminished security requires that account be taken of these advantages which favor the East.

In summary, it is clear that so far in the negotiations, it is the West which has demonstrated real flexibility. We consider that objective bases do exist for reconciling the differing viewpoints of West and East on the individual issues, and we think we have shown the way. But, if we are to make progress towards an agreement, Western willingness shown to modify substantive aspects of its position should be answered by Eastern moves which genuinely take account of the basic Western concerns. We hope that in the next round of negotiations Eastern participants will be in a position to match Western moves in working toward the agreed goals.

Press Conference Statement by the Polish Representative (Strulak) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, April 17, 1975 [1]

Ladies and gentlemen of the press:

Having followed the proceedings of the fifth round of the Vienna negotiations and frequently commented on them, you will understand that I am not in a position to report to you today anything which would suggest that we have achieved a major progress.

Yet, if you asked me to assess this round in one sentence, I should say that this has been the time of incessant initiative and efforts by the Socialist countries, aimed at overcoming the difficulties existing in the negotiations and finding some way towards mutually acceptable agreement. Though our flexibility has so far not been reciprocated, we believe that this constant input of initiative and effort on our part is bound to bring about the output.

As you will recall, soon after this round had started, the public opinion came to know about the important proposal of the four Socialist states: Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Soviet Union and Poland, providing for a joint commitment of the eleven direct participants of the Vienna talks not to increase the manpower of their armed forces in Central Europe for the duration of the negotiations. This simple commitment, seeming almost natural to parties negotiating the reduction of their armed forces, was meant to start on a note of quick accord, put an evident halt to tendencies for armaments race in

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[1] From MBFR Vienna, telegram 0193, Apr. 17, 1975, pp. 32-36. For a statement of the Western position on the MBFR talks, see *supra*.

the area of Central Europe and thus facilitate agreements on reductions. No doubt, it would be hailed as important for the general process of detente in Europe by all those who are interested in the consolidation of this process.

As you know, there has been a negative response to this proposal on the part of our Western partners. The major argument against it, also taken over by some Western papers, was the alleged freeze-effect of the proposed commitment in respect of the existing force relationship in Central Europe.

But this is the criticism which grossly misses the point. First, what we have in mind, is to prevent the increase of forces, not their decrease. Second, this would be clearly an interim commitment, to be replaced as soon as possible by the reduction agreement. Third, the respective attitudes of the parties in the negotiations on the question of reduction would not be prejudiced in any way.

We, therefore, consider the idea of a preliminary and temporary non-increase accord, and our proposal to this effect, to be a standing one, and offering good chances of further progress.

Of course, what the Socialist countries are primarily concerned with at these negotiations is the agreement on substantial reductions of armed forces and armaments. Soon after these negotiations started, now about one and a half years ago, the complete draft of such agreement was put forward by the four Socialist countries—on 8 November, 1973. It proposed to reduce forces and armaments in the area by more than 15 percent within the period of 3 years—until the end of 1977.

The suggested method of reduction by equal percentage fully corresponds with the requirement of the basic principle of these negotiations which all participants pledged to respect, namely the principle of undiminished security of any party to the future reduction program. The Socialist draft agreement gives the clear picture of each participant's obligations and effective contribution to the reduction process. It is concrete in terms and timing.

As you know, in the course of this round we have made a major move of introducing some amendments and additions to this draft agreement. They concern two out of the three stages of reduction proposed in the draft agreement, that is the reductions in 1975 and in 1976.

In 1975 we have suggested to carry out reductions of the armed forces of the seven Western states—U.S.A., United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—and of the four Socialist countries—USSR, Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Poland—by the total of 20 thousand men on each side. We believe that confidence has to be mutual and is to be created by reductions of all armed forces in the area, but one may now say that the Socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular, are taking a major step to invest earlier and more into the mutual confidence—through prior and greater reductions.

You may recall that the question of whose forces should be reduced

from the outset has been recognized a crucial one of these negotiations. The Western states insisted that Soviet and American reductions should precede those of the forces of the Western European states as a necessary assurance. This view being regarded by us as totally unfounded, it is nevertheless largely met in our latest proposals. Consequently, we believe that a compromise answer has been now provided to the question: who should reduce first?

I should like to emphasize that given this manifestation of good will on the part of Socialist countries, it is doubly hard to understand why the Western European direct participants and Canada continue to balk from declaring, in clear terms, their readiness to participate in reductions.

I believe that these characteristics of our proposals of 6 March 1975 suffice to refute the rash comment which appeared in some Western papers to the effect that these were but procedural moves. The issues of timing, sequence and amount of reduction are no procedural issues. Readiness to take [the] advance step of reducing some tens of thousand of troops is not a procedural move.

It is to be sincerely regretted that these serious and substantial compromise moves by the Socialist countries have, as yet, neither met a constructive response nor resulted in any counter-proposal. If taken up and reciprocated, they would definitely move the negotiations forward. Unfortunately, the Western position in this round has remained unchanged.

We continue to be faced with the firm refusal of the Western European direct participants and Canada to undertake obligations as to the amount and timing of their reductions—together with all the four Socialist countries and the United States that are ready to do so. Under the circumstances when USSR, Poland, GDR and Czechoslovakia declare their readiness to undertake specific obligations, such an evasion on the part of these Western states concerning, among others, the largest component of the NATO in the area—that of the West German armed forces—indeed blocks the way to an agreement.

We are further confronted with demands to change the existing correlation of forces through asymmetrical reductions, supported by artificial, selective and, therefore, unobjective arguments of so-called disparities in ground forces and in geography. But these demands, in fact, convey tendencies to obtain unilateral military advantages. The objective judgement, taking into account the whole spectrum of military capabilities in Central Europe, not just singling out ground forces alone, indicates the existence of the equilibrium, recognized also by the Western official sources. Geographic factors work not only eastward but westward, and were fully taken into account when the area of reductions was agreed upon.

Our well founded and repeated demands to include into reduction the nuclear weapons and the air forces as essential components of military

capabilities in the area, remain unanswered. We are puzzled by the evident dichotomy between the well articulated trend of opinion in Western Europe in favor of the reductions of nuclear weapons and the Western delegations total silence on this matter.

We are surprised by the stress evidently put by some Western countries on a reduction arrangement under the so-called common ceiling which would eventually enable them to increase their forces. Such a tendency clearly runs counter to the very idea of these negotiations and to the equality and mutually of obligations. We believe that no party to these negotiations should take steps undermining the mutual confidence.

The Socialist countries do not propose for any country to undertake any obligation which they themselves would not undertake, but so also they do not see any basis for granting particular privileges to any country.

In short, the discussion in this round has not allowed us to discern any new elements in the Western position.

But we are not discouraged. In an effort to reach agreement in these negotiations, which our governments consider to be greatly important, we have presented a series of proposals. They are:

A. The draft agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe of 8 November 1973 as now amended and completed;

B. The proposal for the initial reduction step in 1975, which, though now identical with the first stage of our comprehensive draft, also remains as a separate one, should this be preferable to our Western partners;

C. The proposal for a joint declaration by the eleven direct participants on non-increasing the manpower of their armed forces in the area for the duration of the negotiations.

These parallel proposals do demonstrate not only our interest to bring about substantial reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, but our good will and earnest desire to find solutions which are mutually acceptable. They reflect our readiness to search for an agreement either on a partial or general basis.

We realize how much is at stake in these negotiations—not only militarily but also politically, economically and even psychologically.

Thinking, as we do, in terms of detente, in terms making it irreversible, supplemented by measures of military detente, the governments of the Socialist countries and our delegations here will spare no effort to succeed.

We are not without assets. Ours and our partners' involvement in the process of detente is a major one.

In the Vienna talks this is signified by the seriousness, the intensity and the matter-of-fact character of our discussion. This discussion, though difficult, continues to be carried in a good atmosphere.

We have the important and continuously valid basis of agreement which the participants achieved prior to these negotiations: on principles of undiminished security and mutuality; on the circle of direct participants; on the subject of negotiations; on the reduction area, and on the general objective of these negotiations.

The public opinion may rest confident that the Socialist countries will make their utmost in assuring essential progress in these talks. If equally good will of the Western states results in their constructive response, we may be expected to move forward.

Address by ACDA Director Iklé to the United States Naval Academy, April 23, 1975 [1]

Mankind's first nuclear era began 30 years ago. Three-fifths of the people alive today had not yet been born. For those who remember that beginning, it offers mixed memories. People were stunned by the destructiveness of this new power. At the same time, they looked upon the bomb as bringing an end to a war that threatened to grow bloodier and go on for endless days.

And there was a widespread feeling that the world now had a singular opportunity to rebuild itself in a better way. Almost everyone recognized the world could never be the same—atomic power had revolutionized the nature of peace and war.

Americans were confident that their country would show the way. Our self-confidence found concrete expression in a proposal to the United Nations—a proposal that combined our hopefulness of that time with acceptance of our responsibility as sole possessor of the atom bomb. This proposal, known as the Baruch plan,[2] envisaged placing all nuclear resources throughout the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. Its purpose was to assure that this new force served only peaceful ends.

Some debate has arisen about the realism of the Baruch plan and even about the sincerity with which it was offered. Let me lay a myth to rest.

Was it realistic? No, because its optimism demanded too great a change in the politics of power. Yes, because its boldness matched the magnitude of the problem.

Was it sincere? While preparing and pressing this proposal, did we exploit our nuclear monopoly to the hilt, or did we exercise self-restraint?

What we did was this: First, the United States diminished its nuclear research and development from $940 million in 1944 to $280 million in 1946. Second, in 1946 and early 1947, the United States exploited its

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 19, 1975, pp. 641–645.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament 1945–59, vol. I*, pp. 7–16.

nuclear monopoly by having on hand a total stockpile of battle-ready weapons that numbered—I will give you the exact figure—zero. As late as April 1947, President Truman noted that we still had only few components of bombs and that our bombs were not assembled. Evidently, Harry Truman—that alleged cold warrior—had not ordered a crash program.

These facts are available to any historian. Yet they have been conveniently overlooked in recent attempts to rewrite the history of how the cold war began. We do not have to assert that we were without flaw during that period. But we should not forget the truth—the self-restraint and generosity in American foreign policy during that period, a period when the United States had a world monopoly on power without parallel in history.

The United States, during the critical years of 1946 and 1947, continued to press for an effective international system of control and ownership of the atom. It did not launch a massive research and development program to assure that its nuclear superiority would remain unchallengeable. It did not rush to amass a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Thus it did not exploit its monopoly to impose its own interpretation of the World War II settlements. But at the end of 1947, it seemed clear that the Baruch plan—or any comparable, effective constraint on nuclear arms—would not be accepted. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb. Over the next 15 years, the nuclear arsenals grew competitively on both sides to incomprehensible levels of destructiveness.

The United States maintained its lead in this deadly competition. Nevertheless, in the mid-1960's it took the initiative of restraining the expansion of its strategic offensive and defensive forces, seeking stability by a renewed effort for agreed controls. This American self-restraint found formal expression in the 1969 decision to discard "strategic superiority" as official U.S. policy.[3] The Soviet Union would thus be allowed to achieve equality where the United States had held an advantage for 25 years.

This decision was based on recognition that a stable world order cannot be achieved if either superpower engages in the futile and dangerous pursuit of unilateral advantages. We have pursued this principle of equality and mutual self-restraint through six years of difficult strategic arms talks, and we continue to pursue it in other East-West arms control negotiations.

Given the historic development of the American and Soviet positions in the world, parity between our strategic forces is a relationship that can add to stability. And strategic parity is to be anchored even more securely in the agreement on offensive arms based on the accord reached at Vladivostok. The agreement will complement the Antibal-

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[3] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 32–33.

listic Missile Treaty of 1972 [4] and its 1974 protocol.[5] By that groundbreaking set of agreements, we and the Russians effectively renounced major weapons systems in the interests of world stability.

Now, these are substantial achievements. The world's two most powerful nations, to enhance their own security, have begun to rely on controlling their armaments. It might thus seem as if the road ahead were clear. Successive limitations and reductions to be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union might seem all that is needed to avoid nuclear war.

But something more is needed.

COMPLEX NEW PROBLEMS

For we are now moving into a new era that will differ fundamentally from the world to which we have, in part, adjusted. The revolutionary agent is the inexorable diffusion of nuclear technology throughout the world. We can slow down the spread of the means to make the bomb; but we—the United States—cannot stop it. As if to saddle mankind with a double curse, the nuclear technology now of greatest interest throughout the world—reactors to produce energy—is also a technology that yields the material necessary to build nuclear bombs. From a powerful mixture of economic and nationalistic motives, nation after nation will want this technology. The most dangerous material man has ever fashioned will gradually spread all over the world.

In the coming era, we will no longer be able to prevent use of the nuclear bomb solely by deterring one or two potential adversaries. Further, we will no longer be able to curb nuclear arms competition through bilateral agreements alone.

Realism forces us to recognize that most nations which acquire nuclear arms will insist on retaining sovereign control over them for decades to come. For this and other reasons, "general and complete disarmament" is not a guideline for policies to shape the foreseeable future. Yet realism also forces us to recognize that the continuing spread of nuclear materials cannot coexist for decades with the present structure of nuclear deterrence on the one hand and the present fragile controls over nuclear explosive technology on the other.

Political philosophers, to be sure, may wish to explore the possibility of a world in which nation-states as we know them will have disappeared in a dispensation of general and complete disarmament. Similarly, military strategists may wish to speculate on how nuclear deterrence as we now understand it could survive in a world with several dozens of nuclear powers and where even criminal groups might obtain nuclear bombs. But I believe neither of these worlds is realistic. Something will have to give.

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[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

The coming era calls for realism and for vision, for an effort that will mobilize the support of other nations and draw on our own vast intellectual, scientific, and moral strength. The second nuclear age calls for a U.S. arms control program that reaches so far ahead that we can shape our future.

TASKS FOR THE COMING ERA

As I see such a program taking shape, three important tasks stand out.

First, for many nonnuclear powers, protection against nuclear threat or attack rests on American commitments. America's self-interest dictates that we sustain our alliances. If we withdrew our protection, or if confidence in it were shaken, strong internal pressures would arise in many countries to acquire nuclear armaments for their self-protection. Then their neighbors would feel threatened and follow suit.

To the degree that we appear to turn inward, we encourage nonnuclear nations—from Asia to Europe and the Middle East—to create their own nuclear forces. We will thus make the future less manageable and eventually bring arms control efforts to a dead end. How could arms control and disarmament make progress in a world where nations increasingly depend for security on a tangled web of nuclear threats and counter-threats among dozens of nuclear-armed countries? Our alliances help protect both other nations and ourselves from the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

A second task is to make safer our reliance on nuclear deterrence—to be very clear about its shortcomings and to find ways to correct them.

Never in man's history has the technology of warfare changed so sweepingly and so rapidly—and never without being tested in real battles. We can only be thankful, of course, that the generation which has grown up since the Second World War has never been witness to the cruel impact of nuclear destruction. But to be spared such experience has also insulated this generation from the grim reality of nuclear arsenals. Today, nuclear strategists of all countries analyze a shadow world of abstract calculations. We are not moved by compassion or revulsion, and the corrective mechanism of learning from experience cannot work.

In past centuries, every advance in technology was eventually used for war. Then, however, the scope and suddenness of destruction were never so immense. Weaponry was never rigged in such a way that one single failure could mean the last chance had passed.

But we have made mutual deterrence hinge on cataclysmic speed. There would be no time for learning, no time for human compassion and mercy to call a halt, no pause in the battle long enough for governments to reflect and gain a sense of proportion. Over the long term,

this emphasis on speed imposes a risk that is intolerable and unnecessary.

Major changes in deterrence will be needed in the second nuclear era, when the danger of nuclear war from deliberate attack may be overshadowed by the chances of war from accident or miscalculation.

We have already taken promising steps, both unilaterally and through agreement, to escape from the interlock of "hair-triggered" nuclear armaments where one tragic episode could lead to mutual genocide. We have reached agreements with the Soviet Union on measures against the risk of accidents [6] and on improvements in the Washington-Moscow hotline.[7] We must take further steps along this important road. Unilaterally, we continue to improve the controls and safety of our nuclear armaments.

We are also adjusting our strategic doctrine to changing conditions. Here we must carefully strike a balance. On the one hand, we must not stake our survival on one single gamble, the gamble that deterrence will never be seriously tested and that we will never require room for choice—after some nuclear weapons have been used—to avoid mutual genocide. On the other hand, we must not slide back into errors of the past by permitting nuclear weapons to be regarded as a substitute for conventional defenses. We must not mistake nuclear war or the threat of it for an acceptable instrument of foreign policy.

A great deal more needs to be done to make deterrence safer. We must search for improvements with a distrust of anyone who pretends all is well. Year in, year out, the avoidance of nuclear war now depends on the proper working of farflung armaments, on the safety of alert missile forces halfway around the globe, on the integrity of military command chains stretched thousands of miles. We have to rely on the absolute control of these engines of destruction, all in a state of readiness day and night, month after month, all managed by people, large communities of people, with the usual admixture of heroes and villains, wise men and fools.

It would be an insult to the ingenuity of our strategic experts and our engineers to argue that for decades to come such an unbelievably explosive contraption is the best we can build.

INTERNATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP

A third task is to create an international guardianship of peaceful nuclear technology.

To keep nuclear technology peaceful was a need manifest from the very beginning, but it will be far more compelling in the second nuclear era. Its urgency will increase as technology spreads and nuclear materials increasingly supply the world's energy needs. Hence, the effort to

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[6] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 634–635.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 635–639.

assure that these resources serve only peaceful ends must expand and intensify year by year.

Inevitably, the international guardianship of dangerous nuclear materials will become steadily more important. Its work will involve an increasing number of people and a broadening array of tools to coordinate or manage directly the flow of nuclear materials among a steadily growing number of countries. The timely supply of these fuels will be crucial to the economy of many; their perpetual and total safety will be crucial to the safety of all people.

The activities of this guardianship will be a matter of daily concern rather than a matter of sporadic intervention in emergencies. It will have to deal chiefly with persistent problems, such as the growing worldwide need for nuclear-waste disposal and the ever-present danger of theft of nuclear materials.

Unlike mutual deterrence and the strategic analysis that supports it, it will not be condemned to live in a world of theory and abstraction. Its workings will be tested every day. Hence, it can learn from trial and error. Because failures will not inevitably be fatal, experience can teach.

Again unlike deterrence, the guardianship of the world's peaceful nuclear resources does not fix nations in a posture of deadly antagonism. The dangers which must be controlled—some man-made, some essentially natural forces—are the byproducts of peaceful activities, not the result of a hostile arms competition.

Can the nations of the world ever reach the kind of agreement that produces an effective and reliable guardianship? Over the last 20 years—when the risks were not yet so compelling—over 100 countries have learned to work harmoniously together in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The fruitfulness of that collective effort—based on an American initiative—should give solid encouragement.

I do not mean to project some instant utopia. There will be pitfalls of many kinds. The effort to build an international guardianship might become entangled in the short-term politics of the struggle for resources. Or it could fail because of ideological schisms. There may be breakaway or outcast nations whose obsolete view of the world blinds them to the realities of their own interests. But we have the promise of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And over 80 nations support the Nonproliferation Treaty. These examples point the way to the political consensus we must create.

A decade hence, the performance of this international guardianship will vitally engage the attention of governments throughout the world. It will affect the most elementary interests of the general public and political leaders alike: their welfare and their physical survival. By the nature of its task and the way it must work, it can forge a common bond among nations that may prove more fruitful and sturdy than any we have tried to create and teach a more meaningful collaboration

than any we have known. Given America's position as the leader in nuclear technology and our skill in designing international institutions, we can play a particularly creative role.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Senate Committee on Government Operations: Nuclear Exports, April 24, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

I want to provide any information I can that will be helpful to this committee. Since we are trying to cope with new technology that will expand and spread over the years to come, it may be helpful to gain some historical perspective.

For 30 years now, our Government—both legislative and executive branches—has sought to prevent destructive uses of atomic energy while permitting legitimate peaceful uses.

Unfortunately, it is true to say that if nuclear technology did not serve any important peaceful purpose, the control of proliferation of nuclear bombs would be much easier.

As you recall, our first atomic energy legislation, the McMahon Act of 1946, placed great emphasis on preserving nuclear secrecy.

Five years later, in 1951, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act so that we could share some nuclear information for military uses with countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The purpose was to strengthen the alliance, not to encourage peaceful applications.

But as the prospect for peaceful benefits of nuclear energy grew more realistic and more important, the U.S. policy was changed in an almost revolutionary way.

Congress passed the revised Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This revision gave permission—indeed, strong encouragement—for sharing nuclear information for peaceful purposes with a great many other nations, allies, as well as friendly nations.

The clear intent was to continue strict controls on weapon design information. We recognize now with the benefit of hindsight, that in a sense we had "locked the wrong barn door."

By transferring the technology for reactors that can produce plutonium, the most difficult element for a capability to manufacture explosives have been given away.

Holding on tightly to weapon design information might prevent the fabrication of advanced warhead types, but does little to prevent construction of nuclear devices or bombs several times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb.

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[1] *The Export Reorganization Act—1975: Hearings Before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session*, pp. 7–9.

All of this is easier to see from hindsight, of course.

Our main purpose of the new policy that began with the revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, was a valid and foresighted one: To build up international machinery that could control or at least monitor the legitimate peaceful applications of nuclear energy, to prevent diversion to destructive purposes.

In support of that objective, Congress gave its approval in 1957 to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, today one of the most effective and important organizations within the United Nations family.

American initiative was decisive in bringing this organization into being.

In the 1960's, the threat of nuclear proliferation attracted increasing attention. Through the Pastore Resolution of 1966,[2] Congress paved the way for the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 [3]—today one of the most important barriers against the further spread of nuclear weapons.

As you will recall, the week after next, the conference to review this treaty will begin in Geneva. We expect this review conference, which was envisaged by the treaty, to reaffirm the widest support for the treaty. Over 80 nations are now party to it. The Republic of Korea has just completed its ratification. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, you will agree with me that this decision by the government of Korea is a most gratifying development. We are hopeful that other important nations will soon complete their ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Today, not only the United States, but several industrial nations, are exporting nuclear fuel, equipment, and knowledge to many countries who do not yet have nuclear weapons.

More and more countries are looking to nuclear weapons. More and more countries are looking to nuclear reactors to help them meet their energy needs.

But that old problem is still with us. As nuclear technology spreads to more and more nations around the world for peaceful purposes, it can also provide the makings for nuclear weapons, unless strict controls can be maintained. And it appears there are now some countries that might want to take advantage of this nuclear trade, to develop the capability some day to produce their own nuclear weapons. If they should press ahead, it will begin to threaten their neighbors, who in turn will be tempted to follow suit.

There are things we can do. We can continually improve and work toward better international controls over exports of nuclear materials. We must make sure that commercial interests do not conflict with our long-term security needs.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 306–307.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

We can take steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, through financial and technical assistance. We can press for the support by all nations to make the Nonproliferation Treaty more effective, and we can act on every front to lessen the motivations for the acquisition of independent nuclear weapons capabilities.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, Senator Glenn, this means that we must sustain our alliance commitments, lest other nations now depending on these commitments, feel compelled to acquire nuclear arms.

The United States cannot of course accomplish international controls alone; but it can, as a first and foremost nuclear nation, take the lead.

In fact, it is my opinion the United States is the only nation that can do that, and, of course, the support by members of your committee, and the Congress will be crucial here as they have always been in the control of nuclear energy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977, May 1, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you in support of my Agency's legislative program.

In his letter transmitting the bill now before you,[2] President Ford pointed out that the negotiation of effective arms control arrangements continues to be a priority objective of this administration. To that end, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are continuing in Geneva with a view to implementing the Vladivostok accords.[3]

Additional agreements are in the process of negotiation, on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, on nuclear nonproliferation, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

As the President said in his letter:

> By continuing these negotiations and by seeking solutions to the many complex and difficult problems involved, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities.[4]

To move ahead on arms control, strong and effective cooperation between the Congress and the executive branch is imperative. Fortunately, both the legislative and executive branches generally agree today that verifiable arms control is essential for our national security.

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[1] *Foreign Relations Authorization, Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on S. 1517*, pp. 143–145.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 63–64.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

[4] *Ante*, p. 64.

Were it not for this shared outlook, the prospect for continuing progress in arms control would be poor. Consequently, we seek to inform this committee of the Agency's needs, to express our gratitude for your backing in the past, to keep you and other Members of Congress informed about our work, and to request your advice and guidance.

With this in mind, in 1974 I made approximately 75 visits to Member's offices, and during the year I and other Agency officials testified before congressional committees a total of 18 times. It has been my privilege to testify before this Committee on many occasions.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. Chairman, I would propose to limit my prepared remarks today to my Agency's legislative program. However, I will be happy, of course, to answer your questions about other matters of interest to the committee.

The Agency will need a slight increase in resources for each of the next 2 years, compared with the current fiscal year 1975. We are requesting a total of $23 million for the 2-year period of fiscal years 1976 and 1977. Of this $23 million total, $10,690,000—plus $360,000 for estimated pay increases and other unprogramed costs—will be needed for fiscal year 1976. The balance will remain for fiscal year 1977.

We are also requesting a small change in our act so we can grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their employees on the basis of security clearances granted by the Department of Defense. This amendment would eliminate costly and time consuming investigations in cases where the Agency requires the services of contractors already cleared by the Department of Defense.

The $23 million authorization which we are requesting for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 is $1 million more than the $22 million authorized by Congress for the 2-year authorization period of fiscal years 1973 and 1974, and represents an increase on an annual basis from the $10.1 million authorized for the current fiscal year.

Approximately two-thirds of the increase for fiscal year 1976 is for program operation and one-third for research. The increase for program operations is primarily to cover rising costs, both in Washington and at the site of the SALT negotiations in Geneva; and it will also cover the new negotiations with the Soviets on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and on overcoming the danger of environmental modification as a weapon for war. Most of the increase in external research is needed for solutions to nuclear proliferation problems.

Of the additional increase for fiscal year 1977, approximately half would also be used to build up the external research program.

In sum, the current request will permit the Agency to fulfill the President's goal that the Agency "play an even more important role in future arms control and disarmament activities."

I respectfully request the committee to approve the authorization bill as submitted by the administration.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 6, 1975 [1]

It is my privilege to convey a message to this conference from the President of the United States:

This Review Conference offers an opportunity to focus new attention on our vital obligation to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. It is a responsibility that confronts all nations equally and impartially. Nuclear energy can and should promote the fortunes of nations assembled at this conference. But its destructive potential can and must be contained.

Support for the Nonproliferation Treaty [2] is a major tenet of American policy. Consequently, I hope this conference will:

—Convey the importance of nonproliferation to the security of all nations, hence to global stability;
—Promote international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while insuring that it not be misused as a means of mass destruction;
—Encourage the further development and wider application of effective safeguards and physical security measures for nuclear materials and facilities; and
—Review the considerable progress that has been made in arms control and disarmament since the treaty was signed, and promote efforts to build on what has been achieved.

We welcome the important recent additions to the roster of parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as the indications that others are moving toward adherence. We recognize that the treaty's promise is not yet fully realized, but we take satisfaction from what has been achieved. We further recognize that no treaty by itself can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet we remain convinced that the Nonproliferation Treaty is an essential means of advancing this purpose.

Although we still have a long way to go, we see in reviewing the record that the cooperative undertaking to create a more stable world community is well underway.

I take this occasion therefore to rededicate the United States to the support of the Nonproliferation Treaty and to the high purpose of a stable peace which animates it.

Few international endeavors are more deserving of our attention and energy than containing the destructive potential of the atom. The stakes involved are enormous.

We cannot be complacent—and indeed we are not—about the nuclear arsenals that now exist. We must press ahead to make more comprehensive the limitations which have been imposed and begin to reduce the potential for destruction, a potential that we can scarcely grasp.

But it would be a fatal error if we assumed that we could move forward in reducing the threat of nuclear destruction while nation after nation began to build its own nuclear arsenals. We cannot move forward and backward at the same time. The risk of nuclear destruction—by design, miscalculation, or accident—cannot be reduced if nuclear

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, June 30, 1975, pp. 921-924.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

competition drives a dangerous wedge between neighboring nations throughout the world.

Let there be no mistake. The dangers resulting from nuclear proliferation are shared by all, nuclear powers and non-nuclear-weapon states alike.

We therefore have a common interest in the success of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is my government's hope that this conference will focus attention on the treaty's essential role in promoting the security of all states and that it will provide a stimulus for cooperative international effort to make the treaty as effective and universally applicable as possible.

The basic provisions of the treaty, articles I and II, have been followed faithfully by the parties. The safeguards resulting from article III make an important additional contribution to the security of all states.

But in our judgment, the effectiveness of all three articles can be strengthened best by securing the widest possible adherence to the treaty. Hence, it is most gratifying that several states have recently completed their ratification. The Republic of Korea ratified the treaty. Just last week major industrial countries of Western Europe also became parties to the treaty: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

We welcome all the new parties. Several of them have attained world leadership in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. This offers telling evidence that the treaty is consistent with progress in the peaceful uses of the atom. In fact, the treaty not only supports peaceful uses but helps preserve the world order without which peaceful uses could not survive and expand.

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE TREATY

In its first five years, the treaty has clearly served to increase the volume of international nuclear commerce. The United States, for example, has entered into international arrangements for the enrichment of uranium to meet the needs of some 150 power reactors in non-nuclear-weapon states, having a total capacity of about 120,000 megawatts. In addition, the United States has exported 35 nuclear reactors since 1970. Most of this cooperation has been with states now party to the Nonproliferation Treaty or with signatories whose ratification appears imminent.

The United States has shared its peaceful nuclear technology generously. It has provided information, offered training, supported research programs, supplied uranium enrichment services, and sold or donated research and power reactors embodying the most advanced technology.

Aid to the developing countries has also increased considerably since the treaty was opened for signature. We believe the developing countries party to the treaty should be given favored consideration in nu-

clear assistance. Last year, my government announced that parties will be given preference in the allocation of our in-kind contributions to the technical assistance program of the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, we are increasing substantially the amount of our voluntary contribution for 1975.

SAFEGUARDS OVER PEACEFUL USES

A major purpose—indeed, a major accomplishment—of the Nonproliferation Treaty is to make possible the expansion of peaceful nuclear cooperation. But, as Secretary Kissinger stated to the United Nations last fall,[3] our policy of widely supplying nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials "cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives."

The rapid expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has raised massive new problems. One is meeting fuel-reprocessing needs in the safest and most economic way. Another is the disposal of the rapidly accumulating nuclear wastes. Fortunately, we still have some time to work out solutions. There is no economic need for reprocessing for several years to come, and spent fuel can still be kept in temporary storage. But nations must cooperate to solve these problems soon to protect the health and safety of all the people.

The promotion of peaceful uses of the atom is inseparably linked with safeguards to inspire international confidence that fissionable materials are not being diverted to destructive purposes. We can all take pride in what has been done about safeguards. Specifically, the International Atomic Energy Agency has accomplished a great deal. Its efforts deserve the wholehearted support of us all.

Virtually every party to this treaty with nuclear facilities requiring safeguards has negotiated an agreement with the Agency; and almost every nuclear facility now operating in the non-nuclear-weapon states is subject to Agency safeguards or will be in the near future. This is a good record.

But much remains to be done. We need to insure:

—That all parties to the treaty conclude agreements with the Agency;
—That safeguards are effective and efficient; and
—That safeguards cover, as comprehensively as possible, the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty and preclude diversion of nuclear materials for any nuclear explosive device.

Also, we have to concern ourselves seriously with the threat of theft and other criminal seizure of nuclear material. We hope this conference

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[3] *Ibid.*, 1974, p. 510.

will recognize the need for international measures to deal with this grim danger.

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Article V, as we all know, was included in the treaty to insure that the non-nuclear-weapon states adhering to the treaty would not be deprived of any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that might be realized by the nuclear-weapon states.

In the United States, there has been much research and experimentation on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. But we have not yet reduced any application to practice, nor have we obtained any commercial benefits from this technology. If and when we should succeed in doing so, we would of course make those benefits available as called for in the treaty.

Questions remain to be resolved regarding the feasibility and practicability of peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, no request for such explosions has ever gone beyond the stage of preliminary feasibility studies. For these reasons, there has so far been no practical necessity to conclude the international agreement or agreements mentioned in article V. However, the United States stands ready to negotiate the requisite agreements when the practical need develops.

In the meantime, the United States is prepared to participate in consideration of the institutional arrangements that may be required to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available internationally. Toward this end, important steps have already been taken within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My government, as one of the potential suppliers of such services, has agreed to assist the Agency in a study of the related legal problems.

U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

When this treaty was opened for signature in 1968, the only other postwar arms control agreements were the Antarctic Treaty,[4] the "Hotline" Agreement,[5] the Limited Test Ban Treaty,[6] and the Outer Space Treaty.[7] While these were solid accomplishments, they did not reduce the levels of existing nuclear armaments.

At the signing ceremony of the Nonproliferation Treaty, my government and the Soviet Government announced that we would open negotiations to limit offensive and defensive strategic arms. The relationship between the treaty and this announcement was clear: the successful negotiation of this treaty had strengthened mutual confi-

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[4] *Ibid., 1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.
[5] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 236–238.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 291–293.
[7] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

dence between the two largest nuclear-weapon powers and promised to keep nuclear arms control from becoming totally unmanageable.

Since then, serious and intensive negotiations on strategic arms limitations have continued steadily and received personal attention at the highest level of the two governments. The first fruits of these negotiations were the improved "Hotline" Agreement [8] and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.[9]

The culmination of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 brought the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems [10] limiting each side to two narrowly circumscribed complexes. In my country it led in fact to dismantling an anti-ballistic-missile complex already well under construction. By renouncing major anti-ballistic-missile systems, the United States and the Soviet Union gave up a potential new weapons system that they were in a unique position to exploit. No other country could have built such systems.

Along with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an interim agreement was worked out to limit the number of strategic offensive launchers on both sides for five years, a period that would provide time to achieve more comprehensive limits.[11]

At the summit meeting in the summer of 1974, the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union took a further important step by negotiating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[12] I should point out that this was not only an important arms control measure in its own right; it was also a positive step toward a comprehensive test ban, to which we remain firmly committed.

Last November, at Vladivostok, a major milestone was reached when President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev established specific guidelines for a new agreement to limit strategic offensive arms. Based on this accord,[13] negotiations are now underway here in Geneva. The new agreement is to limit strategic offensive armaments, including strategic bombers and missiles equipped with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRV's), to equal totals on each side.

The implications of this breakthrough are far-reaching. By putting an overall ceiling on strategic armaments, we establish a promising basis for further reductions. We look forward to follow-on negotiations on further limitation and reductions as soon as the Vladivostok agreement is complete.

An encouraging precedent has already been set: only two years after the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty imposed comprehensive, equal ceilings on these systems, both sides agreed to reduce the permitted deployment levels by one-half.

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[8] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 635–639.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 634–635.
[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 202–204.
[12] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225 ff.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 746–747.

Five years have now elapsed since the Nonproliferation Treaty went into effect. This period is only one-sixth of the nuclear era that began at the end of the Second World War. Yet, in this short time, far more has been accomplished in the control of nuclear arms than in the preceding 25 years. In historical perspective, the treaty has proven to be both a prerequisite and a catalyst for progress toward nuclear disarmament. That process is underway. And it is up to all of us to encourage and sustain it.

The Nonproliferation Treaty is indispensable to nuclear disarmament. It is indispensable to achieving the maximum peaceful benefits of nuclear energy. It is indispensable to the security of all. The task of this conference is to provide the support and forward movement that are needed to enable the treaty to fulfill its great promise.

Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 30, 1975 [1]

PREAMBLE

The States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] which met in Geneva in May 1975, in accordance with the Treaty, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the objectives of the Treaty,

Affirming the belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all States,

Firmly convinced that, in order to achieve this aim, it is essential to maintain, in the implementation of the Treaty, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of all States Party to the Treaty, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare, and that the promotion of this objective will be furthered by more rapid progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the limitation and reduction of existing nu-

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, June 30, 1975, pp. 924–929; NPT/CONF/30/Rev. 1, Annex 1; adopted by consensus on May 30.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

clear weapons, with a view to the eventual elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons, pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress should be possible towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Noting the important role which nuclear energy can, particularly in changing economic circumstances, play in power production and in contributing to the progressive elimination of the economic and technological gap between developing and developed States,

Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy will, in the absence of effective safeguards, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability,

Recognizing the continuing necessity of full cooperation in the application and improvement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, and

Recognizing that all States Parties have a duty to strive for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain the objectives of the treaty,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Party to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts

—to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons
—to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and

—to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under adequate safeguards.

REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III

The Conference notes that the verification activities of the IAEA under Article III, 1, of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the continued application of safeguards under Article III, 1, on a non-discriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference notes the importance of systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of States Party to the Treaty and of co-operation with the IAEA in order to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in Article III, 1. The Conference expresses the hope that all States having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for the continuance of the application of safeguards upon re-export.

The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation in order, among other things, to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing advisory group on safeguards implementation.

The Conference emphasises the necessity for the States Party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material

or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

The Conference urges that:

(a) in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty;

(b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) all Parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

The Conference takes note of:

(a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States;

(b) (i) the suggestion that it is desirable to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material processed, used or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty;

(ii) the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.

The Conference recommends that, during the review of the arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be undertaken by its Board of Governors at an appropriate time after 1975, the less favourable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account. It recommends further that, on that occasion, the Parties to the Treaty concerned seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs.

The Conference attaches considerable importance, so far as safeguards inspectors are concerned, to adherence by the IAEA to Article VII.D of its Statute, prescribing, among other things, that "due regard shall be paid . . . to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible"; it also recommends that safeguards training be made available to personnel from all geographic regions.

The Conference, convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be pursued to elaborate further, within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including

principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities (i) to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection; and (ii) in the framework of their respective physical protection systems, to give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA's recommendations.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 1, that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 2, the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange and welcomes the efforts made towards that end. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Recognizing, in the context of Article IV, 2, those growing needs of developing States the Conference considers it necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme.

The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assist-

ance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional and other appropriate financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, including co-operation related to the continuous operation of peaceful nuclear facilities, States Party to the Treaty should give weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connexion, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, "technically sound" requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such "technically sound" requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.

The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty.

The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include, among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

The Conference urges all Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

The Conference hopes that, if these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE V

The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

The Conference notes that any potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of, the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the United Nations General Assembly and enabling States Party to the Treaty but not Members of the IAEA which would wish to do so to participate in such work.

The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.

The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX).[3] It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications

[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 803–806.

of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI

The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating

—to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
—to nuclear disarmament and
—to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.

The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty [4] and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [5] to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the

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[4] *Ibid., 1963*, p. 291.
[5] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 461.

Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, meanwhile, to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time.

The Conference appeals to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavour to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974.[6] The Conference looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations of, and significant reductions in, their nuclear weapons systems as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

The Conference notes that, notwithstanding earlier progress, the CCD has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures to advance the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty. It urges, therefore, all members of the CCD Party to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States Party, to increase their efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD.

The Conference expresses the hope that all States Party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the CCD and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expresses the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all governments and peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance for the attainment of the aims of Article VI. The Conference therefore invites the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues,

[6] *Ibid.*, *1974*, pp. 746–747.

in order to keep all governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII AND THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It acknowledges that States Parties find themselves in different security situations and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of States Parties.

The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255 (1968),[7] that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The Conference, bearing in mind Article VII of the Treaty, considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of those States. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.

The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. At the Conference it was urged by a considerable number of delegations that nuclear-weapon States should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts must be made especially by the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both nuclear-weapon States and

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[7] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 444.

non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of all practical means to this end, taking into account the views expressed at this Conference.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VIII

The Conference invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a second Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference."

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. At the same time, the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not as yet achieved universal adherence. Therefore, the Conference expresses the hope that States that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.

Statement by the U.S. Alternate Representative (Klein) to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 30, 1975 [1]

My delegation is pleased to have joined in the adoption of the final

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 4, 1975, pp. 193–195.

declaration of this, the first NPT Review Conference.[2] We believe that by reaching agreement on the conference declaration, which is the culmination of our efforts over the last four weeks, we have taken an important step forward.

The declaration is a realistic document, containing recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the treaty's operation and, most important, of the nonproliferation regime generally. Some ideas—including those relating to international cooperation on physical security, to improvements of safeguards on exports, and to regional solutions to fuel-cycle needs—are innovative and are receiving broad international endorsement for the first time. In addition, the conference declaration strongly underlines the need for determined and timely efforts to achieve widely shared objectives. Taken as a whole, the final declaration establishes a practical and comprehensive course of action for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. It shows clearly that we all have a shared and overriding interest in the success of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, which is a continuing and complicated process.

We recognize that no delegation can give unqualified support to each of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the declaration. Some may have reservations about particular ideas expressed in the document; others may regret that some of their suggestions were not included or were given less emphasis than they would have preferred. This is as true of our delegation as it is of others.

I would like to take this opportunity to briefly state for the record our views on some of the issues covered in the final declaration.

First, I would like to reiterate that we look forward, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement outlined at Vladivostok,[3] to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms.

Second, with respect to the question of restraints on nuclear testing, my government joins in affirming the determination of participants of this conference to achieve the discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The final declaration notes that a number of delegations at the conference expressed the desire that the nuclear-weapon states parties enter as soon as possible into an agreement to halt all nuclear-weapon tests for a specified period of time. Our view is that any treaty or agreement on nuclear-weapons testing must contain provisions for adequate verification and must solve the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. It would not be realistic to assume that an agreement banning all nuclear-weapons testing, whether by nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT or by all testing powers, could be concluded before solutions to these problems are found.

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

With reference to nuclear-free zones, we believe that the creation of such zones could effectively complement the NPT as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear-explosive capabilities. We have emphasized that, to be effective, regional arrangements should meet the following criteria:

The initiative should be taken by the states in the region concerned. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements, and provision must be made for adequate verification. Finally, we do not believe that the objective of nonproliferation would be served if a nuclear-free-zone arrangement permitted the indigenous development of nuclear explosives for any purpose; no effort to achieve nonproliferation could succeed if it permitted such indigenous development of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon states or failed to safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials to such use.

A number of delegations at the conference urged that nuclear-weapon states provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those states which became fully bound by the provisions of a regional arrangement. My government adhered to protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty,[4] which contains such a binding security assurance, after determining that that treaty met the criteria noted above. However, we believe that each nuclear-free-zone proposal must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the provision of specific security assurances would be likely to have a favorable effect. Moreover, we do not believe it would be realistic to expect nuclear-weapon states to make implied commitments to provide such assurances before the scope and content of any nuclear-free-zone arrangement are worked out.

I ask that this written statement be incorporated in annex II of the final document.

News Conference Remarks by President Ford [Extract], June 9, 1975 [1]

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EUROPE

Q. I wonder if I can change the subject to Europe and the future. There are reports in Europe, sir, that both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be less and less interested in the security conference that is due up this year. Could you tell me something about the

[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 16, 1975, p. 614.

future timetable, when that might come up, how SALT is doing, when you might be seeing Mr. Brezhnev, and so forth? There seems to be some slippage in this.

THE PRESIDENT. While I was in Europe, I discussed with many European leaders the status of the European Security Conference, their views. It appears that there are some compromises being made on both sides between the Warsaw Pact nations and European nations, including ourselves, that will potentially bring the European Security Conference to a conclusion. Those final compromises have not been made, but it's getting closer and closer.

I hope that there will be sufficient understanding on both sides to bring about an ending to this long, long negotiation. If it does, in the near future we probably would have a summit in Helsinki.

The negotiations on SALT Two are progressing, I think, constructively. The technicians are now working on the problems of verification and other matters that are very important, but can be better outlined and put together by the technicians.

I'm optimistic that we can have a SALT Two agreement, but I can assure you, as I have others, that we are going to make sure, make certain that our national security interest is very, very adequately protected, and I think it can be, as I look at the overall picture.

Q. To follow up, sir, when do you think Mr. Brezhnev might be coming here? Would you give a ballpark guess on that?

THE PRESIDENT. I would hope if negotiations go the way they are, some time in the fall of 1975.

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Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the House Appropriations Committee: Binary Chemical Weapons, June 9, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on U.S. efforts to limit chemical weapons in the world. We welcome your interest in the ongoing international discussions and in the effects U.S. production of binary weapons might have on arms control and our national security.

As you know, U.S. policy has ruled out first use in war of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. This policy became a formal, legally binding commitment this year subsequent to the U.S. Senate giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the 50-year-old Geneva Protocol. However, we have retained chemical weapon stockpiles as one means of deterring chemical attack.

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[1] *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1976: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense*, Pt. 9, pp. 227–229.

The idea of prohibiting chemical weapons has a long history. Back in the days of the League of Nations, unsuccessful attempts were made to work out an agreement to prohibit production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Since World War II, provisions for eliminating chemical and biological weapons have been proposed and discussed on many occasions. More recently, the main forum for negotiations on chemical warfare has been the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1971 that Conference produced a separate agreement prohibiting biological weapons,[2] which the United States ratified this year. This splits off biological from chemical weapons. According to Article IX—of the Biological Weapons Convention, the parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for prohibiting chemical weapons.

There are two draft treaty proposals before the Geneva Conference—CCD—at the present time: one presented by the Soviet Union and its allies,[3] the other by Japan.[4] The Soviet draft would completely prohibit the development and production of chemical warfare agents and munitions, and calls for the destruction of stockpiles. In our view, this draft treaty is not an acceptable basis for negotiation because of its inadequate verification provisions.

The Japanese proposal contains some constructive ideas. It is based on a phased approach to an eventual comprehensive ban; that is, it relates the scope of the prohibition to the possibilities for verification.

Let me be perfectly frank here. From the U.S. point of view the main, if not the only, stumbling block to an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons is the difficult issue of verification. Now that the U.S. has ratified the Geneva Protocol, hence is legally bound not to use chemical weapons first, we would surely be willing to do away with chemical weapons altogether if we could be confident that our potential adversaries also got rid of these weapons. In our Armed Forces, chemical weapons serve only to deter attack with chemical weapons. Unlike our nuclear weapons, our chemical warfare agents do not serve as a general deterrent against major aggression. On the other hand, the Soviet Armed Forces give far more emphasis to chemical warfare in their training, equipment, and doctrine.

Depending on how far new prohibitions on chemical weapons went, their verification would become increasingly difficult, or impossible, in closed societies. Article IX of the Biological Warfare Convention mentions "measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed" for the use of chemical agents. Depending on how you define "specifically designed," some agreed procedures might be developed to verify such measures. But the same article also mentions destruction of stockpiles. While it seems feasible to design verifiable

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 120–124.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 99–106.

procedures for the destruction of declared stockpiles, we do not know how to verify whether all existing stockpiles have been properly declared. And just as difficult is the verification of a prohibition of production. Production of chemical weapons could take place in the shadow of normal operations of chemical industries—one of the most difficult activities to ferret out in a society with a high degree of secrecy.

Clearly, we must make some difficult judgments in deciding what to do about prohibitions of chemical weapons. Would the benefits of an agreement limiting chemical weapons be significant enough to outweigh the drawback of accepting prohibitions that are essentially unverifiable?

In the case of the Biological Weapons Convention, we concluded the agreement would serve U.S. interests even though verification was essentially impossible. This was based on two considerations:

First, the military utility of the biological weapons is considered dubious, at best. The effects are unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable, and there has been no military experience with them. In brief, the Convention does not deny us a viable military option.

Second, the Convention can help discourage misguided competition in biological weapons. Without such a prohibition, new discoveries and inventions in the biological sciences would tend to raise anxieties that they might lead to applications for new terror weapons.

Similar considerations must be weighed in any judgment on chemical weapons policy. In the review now underway in the executive branch, we are attempting to look at the pros and cons of the various alternatives to update the overall U.S. position.

House International Relations Committee Report on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, June 11, 1975 [1]

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 7567]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 7567) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

BACKGROUND

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established by Congress in 1961. Since that time it has customarily received 2-year

[1] House Report No. 94-281, 94th Congress, 1st Session.

authorizations. For fiscal year 1975, however, the Congress provided a 1-year authorization to allow for a major indepth study and review of the Agency.

In its report on the ACDA authorization for fiscal year 1975 (No. 93-904), the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that a thorough examination of ACDA was deemed appropriate for several reasons.

First, the Agency had not been subjected to a comprehensive oversight review during the 13 years of its existence. Further, there were indications that Agency activities had, in several instances, veered away from original Congressional intentions. Finally, there was growing concern that ACDA no longer played the role in the formulation and execution of United States arms control policies that it once did.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The responsibility for this oversight review was assigned by the Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, to the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. As a first stage in its effort the subcommittee ordered a comprehensive staff review as a basis for planning and conducting its study and hearings. The subcommittee subsequently held 5 days of extensive hearings in September-October, 1974, published under the title, "Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Testifying were: Hon. John J. McCloy, former chairman, General Advisory Committee; Hon. Adrian S. Fisher, former Deputy Director, ACDA, and Dean, Georgetown University Law School; Donald G. Brennan, Director, National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute, and Consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Hon. Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and member of U.S. SALT Negotiating Team; Prof. George W. Rathjens, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Hon. McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, and former National Security Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Hon. Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense; Hon. Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State; Hon. Gerard Smith, former Director, ACDA; and Hon. Fred C. Ikle, Director, ACDA. A written summary-analysis report of the hearings was filed with the chairman of the Committee on December 27, 1974.

On January 16, 1975, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee, for himself and 5 cosponsors, introduced H.R. 1550, legislation embodying recommendations considered during the 1974 hearings aimed at enhancing the future status and effectiveness of ACDA.

On February 19, 1975, the House of Representatives received a communication from the President of the United States (H. Doc. No. 94-95), transmitting the draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the

authorization for appropriations to fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and for other purposes.[2]

Subsequently, on March 4, 1975, the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, introduced, by request, a bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (H.R. 4265).

The Subcommittee held hearings on April 8 and 10 on both H.R. 1550 and H.R. 4265, taking testimony from Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director of ACDA[3]; the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota; the Honorable Michael Harrington of Massachusetts; the Honorable Adrian Fisher, vice-president of the Arms Control Association; and Dr. Charles C. Price, chairman, Council for a Livable World.

On April 14 and 15, the Subcommittee met in open session to consider the bills, combined and amended them, and ordered H.R. 1550 reported as amended, by a vote of 4 to 1.

On May 14 the Committee held hearings on H.R. 1550. Testimony was received from the Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Honorable James P. Wade, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, International Security Affairs.

On June 3 the Committee met in open session to mark up the Committee Print version of H.R. 1550 as reported by the Subcommittee. Having read the bill for Committee amendments, the Committee proceeded to amend H.R. 1550. The same day Mr. Zablocki and 19 cosponsors introduced the proposal in the House as H.R. 7567. The Committee met again on June 5 and ordered the bill favorably reported by unanimous voice vote.

PURPOSES OF THE LEGISLATION

The primary purposes of the legislation are two-fold:

First, as amended, H.R. 1550 authorizes an appropriation of $23 million to fund operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal years 1976 and 1977.

Second, as is explained below in greater detail, in order to improve the operation of the Agency, the legislation amends the basic Act of 1961 in several ways.

On the fundamental principle that the arms control and disarmament are basic components of national security, the legislation:

1. Enhances the status and effectiveness of ACDA by:

(a) clarifying the Agency's function and purpose from a designation of capability to perform certain functions to that of having

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[2] *Ante*, pp. 63–64.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 98–100.

primary authority for arms control and disarmament matters "under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State."

(b) making the Director of ACDA a statutory principal adviser to the National Security Council on arms control and disarmament matters.

2. Generates vital and necessary information for both the Executive Branch and the Congress by:

(a) providing for Agency participation in assessing and analyzing the impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations of proposed weapons programs or technology. On the basis of that assessment-analysis, the Director would register his advice and recommendations to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the initiating agency. In addition, on the basis of his assessment-analysis and resulting advice and recommendations, a complete statement assessing the arms control and disarmament impact of such programs would be included with authorization or appropriation requests to Congress; and

(b) providing for an expanded Agency annual report to include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.

3. Amends the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require coordination with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and consideration of the Director's opinion as to the arms control implications of:

(a) decisions on issuing licenses for export of articles on the United States Munitions List;

(b) evaluation of proposed sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act; and

(c) decisions to furnish military assistance under Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

The authorization levels sought by this legislation are $10,690,000 for fiscal year 1976, $11,310,000 for fiscal year 1977, and $1 million to cover possible executive and regular pay act increases and other contingencies—for a total of $23 million. The increment for future pay legislation was included pursuant to the advice of the Office of Management and Budget. (The 3-month transition period of July 1 through September 30, 1976, between fiscal years 1976 and 1977, will be covered by the

proposal for a general authorization of appropriations which will be submitted to the Congress by the Administration.)

Over the 13 years of its existence, the Agency's average annual authorization has been approximately $10 million. The $23 million authorization for fiscal years 1976–77 is $1 million more than the $22 million authorized by Congress for the 2-year authorization period of fiscal years 1973–74 and is also an increase on an annual basis from the $10.1 million authorization for fiscal year 1975.

The increase over fiscal year 1975 is required in large part to offset higher costs, including inflationary price increases, generated in the exercise of the Agency's basic operations, including its statutory support responsibility for some 12 different arms control and disarmament negotiations in which the United States is a participant. Among the latter are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR), continued implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and operations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

Since the arms control impact reports contain information which, for the most part, is already gathered and analyzed by ACDA officials, the Committee does not believe this assessment-analysis and reporting function should require additional personnel nor funding for the Agency at this time.

The following tables show the allocation of funds under the Agency's appropriation for fiscal year 1975, and the proposed allocation of funds in fiscal years 1976–77:

TABLE I.—*Authorization, appropriations, and estimated obligations for the expiring fiscal year 1975 authorization period*

Fiscal year 1975 authorization	$10,100,000
Fiscal year 1975 appropriations:	
Enacted	9,250,000
Supplemental requested for October 1974 pay raise	160,000
Total appropriations	9,410,0.
Fiscal year 1975 obligations:	
Program operation	8,130,000
External research	1,280,000
Total obligations	9,410,000
Unobligated balance	0

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

TABLE 2.—*Projected Breakdown of Estimated Appropriation Request for the Fiscal Year 1976–77 Authorization Period*

	Estimate—		Total
	1976	1977	
Program operation	$ 8,990,000	$ 9,310,000	$18,300,000
External research	1,700,000	2,000,000	3,700,000
Total	10,690,000	11,310,000	22,000,000
Future pay act and other contingencies	360,000	640,000	1,000,000
Grand total	11,050,000	11,950,000	23,000,000

STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ACDA

For a variety of reasons, not always or entirely its own, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has recently gone into somewhat of an "eclipse." This diminishment in status and function has resulted in a corresponding ineffectiveness in achieving the goals Congress originally intended for the Agency.

In an effort to rectify this deficiency this legislation attempts to strengthen the Agency and thereby enhance its effectiveness. With a strengthened and more effective operation it is expected that the Agency will again play the vital role Congress envisioned for it in contributing significantly to the formulation and execution of U.S. arms control policies.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The legislation strengthens the status of the Agency, first, by augmenting the status of its Director. It does so by formally establishing him as principal adviser to the National Security Council on arms control and disarmament matters. Thus, his role in relation to the NSC is comparable to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency.

The Committee recognizes that many of the issues treated by the NSC involve, directly or indirectly, arms control and disarmament implications. Therefore, the Committee believes that this enhancement of the Director's relation to the NSC will help to assure fuller consideration for the arms control aspects of all issues considered by the NSC. Presently, the Director attends the NSC only by invitation.

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT

Congress has a Constitutional responsibility to share in the formulation of foreign policy. In order to fulfill that role properly and respon-

sibly in the all-important area of proposed defense programs, it needs complete information—especially in terms of the impact of such proposals on U.S. arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

Thus, one key purpose of the legislation is to have a strengthened and more effective Arms Control and Disarmament Agency participate in a process of generating such information not only for the Congress but for certain significant offices of the executive branch as well. It would function in the following staged procedure:

(1) Any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization for armaments, ammunition, implements of war or military facilities would be required to provide the Director of ACDA, on a continuing basis, with full and timely access to detailed information on the nature, scope, and purpose of such programs.

(2) On the basis of such information the Director would assess and analyze each such program with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

(3) On the basis of his assessment and analysis he would advise and make recommendations to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing the program.

(4) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for any program within the specified funding limits and, in addition, any program found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations from the Director of ACDA, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations would include a complete statement assessing and analyzing such impact.

(5) Upon the request of any appropriate committee of Congress, the Director, after informing the Secretary of State, would advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program on which a statement has been submitted.

Programs affected would be those whose total estimated program cost exceeds $250 million or $50 million annually. For weapons programs which fall below the $50 million annual limit and policy issues with no expenditure as such, the legislation provides a discretionary authority for the Director to make an arms control and disarmament assessment and analysis identical to the procedure outlined above. The intent in providing this discretionary authority to the Director is to include programs which, regardless of cost, have a potentially significant arms control impact. Included in this intent are items of a "seminal" nature, such as major philosophical or doctrinal changes in defense posture or new weapons concepts in various stages of research and development—any of which could have far-reaching implications for arms control and disarmament policy and planning.

As noted, Section 103 provides that any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for such programs would include a complete statement assessing and analyzing its arms control and disarmament impact. Any such statement containing confidential or classified materials would be handled under an appropriate injunction of secrecy. While Congress expects good faith compliance with these procedures by all agencies involved it will exercise careful oversight review to assure effective operation of the procedure. At the same time, it is not the intention of Congress that there be any judicial enforcement of these provisions or any judicial review with respect to the adequacy of compliance with these provisions. Thus, the legislation contains an express provision to that effect.

The advice and recommendations of the Director furnished to various executive branch offices would not be available to members of the general public under the Freedom of Information provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code. At times, such advice and recommendations might include sensitive security information and accordingly would be classified and therefore exempted from disclosure by Section 552(b)(1)(A). More generally, the advice and recommendations furnished to the executive branch offices by the Director is the type of predecisional interagency advice furnished to assist in the decisionmaking process which is exempted from public disclosure by Section 552(b)(5).

Since the impact statements would contain information which for the most part is already gathered and analyzed by ACDA officials, the Committee does not believe this requirement should necessitate additional personnel nor funding for the Agency at this time.

Annual Agency Report to Congress—Posture Statement

As a complement to the arms control impact statement procedure, the legislation also provides for an expanded Agency annual report to Congress. Analogous to the annual "Posture Statement" provided to Congress by the Secretary of Defense, the report would be extended to include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities as well as an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect. The intent is to once again provide Congress with more comprehensive and updated information on which it can more effectively and intelligently carry out its role of advising and consenting in the formulation of foreign policy.

Conforming Amendments to Other Acts

The legislation amends 3 existing statutes: the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The intent is to require coordination with ACDA and consideration of the Director's opinion as to the arms control implications of certain activities carried out under those acts.

Although Section 35 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and subsequent Executive Orders (Nos. 11044 and 11501) already provide authority for similar procedures of cooperation and consultation on an informal basis, those procedures have not been fully implemented or followed.

It is therefore appropriate and desirable to reinforce this ACDA review and consultation process by formalizing it. At the same time, it is not the intent to impose upon ACDA and other affected Government agencies burdensome or rigid mechanisms which would impair harmonious internal relationships within the executive branch.

General Advisory Committee

As part of its objective of expanding communication between the Congress and the Agency, the legislation originally contained a provision calling for Members of Congress to serve on the Agency's General Advisory Committee (GAC). Although the provision was eliminated by the Subcommittee for constitutional reasons, its original objective remains a concern of the committee.

Thus, the Committee's hope is that the GAC will develop a meaningful status. Among the means to that end recommended by the Committee are the following:

That the GAC would consider inviting Members of Congress to its meetings as observers;

That the Chairman of the GAC meet periodically on an informal basis with appropriate committees of Congress in an effort to exchange views on pertinent and timely arms control and disarmament issues, or to file an annual report with Congress;

That the GAC increase the number of its meetings yearly from two, as now prescribed, to at least six;

That the GAC make every effort to expand its contact with the general public and interested organizations in particular as a means of broadening its base of insight into arms control and disarmament matters.

The Committee believes that the adoption of these various recommendations would enable the GAC to better fulfill the role mandated for it in Section 26 of the basic Act, namely, that of advising the President, the Secretary of State, and the Director of ACDA respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Operations

In recent years the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's dominant activity has been directly participating in or supporting a variety of arms control negotiations. They include:

(1) *SALT.* The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks continue to be a

principal activity of the Agency and will require a large part of the Agency's personnel and budgetary resources for fiscal year 1976–77. The United States-Soviet Summit in Moscow last summer and the meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok last November gave added impetus to the second round of these talks (SALT II—which began November 1972 in Geneva).

The Vladivostok agreement reaffirmed the intention by both sides to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms covering the period through 1985 and added momentum to this process when several significant provisions were agreed to as a basis for achieving this new agreement. Most importantly, these provisions would (1) incorporate into the new agreement relevant portions of the 1972 Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and (2) set a ceiling for strategic offensive delivery vehicles and a subceiling for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's).

(2) *MBFR, Conventional and Regional Arms Control.* In fiscal year 1976–77 it is expected that ACDA will continue to support negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, as well as conventional and regional arms control activities in general.

On October 30, 1973, formal MBFR negotiations opened in Vienna, Austria between the NATO nations and Warsaw Pact member states. Four sessions have been completed, and the fifth began in January. ACDA chairs the MBFR Interagency Coordinating Committee in Washington, which coordinates the preparation of instructions to the U.S. Delegation in Vienna and the U.S. Mission to NATO. ACDA also contributes a component of the U.S. Delegation at Vienna and participates actively in the MBFR work of the NSC system.

In the field of conventional armaments the Agency will continue to explore the possibility of limitations in areas outside Europe, especially in those parts of the world where the potential for big power confrontation is high. Concerning regional arms control measures not strictly limited to conventional weapons, ACDA is devoting increased attention to proposals for nuclear free zones and regional areas of restraint. Recent proposals for such zones in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and the interest of certain Southeast Asian states in an area of restraint, have spurred this heightened interest.

(3) *Nuclear Non-Proliferation.* An increasing allocation of ACDA staff and budget will be devoted to efforts over the next two years to help limit the nuclear proliferation of weapons. The Agency is extensively involved in preparing for and participating in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (required by the Treaty) which began in Geneva on May 5, 1975. This Conferense could be important to the future of the Treaty, which is a major instrument in our policy of discouraging further proliferation of nuclear weapons. A senior official of ACDA has three times led the U.S. contingent to Geneva to participate in international consultations to prepare for the Conference. ACDA is playing a principal role in formulating initiatives for the Review Con-

ference, contributing a substantial part of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, and will be directly involved in followup activities stemming from it.

(4) *Chemical and Biological Weapons.* On December 16, 1974, the Senate unanimously gave its advice and consent to ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical and biological warfare and the convention signed in April, 1972, prohibiting development, production, or retention of biological weapons. These agreements were ratified by the President on January 22, 1975, and the convention entered into force on March 26, 1975. In addition to these historic steps, an effective international agreement to control chemical weapons has been an important agenda item at the CCD, and the communique from the recent 1974 Moscow Summit reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to such an agreement. Therefore, the CCD will continue active discussion toward this end.

(5) *Administrative and Other Support.* The balance of Agency manpower and funds will be used for administrative support, liaison with other government entities (particularly Congress, the NSC, OMB, the State Department, DOD and ERDA), public information, and historical activities. Although rising significantly in 1976 because of domestic and overseas wage and price increases, ACDA administrative costs are still relatively low. Nevertheless, ACDA is reviewing all of its administrative activities in an effort to improve efficiency and cut costs to the fullest extent possible.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

TITLE I

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1975

Section 101.—Section 101 changes the emphasis in the mandate of ACDA from capability to perform certain functions relative to arms control and disarmament matters to designation as the Government agency having primary authority for performing those functions, under the direction of the President and Secretary of State. It brings section 2 of the ACD Act of 1961 into conformity with section 22 of the Act which designates the Director of ACDA as having the prime authority, under the direction of the Secretary of State, within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters. It thereby eliminates any possible question as to the Agency's statutory authority.

Section 102.—Section 102 establishes the Director of ACDA as principal adviser to the National Security Council on arms control and disarmament matters. Presently, the Director attends—by invitation—only those meetings of the National Security Council dealing with arms control and disarmament issues. However, it should be recognized that many of the issues handled by the NSC involve, directly and indirectly, a degree of arms control and disarmament. Thus, his

more formalized role in relation to the NSC would help to assure full and proper consideration for the arms control aspects of all issues considered by NSC.

Section 103.—Section 103 amends the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by adding a new section 36 which establishes a procedure under which the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would assess and analyze the impact of proposed defense programs on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations. This new section (1) stipulates the circumstances requiring such an assessment-analysis, (2) prescribes the procedure under which it shall be carried out, (3) specifies the offices and agencies within the Executive Branch which are to receive advice and recommendations from the Director, and (4) states the method and circumstances by which arms control impact statements would be sent to Congress. A central purpose of the reporting requirement is to provide the Congress and key agencies and offices in the Executive Branch with accurate and systematically-developed information on the arms control and disarmament implications of proposed defense programs. The Committee believes that such information would, especially in the case of Congress, facilitate independent appraisals and ultimately achieve a more integrated, effective, and balanced national security policy.

In outlining the circumstances requiring an assessment-analysis, section 36(a) stipulates that the procedure begins with and applies to "any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal" involving certain specified program activities on new or on-going defense programs. The language "any Government agency" is all-encompassing but is intended to specifically include the Department of Defense and the Energy Resource Development Administration (ERDA). The phrase "preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal" is conceived of as the process of developing materials and information which in and of themselves constitute or result in the submission to Congress of authorization and appropriation requests. Specifically included in the Committee's intent here is the on-going, year-long, constant procedure followed in the Department of Defense.

The specified program activities for which such legislative or budgetary proposals would be prepared include "research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, and modernization with respect to armaments ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities."

In reference to the word "research," the Committee recognizes the need for a broad-gauged research program. Many ideas which anticipate larger expenditures are, of course, later permanently set aside in a competition among the various alternatives under study. In order to promote an environment in which tentative and exploratory ideas can flourish, we do not wish to constrain prematurely such ideas by subjecting them in their infancy to overly exacting analytical requirements. The more appropriate concern here, then, is with advanced

research which is approaching the stage of being transformed into important new systems. In reference to the word "deployment," the Committee's intent is not to include the routine movement of existing military personnel and equipment, that is, operational deployments and redeployments.

The legislation specifies two program categories with respect to which the Director would in all cases be provided access to information which would form the basis of his assessment-analysis:

(1) those having "an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000"; and

(2) those having "an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000."

In addition, recognizing that there are programs which, regardless of cost, have a potentially significant arms control impact, the legislation establishes a third program category on which an arms control and disarmament assessment and analysis may be necessary or desirable as determined by either the Director or the initiating agency. Thus, the legislation includes language which refers to "any other program involving weapons systems or technology which [the initiating] Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations." The Committee's intent here is to provide an opportunity for an arms control and disarmament assessment and analysis of programs which fall below the $50 million annual limit and policy issues with no expenditure as such. Included in this intent are items of a "seminal" nature, such as major philosophical or doctrinal changes in defense posture or new weapons concepts in various stages of research and development. In reference to the word "negotiations," the Committee has in mind such formal arrangements as SALT and MBFR.


The language next prescribes the detailed procedure under which the arms control and disarmament assessment-analysis shall be carried out, including the nature of the relationship between the Director and the Government agency initiating the affected program. To that end it stipulates that the initiating agency shall, "on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope and purpose of such proposal."

The phrase "on a continuing basis" expresses the Committee's intent that the Director's access to information be on a regular on-going, uninterrupted basis as opposed to it being restricted to any specified time frame. The phrase is an improvement on and expansion of earlier language which merely required that information on affected programs be provided to the Director "not less than 30 days prior to requesting an authorization." It also takes into account the on-going, year-long, continuous nature of the budgetary preparation process followed in the

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


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Department of Defense. Finally, it accommodates, institutionalizes, and strengthens the established working arrangement whereby ACDA has taken part in that process on an informal basis.

The phrase "provide the Director" is intended to convey the Committee's intent that the Director's access to information be made in a cooperative and willing manner by the affected agency.

The phrase "with full and timely access to detailed information" expresses the Committee's intent that the information available to the Director be complete, accurate and current in every respect. It is also intended to convey the idea that the Director have ready and easy availability to such information and to the personnel responsible for developing, analyzing, or compiling it. Finally, the phrase is intended to convey the Committee's intent that this arrangement be carried out in a cooperative and responsive manner by all parties concerned.

The phrase "in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act" conveys the Committee's intent that the assessment-analysis procedure complement and extend the coordination responsibility outlined in that section.

Finally, the phrase "with respect to the nature, scope and purpose of such proposal" refers to the specific nature of the information to which the Director shall have access. The Committee's intent here is that the information include, but not necessarily or exclusively be limited to, detailed data and facts regarding such aspects of the proposal as its inherent character, range of operation, and intended objective, as well as such other information as would be pertinent to the Director's assessment-analysis.

Subsection (b)(1) of the new Impact Statement section specifies the procedure to be followed by the Director in assessing and analyzing affected programs. First, the phrase "as he deems appropriate" expresses the Committee's belief that he exercise prudent discretion in determining those programs whose impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiation is significant enough to warrant an assessment-analysis. Thus, the Committee's intent is to rely on his informed, professional judgment as to which program legitimately require such assessment-analysis. The phrase is also intended to convey the Committee's intent that he determine the extent and form of such assessment-analysis.

On the basis of such assessment-analysis the Director will "advise and make recommendations . . . to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program." The Committee's intent is to make available to these offices and agencies the Director's judgment regarding the impact of affected programs on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiation. In the interests of achieving a more integrated, effective and balanced national security policy it is the Committee's expectation that the specified offices and agencies would take the Director's advice and recommendations into full account.

Subsection (b)(2) of the new section 36 outlines the conditions and procedure by which impact statements would be conveyed to Congress. It specifies that "any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations" for any program within the specified funding limits would automatically include "*a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.*" In addition, those programs not within the specified funding limit would include an arms control impact statement whenever the National Security Council finds, on the basis of the Director's advice and recommendations, that they do have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations. It is anticipated that any impact statement so included would be comprehensive, complete and substantive enough for Congress to exercise independent appraisals.

At the same time, we do not anticipate the need for massive and expensive documentation which would lead to the formation of additional bureaucracies in any involved agency, or would strain existing analytical capabilities. Nor is there any reason why this should occur, since it is hoped that arms control implications would be taken fully into account even in the absence of this legislation.

It is essential that the requirement for this statement not become an excuse for delays in the Congress' normal procedure of considering and acting upon authorization and appropriations requests.

Subsection (b)(3) of the new section 36 provides that the Director advise Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any affected program. By use of the word "request," the Committee's intent is that such requests can be conveyed either in writing or verbally during hearings. By the phrase "any appropriate committee of either House of Congress" the Committee's intent is to include those committees with proper jurisdiction: the House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the House Government Operations Committee.

The language in this subsection complements the directive in Section 2 of this Act which stipulates that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency must provide the Congress with recommendations concerning U.S. arms control and disarmament policy generally. Thus, the Committee does not intend this language to be interpreted in any way which would preclude the Director from advising the Congress regarding programs for which no impact statement has been provided.

Subsection (c) of the new section 36 expresses the Committee's intent that there be no judicial enforcement of these provisions nor any judicial review with respect to the adequacy of compliance with these provisions.

Finally, it is the Committee's intent to exercise full and careful over-

sight on the various procedures outlined above to assure that they are complied with fully, effectively, and accurately.

Section 104.—Section 104 has two basic objectives. First, it permits the Director to waive the requirement for a high level security clearance for a limited class of special employees who do not require nor have access to classified information. From time to time the Agency requires the services of consultants for brief periods to work on unclassified projects. As presently written, the law prohibits such services from being performed until an unnecessary, expensive, and time-consuming investigation is conducted.

Secondly, Section 104 authorizes the Director of the Agency to grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense. As presently written, the law only permits the Director to accept a security investigation conducted by another Government agency, and then only if it meets the particular standards in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Currently, such other agencies of the Government as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of State are able to rely on clearances previously granted by the Department of Defense.

In both instances above it is estimated that approximately $750 in investigation costs will be saved for each unnecessary investigation. As important as the money saved is the time saved in getting important contract and consulting work underway promptly.

Section 105.—Section 105 authorizes appropriations of $23.0 million for the 2-year period of fiscal years 1976 and 1977. The projected budget is $10,690,000 for fiscal year 1976 and $11,310,000 for fiscal year 1977. The remaining $1 million is to cover possible executive and regular pay act increases and other unforeseen costs. The expiring authorization for fiscal year 1975 was $10.1 million. The Agency does not have a permament authorization and its current authorization expires on June 30, 1975.

Section 106.—Section 106 while not eliminating the prohibition against "propaganda" within the U.S. on the Agency's activities, reaffirms the need for and desirability of fulfilling one of the Agency's functions as cited in Section 2(c) ["Purpose"] of the Act.

In the past the prohibition against "propaganda" has tended to inhibit the Agency from carrying out necessary and legitimate public information activities within the United States. By explicitly reaffirming one of the Agency's basic purposes, this change will allow ACDA to provide the public with information on U.S. arms control and disarmament goals and activities. It should also serve to balance the extensive public information program carried out by the Department of Defense.

Section 107.—Section 107 requires that the Agency's annual report to the Congress be expanded to include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activ-

ities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.

The present annual report provided for in Sec. 50 of the Act presents little more than a sketchy update on the agency's activities generally. It provides the Congress with little if any substantive information on which to base an informed judgment as to progress and needs in achieving arms control goals. This change is intended to correct that deficiency, thereby enhancing the role and action of Congress on arms control matters as they relate to U.S. national security interests. The added reporting requirement called for in this change is seen as analagous to the annual "Posture Statement" provided to Congress by the Secretary of Defense.

TITLE II

Conforming Amendments to Other Acts

Section 201. Section 414 Mutual Security Act.—Section 201 requires that the Director of ACDA be consulted and his opinion considered in making decisions regarding the issuance of licenses for the export of articles designated as arms, ammunition, and implements of war under this section.

Although the law requires that consideration be given to the arms control impact of decisions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, there is no such requirement in the munitions control section of the Mutual Security Act. At present ACDA is consulted about the issuance of certain export licenses. However, this is an informal arrangement without any statutory basis, and it has not been effectively implemented. The change would ensure that all decisions under section 414 have the benefit of the Director's opinion of their impact on arms control policies and negotiations.

Section 202. Sec. 42(a) Foreign Military Sales Act.—Section 202 requires that the Director of ACDA be consulted and his opinion considered as part of the evaluation of all sales proposed to be made pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Although section 42(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act requires that the evaluation of proposed foreign military sales take into account their arms control impact, it does not specifically require that ACDA be consulted or that its views be obtained. The change would assure that all such evaluations have the benefit of the Director's opinion of the impact of the proposed sale on arms control policies and negotiations. ACDA's participation on the Secretary of State's Security Assistance Program Review Committee does not obviate the need for this change, because that committee is concerned with the formulation of annual programs and multi-year plans. This change would ensure ACDA participation in decisions on changes in the credit sales program and on unprogrammed cash sales requests.

Section 203. Sec. 511 Foreign Assistance Act.—Section 203 requires

that the Director of ACDA be consulted on all decisions to furnish military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act and that his opinion as to the arms control impact of such assistance be taken into account in making such decisions.

Although section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the decisions on military assistance take into account their arms control impact, it does not specifically require that ACDA be consulted or that its view be obtained. The change would assure that all such decisions have the benefit of the Director's opinion of their impact on arms control policies and negotiations. ACDA's participation on the Secretary of State's Security Assistance Program Review Committee does not obviate the need for this change because that committee is concerned with the formulation of annual programs and multi-year plans. This change would ensure ACDA participation in decisions on program changes.

Cost Estimate

Pursuant to Clause 7 of Rule XIII of the House Rules, the Committee has examined the requests submitted by the President to extend the appropriation authorization for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In projecting possible Agency costs for the next three fiscal years, it should be noted that the cost of ACDA operations is dependent in large part on the number and nature of arms control negotiations, conferences, and related operations in which it is involved. Those, in turn, are affected by changed international conditions.

Nevertheless, the committee—noting the stability of the Agency's funding for the past 13 years—does not anticipate that expenses will rise significantly in the foreseeable future. A more specific estimate of future costs, however, is not possible at this time.

Statements Required by Rule XI(1)(3) of House Rules

Pursuant to the requirements of Rule XI(1)(3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following statements are made:

(A) *Oversight findings and recommendations:* The oversight findings and recommendations made by the Subcommittee study and hearings referred to earlier are embodied in this measure. In addition, however, the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs will maintain close oversight over the effective implementation of the impact statement procedure established in Section 36.

(B) *Congressional Budget Act Section 308(a) requirement:* This measure provides for no new budget authority or new or increased tax expenditures.

(C) *Congressional Budget Office Estimate and comparison:* No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the Committee.

(D) *Committee on Government Operations Summary:* No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of Rule X.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

This measure would not have any specifically identifiable inflationary impact. In fact, its long-term effect is to the economic benefit of the United States:

If, by the effective implementation of the Impact Statement provision, expenditures for unnecessary or destabilizing weapons proposals can be reduced, avoided, or delayed.

If, by a more successful attainment of United States arms control and disarmament policies, overall defense expenditures can be reduced, without jeopardizing legitimate U.S. national security requirements.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

TITLE I—SHORT TITLE, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS

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SEC. 2. An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It is the purpose of this Act to provide impetus toward this goal by creating a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field. This organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect

of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy.

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. [It must be able] *It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,* to carry out the following primary functions.

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;

(b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;

(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

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TITLE II—ORGANIZATION

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SEC. 21. There is hereby established an agency to be known as the "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency".

Director

SEC. 22. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, *the National Security Council,* and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate:

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TITLE III—FUNCTIONS

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Arms Control Impact Information and Analysis

Sec. 36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—

(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—

(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or

(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or

(2) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

(b)(1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

(A) any program described in subsection (a)(1), or

(B) any program described in subsection (a)(2) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

(3) Upon the request of any appropriate committee of either House of Congress, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

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Security Requirements

SEC. 45. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in

the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. [The Director] *Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director* shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-field background security and loyalty investigations of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, advisory boards, contractors and subcontractors, and their officers and employees, actual or prospective. In the event the investigation discloses information indicating that the person investigated may be or may become a security risk, or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investigation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-field investigation. The final results of all such investigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determination. [No person] *Except as provided in subsection (d), no person* shall be permitted to enter on duty as such an officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such detail, and no contractor or subcontractor, or officer or employee thereof shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, until he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsection and the report of such investigations made to the Director, and the Director shall have determined that such person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. Standards applicable with respect to the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in this subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of such persons for such purposes shall not be less intensive or complete, than in the case of such clearance of persons in a corresponding category under the security procedures of the Government agency or agencies having the highest security restrictions with respect to persons in such category.

(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof: *Provided*, That security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than "confidential" to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check. *Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any*

agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c).

(c) The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize any of its employees, or employees of any contractor, prospective contractor, licensee, or prospective licensee of the Atomic Energy Commission or any other person authorized to have access to Restricted Data by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 2165 of title 42, to permit the Director or any officer, employee, consultant, person detailed from other Government agencies, member of the General Advisory Committee or of an advisory board established pursuant to section 41(f) contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, or officer or employee of such contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, to have access to Restricted Data which is required in the performance of his duties and so certified by the Director, but only if (1) the Atomic Energy Commission has determined, in accordance with the established personnel security procedures and standards of the Commission, that permitting such individual to have access to such Restricted Data will not endanger the common defense and security, and (2) the Atomic Energy Commission finds that the established personnel and other security procedures and standards of the Agency are adequate and in reasonable conformity to the standards established by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 2165 of title 42, including those for interim clearance in subsection (b) thereof. Any individual granted access to such Restricted Data pursuant to this subsection may exchange such data with any individual who (A) is an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or a contractor or subcontractor of any such department, agency, or armed force, or any officer or employee of any such contractor or subcontractor, and (B) has been authorized to have access to Restricted Data under the provisions of sections 2163 or 2455 of title 42.

(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States.

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Appropriation

SEC. 49. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964 and 1965, the sum of $20,000,000, and for the three fiscal years 1966 through 1968, the sum of $30,000,000, and for the two fiscal years 1969 through 1970, the sum of $18,500,-

000, and for the two fiscal years 1971 and 1972, the sum of $17,500,000, and for the two fiscal years 1973 and 1974, the sum of $22,000,000, and for the fiscal year 1975, the sum $10,100,000, *and for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 the sum of $23,000,000,* to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, not more than $7,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to the preceding sentence for fiscal years 1969 through 1970 may be used for the purpose of research, development, and other studies conducted in whole or in part outside the Agency, whether by other government agencies or by public or private institutions or persons: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply to field test activities conducted pursuant to the authority of this Act.

(b) Funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be allocated or transferred to any agency for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Such funds shall be available for obligation and expenditure in accordance with authority granted in this Act, or under authority governing the activities of the agencies to which such funds are allocated or transferred.

(c) Not more than 20 per centum of any appropriation made pursuant to this Act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last month of a fiscal year.

(d) [None] *Except as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act specified under section 2(c), none* of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda concerning the work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Report to Congress

SEC. 50. The Director shall submit to the President, for transmittal to the Congress, not later than January 31 of each year, a report concerning activities of the Agency. *Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.*

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THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954

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SEC. 414. MUNITIONS CONTROL.—(a) The President is authorized to control, in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the export and import of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, other than by a United States Government agency. The President is authorized to designate those articles which shall be considered as arms,

ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, for the purposes of this section.

(b) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any arms, ammunition, or implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, designated by the President under subsection (a) shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section, and, in addition, shall pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations. Such regulations shall prohibit the return to the United States for sale in the United States (other than for the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies or for any State or local law enforcement agency) of any military firearms or ammunition of United States manufacture furnished to foreign governments by the United States under this Act or any other foreign assistance program of the United States, whether or not advanced in value or improved in condition in a foreign country. This prohibition shall not extend to similar firearms that have been so substantially transformed as to become, in effect, articles of foreign manufacture.

(c) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section or any rule or regulation issued under this section, or who willfully, in a registration or license application, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statement therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

(d) This section applies to and within the Canal Zone.

(e) Licenses issued for the export of articles on the United States Munitions List in excess of $100,000 shall be reported promptly to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, which report shall contain—

(1) the items to be exported under the license;

(2) the quantity of each such item to be furnished;

(3) the name and address of the consignee and of the ultimate user of each such item; and

(4) an injunction whenever appropriate, concerning the necessity to protect the confidentiality of the information provided.

(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

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THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

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CHAPTER 4.—GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 41. EFFECTIVE DATE.—This Act shall take effect on July 1, 1968.

SEC. 42. GENERAL PROVISIONS.—(a) In carrying out this Act, special emphasis shall be placed on procurement in the United States, but, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, consideration shall also be given to coproduction or licensed production outside the United States of defense articles of United States origin when such production best serves the foreign policy, national security, and economy of the United States. In evaluating any sale proposed to be made pursuant to this Act, there shall be taken into consideration (1) the extent to which the proposed sale damages or infringes upon licensing arrangements whereby United States entities have granted licenses for the manufacture of the defense articles selected by the purchasing country to entities located in friendly foreign countries, which licenses result in financial returns to the United States, (2) the portion of the defense articles so manufactured which is of United States origin, and (3) *in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to* the extent to which such sale might contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

(b) No credit sale shall be extended under section 23, and no guarantee shall be issued under section 24, in any case involving coproduction or licensed, production outside the United States of any defense article of United States origin unless the Secretary of State shall, in advance of any such transaction, advise the appropriate committees of the Congress and furnish the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate with full information regarding the proposed transaction, including, but not limited to, a description of the particular defense article or articles which would be produced under license or coproduced outside the United States, the estimated value of such production or coproduction, and the probable impact of the proposed transaction on employment and production within the United States.

(c) Funds made available under this Act may be used for procurement outside the United States only if the President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the United States in its balance of payments with the rest of the world,

which outweigh the economic or other advantages to the United States of less costly procurement outside the United States.

(d)(1) With respect to sales and guaranties under sections 21, 22, 23, and 24, the Secretary of Defense shall, under the direction of the President, have primary responsibility for—

(A) the determination of military end-item requirements;

(B) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs;

(C) the supervision of the training of foreign military personnel;

(D) the movement and delivery of military end-items; and

(E) within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to sales and guaranties.

(2) The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment shall, under the direction of the President, be determined by the Secretary of Defense.

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THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
PART II

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CHAPTER 2—MILITARY ASSISTANCE

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SEC. 511. CONSIDERATIONS IN FURNISHING MILITARY ASSISTANCE.—Decisions to furnish military assistance made under this part shall [take into account] *be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to* whether such assistance will—

(1) contribute to an arms race;

(2) increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict; or

(3) prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

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Resolution Adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on the Establishment of an Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June 11, 1975 [1]

The Board of Governors,

(a) *Deeply conscious* of the importance of the objective of the

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[1] A/10168/Add. 1, Sept. 29, 1975.

Agency set forth in Article II of its Statute to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world,

(b) *Mindful* that, under that Article, the Agency shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose,

(c) *Desirous* that any benefits which may accrue from the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE) may also be available to non-nuclear-weapon States, and

(d) *Recalling:*

(i) Resolution 2829 (XXVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, regarding the establishment within the framework of the Agency of an international service for PNE; [2]

(ii) Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] and Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; [4]

(iii) Its report to the General Conference in 1969 on the Agency's responsibility to provide services in connection with PNE [5] and the guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of PNE which it approved in 1972; [6]

(iv) Its resolution of 13 September 1974 on PNE [7] and the approach it has decided should be adopted by the Agency in responding to requests for PNE-related services; [8]

(v) Resolution 3261 D (XXIX) in which the General Assembly requested the Agency to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects; [9] and

(vi) The views of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 1975, regarding Article V of the Treaty, as expressed in the Final Declaration of the Conference,[10]

1. *Decides* to establish an advisory group under the aegis of the Board, open to participation by interested Members of the Agency, to be known as the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and having the following terms of reference:

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 897-898.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 463-464.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291-292.
[5] GC(XIII)/410.
[6] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/169.
[7] A/9722/Add. 1, Annex I.
[8] *Ibid.*, Annex II.
[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 806.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 146-157.

(a) To examine the aspects of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE) coming within the Agency's sphere of competence, with particular reference

(i) Procedural aspects relating to possible requests for PNE-related services;
(ii) Legal aspects and treaty obligations;
(iii) Health and safety matters; and
(iv) Economic aspects, including comparisons with non-nuclear alternatives,

taking fully into account the work already done in these fields by technical committees under the auspices of the Agency;

(b) To advise the Board on the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for PNE as envisaged in paragraph 1(c) of its resolution on PNE of 13 September 1974; [11] and

(c) To advise the Board, within the Agency's sphere of competence, on the structure and content of agreements necessary under Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; [12]

2. *Requests* the Director General to arrange for the Ad Hoc Advisory Group to begin work after the General Conference's session in 1975;

3. *Directs* the Ad Hoc Advisory Group to elect a chairman and two vice-chairmen;

4. *Requests* the Director General:

(a) To transmit the text of this resolution to all Members of the Agency, inviting them to communicate to him information and views within its context;

(b) To prepare and circulate a compilation of the information and views received, with such comment as he may deem appropriate, as a basis for the Ad Hoc Advisory Group's work; and

(c) To furnish the Ad Hoc Advisory Group with any expert assistance it may require, and to co-ordinate the Agency's programme in the field of PNE with the work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group;

5. *Requests* the Ad Hoc Advisory Group to submit a final report to the Board, if possible within eighteen months, submitting interim reports if deemed appropriate;

6. *Requests* the Director General to bring this resolution to the notice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for communication to the General Assembly; and

7. *Authorizes* the Ad Hoc Advisory Group to invite States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but not members of the Agency which would wish to do so to participate in the Ad Hoc Advisory Group's work.

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[11] A/9722/Add. 1, Annex I.
[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 463–464.

Address by General Secretary Brezhnev [Extract], June 14, 1975 [1]

Comrades! A correct foreign policy is called upon to ensure favorable, peaceful conditions for our communist construction. Understandably, the voters show just as lively an interest in foreign-policy questions as they do in problems of our internal development.

The line of our party and state in international affairs is well known. It stems from the very nature of socialism and is wholly subordinated to the interests of the peaceful constructive labor of Soviet people and our brothers in the socialist countries . . . .

In the past few years, a belief in the possibility and, more than that, the necessity of peaceful coexistence has become firmly established in the minds of the broad masses and of the ruling circles of most countries . . . .

The norms of peaceful coexistence between states have been registered in many binding official documents of a bilateral and multilateral nature, as well as in political declarations . . . .

The world is now entering a period in which the task of embodying the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation in day-to-day practical affairs is coming to the fore.

This is a crucial period. Those to whom the destinies of states and peoples have been entrusted should show that their deeds match their words. After all, there are politicians who, in using slogans of peace and paying lip service to the principles of peaceful coexistence and detente, do this as a decoy, while in fact they hope to return to the policy of the "cold war" era, issue calls whipping up the arms race, and display open animosity toward the socialist countries.

The efforts of these politicians run counter to the aspirations of the peoples. After all, in point of fact they can offer nothing except new economic burdens and the revived threat of a new world war. However, if they are not given a timely rebuff they can retard the strengthening of universal security and the development of peaceful cooperation among peoples.

Life teaches us that if peace is to become genuinely lasting, statesmen and politicians must make consistent and purposeful efforts; they must be able to counter the opponents of detente, and they certainly must not be led by them.

One cannot help being surprised when one hears from certain seemingly responsible figures in the West arguments about whether detente is beneficial or harmful, i.e., about whether it is beneficial or harmful

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[1] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXVII, no. 24 (July 9, 1975), pp. 2–4. The remarks were made at a pre-election meeting of electors to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

to live in conditions in which peace is gaining strength and the danger of war is lessening.

Sometimes we are told that attempts to cast doubt on the benefits to be gained from the easing of tension are being made for purely domestic-political, tactical considerations, in order to win the sympathy of right-wing circles in a particular country. But, frankly speaking, we are convinced that the strengthening of peace is too serious a matter for the present and future generations of people to be subordinated to any considerations of momentary expedience or to someone's mood. (*Applause.*)

Needless to say, we have our own ideology and our own convictions, but we proceed from the premise that all peoples need peace in the same degree, that all states have a stake in eliminating the danger of a world nuclear war. This is the main foundation of joint efforts to strengthen peace and security. In speaking about Soviet-American relations, U.S. President Ford emphasized recently that "detente is advantageous to both sides." It seems to me that one cannot help agreeing with this.

We firmly hold to the opinion that detente can and must be deepened further. To this end, it is necessary that states properly consider their mutual—mutual, not unilateral—interests and assume treaty commitments on a basis of reciprocity. As a matter of fact, the easing of international tension began on this basis, and it is developing on this basis.

Comrades, allow me to state from this rostrum once more and as clearly as possible that the Soviet Union, its Communist Party and the entire Soviet people resolutely and consistently advocate and will continue to advocate the improvement of the international climate, the strengthening of peaceful ties among states, the consolidation of security in Europe, and the further improvement of relations with France, the United States, the FRG, Britain, Italy and Japan, with all countries that show reciprocity toward us on this point. (*Prolonged applause.*)

We believe that in the near future it will be fully possible to take major and realistic new steps toward a stabler and sounder peace in Europe and throughout our planet.

This means the all-European conference, where the overwhelming majority of the work has been done and the conference's completion is in sight.

It also means the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe—if they are approached honestly and objectively, if there are no attempts to use them as an instrument for strengthening one's own military positions with respect to the other side, as the NATO countries are still trying to do.

It also means relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

The steps for the further development of these relations, steps that are now being mapped out in connection with the new Soviet-American

summit meeting that is to take place this year, including the signing of a new agreement on strategic arms limitations based on the Vladivostok accord,[2] are very necessary and important steps. But we by no means believe that this exhausts everything that can be done in the struggle against the arms race.

It is well known that as a result of the agreements concluded in the past few years there has been a measure of success in checking the arms race in some sectors and that the socialist states have played a very important role in this matter. But, unfortunately, we cannot say that an end has been put to the arms buildup.

In the case of some Western powers, a vigorous inflation of military budgets is taking place. The military departments there are exerting enormous efforts to push more and more new appropriations through legislative bodies. The Soviet Union believes that things should be moving in another direction. We favor the reduction of military budgets, and we call upon the other powers to reduce them. Our country has been and remains a strong champion of arms limitation and reduction, a champion of disarmament. We shall not slacken our efforts in this area. (*Applause.*)

In this connection, I would like to emphasize the importance of one important question. It has still not been reflected in agreements between states, but we are convinced that it is becoming more and more acute and urgent every day. I mean that states—the major powers first of all—should conclude an agreement banning the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The level of science and technology today is such that there is a serious danger of creating weapons even more terrible than nuclear ones. The good sense and conscience of mankind dictate the necessity of putting up an insurmountable barrier to the emergence of such weapons. (*Applause.*)

Of course, this task will require the efforts of a broad circle of states, the major powers first of all. But the Soviet Union and the United States, acting in the same direction, could, we believe, make a considerable contribution in this respect as well.

Comrades! Everything that our party is doing in the field of foreign policy is aimed at ensuring peace and security for the Soviet people and the peoples of the fraternal socialist states and strengthening world peace. Everything that our party is doing in the field of domestic policy is ultimately aimed at improving the life of the Soviet people.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746 ff.

Press Interview With Secretary of State Kissinger [Extract], June 23, 1975 [1]

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Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic arms limitation agreement that was signed in 1972? [2]

Secretary Kissinger: When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American Standing Commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues we have received answers which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

Q. What about SALT Two? Is there going to be an agreement this fall?

Secretary Kissinger: The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is the technical implementation of issues that are very complicated. I should think that the chances are better than even that we will have a SALT Two in the fall. But we could fail, either because we just can't solve the technical issues or because political tensions rise.

Q. Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: That will depend on SALT.

Q. In other words—no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit with some significant result.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 7, 1975, p. 18; *U.S. News and World Report*, June 23, 1975.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, June 24, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to resume our work under your guidance, and I want to greet all my colleagues from the previous session. It is a special pleasure to greet Ambassador Osman of Egypt, whom I have had the pleasure of knowing in New York. I would also like to welcome Ambassador Berhanu of Ethiopia to the Committee. I hope these new representatives will enjoy working with us, and I am certain that we will continue to work with them in the spirit of co-operation that has always been characteristic of this Committee. I also want to greet Mr. Bjornerstedt, the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat staff, including Mrs. Gill. And I want to offer a special welcome to Mr. David Duncan, who is now the British Ambassador to Nicaragua and was formerly a member of this Committee. It is a great pleasure to see him again.

During the coming weeks much of our attention will be devoted to subjects relatively new to the CCD, notably the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and military environmental modification activities. My delegation intends to take an active part in our deliberations on these and on the other issues before us. We look forward to a productive session.

As we begin, I would like briefly to review some significant recent developments that bear on our work and look ahead to some of the specific items on our agenda. One important event occurred on 2 May, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force for the five non-nuclear EURATOM countries—Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This marked a milestone in the movement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is with great satisfaction that my Government welcomes this development. We are also gratified by the recent ratification of the Treaty by countries in other parts of the world, including the Republic of Korea, the Gambia, Rwanda and Libya.

Another important event that has taken place since we last met was the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My Government was impressed that, despite some expected differences of view on the Treaty's implementation to date and on priorities for promoting its future effectiveness, the NPT Parties participating in the Conference demonstrated their overriding common interest in ensuring the success of the Treaty and thus in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The most tangible evidence of this shared interest was the adoption by consensus of the Final Declaration of the Conference.[2] While no consensus document can fully reflect the preferences of all participating

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[1] CCD/PV.666, pp. 6–9.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.

States—and undoubtedly many participants at the Review Conference felt that some of their views deserved to be included or given greater emphasis—I am sure that the Declaration will be generally recognized as a document of considerable significance.

Indeed, the Declaration comes to grips with one of the most critical international issues of today—namely, the challenge of harnessing nuclear energy to help meet pressing worldwide energy needs, particularly of developing countries, and to meet this need in a manner that will not contribute to the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. We are particularly pleased that the Conference gave strong support (1) for strengthening common nuclear export requirements, (2) for promoting international arrangements to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials, (3) for continuing and increasing nuclear assistance to developing countries Parties to the NPT, and (4) for accelerating the examination of the utility of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres. Underlying these constructive recommendations was the recognition that the full exploitation of the peaceful potential of nuclear energy would be inconceivable without a reliable framework to guard against the dangers of diversion to destructive purposes. It is our hope that the course of action outlined in the Declaration will further strengthen the NPT [3] and promote still wider adherence to it.

In dealing with the NPT's role in furthering efforts to halt the arms race, the Declaration welcomes the progress that has been made since the Treaty's entry into force, but recognizes that much has yet to be done. It therefore calls for constant and resolute efforts by all NPT parties, especially the depositary Governments, to implement article VI of the Treaty fully and effectively. The Conference acknowledges the unique contribution that the CCD can make in these efforts. The United States, for its part, will continue to work diligently in this Committee and in other forums towards the achievement of effective measures of arms control and disarmament in furtherance of the objectives of NPT article VI. In this connexion, it should be noted that the United States and the Soviet Union will soon resume their negotiations in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to work out a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms through the next decade. In addition, the two Governments are continuing work on an agreement governing peaceful nuclear explosions under article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974.[4]

Looking ahead to our own work, the Committee has scheduled informal meetings with experts for the week of 14 July to examine the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. This topic encompasses several distinct issues. As I noted at our spring session, these include the implications of PNEs for weapons development by existing nuclear-weapon States as well as the implications for the

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

spread of nuclear weapon capabilities among non-nuclear weapon States. I plan to turn to these issues in the near future and table a working paper to help prepare for the informal meetings, in which United States experts will participate.

My delegation also expects to participate actively in discussions on military use of environmental modification techniques, and we look forward to a broadly based exchange of views during the summer session. In this connexion, I wish to announce that United States experts will take part in the informal meetings on this subject scheduled for the week of 4 August.

As our own work in the Committee proceeds, the group of experts we established last spring will be carrying out its study of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As I stated earlier, we think it unrealistic to expect the experts to be able to draw up universally applicable prescriptions for the establishment of such zones. But by identifying and thoughtfully examining the broad range of factors involved in setting up effective nuclear-weapon-free zones, the experts' work could be of significant value, particularly to countries considering the role that such zones could play in their regions in support of non-proliferation objectives.

At our spring session a number of delegations expressed interest in the status of the United States-Soviet commitment to consider a joint CCD initiative with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.[5] At the conclusion of the session, I reaffirmed the seriousness with which the United States views the commitment.[6] I would like to add now that contacts between the two Governments have continued with a view to finding an appropriate means of carrying out a possible joint initiative.

At the close of the spring session, I reiterated my Government's long-standing interest in exploring regional approaches to conventional arms control and suggested a number of illustrative principles of restraint that could be applicable on a world-wide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms.[7] I would like to take this opportunity to stress once again the importance my Government attaches to examining all practical means of achieving restraints in the conventional arms field, and to express the hope that these suggestions have provided a spur to further thought by members of this Committee. Let me encourage other delegations to join in an exchange of views on this important subject; my delegation would welcome any comments, whether made formally or informally.

I believe we can add a number of important accomplishments to the CCD's record this summer. My delegation, for its part, will offer its full co-operation in our work toward that end.

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[6] *Ante*, p. 112
[7] *Ante*, pp. 112-113.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, June 24, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to join in welcoming our new colleagues, the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Ahmed Osman, and the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Wakwaya Berhanu. I would like also to welcome the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Björnerstedt, as well as all our colleagues present here at the opening of the summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament which is opening today, it will be necessary to continue the consideration of a number of questions relating to arms limitation and disarmament. These questions are, primarily, the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes, the prohibition of chemical means of warfare, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, peaceful nuclear explosions and the carrying out of studies on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The summer session of the Committee is beginning its work in conditions of a favourable development of the international situation and a deepening of international détente. The Committee's session is opening soon after the convening and holding of the Conference to review the application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[2] a treaty which is of important significance for the solution of the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet side notes with satisfaction that this Conference has confirmed the vitally important role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the achievement of the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in limiting and ending the nuclear arms race.

The wide recognition of the significance of this important international treaty is confirmed by the fact that, in direct relationship with the convening of the above-mentioned Conference to review the application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, eight more States became Parties to the Treaty on the eve of and during the Conference. The significance of this important event is underlined by the fact that the States which have recently become Parties to the Treaty include "near-nuclear" countries whose industrial potential is capable of developing nuclear explosive devices. These States include the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, which are members of the Committee on Disarmament, and also Belgium. The accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of these and a number of other States represents a consolidation of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and at the same time a step on the way towards strengthening

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[1] CCD/PV.666, pp. 9–15.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

international security and improving the international climate as a whole.

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty considered a wide range of problems relating to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty—problems concerning the implementation of its basic provisions regarding the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, verification of the fulfilment by Parties to the Treaty of the obligations assumed thereunder, the development of international co-operation in the use of atomic energy and, lastly, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The most important task directly connected with the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to make it a universal international instrument and to ensure that all States in the world—and particularly all militarily important States, including all nuclear Powers—become Parties to it. Efforts in this direction must be undertaken in all international forums, including the Committee on Disarmament. The participation of all militarily important States in international co-operation in the solution of disarmament problems would be furthered by the convening of a World Disarmament Conference in which all such States would take part.

At the Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, representatives mentioned, as a positive factor in international life, the conclusion of a number of important agreements on disarmament problems. At the same time, concern was expressed regarding the continuing arms race. The Conference called upon States members of the Committee on Disarmament to make every effort to achieve effective agreements on this problem. This appeal by the Conference must be given an appropriate response in the work of the current and future sessions of the Committee.

The Soviet Union is constantly making significant efforts to end the arms race. The efforts of the USSR and a number of other States have resulted in definite progress in arms limitation and disarmament. With the active participation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, a number of important international agreements on arms limitation and disarmament have been concluded in recent years. The Soviet Union is trying to ensure progress in the solution of this problem, both by means of concluding multilateral agreements and through bilateral negotiations and agreements with the United States of America. The Soviet initiatives in the United Nations and in other international forums also play a prominent role in this context.

The struggle for a reduction in armaments and for disarmament constitutes an important and integral part of the foreign policy of the Soviet State. In the USSR it is realized that the arms race, the increase in military budgets in many countries and the expansion of military arsenals are obstructing the normalization of the situation in the world and the reduction of international tension.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in a statement at a pre-election meeting of

electors to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 13 June this year, observed that:

> It is well known that, as a result of agreements concluded in recent years, the armaments race is being checked to some extent in certain sectors and the role of the socialist States in this matter is very important. But we cannot, unfortunately, say that the armaments build-up is finished.
>
> In certain Western countries there has been an intensive swelling of military budgets. The military authorities in these countries are making enormous efforts to get the legislative bodies to approve more and more appropriations. The Soviet Union believes that action should be taken in the other direction. We are in favour of reducing military budgets, and we appeal to other Powers to do this. Our country has been, and still is, a firm advocate of the limitation and reduction of armaments, and an advocate of disarmament. We shall not weaken our efforts in this direction in future, either.
>
> In this connexion I should like to emphasize the significance of one important question. It has not yet been reflected in agreements between States, but we are convinced that it is becoming increasingly acute and urgent every day. It is that States—and above all the major Powers—should conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of these weapons.
>
> The level of contemporary science and technology is such that there is a serious danger that a weapon even more terrible than nuclear weapons may be developed. The wisdom and conscience of mankind dictate that an insuperable barrier should be placed in the way of the emergence of such a weapon.
>
> Of course, this task calls for efforts by a wide range of States, and primarily by the major Powers. But here too the Soviet Union and the United States, acting in the same direction, might, we believe, make a not inconsiderable contribution.[3]

Recognizing the need for and urgency of a solution to the problem of disarmament, the Soviet delegation in the Committee on Disarmament will make every effort to move forward the negotiations on the problems under consideration in the Committee.

It is impossible, of course, to disregard the fact that a solution of the fundamental problems of disarmament calls for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in agreements on such problems. The non-participation of certain nuclear-weapon States in such agreements and in the implementation of essential disarmament measures might have the consequence of weakening the security of some States at the expense of others; and this would exacerbate the military threat, including the threat of nuclear war.

With regard to the particular problems of disarmament which are under consideration in the Committee, we should like to express the views of the Soviet side on some of them.

One of these problems is the General Assembly's request that agreement should be achieved on a draft convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes.[4] Considerable interest in this problem was displayed by delegations at the spring session of the Committee. In this connexion, both political and technical questions were raised. With a view to obtaining a more detailed knowledge of the substance of the matter, an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of technical experts has been scheduled for 4 August next. At that meeting, as at

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[3] *Ante*, p. 192 (*variant translation*).

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.

the official meetings of the Committee, we intend to explain the position of the Soviet Union on this question. For the moment, we should like to emphasize its importance and the urgency of complying with the General Assembly's request.

One important problem facing the Committee on Disarmament is the elaboration of and achievement of agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As has already been announced, measures are being taken for the preparation of a joint Soviet-United States initiative concerning the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the most dangerous and lethal types of chemical weapons.[5] We hope that the implementation of practical measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons will soon appear to be possible. For the present, we consider it necessary that the Committee should continue its comprehensive consideration of the various aspects of this problem, on the basis of the documents submitted to the Committee, among which documents a prominent place is occupied by the draft convention submitted by the Socialist countries.[6]

The Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons [7] entered into force in March of this year. We attach great value to this international agreement, which bans one of the types of weapons of mass destruction. Under the main provisions of this Convention, the Parties undertake not to develop, produce or acquire bacteriological or toxin weapons, and to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all stockpiles of such weapons.

In this connexion, I have been instructed to state the following:

In accordance with the legislation and practice of the Soviet Union, compliance with the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, which was ratified by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate State institutions of the USSR. At present, the Soviet Union does not possess any bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, as referred to in article I of the Convention.

We have noted with satisfaction the statements by the delegation of the United States of America on 4 March 1975 [8] and by the delegation of the United Kingdom on 18 March 1975,[9] that these States do not now have any stockpiles of biological or toxin weapons.

Under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament, a group of governmental experts is to carry out a comprehensive study of the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Soviet Union

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 236, 748.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 120–124.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 133–138.
[8] *Ante*, p. 78.
[9] CCD/PV.659, p. 13.

attaches great importance to the problem of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The position of principle of the USSR on this problem is that the USSR aims to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. The Soviet side considers that the establishment of such zones must help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of the Soviet side, it is essential in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones to ensure that they constitute an important supplement to, and development of, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that these zones should be an effective instrument in the struggle for reducing and eliminating the threat of nuclear war and that they should further the development of the process of reducing international tension.

On the basis of its positive attitude towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Soviet Union, at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, supported the proposal for a comprehensive study of this question and the preparation of a report on the subject.[10] In our view, the preparation of this report should be directed towards the consideration of possible ways and means of promoting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thereby the further strengthening of the system of measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In preparing the report on the problem of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential to consider, and draw general conclusions from, information on this problem based on the statements submitted by States concerning their positions in regard to the establishment of such zones. We assume that the work of the Group of Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones will be conducted precisely along these lines.

The Soviet Union's position on this question will be set out in detail by experts from the USSR in the Group of Experts.

In conclusion, the delegation of the USSR would like to emphasize the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to the problem of disarmament and to negotiations on this problem in various international forums. Speaking on 2 June this year at a meeting of electors of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that:

> The struggle to end the arms race, to reduce military budgets and to ensure that vast quantities of material and human resources are used not for the production of weapons but for improving the material welfare of people and for building houses, schools and hospitals, still remains for us one of the most pressing tasks in international affairs.

We hope that the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on problems relating to arms limitation and disarmament will have a positive effect on negotiations and on the solution of the problem of ending the arms race and implementing effective measures in the field of disarmament.

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[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 733.

Press Conference with President Ford [Extract], June 25, 1975 [11]

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Q. Mr. President, your old sidekick, the former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, has written in a magazine article that the Russians have repeatedly violated the SALT agreement and have mocked détente,[12] *and he also has some things to say about what they are doing in Portugal and the Middle East. How concerned are you about these charges?*

President Ford: I have investigated the allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT agreements, that they have used loopholes to do certain things that were intended not to be done under the agreement.

I have found that they have not violated the SALT agreement, they have not used any loopholes. And in order to determine whether they have or they have not, there is a standing consultative group that is an organization for the purpose of deciding after investigation whether there have been any violations. And that group, after looking into the allegations, came to the conclusion there had been no violations.

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General Accounting Office Report to the House International Relations Committee [Extracts]: Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Safeguarding Nuclear Material, July 3, 1975 [1]

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DIGEST

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO was asked to provide reports on a broad range of subjects concerning international agreements for peaceful cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. This is GAO's third such report and deals with the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in safeguarding nuclear material.

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[11] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 21, 1975, p. 95.

[12] Melvin R. Laird, "Is This Détente?", *Readers Digest*, July 1975, pp. 54–57.

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives: Role of The International Atomic Energy Agency in Safeguarding Nuclear Material.* By the Comptroller General of the United States. Department of State, Energy Research and Development Administration. (ID–75–65), front matter and pp. 1–34.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Agency, an autonomous organization under the aegis of the United Nations, administers an international nuclear safeguards program designed to detect diversion of nuclear materials for nonpeaceful purposes.

Its 106 member countries include all nations with significant amounts of nuclear activity, except the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The latter's nuclear facilities, however, are subject to Agency safeguards.[2]

Membership in the Agency does not obligate a country to accept safeguards on its facilities. For example, nuclear facilities of major nuclear weapons countries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, are not subject to Agency safeguards except on a voluntary basis. In addition, India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974, along with Argentina, Egypt, Israel, Spain, Japan, Pakistan, and South Africa are members with nuclear facilities not subject to Agency safeguards.[3]

The Agency's safeguards system consists of material accountability, onsite inspections, and surveillance and containment devices such as cameras and seals. The principle is that the detection capability of the system will deter a would-be diverter. However, limitations in the scope and applicability of inspections must be recognized.

—Agency safeguards are designed only to detect diversions on the national level, and it is assumed that member nations will protect nuclear material from terrorist or subnational groups.[4]
—Agency safeguards do not include physical protection, the safe international transport of nuclear material, or the safeguarding of nuclear waste.[5]
—The Agency does not have the authority to seek out undeclared or clandestine nuclear facilities and cannot pursue or retrieve diverted nuclear material.[6]

With the expected spread in peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world, problems encountered in the administration and implementation of the Agency's safeguards system can be expected to increase. They relate to such matters as:

—Adequacy of material accountability records within the member countries and their compatibility with the Agency's system.[7]
—Continuing need for more advanced measuring instrumentation.[8]

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[2] See pp. 206, 212.
[3] See pp. 209–210, 212, 213.
[4] See pp. 214–216.
[5] See pp. 223–224.
[6] See p. 215.
[7] See p. 218.
[8] See pp. 218–219.

—Equitable apportionment of costs of the safeguards system among member nations.[9]
—Differences in safeguards agreements with member countries and their interpretation.[10]

Actions the Agency can currently take in the case of nuclear diversion are

—notification to member countries and the United Nations,
—suspension of Agency membership rights and privileges, and
—the recall of Agency-sponsored material and technical assistance.

It is not clear, however, how Agency-sponsored material would be retrieved.[11]

In view of dangers involved in the spread of nuclear weapons capability, stronger penalties may be needed for those who might violate their pledge to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes.[12]

Real effectiveness of Agency safeguards is not known. There is no public evidence to show whether Agency safeguards have prevented or detected diversion of nuclear material from intended peaceful purposes.[13]

The mere fact that the Agency has never disclosed a diversion is not sufficient assurance for many countries that the safeguards are effective.[14]

—Effective international safeguards depend in large measure on the intent and cooperation of the country to which they are applied and the adequacy of technological control and implementation.[15]
—U.S. and Agency officials generally conceded that a country could circumvent safeguards if it was willing to assume the risk of detection, incur the expense, and take the trouble to do so.[16]
—Since the Agency does not disclose to member nations results of its inspections, on the grounds that proprietary information might be disclosed, the Agency faces the difficult problem of how to assure member nations that safeguards are being applied effectively, fairly, and consistently in all countries.[17]

The question of whether U.S. interests are best served through bilateral or Agency safeguards is difficult to answer. Agency safeguards tend to be more uniform and less costly than numerous bilateral safeguards would be. Bilateral safeguards provide the supplier with greater

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[9] See pp. 219-220.
[10] See p. 220.
[11] See p. 216.
[12] See p. 228.
[13] See p. 216.
[14] See p. 223.
[15] See p. 214.
[16] See p. 217.
[17] See p. 223.

confidence that material it supplied is not diverted but provide no assurances on material supplied by others.[18]

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

As requested by the Committee, GAO did not obtain formal Agency comments on this report. However, the report was discussed with officials of the Agencies involved, and they generally agreed with the information.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE

The Committee, together with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, may wish to pursue with executive branch officials major policy matters related to the role of the Agency, including:

—The need for expanding Agency responsibilities in the physical protection of nuclear material, control of nuclear waste, and safe transport of nuclear materials internationally.
—The technical and political limitations in applying Agency safeguards.
—The lack of sufficiently strong penalties or sanctions on a country that diverts nuclear material for military purposes or that knowingly supplies material to another country for developing nuclear explosive devices.[19]

In addition, the Committees may wish to discuss with executive branch officials the desirability of proposing that the Agency publish annually a report showing, by member country, the amount of nuclear materials subject to its safeguards and the amount and/or percentage of material which could not be accounted for during Agency inspections, while not divulging host country proprietary information. This could help assure all member countries that safeguards are effective and that safeguarded material is not being diverted.[20]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On July 30, 1974, the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations asked that we report to the Committee on a broad range of subjects concerning international agreements for peaceful cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.[21] This report deals with the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in safeguarding against the diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful purposes.

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[18] See pp. 208-209.
[19] See p. 228.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Not printed here.

The term "safeguards" within the international context refers to a system of inspection and verification which, when applied to one country's nuclear activities, will provide assurance to other countries that nuclear material is not being diverted for nonpeaceful purposes. The IAEA safeguards are designed only to detect diversions of nuclear material on a national level, and it is assumed that member nations will protect such material from terrorist or subnational groups. The principle of such safeguards is that the risk of early detection and unmasking in the world community will deter a would-be diverter.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Information for this report was obtained through a review of pertinent records and discussions with officials at the Department of State, the U.S. Mission to IAEA, ERDA, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and IAEA. We visited the IAEA laboratory and a research reactor in Seibersdorf, Austria. We also observed an IAEA inspection of Japanese-owned plutonium being stored in Cheswick, Pennsylvania.

Within IAEA, our review was primarily centered around interviews with officials in the Department of Safeguards and Inspections. Since IAEA does not provide to other member countries the results of its inspections or related documents, on the grounds that host country proprietary information might be disclosed, major portions of our review were necessarily based on discussions.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF SAFEGUARDS

Nuclear reactors can be fueled with uranium ranging from its natural state (containing 0.7 percent fissionable material) to highly enriched (containing 90 percent or more fissionable material), as well as plutonium. Only plutonium and highly enriched uranium are suitable for making nuclear explosives. Between 5 and 10 kilograms of plutonium or between 20 and 30 kilograms of highly enriched uranium are needed to make a nuclear explosive device.

Nuclear power reactors in use throughout the world today are fueled with either natural or slightly enriched uranium. After natural or slightly enriched uranium has been used to fuel a power reactor for about a year, plutonium is produced as a byproduct in the spent fuel.

To detect any diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities, international safeguards were established. Since the inception of the IAEA safeguards in the early 1960s, the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to such safeguards has continued to grow. It has been estimated that by 1980 the number of power reactors in IAEA member countries will increase from the 1974 level of 182 (with a capacity of about 72,000 megawatts) to about 400 (with a capac-

ity of about 263,000 megawatts). An IAEA survey estimated the market for nuclear power reactors in developing countries between 1981 and 1990 would amount to an additional 355 units with a total capacity of 220,000 megawatts.

This rapid growth of nuclear power as a source of energy greatly enhances the opportunity for countries to develop nuclear weapons.

U.S. INTEREST IN SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPMENT

Shortly after his Atoms for Peace message before the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, President Eisenhower proposed revising the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to allow for cooperation with allies in certain atomic energy matters.[22] The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011) authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to distribute nuclear materials to foreign countries through bilateral Agreements for Cooperation for the civil uses of atomic energy. Each agreement indicated among other things, that materials would not be used for any military purpose and would not be transferred to unauthorized persons.

The safeguards evolved from a U.S. decision to insure that the "not to further any military purpose" clause in the bilateral cooperative agreements was being adhered to by recipient countries. Safeguards provisions in early U.S. agreements were rather broad in scope, but later agreements gave the United States more detailed safeguards rights in such areas as facility design review, records, reports, and inspections.

IAEA benefited from the U.S. experience with safeguards gained in administering bilateral agreements. When the U.S. agreement with IAEA came into force in July 1957, the United States had had almost 3 years of experience in negotiating and administering bilateral agreements.

In 1961, IAEA adopted guidelines for a safeguards system.[23] Then in 1963, the United States and Japan—a bilateral partner—completed an agreement to transfer to IAEA the function of safeguarding U.S.-supplied material and equipment.[24] This was the first trilateral safeguards transfer agreement. Since that time, the safeguards functions of most U.S. bilateral cooperative agreements have been transferred to IAEA.

As of December 31, 1974, the United States had in effect bilateral agreements with 29 countries, as well as agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and IAEA. The safeguards portions of the majority of these agreements have been suspended in favor of trilateral agreements between the United States, IAEA, and the recipient country. Under trilateral agreements, the United States

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[22] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, Vol. I, pp. 393–400.
[23] *Ibid., 1961*, pp. 21–33.
[24] TIAS 5429; 14 UST 1265.

suspends its safeguards rights in favor of IAEA's safeguards. The supply and cooperation provisions of the bilateral agreements remain in effect, and the safeguards provisions are suspended—not superseded. If for some reason the trilateral agreement were terminated, bilateral safeguards would be reinstated.

An alternative method for countries to obtain nuclear materials and equipment from the United States is through IAEA project agreements. Under this arrangement, the United States supplies materials and equipment to a country under the aegis of IAEA, which assumes the safeguards responsibilities. For example, the United States has agreed to supply nuclear materials and equipment to Yugoslavia and Mexico through IAEA project agreements.

BILATERAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

United States bilateral safeguards and IAEA safeguards are difficult to compare because (1) most of the U.S. experience in international safeguards was gained during the formative years and dealt primarily with research reactors, (2) the United States subsequently assigned the majority of its bilateral safeguards responsibilities to IAEA, and (3) the U.S. experience applied, for the most part, to the types of reactors and equipment which were produced and exported from the United States, whereas IAEA safeguards apply to foreign as well as U.S. types of reactors and equipment. With assistance from certain member nations, IAEA is advancing the state of the art in safeguards.

The question of whether U.S. interests are best served through bilateral or IAEA safeguards also is difficult to answer since there are advantages and disadvantages to both. U.S. officials have outlined the following advantages to IAEA safeguards.

—IAEA safeguards may be viewed globally as more credible than bilateral safeguards, particularly in instances where the supplier and the recipient are close allies.
—IAEA safeguards would be more uniform and thus would minimize discriminatory application. If several supplier countries had bilateral safeguards systems, effective application might well be reduced to the least strict system.
—Safeguards applied by an international organization can serve as an important precedent for international inspection for any future disarmament agreement.
—It would be more expensive, in the aggregate, for many supplying countries to establish duplicative inspection systems than for one international organization to undertake the job.
—Relying upon IAEA to carry out the safeguards function enhances its prestige and increases its responsibilities and thereby makes it a more effective instrument in all of its fields of endeavor.
—Because of costs and technical manpower limitations, many supplying countries would find it difficult if not impossible to undertake bilateral safeguards on nuclear materials which they supply.

On the other hand, IAEA and Mission officials stated, in certain instances a supplier country might be in a position to negotiate stronger safeguards provisions bilaterally than IAEA. This is particularly true when the supplier country is a primary or sole source as it may be able to override any restrictions or limitations desired by the recipient country on safeguards application. However, as more countries become exporters of similar nuclear commodities, suppliers may become reluctant to put themselves at a commercial disadvantage by requiring too stringent safeguards.

The obvious advantage of the bilateral safeguards system is that the supplier would have more confidence in an inspection or system which it controlled than in the efforts of others. Bilateral safeguards provide the supplier with greater assurance that material it supplied is not diverted but provide no assurance on materials supplied by others.

According to a State Department official, a supplier, even one like the United States that has transferred its bilateral safeguards responsibilities to IAEA, can get few details of the precise status of materials supplied because IAEA inspection reports are not made available to the supplier. Politically, however, U.S. officials believe that IAEA safeguards are preferable.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into effect on March 5, 1970,[25] initiated a new era of IAEA safeguards responsibilities. NPT is an unprecedented concept in international relations, in that it requires a general commitment to international inspection of all nuclear programs within a nation's borders. Outside NPT, IAEA applies safeguards to only certain facilities and/or nuclear material within a country.

NPT divides nations into two classes: those which had nuclear weapons prior to 1967 (nuclear weapons countries) and those which did not (non-nuclear-weapons countries). It commits the non-nuclear-weapons countries, which are party to NPT, to accept international inspections in return for assurance that inspections would also be made to detect any diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful purposes by other such NPT adherents. Nuclear weapons countries are not required to accept international safeguards under NPT but may accept them on a voluntary basis.

Under NPT, only the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and the People's Republic of China are considered nuclear weapons countries. These last two countries, as well as India which exploded a nuclear device in 1974, have not signed NPT.

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[25] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

As of May 12, 1975, 105 non-nuclear-weapons countries were party to NPT. Adherents to NPT are not required to be members of IAEA, and IAEA members are not required to become parties to NPT. A total of 26 nations that had signed, acceded to, or ratified NPT were not members of IAEA and 24 IAEA members were not party to NPT.

NPT safeguards do not begin the day a country signs the Treaty. The process between signing and safeguards application is normally one of lengthy and intensive political, legal, and technical consideration and consultation, normally following this pattern:

—Signing of or accession to NPT by the country.
—Ratification according to national law, if applicable.
—Agreement between the country and IAEA governing safeguards implementation. This outlines the general requirements of both parties and states general *exemptions* from safeguards.
—Subsidiary arrangements between the country and IAEA detailing procedures for executing the agreement.
—Facility attachments, appended to the subsidiary document, detailing safeguards application for each facility subject to coverage.

As of May 12, 1975, only 35 of the 105 non-nuclear weapons countries had safeguards agreements in force. (See app. V.) [26]

Nine European IAEA member nations (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) belong to EURATOM and have their own multilateral safeguards system. The facilities in these countries are not currently subject to IAEA safeguards. However, pursuant to NPT, EURATOM and IAEA have negotiated, but not yet implemented, an agreement providing for IAEA verification of the findings of the EURATOM safeguards system in its non-nuclear-weapons countries.

Several countries appear unlikely to adhere to NPT for political, nationalistic, or security reasons; and little is known about the intentions of others. Among the nonsignators are the People's Republic of China, France, India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, and Spain. Fifteen countries, including Japan, Egypt, and Indonesia, have signed but not ratified NPT.

To demonstrate to non-nuclear-weapons countries that NPT safeguards would not represent an excessive burden or put them at a commercial disadvantage, the United Kingdom and the United States have offered to subject to IAEA safeguards their nuclear facilities not associated with national security. These offers are now being negotiated. The United States, in an effort to encourage participation in NPT, recently announced it would give preference to NPT countries over non-NPT countries in providing technical assistance-in-kind.

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[26] Not printed here.

TWO IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS

IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear material and facilities under two systems: the NPT system[27] and an earlier IAEA system. IAEA's first broadly applied safeguards system—described in IAEA Information Circular 66—borrowed heavily from the early bilateral experience of the United States.[28] Although this system has been supplemented to an extent by the later, more extensive NPT safeguard system, the Circular 66 system still has wide application.

The Circular 66 safeguards system is primarily facility oriented, having originally been developed to serve in connection with project agreements, safeguards transfer agreements, or unilateral submission agreements. These agreements, as a rule, pertain to a single nuclear facility or to a limited number of facilities rather than to all of a country's nuclear activities. In fact, under a safeguards agreement pursuant to Circular 66, a country may put a single facility or certain nuclear material under IAEA safeguards while retaining numerous unsafeguarded facilities or material.

The Circular 66 system, although requiring that a country maintain facility inventory records of safeguarded nuclear material and submit inventory reports, does not require the country to establish a national nuclear material accounting and control system.

The stated purpose of Circular 66 is to establish a system of controls to insure that IAEA assistance is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement or, at the request of a country, to any of that country's activities in the field of atomic energy. The country's obligations under Circular 66, therefore, go beyond those arising from NPT. The Circular 66 agreements prohibit not only the development and manufacture of any nuclear explosive device but also any other activity that furthers a military purpose. These prohibitions, however, pertain only to specified nuclear material, equipment, and facilities.

The NPT system is designed to safeguard all nuclear material and facilities within a country so that there are no unsafeguarded areas in the national program for peaceful uses of the atom. Thus the main inspection effort may be concentrated where it is most needed and can be most effective.

NPT does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for military purposes except for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. It implies that such nonproscribed military uses do not come under safeguards. However, NPT requires assurances that any nonproscribed military use does not constitute a course through which nuclear material could be channeled into prohibited uses. This obligates

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[27] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 218–244.
[28] *Ibid., 1965*, pp. 446–460.

a country to inform IAEA of the activity in question and to make arrangements for the nonapplication of safeguards for the time that the nuclear material is in the military activity. The country must also demonstrate that such uses are not in conflict with any undertaking it may have previously entered into to which IAEA safeguards apply.

Safeguards activities of IAEA have grown considerably since NPT came into force. Generally the safeguards under agreements concluded pursuant to Circular 66 are suspended while an agreement pursuant to NPT is in force; however, the original agreement remains in existence. This means that the safeguards requirements of the original agreement are deemed to be satisfied by the application of NPT safeguards for the time that the latter agreement is in force. It is worth noting that, since the entry into force of NPT, a number of additional agreements have been concluded under Circular 66 with countries that are not party to NPT.

FACILITIES AND MATERIALS SAFEGUARDED

IAEA member nations include all countries with significant amounts of nuclear activity except the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). However, the nuclear facilities of Taiwan, a former IAEA member nation, are subject to IAEA safeguards. Not all member nations have nuclear facilities, and not all of the facilities within the member nations are covered by IAEA safeguards. Mere membership alone does not obligate a nation to accept IAEA safeguards. In 1974, 181 nuclear facilities were subject to safeguards under Circular 66 and 234 facilities were subject to safeguards under NPT.

NUCLEAR FACILITIES SUBJECT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Type of facility	1973			1974		
	Circular 66 safeguards	NPT safeguards	Total	Circular 66 safeguards	NPT safeguards	Total
Power plants	21	10	31	20	40	60
Conversion plants	1	1	2	1	2	3
Fuel fabrication plants	6	3	9	5	18	23
Reprocessing plants	—	—	—	2	3	5
Pilot fuel fabrication plants	8	3	11	8	3	11
Pilot reprocessing plants	4	—	4	4	—	4
Research reactors	54	31	85	47	99	146
Research and development facilities	17	10	27	13	40	53
Other facilities and locations	83	28	111	81	29	110
Total	194	86	280	181	234	415

As of December 1, 1974, records showed the following quantities of nuclear material to be under IAEA safeguards.

	Total kilograms	Under NPT	Under Circular 66
Special nuclear material:			
Plutonium	6,000	25%	75%
Enriched uranium	2,177,000	8	92
Source material:			
Natural uranium	3,555,000	83	17
Depleted uranium	282,000	56	44
Thorium	11,000	86	14

The quantity of nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards in 1974 was about an 80 percent increase over the quantity under safeguards in 1972.

IAEA does not keep records of amounts of special nuclear material in countries or facilities where it does not apply safeguards. IAEA estimates from publicly available information that the following quantities of nuclear material are not safeguarded by the IAEA.

	Kilograms
Plutonium	5,000
Enriched uranium	1,600,000
Natural uranium	780,000

According to IAEA, the greater part of this material is subject to EURATOM safeguards.

Information is not readily available on the total number of nuclear facilities worldwide not subject to IAEA, EURATOM, or U.S. bilateral safeguards. Although we did not have information on potential bilateral safeguard arrangements with supplier countries other than the United States, we identified the following facilities in eight IAEA member non-nuclear-weapons countries, which are not known to be internationally safeguarded:

COUNTRY	FACILITY
Argentina	Small reprocessing plant
Egypt	Inshas research reactor
India	Cirus research reactor
	Apsara research reactor
	Zerlina research reactor
	Purnima research reactor
	Fuel fabrication plant
	Reprocessing plant
Israel	Dimona research reactor
Japan	Experimental uranium enrichment plant
Pakistan	Small reprocessing plant
South Africa	Prototype uranium enrichment plant
	Pelinduna research reactor
Spain	Pilot reprocessing plant
	Vandellos power reactor (jointly operated and controlled with France)

CHAPTER 3

EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Effective safeguards depend in large measure on the intent and cooperation of the nation to which they are applied and the adequacy of technological control and implementation. However, technological control in the absence of genuine political commitment is inadequate and political willpower and cooperation is likewise insufficient without a corresponding effort at the technological level.

At the present time, the challenges to safeguards are great. Rapid growth is expected in nuclear facilities throughout the world, and IAEA will be asked to respond. Instrumentation and techniques will need to be developed and refined. Adequate numbers of qualified staff will need to be recruited, and political solutions and compromises with participating nations and facility operators will be needed.

Although IAEA is working diligently in the safeguards area, problems do exist and will probably continue to develop.

LIMITATIONS ON SAFEGUARDS

The desired effects of IAEA safeguards are to (1) deter, through prompt detection, national diversions of safeguarded nuclear material; (2) place responsibility on the country for instituting domestic programs to guard against subnational diversion of safeguarded nuclear material (i.e., by individuals or groups acting contrary to government policy); (3) reduce specific international tensions by providing a degree of assurance among countries, especially hostile neighbors, that the safeguarded country is not developing nuclear explosive devices; and (4) insure that international nuclear commerce can be freely conducted without contributing to insecurity and tension among nations. It would be difficult if not impossible to prove whether or to what degree the safeguards actually accomplish the desired effects, as described above. Although certain technical conclusions can be derived from safeguards activities, the extent to which the safeguards are effective is largely a matter of judgment.

It is important to recognize the constraints on IAEA safeguards before discussing their implementation or effectiveness. Several key limitations are identified below.

—IAEA safeguards are not foolproof; the system cannot provide absolute assurance that nuclear material has not been diverted. When large quantities of nuclear material are being used or processed, technical limits on the ability to measure inventories of nuclear material will leave uncertainties as to the actual quantities which are subject to safeguards. If the safeguarded country, or facility operator, has more sophisticated and accurate control of the nuclear material than IAEA is aware of and can detect, diver-

sion within the limits of IAEA detection capabilities might take place over an extended period without detection. It is a question of competition for technological competence.

—IAEA has no authority to implement physical protection measures in safeguarded activities, such as armed guards, locks, and other exclusion devices, or to pursue and recover diverted material. These measures can only be employed by sovereign nations (against subnational groups or individuals) which have legal bases and jurisdiction for applying them. Therefore, IAEA safeguards provide no physical protection against takeover of safeguarded nuclear material for military purposes but only an assurance that such takeover would be discovered.

—IAEA safeguards under NPT agreements cover only declared peaceful nuclear activities. IAEA has no authority to seek out possible undeclared or clandestine facilities or stockpiles of nuclear material. Under non-NPT safeguards agreements, IAEA might apply safeguards at only one minor facility out of a large civil nuclear program involving many facilities. It has no authority with respect to those other facilities unless safeguarded nuclear material is transferred to them.

—IAEA safeguards under NPT agreements do not preclude a country from using nuclear materials in military programs, such as naval propulsion, as long as those programs are not developing nuclear explosive devices. Further, if a country wishes to use nuclear material in such a nonproscribed military use, IAEA safeguards will not be applied to that material and no international controls to verify nondiversion for nuclear weapons would be in effect for those activities. For a supplier to prevent its assistance from being used in this way under NPT safeguards agreements, it must enter into a special understanding with IAEA and the recipient country as the United States has.

—IAEA safeguards under non-NPT agreements specifically preclude "furthering any military purpose." [29] Several countries consider this to allow development of peaceful nuclear explosives. However, the Director General of IAEA recently announced at a Board of Governors meeting that he considered IAEA safeguards responsibilities to preclude the development of any nuclear explosive devices.

—A country has the right to withdraw from NPT upon 3 months' notice, if it considers its national interests to be seriously jeopardized. Critics contend that a nation could proceed secretly as far as possible with all the plans for making nuclear weapons and, when it was ready, merely notify IAEA and the United Nations Security

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

Council that it was withdrawing its nuclear facilities from IAEA safeguards and complete development of the nuclear explosives outside the realm of safeguards.

Under the IAEA Statute, detection of diverted nuclear material carries limited sanctions. If IAEA cannot verify the nondiversion of special nuclear material, the country involved is to be given a "reasonable time" to take corrective action, before procedures for noncompliance may be initiated. Such procedures may include notification to member countries and the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. Continued failure by the country to rectify the situation may also result in the recall of IAEA-sponsored material and technical assistance as well as suspension of membership rights and privileges. By the time these sanctions are applied, the country may have had sufficient time to complete its weapons development. It is also not clear how IAEA-sponsored material would be retrieved, if the country were unwilling to voluntarily return it.

The U.S. Mission pointed out that IAEA had never publicly disclosed that material was diverted or unaccounted for. It should be noted that the documents and reports relating to inspections may contain sensitive information due to proprietary concerns of operators and sovereign concerns of the country and are therefore treated as confidential. Just because IAEA has never publicly reported that material was diverted or unaccounted for is no real proof that IAEA's safeguards system is effective.

SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION

IAEA's safeguards systems depend on two elements: (1) the maintenance and review of records showing the receipt, production, consumption, transfer, and storage of nuclear materials and (2) onsite inspections. While recognizing that two systems are involved—NPT and Circular 66—and that requirements and procedures of the earlier system, Circular 66, are more general, IAEA safeguards consider the following items.

—A review of the design of the nuclear facilities.
—A review of facilities' material records and reports.
—Inspections and surveillance of the facilities.

A basic step in implementing safeguards after the underlying agreements are concluded is to review the facility design. This enables IAEA to determine the character, purpose, capacity, and layout of the facility.

After consulting the country, IAEA selects which surveillance techniques and containment devices such as cameras and seals, if any, will be employed; selects key points for measuring material flows and inventories; and establishes requirements for records and reports.

The decisions reached on what safeguards will be implemented at the plant level are reflected in the facility attachment document. This

also contains information on the number, scope, and mode of inspections which, to a large degree, are governed by the amount and type of nuclear material handled at the facility. Under NPT, inspection access is more specifically defined than under the earlier Circular 66 system.

IAEA recently initiated a program to prepare an internal "Safeguards Implementation Practices" document for each safeguarded facility. This document establishes the safeguards approach for a given facility. Among other things, the document analyzes the material diversion possibilities and notes any inspection limitations or shortcomings due to such factors as facility design, instrumentation, legal agreements, and the degree of the country's cooperation. To date, this program has been applied to only a limited number of facilities.

A major concept, which has special emphasis under the NPT system, is that each country should establish its own system to account for and control all nuclear material and to interface with the IAEA system. The IAEA safeguards are then applied in such a way as to verify the country's national accountability system.

The starting point for any inspection, according to IAEA officials, is the inventory data submitted by the country. Changes in the inventory since the last inspection, based on receipt and transfer notices, are recorded. This book inventory then becomes the basis for inspection. To verify the inventory, IAEA inspectors may count, weigh, and measure the material; take samples for independent analysis; inspect previously applied seals; and make comparisons with the accounting records . . . .

Inspection results are reviewed with the facility operator by the inspector to preclude misunderstandings, and a detailed report is subsequently submitted to IAEA. The report is reviewed within the Department of Safeguards and Inspections; and upon completion of the review process, IAEA provides the country with a statement of its results and conclusions. Inspection results are reported only to the country.

SAFEGUARDS PROBLEMS

IAEA hopes to apply safeguards with a high degree of reliability and assurance, within acceptable cost limits and without unduly interfering with commercial operations. IAEA officials stated that safeguards would never be completely effective—they could never be fully confident that no material had been diverted. Mission and IAEA officials generally conceded that a country could circumvent safeguards if it was willing to assume the risk of detection, incur the expense, and take the trouble to do so.

Mission officials feel safeguards are keeping pace with the growth of nuclear activities throughout the world; however, problems exist and probably will continue to develop.

Due to the confidential nature of inspection reports and other IAEA documents, the information presented below was obtained primarily through discussions with IAEA and Mission officials and is not specifi-

cally attributed to any particular country or facility. The problems identified by officials are, therefore, necessarily general in nature and in a few cases reflect anticipated rather than current problems. Mission officials cautioned that many of these problems, particularly those discussed under the technical section, are not unique to IAEA but would be encountered by any organization or country attempting to apply safeguards.

Material Accountability Problems

As previously stated, IAEA verification of national and facility material accountability records is a primary safeguards function. To the extent that these records are incomplete or inaccurate, verification is hampered. Some of the problems encountered with the accountability records have been due to differences in internal reporting systems between individual facilities and the national system. Others are due to national systems not fully interfacing with the corresponding IAEA system.

For example, some countries are slow to report to IAEA the receipt and/or export of materials and at least one country was not fully complying with IAEA standards for measuring nuclear material on hand. Another problem is that initial inventory data, which is the starting point for safeguards inspections, may not always be accurate. In at least one case, the national system did not require a physical inventory of materials until just recently.

Although alternative techniques for compiling and verifying data may offset some of these problems, IAEA will probably have serious difficulties until adequate national systems are fully implemented.

Technical Problems

Technical problems can generally be divided into two groups: those dealing with instrumentation development and refinement and those dealing with limitations in safeguards application. To an extent, these problems overlap and in some instances, particularly those concerning bulk processing facilities where IAEA has had very little experience in applying safeguards, the problems are anticipatory rather than current.

Problems identified in the development and use of instrumentation are:

—Some instruments in current use do not measure with the accuracy which will be necessary when larger amounts of accountable material are processed.
—In some facilities, IAEA must rely on the same measuring instruments as the operator. This may not be as reliable as desired. However, IAEA does check calibration of these instruments.
—In other areas, instruments have not been developed to measure materials which do not lend themselves to sampling and evalua-

tion except at a laboratory. Examples include fuel elements and sludge from chemical reprocessing.

—The high cost of instruments which IAEA may wish to install in facilities could present funding difficulties unless the country or facility operator shares in the costs.

To help IAEA keep pace, many member countries, including the United States, develop instrumentation at little or no cost to IAEA.

Technical application of safeguards is limited in some instances and difficult to apply in others.

—Some countries exclude or limit the use of certain surveillance and containment devices (cameras and seals) in their facilities.

—Statistical errors in sampling and measurement set limits on accuracy, and there can be no assurance of the detection of every slight loss. This problem decreases the ability to detect potential diversion when large amounts of nuclear material are handled.

—Proprietary concerns of the operator and design features of some facilities may make it difficult to apply techniques or install instrumentation in the best and most efficient manner.

—Simultaneous inventorying at all nuclear facilities within a country (especially at bulk processing facilities) is not practicable under present operating constraints, and this presents an opportunity for inventory manipulation. Although this is not now a problem in most countries, its significance will increase with facility growth.

—Some countries limit the number of inspectors by not accrediting as many to their country as IAEA may deem desirable.

IAEA is continually developing and refining safeguards techniques and has devoted extensive effort to producing standards of application and alternative means of applying safeguards. It is developing a very detailed safeguards technical manual covering safeguarding methods and techniques to be applied at various nuclear activities and facilities.

Financing Problems

Safeguards financing has been the subject of intensive negotiations within IAEA, and apparently it will continue to be a point of contention, threatening effective safeguards application.

With the advent of NPT, many members, particularly developing countries, were concerned that IAEA's responsibilities and related safeguards expenses would increase considerably. This could have the effect of increasing assessed contributions and/or diminishing other IAEA programs. Intensive discussions resulted in varying views—from the concept that the country being safeguarded should pay for safeguards to that of the advanced countries paying the entire cost of safeguards. The United States, among others, argued that safe-

guards benefit all members and should, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, be included as an administrative expense under the regular budget.

In the end, a complex formula was developed which would, in effect, limit the financial liability for safeguards of most developing countries to their 1971 (the pre-NPT) level, leaving the bulk of the increased costs of safeguards to the more advanced countries where the greatest part of the world's nuclear activities are located.

The developing countries' concern has not been completely unwarranted. Mission computations show that, while the cost of safeguards as a percentage of the total resources available to IAEA increased from 9.2 percent ($1.9 million) in 1971 to an estimated 9.7 percent ($3.4 million) in 1974, resources available for technical assistance decreased from 25.6 percent to 21.3 percent for the same period.[30]

The increase in safeguards costs caused the developing countries' 1974 safeguards assessments to exceed their 1971 assessments by about $33,000 in total, or an average increase of $470 per country. This increase appears small in light of the fact that in 1974, the 31 advanced countries paid a total of $2.3 million more toward safeguards than they paid in 1971. However, some of the developing countries are contending that the safeguards formula has not progressed as foreseen. The developing countries have made it known that they intend to invoke, as soon as possible, the provision of the agreement which calls for a review of the formula after 1975.

Financing the safeguards program appears to be one of the key issues facing IAEA. Costs will undoubtedly increase appreciably as more inspectors and more advanced techniques and equipment are needed to keep pace with the rapidly expanding nuclear world.

Political Problems

Some problems exist today and others may develop concerning what IAEA can and cannot do in the area of safeguards in a sovereign nation. Some of these are:

—In negotiating safeguards agreements, some countries may place more restrictions on how safeguards are to be applied than other countries.
—Different interpretations of agreements between some countries and IAEA exist, particularly under the Circular 66 agreements which are less specific in certain details than those under NPT.
—It is unclear what would happen if IAEA took certain actions, such as attempting to compel a country to fully comply with all stand-

[30] Although the percentage decreased, the dollar value of funds, equipment, and services actually increased from $5.2 million in 1971 to $7.4 million in 1974. [Footnote in original.]

ards contained in IAEA's NPT implementing procedures or at what point the standards conflict with national sovereignty.

—IAEA, in some cases, is not requiring strict compliance with NPT implementing standards because it does not want to frighten off potential NPT adherents by establishing burdensome requirements. However, it may be setting undesirable precedents.

SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS

The Statute of the IAEA provides that:

> The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.[31]

The Department of Safeguards and Inspections, as of September 25, 1974, was composed of 62 professional staff members. Within this Department, the Division of Operations, which is responsible for conducting the safeguards inspections, was staffed by 40 professionals from 33 countries. Guatemala, Nigeria, and Sudan, who have representatives within the Division, have no nuclear activities of their own.

IAEA's Division of Operations
Professional Staffing Allocation by Country

Argentina (1)	Japan (1)
Australia (1)	Netherlands (1)
Austria (1)	Nigeria (1)
Belgium (1)	Norway (1)
Canada (1)	Poland (1)
Chile (1)	Portugal (1)
Czechoslovakia (1)	Republic of China (1)
Egypt (1)	Romania (1)
Federal Republic of Germany (2)	Spain (1)
France (1)	Sudan (1)
Greece (1)	Sweden (1)
Guatemala (1)	Switzerland (1)
Hungary (1)	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (2)
India (1)	United Kingdom (3)
Indonesia (1)	United States (2)
Israel (1)	Yugoslavia (1)
Italy (3)	

Mission officials feel the U.S. representation in the Department of Safeguards and Inspection is low (8 out of 62 professionals appointed on a geographic basis), especially in view of U.S. interest in this area, and they are making a conscious effort to place U.S. personnel in posi-

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[31] 8 UST 1093 (Art. VII D); also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, p. 921.

tions as they become vacant. However, the Mission considers the positions currently held to be key positions in that six of the eight U.S. professionals are at supervisory levels in safeguards development. On an overall basis, U.S. personnel occupy 20 percent of the 290 professional IAEA positions subject to geographic distribution.

The selection of professional staff for safeguards inspector positions generally starts with a vacancy notice. IAEA prepares vacancy notices for a position, listing the required background qualifications, experience requirements, and salary, and circulates the notice to member countries. The countries may then nominate candidates and IAEA accepts or rejects each nominee. Mission officials stated that IAEA will not hire an individual unless the country of which the candidate is a citizen gives its approval. There are no background security checks of employees, such as those conducted by the United States on some of its employees.

Agency officials stated that once an inspector is hired, they prefer to retain the inspector and to experience as little turnover as possible. This supposedly eases the fears of the member countries of industrial espionage as generally the same inspector or group of inspectors continues to review the same facilities in the same countries. Safeguards inspectors must be accredited to the country in which they are to inspect, and the country has the opportunity to accept or reject each inspector.

Because of differences in inspectors' backgrounds, countries' preferences, and IAEA practices, some problems have arisen. Staffing and training have the following problems.

—Some inspectors, although academically qualified, have limited practical experience in nuclear facilities or safeguards and require a long period with IAEA before becoming fully effective. Because some of these same inspectors stay with IAEA for only a few years, their useful contribution is limited.

—To date, IAEA has no comprehensive training program in safeguards and most inspectors obtain their training on the job. However, some personnel have participated in safeguards training courses in the United States, and IAEA hopes to have a comprehensive safeguards training program under way in the near future.

—An overall philosophical approach to safeguards has not been developed. As a result, some inspectors take an adversary approach in applying safeguards while others take a more lenient approach. One IAEA official stated that, if the adversary approach were pushed too hard, countries would be less inclined to cooperate and might not cooperate at all.

—Recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible has occasionally placed individuals in positions for which they were either underqualified or overqualified.

—As nuclear activity expands, there may be problems in recruiting qualified inspectors at salary ranges commensurate with IAEA

resources. This may be especially true if competition between IAEA and national safeguards systems for the limited number of qualified inspectors become keener.

ASSURANCE TO MEMBER NATIONS OF SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS

In February 1972, a panel established by the Secretary of State to review U.S. policy objectives toward IAEA concluded that a weak or marginal safeguards program would probably be worse than no safeguards at all because it would further a false sense of security. However, reliable evaluation of safeguards effectiveness presents a dilemma.

One of the most difficult problems facing IAEA is how to assure member nations and the world at large that safeguards are effective and yet retain the necessary confidentiality of inspection results. The mere fact that IAEA has never reported a diversion is not sufficient assurance for many countries. Linked to this problem is the one of assuring member nations that safeguards are being applied fairly and consistently in all countries.

IAEA officials do not believe safeguards will ever be considered effective by everyone merely on the basis of IAEA's saying everything is satisfactory. However, changes are being contemplated to make more information available to assure member nations that the safeguards are effective.

One internal change being considered is a process, independent of the Safeguards Department, for reviewing inspection results. IAEA is also going to make available to members the safequards technical manual which will explain how inspections are carried out in a particular type of facility.

Some nations want further assurances. Japan, seeking assurance that safeguards will be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, is trying to convene a standing committee to perform an oversight function of IAEA safeguards. U.S. Mission officials favor a committee of this type but are unsure of how much information could be made available to the public because of the proprietary nature of safeguards information.

The United States is seeking consultations with IAEA to review the results of safeguards activities under U.S. trilateral transfer agreements. The United States suspended its bilateral inspection rights in favor of these safeguards but does not receive the results of inspection activities. IAEA has indicated a willingness to discuss these matters, but the final outcome is still uncertain.

CHAPTER 4

SAFEGUARDS-RELATED ISSUES

The expected growth of nuclear activity throughout the world has heightened concern over several related issues, such as nuclear terror-

ism, physical protection, and disposal of highly radioactive wastes. Some countries want the benefits of the "peaceful atom" yet are concerned about encroachment on their national sovereignty by an international organization. Some countries wish to sell nuclear materials and equipment but are reluctant to attach safeguards to nuclear exports. There is also concern about the handling and disposal of highly radioactive wastes that must be controlled, in some cases, for centuries.

IAEA is basically limited on what it can do in these areas. It carries out the decisions of its member nations, and therefore direction must ultimately come from agreements reached among this large and rather diverse group.

Concerning waste management, physical protection, safe transport, and for the most part health and safety, IAEA has no responsibility for controlling, supervising, regulating, or inspecting member countries' activities. Its standards and guidelines in these areas are largely advisory.

Although these matters are not included under the safeguards systems, they, along with the exporting policies of supplier nations, have an important bearing on safeguards.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND TRANSPORTATION

IAEA has no regulatory authority over physical protection and transportation and must limit its activities to recommending standards and advising and assisting member nations. Many countries feel that physical security is an individual national concern.

Recognizing that physical protection is an essential supplement to a country's system of accounting and control of nuclear material, IAEA sponsored a panel of experts which developed recommendations for physical protection. Although the recommendations outlined in a publication known as the "grey book" are not binding upon countries, IAEA recommends their use in establishing physical protection systems. The U.S. Resident Representative to the IAEA stated that many developing countries have adopted the grey book as their national system while most advanced countries have their own systems.

IAEA's recommendations include general and detailed requirements for physical protection of nuclear material in use, in storage, and in transit. Responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material during international transfers is agreed upon by the parties involved. An IAEA official informed us that IAEA sometimes, upon request, seals shipping containers for member countries but has no requirement or authority to safeguard materials in transit.

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

IAEA's nuclear safety and environmental protection program consists of three major segments—nuclear safety, radiological safety, and waste management. For the most part the IAEA's authority is limited to establishing and recommending safety standards which can be

adopted by member nations. It may establish and apply safety standards to facilities which have received IAEA assistance; to facilities covered under special bilateral or multilateral arrangements; or, if requested, to a nation's nuclear activities. When applying safety standards, it leaves the country great latitude in applying its own standards and measures once it is determined that the country's system is adequate. Adequacy is determined through examining operation plans, safety measures to be applied, and other records. Efficiency and effectiveness are further evaluated through observation.

IAEA's standards are written in such a way that a country can easily incorporate them as its own national safety system. According to a Mission official, the IAEA's experience in applying safety standards has been limited to research reactors. It is planning to draw up specific detailed safety standards for power reactors.

In the nuclear safety area, IAEA's objective is to provide member nations with advice and assistance for the safe location, design, construction, and operation of research reactors, nuclear power plants, and plants storing and processing nuclear material. IAEA also advises on licensing procedures and compliance controls. Codes of practice have been promulgated as part of its safety standards.

IAEA develops standards for radiological safety and assists member nations in protecting man, his property, and his environment against any harmful effects of radiation. Emphasis has gradually shifted from preparing standards to helping member countries apply standards, train specialists and technicians, and promote and coordinate research.

The objectives of the waste management program are to develop standards, promote and coordinate research, and develop and review techniques for preventing the release of harmful nuclear contaminants. IAEA also develops and disseminates information and advises member countries on the safe management of radioactive waste.

POLICIES OF MAJOR EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Article III.2 of NPT states that:

> Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

Several major exporting countries, who are party to NPT, mutually agreed in 1974 not to provide certain categories of material and equipment to any non-nuclear-weapons country for peaceful purposes unless such material and equipment is subject to an appropriate safeguards agreement. The list of items to be safeguarded included special nuclear materials, nuclear-related materials, and various equipment for reactors, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing.

The above safeguards requirements also extend to re-transfers. It was made clear that this "trigger list" was a minimum listing and that exporters could require safeguards on additional items.

The participating exporting countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic. Some countries, although not participating, have indicated they will support the same conditions while others, such as the People's Republic of China, India, and France, have not indicated what policy they will follow. As additional countries begin to export nuclear items, it is not known what policies they will adopt. Some African countries, for instance, export large quantities of natural uranium but have not yet subscribed to any safeguards policies.

According to Mission officials, the trigger list was an attempt to take safeguards out of the marketplace. That is, if all exporting countries could agree to a common policy of safeguarding exports, no one country would have a commercial advantage because it did not require safeguards.

Mission officials stated that the United States requires safeguards on more export items than those appearing on the trigger list. The United States applies end-use criteria to its nuclear and nuclear-related exports. For example, the United States may require safeguards on equipment which is identified for use in a reactor, as well as equipment for heavy water or reprocessing plants, even though such equipment may also be commonly used in industries outside the nuclear field. Switzerland and France evidently do not use the same criteria because Swiss and French companies are assisting India by supplying equipment and technical expertise to build a heavy water plant, which, when completed, will be unsafeguarded. The plant will allow India to produce its own heavy water, a moderator needed in a natural uranium reactor, which is on the trigger list. The United States also places certain restrictions on technical training and assistance while most other countries do not. These types of self-imposed restrictions could possibly affect U.S. sales.

Mission officials feel that U.S. policies should be adjusted to compare with those of other nuclear exporters and that the United States should guard against being too restrictive as such a policy might cause customers to purchase their nuclear needs from other sources. Mission officials also believe the United States should work jointly with other countries in this area because there is little the United States or any other single country can do unilaterally since no nuclear monopoly exists today.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Matters for Consideration by the Committee

The real effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is not known. There is no public evidence to show whether IAEA safeguards have prevented or detected diversion of nuclear material from intended peaceful purposes.

The mere fact that IAEA has never disclosed a diversion is not sufficient assurance to many countries that IAEA safeguards are effective.

Effective international safeguards depend in large measure on the intent and cooperation of the country to which they are applied and the adequacy of technological control and implementation. However, technological control in the absence of genuine political commitment is inadequate. IAEA officials have stated that safeguards would never be completely effective—they could never be fully confident that no material has been diverted. U.S. and IAEA officials generally conceded that a country could circumvent safeguards if it was willing to assume the risk of detection, incur the expense, and take the trouble to do so.

Although certain technical conclusions can be derived from the safeguards activities, the extent to which IAEA safeguards are effective is largely a matter of judgment. Since IAEA does not disclose to member nations the results of its inspections, on the grounds that proprietary information might be disclosed, it faces the difficult problem of how to assure member nations that safeguards are being applied effectively, fairly, and consistently in all countries.

Membership in IAEA does not obligate a country to accept safeguards on its facilities. For example, the nuclear facilities of major nuclear weapons countries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, are not subject to IAEA safeguards except on a voluntary basis. In addition, India, Argentina, Egypt, Israel, Spain, Japan, Pakistan, and South Africa are IAEA members with nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards.

Limitations in the scope and applicability of IAEA inspections must also be recognized. IAEA safeguards are designed only to detect diversions at the national level. IAEA safeguards do not include physical protection, the safe international transport of nuclear material, or the safeguarding of nuclear waste. It does not have authority to seek out undeclared or clandestine nuclear facilities and cannot pursue or retrieve diverted nuclear material.

With the expected spread of peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world, the problems encountered in the administration and implementation of the IAEA safeguards system can be expected to increase. They relate to such matters as:

—The adequacy of material accountability records within the member countries and their compatibility with the IAEA system.
—The continuing need for more advanced measuring instrumentation for inspectors.
—The differences in safeguards agreements with member countries and their interpretation.
—The equitable apportionment of the costs of the safeguards system among member countries.

If IAEA cannot verify the nondiversion of special nuclear material, the country involved is to be given a "reasonable time" to take correc-

tive action before noncompliance procedures may be initiated. Such procedures include notification to member countries and the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. Continued failure by the country to rectify the situation may also result in the recall of IAEA-sponsored material and technical assistance as well as suspension of membership rights and privileges. By the time these sanctions are made, the country may have had sufficient time to complete its weapons development. It is also not clear how IAEA-sponsored material would be retrieved.

In view of the dangers involved in the spread of nuclear weapons capability, stronger penalties may be needed for those who might violate their pledge to use nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE

The Committee, together with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, may wish to pursue with responsible executive branch officials major policy matters related to the role of IAEA, including:

—The need for expanding the responsibilities of IAEA in the physical protection of nuclear material, the control of irradiated nuclear waste, and the safe transport of nuclear materials internationally.
—The technical and political limitations in applying IAEA safeguards.
—The lack of sufficiently strong penalties or sanctions on a country that diverts nuclear material for military purposes or knowingly supplies material to another country for the purpose of developing nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, the Committees may wish to discuss with executive branch officials the desirability of proposing that IAEA publish annually a report showing, by member country, the amount of nuclear materials subject to its safeguards and the amount and/or percentage of material which could not be accounted for during the inspections, while not divulging host country proprietary information. This could help to assure all member countries that safeguards are effective and that safeguarded material is not being diverted.

Communique of the Sixth South Pacific Forum [Extract], July 3, 1975 [1]

The Sixth South Pacific Forum was held in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, from 1-3 July 1975 and was attended by the President of Nauru, the Prime Ministers of Fiji and New Zealand, the Acting Prime Minister of Tonga, the Premiers of the Cook Islands and Niue, the Chief Minister of Papua

[1] ACDA files.

New Guinea, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and the Minister of Works & Marine of Western Samoa. The Chief Ministers of the Gilbert & Ellice Islands and the Solomon Islands attended as observers.

Delegates and guests were formally welcomed to the opening of the Sixth South Pacific Forum by the Prince Regent, His Royal Highness Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake . . . .

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Nuclear Free Zone

The Forum reiterated its strong opposition to nuclear weapons tests in all environments and called for renewed international efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament. In particular, the Forum emphasised the importance of keeping the region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim. The Forum agreed that it would be desirable for a wider endorsement of the idea to be sought through the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations and for a study of the ways and means of establishing such a zone to be undertaken.

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Japanese Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Arms Control Implications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, July 7, 1975 [1]

1. *Identification of Issues*

PNE can have many different implications depending on one's points of view. It is, therefore, very important that an attempt be made so that significance of PNE may be clarified and its logical relationship with the rest of nuclear activities identified. This will enable us to more clearly understand the situation and thus to formulate programme of appropriate international action. What follows is a first attempt at such logic identification. Experts on this subject, especially those from countries with actual nuclear explosion experiences, can help supply information, to the extent feasible, and can thus provide a great assistance in such exercise.

It is important to state the basic assumption first.

(a) PNE should not be used to mask nuclear weapons proliferation,

[1] CCD/454, July 7, 1975.

(b) nevertheless, complete ban on PNE should be avoided as long as there is economic-technical feasibilities,

(c) the extent to which states' right to conduct PNE-related R & D is an important question because this theme is related to potential capabilities.

In this context, the following points are worth noting:

(i) Since NPT restricts PNE activities of its NNWS parties to receiving services under Article V,[2] this raises the question of members;

(ii) If, bilateral and/or multilateral means may be devised to make non-Article V indigenous PNE impossible, the only remaining arms control implications, at least for the time being, are those of PNE under CTB régime;

(iii) On the other hand, as will be discussed later, the practical difficulty of achieving such bilateral or multilateral means is considerable, and one is faced with the task of structuring a series of logic to assure "peacefulness" of PNEs including such indigenous cases;

(iv) At the same time, this may create a situation in which NNWS parties to NPT cannot conduct their own PNE, while non-parties can under certain conditions;

(v) In any one of the points mentioned above, plus case of PNE by NWS under CTB, there is an important general area of "non-compliance". While the above points are based on the assumption that the PNEs conducted anywhere in the world can always be detected and identified, there may be the question of dealing with the undetectable or unidentifiable PNEs in that they may have arms control implications. Since the objective of this exercise is merely to identify various implications, the paper does not propose to resolve those seeming contradictory situations. It is, however, important to realize that development of more than one measure of controlling unauthorized PNE, even if not 100 per cent certain individually, may be able to produce desired effects practically.

2. *Classification of PNEs*

There are PNEs which use conventional nuclear explosives and those who talk about non-conventional nuclear explosions. It is true to say, especially in the case of conventional nuclear devices, that such explosives in themselves are neither peaceful nor military, while, on the other hand, explosions can be peaceful or military depending on the motivation and the possible range of benefits that may be expected from such explosions. The first task, therefore, is to identify justifiable motivations and benefits of PNEs:

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

(a) underground explosions for recovery of natural resources, such as natural gas in tight geological formation, oil recovery, copper leaching, etc.,
(b) large scale civil engineering works such as excavation of canals and harbours, of storage facilities for gas and radioactive wastes,
(c) underground explosion for generation of super-heated steam and thus electric power generation (PACER project),
(d) heavy atom production,
(e) miscellaneous activities including stopping of oil well fire as reported in a Soviet case,
(f) energy generation through laser fusion or any other fusion burst engine devices,
(g) R & D of laboratory scale, mainly for the purpose of explosion simulation such as fusion burst and its neutron and radiation effects, or of implosion mechanism—as long as these can be related to any one of the above-mentioned justifiable purposes.

On the other hand, nuclear explosions which are for weapons testing purposes, be it for testing new design or random-sample-based quality control purposes, cannot be classified under PNE. Laboratory scale tests for the purposes of obtaining scientific and engineering information for weapons design improvements should also be classified out, although there remain problems of definition because NPT does not explicitly prohibit weapons-oriented R & D short of actual production of explosive devices. From the beginning of NPT, a great deal of effort was spent in an attempt to define "other nuclear explosive devices" or as to who under the NPT régime is authorized to write such definition. It may not be particularly productive to get into that argument again.

3. *Evaluations*

For each of the items listed under 2 above, it will be important to first identify their *military proximities*, namely what *direct* military usefulness each one of them may produce. At the first look it would seem that all underground PNE can mask weapons testing. However, closer examination of the types of devices used for different PNE purposes may provide some way of distinguishing PNE from possible weapons implications. This would also mean then that any PNEs of the categories mentioned above need more precise definition of purposes, procedures and devices involved. Concise summary of information already made public through United States Government laboratory publications, American Nuclear Society publications, or United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics data presented at IAEA panels will be of great use as a handy guide to the arms control community.

In the discussion of *military proximity*, one will be forced to forgo mention of *indirect* military possibilities. Harbours excavated by PNE may be utilized by military vessels, but in such context any peaceful nuclear activities such as generation of electricity can be judged to have

indirect military significance. One question that remains is whether as a consequence of PNE explosion, a state may obtain or accumulate sufficient knowledge for the design and use of nuclear weapons in the sense of "technology transfer". This point will have to be discussed separately.

In this exercise, experts' information about possible existence of threshold between military and peaceful uses will be of great value. Depending on the type of nuclear explosions one takes up, there may be such threshold either in terms of *yields, physical size* or *seismic signature*. If there are such thresholds, this information should be made available. If there is none, it is also important to say so.

On each one of the PNE categories, it is also very important to know what their development potentials are for actual economic use in future. Although there is no denying of the advantage to be derived from the very compact form in which a very large amount of energy can be stored, there are a number of engineering, health and safety, as well as economic problems that need to be resolved before this technology becomes practical. Development potential will have to be stated in terms of time-table, expected R & D costs, prospect for economic and technical feasibilities. The statement should also identify major economic or technical elements which will have to be overcome. Such analysis might very well include influence of the world oil prices, etc. Number of published works in this category should be summarized in concise forms and seeming discrepancy on this score among different publications reconciled, such as through identification of different economic conditions or of regulatory requirements between the countries. In carrying out this analysis, one should exclude possibilities of major technical breakthrough, which will be handled under different heading. The reason is obvious, for if one is allowed to assume major technical breakthrough tomorrow what is not feasible becomes suddenly a very practical proposition. On the other hand, it will be important to include in this analysis, comparison of environmental implications of very low grade oil utilization such as through unearthing of very large volume debris (conventional method) or possible radioactive contamination (in-situ PNE).

4. *Registration Requirements*

It is clear that if PNEs are to be conducted, the onus of proof is with one who conducts explosion so that he can explain to the world community that his explosion was indeed peaceful. If one assumes that the onus of proof is on the side of the world community, the whole concept of PNE control collapses. This means that all and any PNE should be registered in advance, and that agreements should be contemplated to avoid unregistered PNEs. The following items should be considered as possible registration requirements:

(i) purpose of PNE: since no immediate economic or technical bene-

fits are expected, in most cases the purpose must be of R & D nature. Large scale civil engineering works may be exceptions.

(ii) proposed PNE procedures, description of yield, geometrical description of devices, geological information, expected chimney size, expected tritium content, analytical tools employed to calculate such expectations, etc.,

(iii) statement of peacefulness of the exercise,

(iv) data which the state conducting the test expects to make available to the world community. This will have to be within the limits of proprietariness of technical information.

It will be important to identify if there are to be characteristic signatures from PNEs proposed, which can identify them as belonging to any one of the categories mentioned in 2 above. If such signatures may be observable from outside the territory, this will make things a great deal easier. While, on the other hand, if on-site inspections are required, it is important to identify whether design of explosives encasement, type of instrumentations, etc. would serve for the purpose of verification about the nature of the explosions.

One other approach to such verification is when the state conducting PNE is under IAEA safeguards and Special Nuclear Material used for explosion is derived from the safeguarded fuel cycle. In this case, one should at least be able to tell the type of explosive devices and the amount of SNM employed for the purpose (this, of course, within the range of accuracy normally expected from SNM safeguards).

Particularly difficult cases, even under this very generalized observation, would be such PNEs which do not employ SNM (case of D-T fusion pellets) or those conducted above-ground (laboratory tests, above-ground large pressure vessels, etc.). The former, undoubtedly, is related to the problem of definition as discussed in 2 above.

5. *Different PNE Cases Possible*

PNE may be conducted by different types of countries and under various different arrangements.

(a) *those conducted by NWS*: will require announcement, registration, verification, supply of information, and determination whether the technology has reached the stage of offering practical benefits, at least to some countries, so that Article V of NPT should be invoked.

(b) *those conducted by NWS in NNWS territory as Article V services*: announcement, registration, verification, etc. will be obviously required. Disclosure of data and information has to be both by the NWS and NNWS involved. Statement needs to accompany that such PNE exercise did not involve transfer of either devices or control thereof. It is important to clarify whether transfer of explosive or explosion technology took place as a result. This is an important issue that has to be discussed in connexion with the

international régime under Article V, and should be taken up separately.

(c) *indigenous NNWS devices*: in theory, this is only possible in the case of non-NPT party. In any event if the country is under IAEA safeguards covering the entire fuel cycle (such as INFCIRC 153 [3] without full NPT obligations) whether the device came from such safeguarded SNM or not becomes the first issue. If such safeguards are not on, or only on partially (INFCIRC 66?) this creates a different problem. Therefore, in addition to the usual requirement of registration, information, etc. one needs to resolve the problem of what to do with non-NPT party who develops indigenous PNE capabilities. Requirement of INFCIRC 153 type safeguards on all fuel cycle is one. But with the current MUF control requirements, this can not completely rule out the possibilities unless such country simultaneously accepts obligation not to have nuclear explosive devices. The remaining cases are, therefore, NNWS countries who do not accept "no nuclear explosive device" obligation, either with or without safeguards on the entire fuel cycle (the countries may or may not have military fuel cycle).

The last problem mentioned here involves an issue which is more than simple PNE considerations. There are problems of international sanction in the case of NPT-parties' violation of article 2; problem of violation of non-explosive undertakings under INFCIRC 153 as a separate issue; problem associated with difference between INFCIRC 66 [4] and 153 as safeguards technology. In this sense, maybe it is time that we eliminate artificial distinction between 66 and 153.

6. *Current Political and Legal Restraints*

NPT, PTB, TTBT, CTB need to be analysed and their respective control implication of PNE should be clarified. This will have to be done in terms of each one of the PNE classifications mentioned in 2 above. For example, one would need to clarify if CTB will rule out any and all PNEs, or if not, whether the registration requirements by NWS as mentioned in 4 above would be sufficient.

What international body will be technically qualified to oversee, supervise, receive registration, carry out verification and pass final judgement on all the matters mentioned in this paper is another very important subject. Although everyone talks about the IAEA as the only existing and possibly qualified international organization, this in itself may not be sufficient to cover all the issues. Better definition of the structuring of the required international régime will become necessary.

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[3] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 218–244.
[4] *Ibid., 1965*, pp. 446–460.

One of the important issues that has been left unanswered so far is the problem of PNE R & D and the problem of technology transfer. Whereas NPT Articles I and II are not necessarily precise about technology transfer and its implication for "assistance", it is clearly intended that Article IV of NPT will refrain from any imposition of obstacles on inalienable rights of state parties on peaceful R & D and for international flow of technical information. Experts, both technical and legal, need to co-operate in clarification of this problem. If PNE outside of NPT Article V is possible as referred to in 5 above, the problem, of course, is what conditions may be imposed on such countries yet leaving possibilities for indigenous PNEs, especially in consideration of 7 below.

7. *Case of Unexpected Breakthrough*

In any technology, it is widely recognized that assumption that future rests on the extrapolation of the past only is a very dangerous supposition. In the case of PNE also, it is not entirely inconceivable that some form of sudden change in economic circumstances will make the existing PNE entirely feasible within a very short period of time. It is also possible that there appears some major technical breakthrough which renders current PNE technique to be very useful, or that some very unexpected use of nuclear explosion becomes a matter of daily practical use. Whatever international régime one prepares today, should be so structured that such unexpected events may also be well taken care of.

In recognition of the possibility that PNE of some sort may become a daily routine, the following idea may serve as a starting point of consideration.

In today's nuclear fuel cycle considerations, the day Plutonium serves as practical fuel for electricity generation does not seem to be very near either in thermal recycle or in FBR. Countries with spent fuel reprocessing facilities may, therefore, end up in a fair size Pu stores from which the only withdrawal is for experiments (thermal recycle, FBR experiments, limited chemistry research, etc.) and PNE. It is then possible to establish a different safeguards and physical protection régime for Plutonium store so that they should be under more strict control compared to the rest of the fuel cycle. Use of containment and surveillance technology will become the central emphasis, while there are a number of modern techniques which are applicable for such purposes. It is postulated that withdrawal of material for legitimately registered PNE or procedurally justifiable PNE R & D will be permitted. One may start thinking about Pu store as a special category of safeguards/physical protection even outside of INFCIRC 153 etc. and make its acceptance a condition for PNE rights. It may, however, be worth considering such a mechanism as a part of the arms control implications of PNEs, and it might even result in a very practical and useful proposition for the NPT régime in view of rapidly increasing

safeguards requirements as against the limited availability of financial resources and technical personnel.

8. *Conclusion*

This working paper tried to set out some of the current concerns about PNE. As has been clear, PNE is a difficult subject standing exactly on the interface between peaceful and weapons atom. It would have been a lot easier if one can take a simplified attitude of either complete ban or complete liberalization. Neither seems to be very realistic. As stated at the outset, attempts were made so that logical relationship between PNE and the rest of nuclear disarmament system may be identified as much as possible. The paper does not claim that all such relationships have been identified. It is hoped that this would serve as an initial attempt towards such direction, so that experts in various fields would know where they can make the most contribution. It is not entirely inconceivable that the outcome of such exercise might end up in an international agreement on the subject of PNE.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: The Vladivostok Accord, July 8, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Findley, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the implications for arms control and national security of the strategic arms limitation agreement we are now seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Your subcommittee was last briefed on SALT on June 12 in executive session by Ambassador Johnson, the Chief U.S. Delegate to these negotiations. I have reviewed this testimony and found it is still up to date. As you know, the negotiations have been in recess from early May, until last week. We would be pleased to bring you up to date again on new developments, whenever you so desire.

There have been many press stories lately about SALT. Should your subcommittee wish to be briefed on the details of the United States-Soviet positions and tactics, I believe, Mr. Chairman, it would be more practical to meet in executive session. For as you know, when it comes to tentative proposals and counterproposals, a certain privacy is more conducive to constructive negotiations than full publicity.

On the other hand, I firmly believe the principal issues in SALT are

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[1] *The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.S. Security, Arms Control, and World Peace: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session*, June 24, 25, and July 8, 1975, pp. 119–122.

of such vast and long-term importance that the active and open involvement of Congress is essential. My agency wants to encourage public interest in SALT, and we want to remain open to the questions and suggestions of all those who wish to contribute.

VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD FACED WITH DIFFICULTIES

Let me try to clarify the basic issues that face us as we seek to work out an agreement based on the Vladivostok accord.[2] The major points and difficulties that have come up can be grouped under thr oad questions:

(1) Are we getting the right kind of arms control; that ts that will genuinely limit arms, that will increase rather t se stability, that will provide a good basis for further reduction
(2) Are we maintaining the strategic balance with the Soviet Union?
(3) Are the key limitations adequately verifiable?

No agreement can be devised to include and exclude things precisely the way each party would like. In negotiations, one cannot obtain the optimum on every score. We must balance the pluses and minuses among these three areas of basic objectives.

Take for example, the question of the mobile missiles. In SALT I the United States sought to prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers—a proposal on which we failed to reach agreement. We felt at that time the land-mobile ICBM's are undesirable from the point of view of verification. On the other hand, from the point of view of stability, experts point out that mobility of missiles is desirable because it can help reduce vulnerability. Which of these objectives should take priority, verification or invulnerability?

Similar tradeoffs are required for MIRV's, new bomber aircraft, cruise missiles, and various potential "qualitative" developments; that is to say, tradeoffs between one, arms control objectives in the narrow sense—such as stability or lessened competition—two, a proper United States-Soviet strategic balance, and three, verifiability. Many criticisms of the Vladivostok accord overlook this fact of these tradeoffs.

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE CONTINUING PROCESS

Now, let me make another point regarding the evaluation of SALT agreements. It would be a mistake to look at a SALT II agreement as if it was meant to settle the strategic relationship and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union once and for all. Strategic arms control negotiations must be seen as a continuing process. The avenues for future developments of arms are too diverse, too unpredictable to be circumscribed in a single agreement for all time.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

Moreover, the more we try to cram into a single agreement, the longer it will take to negotiate; and the more drawn out the negotiations, the greater the risks of exacerbating the very competition we seek to avoid. On the other hand, the thinner the agreement, the larger the gap through which arms competition will flow unchecked.

There has been criticism that the SALT II agreement might not limit all the possible areas of strategic competition. Of course, it will not. If, since the beginning of SALT, we had tried to cover everything in one grand agreement, we would still be a long way from the ABM Treaty, let alone have some limits on offensive arms. An important test of SALT agreements is not so much how comprehensive they are, but how they will alter the future competition and future negotiations about nuclear arms.

VLADIVOSTOK PROVIDES CLEAR-CUT BENCHMARK OF EQUALITY

One great advantage of the Vladivostok limits is that they provide a simple, clearcut benchmark of equality and thus a basis from which future reductions and further limitations can more easily be negotiated. Major asymmetries tend to slow down negotiations on arms limitations and reductions, whereas an equal starting point tends to facilitate such negotiations.

We did well with the highly symmetric ABM Treaty of 1972.[3] In 1974, long before the 5 years were up for the agreed review conference, we reached a follow-on agreement which cut the permitted levels of ABM deployment by one-half. This protocol to the ABM agreement was transmitted to the Senate on September 19, 1974, for advice and consent to ratification. As of today it is still awaiting action by the Senate.[4]

Viewing SALT as a continuing process helps us to focus on another important aspect. The very fact that such negotiations are going on, forces the political leadership in the Soviet Union to pay attention to the purposes of their strategic armaments and to weigh arms control objective against other political or military objectives.

In the long run, this indirect impact of arms control through changing attitudes, could be more beneficial than specific arms limitations. The SALT Standing Consultative Commission provides a forum to maintain continuity on a technical level. It has proven to be an effective, continuing link between strategic experts on both sides.

LONG-TERM VIEW NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION

We need a long-term view, also, to do justice to the stubborn problem of verification. The overarching reason why verification has been such

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

a formidable obstacle to arms control is that we have to monitor armaments in a closed society. The more openness, the easier it is to collect and corroborate the indicators needed for verification; and the more openness, the less the psychological or political needs for verification to begin with.

As matters now stand, monitoring an expanding array of arms control agreements levies increasing burdens of scope and complexity on our intelligence organizations. And it lies in the nature of this work that much has to proceed under the protection of secrecy.

Unrestrained publicity about our monitoring methods provides a potential violator with a road map for deception or countermeasures, thus making the verification methods ineffective. We cannot inform the party whose conduct we wish to verify of each and every step we take to check its compliance.

Mr. Chairman, today the legal protection of our verification capability is inadequate. Appropriate legislation is needed. This subcommittee, with its keen and constructive interest in arms control, I am sure, is sympathetic to this problem.

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE REGARDING VERIFICATION EMERGES

Another requirement regarding verification emerges, apart from the necessary protection for our intelligence organizations. In the years to come, when the scope of arms control will—hopefully—expand, Congress, in my view, may have to assume a continuing and active role in verification. The question of compliance or violation may often depend on a complex pattern of evidence combining technical and political judgment.

In the end, verification may be more like a jury verdict than a simple litmus test. And for jury verdicts to be viable, the people have to trust the jury. The appropriate congressional committees, in full cooperation with the executive branch, will have to act as guardians of this trust.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

House Bill To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, July 9, 1975 [1]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1975."

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[1] H.R. 7567 (Rept. No. 94-281) as amended, 94th Congress, 1st Session. The House of Representatives approved the bill on July 9, 1975. For the Administration bill, see *ante*, p. 64, n. 2. The Senate bill and the final act appear *post*, pp. 455-458, pp. 706-710.

TITLE I—AMENDMENTS TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

PURPOSES OF ACT

SEC. 101. Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2551) is amended by striking out "It must be able" in the second sentence of the third paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,"

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 102. Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended by inserting ", the National Security Council," immediately after "Secretary of State" in the first sentence.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

SEC. 103. Title III of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571-2575) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

SEC. 36 (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—

"(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—

"(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or

"(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or

"(2) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

"(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment

and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

"(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

"(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1), or

"(B) any program described in subsection (a) (2) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

"(3) Upon the request of any appropriate committee of either House of Congress, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

"(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).".

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS

SEC. 104. (a) (1) The second sentence of section 45 (a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2585 (a)) is amended by striking out "The Director" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director".

(2) The fifth sentence of section 45(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "No person" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), no person".

(3) Section 45 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States.".

(b) Section 45(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2585 (b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c).".

AUTHORIZATION OF ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 105. Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) is amended by inserting in the second sentence thereof immediately after $10,100,000," the following: "and for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 the sum of $24,000,000. Of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1976 under the amendment made by this section, not exceeding $1,000,000 shall be used by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to conduct a study of the impact upon military expenditures of arms control measures mutually agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall submit to Congress every three months reports on the research conducted pursuant to the preceding sentence."

PUBLIC INFORMATION

SEC. 106. Section 49(d) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(d)) is repealed.

REPORT TO CONGRESS; POSTURE STATEMENT

SEC. 107. Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2590) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.".

TITLE II—CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO OTHER ACTS

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954

SEC. 201. Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.".

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

SEC. 202. Section 42(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2791(a)), is amended by striking out "(3)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3) in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to".

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

SEC. 203. Section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321(d)) is amended by striking out the words "take into account" and inserting in lieu thereof "be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to".

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Working Paper on Arms Control Implications of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, July 10, 1975 [1]

Since early in the nuclear age, consideration has been given to utilizing the unique characteristics of nuclear explosions for peaceful as well as military purposes. However, for a number of reasons—including the addition last year of a sixth State with a nuclear explosive capability, the pressing worldwide need to exploit new sources of energy, agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,[2] and the review of the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty[3]—the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has only recently become a major international issue.

At the 1974 United Nations General Assembly, many delegations noted that in approaching the overall question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, it was necessary to weigh carefully, and perhaps to balance against one another, many diverse factors—among them economic utility, technical feasibility, health and safety concerns, legal considerations including existing treaty obligations, and arms control implications. It was generally recognized, however, that current international understanding of several of these factors was far from complete.

On the issue of economic utility, for example, a number of delegations acknowledged that to date PNEs had failed to meet early expectations. My delegation pointed out that, despite considerable efforts in PNE device design and some application experiments, the United States had not yet realized any commercial benefits from PNE technology. At the same time, it was widely recognized that use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was still in the experimental stage, and that the possibility of achieving substantial benefits in the future could not be altogether excluded.

On the question of arms control implications, many delegations were aware of the potential conflict between the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the promotion of important arms control

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[1] CCD/PV.671, pp. 11–15.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, 461–465.

objectives, particularly preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and placing further restraints on nuclear weapons testing. However, there was considerable uncertainty and some difference of opinion as to whether or not peaceful nuclear explosions could be carried out in a manner consistent with those objectives and, if so, the circumstances under which this could be done.

In the course of the General Assembly debate it became apparent that overall assessments and policy prescriptions would have to await further efforts to resolve the remaining uncertainties. Well-informed trade-offs among the various and potentially competing considerations simply could not be made without a clearer understanding of each of the separate considerations involved. Accordingly, the General Assembly decided, in the form of resolution 3261 D (XXIX), on a division of labour for further examination of the diverse component parts of the PNE question.[4]

The International Atomic Energy Agency was asked to continue its studies of the utility and feasibility of peaceful nuclear explosions, including their legal, health and safety aspects. The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was requested to give consideration to the role of PNEs as provided for in that Treaty. Finally, this Committee was called upon to examine those aspects of the problem falling within its particular area of expertise—the arms control implications of PNEs.

The informal meetings with experts next week will give us an opportunity to work toward fulfilling the CCD's part of the General Assembly's mandate. Today, in preparation for those informal meetings, I would like to outline my Government's views on the principal issues that we believe should be covered in the Committee's consideration of the arms control implications of PNEs and to table a working paper that treats those issues in greater detail.[5]

Basic to any examination of the arms control implications of PNEs is an understanding of the common characteristics of all nuclear explosive devices, whether intended for peaceful or military purposes. As is pointed out in the United States working paper, the most fundamental of these characteristics is that all nuclear explosives release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in an extremely short period of time. Moreover, the weight and external dimensions of all nuclear explosive devices considered by the United States for either military or engineering applications are such that they could all be delivered to military targets, although with varying degrees of efficiency, by a wide range of existing land, sea, or air vehicles.

We therefore do not see how nuclear explosive devices could be developed that would not be capable of military application. All existing

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803-806.
[5] For the working paper, see *infra*.

or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could be employed in some fashion as a weapon, although it should be pointed out that such devices would not necessarily add significantly to the military capability of nuclear-weapon-testing States that already possess a broad range of nuclear weapons delivery systems and nuclear explosive devices well-suited to those systems.

From the standpoint of arms control, the chief concern in nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is their potential for contributing to nuclear weapons capabilities. An important arms control objective should therefore be to achieve adequate assurance that a nuclear explosion programme carried out for peaceful purposes does not provide nuclear-weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to the State conducting the programme. It is an objective that can and should be applied to all States. The United States working paper examines first the case of States that had not previously demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability, and then the case of existing nuclear-weapon States, to determine in each case whether and to what extent this objective can be achieved.

Given the desire of all States to enjoy the fullest possible benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a critical question is whether it is possible for a State previously without a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a PNE programme without in the process achieving a nuclear weapons capability. As the working paper points out, there is no reliable means of constraining a PNE programme by a "non-nuclear-weapon State" so as to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The unavoidable consequence of any test that results successfully in a nuclear detonation is to provide the testing State with confidence in the explosive capability of a device that could be used as a weapon.

The working paper goes on to examine various suggestions aimed at preventing a PNE programme from leading to a useable nuclear weapons capability—including constraints on device characteristics, restrictions on the acquisition of delivery systems, and physical control of all special nuclear materials. It concludes that none of these methods provides a reliable basis for distinguishing between a "PNE Power" and a nuclear-weapon State.

On the basis of these considerations, the working paper asserts that the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the carrying out of a PNE programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was this conclusion, of course, which led to the prohibition, in article II of the NPT, of the acquisition of "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." However, it was fully understood at the time of the NPT negotiations that this important arms control implication of PNEs should not stand in the way of non-nuclear-weapon States receiving the potential benefits of PNE technology. Accordingly, article V was designed to assure States that give up the option to acquire any nuclear explosive device that they will not

be denied any benefits of PNE technology that are realized by the nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT.

The United States working paper is based on the assumption that the principal arms control objective regarding PNEs should be pursued just as scrupulously in the case of nuclear-weapon States as in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus, it is necessary to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapon State PNE programmes do not provide nuclear-weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to those States. Whether or not a PNE programme carried out by a nuclear-weapon State would provide such weapons-related benefits would depend on several factors, including the extent and character of that State's existing nuclear weapons capabilities, the level of its PNE activity compared to the level of its weapons testing programme, and the effectiveness of any constraints on its PNE programme.

The working paper notes that if weapons testing were limited by international agreement while PNEs were not constrained, the potential would be created for using the PNE programme to achieve weapon-related benefits no longer available in the weapons testing programme. Therefore, in order to prevent the acquisition of such military benefits, it would be necessary to place strict controls on PNEs as well. Such constraints are currently being worked out by the two parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. While it is too early to predict the content of the PNE agreement called for in article III of the Threshold Treaty, it is essential that it contain adequately verifiable constraints capable of ensuring that PNEs are consistent with the provisions of that Treaty.

Under a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, the objective of preventing the acquisition of weapon-related benefits from a PNE programme would be considerably more difficult to achieve. Since there would be no authorized weapons testing, incentive for seeking military benefits in the course of a PNE programme would be much greater than under a threshold test ban régime that accommodated PNEs.

If PNEs were to be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban, a verification system would have to be devised that would be capable of providing adequate assurance that PNEs were not being used to test a new weapon concept, to verify the performance of weapons already in the stockpile, or to conduct studies of nuclear weapons effects.

In assessing the feasibility of accommodating PNEs, it is important to take into account other information and experience gained in a PNE programme that could be of military value. The working paper concludes that further consideration of these difficult and complex verification issues could provide a better understanding of how it might be possible to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapons-related benefits were not obtained if PNEs were to be permitted under a comprehensive weapons test ban.

It would be unrealistic to expect next week's informal meetings with

experts to resolve all remaining uncertainties about the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. However, my delegation believes that several of the important issues—issues that are essential to a well-informed assessment of the overall PNE question—could be clarified considerably in the course of the experts' discussions. We would hope the United States working paper will help facilitate such discussions, and our experts are coming to Geneva prepared to make a constructive contribution.

United States Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Arms Control Implications of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, July 10, 1975 [1]

Very early in the development of nuclear explosives for military purposes, suggestions were made in the United States for exploiting the unique features of such explosives for engineering applications. Several possible applications have subsequently been identified and examined. Much of the effort in the field of nuclear engineering, at least in the United States, has focused on methods for the recovery of deeply seated energy resources, such as stimulation of natural gas wells and in-situ retorting of oil from shale rock formations. Methods have also been studied for recovering minerals from ore formations that cannot be mined by conventional means, such as the use of nuclear explosives to break up the ore bodies for subsequent extraction mining or in-situ leaching.

Another possible application is the use of nuclear explosions for creating underground cavities for storing petroleum, liquefied gas, or toxic wastes. In addition to these engineering applications, purely scientific applications of nuclear explosions have been explored. These have included production of super heavy elements and experimental determinations of equations of state in regions of high pressure and temperature, regions that are inaccessible when conventional explosive technology is employed. All of these applications are commonly referred to as "contained PNEs" because they are conducted deep underground in a fully contained mode with surface effects generally confined to ground motion resulting from the explosion.

Early in the United States PNE programme considerable research was devoted to the possibility of using nuclear explosives to construct harbours, canals, and water reservoirs and to perform difficult cuts in mountainous terrain for highways and railroads. Such "excavation" applications differ from "contained" applications in that they would involve the dynamic rupture of the earth's surface, the formation of craters, and the ejection of debris, including radioactive materials. As

[1] CCD/456, July 10, 1975.

a result of the absence of promising applications in the United States, health and safety considerations, environmental concerns, questions of public acceptability, and the constraints imposed by the Limited Test Ban Treaty,[2] United States research and development in nuclear explosive engineering in recent years have generally been confined to contained applications.

In order to be suitable for a PNE programme, nuclear explosives must be designed to have certain, sometimes highly specialized, characteristics. Since one of the principal rationales for PNEs is their possible economic advantage over alternative technologies—and because the cost of the explosives can be expected to be a significant part of the total cost of any nuclear engineering project—an obvious and important requirement for the explosives is minimum cost. This requirement dictates the minimum fissile material, tritium, and device complexity that is consistent with other design requirements. Economy would be a particularly critical factor in device design if the number of explosions in a PNE programme were large.

The diameter of the nuclear explosive device should be as small as practicable. This is particularly important for applications involving explosions deep underground, since small diameter explosives can minimize the considerable cost of drilling emplacement holes.

Additional criteria for nuclear explosive design are the amount and nature of the radioactivity produced. For gas and oil stimulation, it would be important to have as small an amount of tritium as possible. For excavation, low total residual radioactivity would be a requirement. For some other applications, there may not be a need for any restriction on radioactivity.

The yield of the explosion is, of course, another critical characteristic of devices for engineering applications. The most appropriate explosive yield will vary from project to project. The United States has studied hypothetical projects with a wide range of yields. For most applications, safety and economy require that the yield of the explosive be highly predictable.

An additional requirement is ruggedness. Depending on the application, explosives may be required to withstand severe environmental conditions—such as extreme temperatures, pressures, and accelerations—without loss of reliability.

While these characteristics are obviously only illustrative of the many design criteria for nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, they are sufficient to demonstrate that the technical feasibility and economic utility of most PNE applications are dependent on highly advanced device design and production technologies. Although there may be some engineering applications whose requirements could be met by relatively simple devices, the production of the necessary explosive

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

devices for most applications, given their rigid and demanding requirements, would not be possible without long developments and testing experience and considerable expense.

As noted above, some of the requirements of nuclear explosives for engineering applications (e.g., minimum cost, predictable yield) are common to virtually all applications, while other requirements vary from project to project. A diverse PNE programme, therefore, would call for the development of different device designs for specific uses. In the United States, design effort has centred around two basic types of nuclear explosives for engineering applications—a very clean, physically large explosive with low total residual radioactivities for excavation, and more recently a small-diameter, minimum residual tritium explosive for gas stimulation.

While variations in technical characteristics may exist among nuclear explosive devices optimized for specific engineering uses and technical differences may likewise exist between devices optimized for such peaceful applications and devices optimized for military purposes, it is important to emphasize that all nuclear explosive devices, regardless of their intended or optimal application, have certain common characteristics.

The most fundamental characteristic common to such devices is that they release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in a time period measured in millionths of a second. Because of this inherent feature, nuclear explosive devices, whether in their crudest or most highly sophisticated forms, take on military significance.

The yields contemplated for nuclear explosive engineering applications span a yield range that is of interest for tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, nuclear explosive devices that have been considered by the United States for peaceful applications typically weigh between a few hundred pounds and tens of thousands of pounds, their diameters range from twenty centimetres to two metres, and their lengths range from one to ten metres. Thus, although the configuration of some explosives cannot be adapted easily, if at all, to certain missile warhead applications or to some other sophisticated forms of delivery, all explosive devices envisaged for peaceful applications are "transportable" and can be carried to military targets (with differing degrees of efficiency) by a wide variety of delivery vehicles.

Because of these basic characteristics, it has not been possible—and we see no basis for believing that it could be possible—to develop a "strictly peaceful" nuclear explosive device, one not capable of military application. All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could also be employed in some fashion as a weapon, although such devices would not necessarily add significantly to the military capability of nuclear weapons testing States that already possess a broad range of nuclear weapons delivery systems and nuclear explosive devices well-suited to those systems.

The principal arms control objective concerning PNEs might be expressed in the following way: To achieve adequate assurance that a nuclear explosion programme carried out for peaceful purposes does not provide nuclear weapons-related benefits not otherwise available to the State conducting the programme. It is important to consider whether and to what extent this objective could be achieved—both in the case of States that had previously not demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability and in the case of existing nuclear weapon States.

Implications for "Non-nuclear Explosive States"

For States previously without a proven (i.e., tested) nuclear explosive capability, the critical question is whether a nuclear weapons capability is inevitably achieved in the process of carrying out a PNE programme. In such a case, the unavoidable consequence of any test that results in a nuclear yield, regardless of the particular characteristics of the device used, is to provide the testing State with confidence in the explosive capability of a device that could be used as a nuclear weapon. Regardless of whatever additional information useful to weapons development could be gained in a successful initial test, the confirmation of this minimum but critical level of device performance (i.e., the realization of a nuclear yield), and the existence of the technological base that would be required for this achievement, would be sufficient for considering the testing State to possess a nuclear weapons capability. While an initial test would be enough to demonstrate that capability, it is obvious that a State wishing to make use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would want to continue its device development and testing programme. However, the process of improving nuclear explosive devices in the context of a PNE programme inevitably improves such a State's weapons capability. Advances in device development, particularly at the earlier and more basic stages, are directly transferable from one application to the other.

It has been suggested that a reliable distinction can be made between a State with the capability to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and a nuclear weapon State. In this connexion, it has been argued that the critical factor is not the demonstrated capability to develop and use nuclear explosive devices, but rather the intentions of the country involved. The major problem with any approach based on intentions rather than capabilities is that the security of all States would be decreased if many States had nuclear explosive capabilities, each questioning the long-term reliability of the peaceful pledges of the others, particularly during crisis situations.

It has also been suggested that it might be possible to prevent a State with a nuclear explosive capability from obtaining a usable nuclear weapons capability by restricting the acquisition of delivery systems. However, as pointed out above, nuclear explosive devices can be carried to military targets by a wide range of existing land, sea, or air vehicles—several of which are widely available, relatively unsophisticated,

and designed for commercial purposes or military purposes other than the delivery of nuclear weapons.

A third theoretical possibility might be to restrict the technical characteristics of the explosive devices so as to make them unsuitable for weapons purposes, and to develop reliable procedures to ensure that all devices conform to the authorized specifications. However, as is pointed out earlier, any nuclear explosive device could be employed, although not necessarily optimally, as a weapon. No technical criteria could therefore be devised to distinguish between devices having only peaceful applications and devices with military applications. While placing restrictions on device characteristics could be expected to reduce the efficiency of certain nuclear weapon systems utilizing the constrained devices, it must be recognized that such systems would nonetheless add enormously to the military capability of a State that previously had not possessed nuclear explosive devices.

A fourth theoretical possibility might be to permit "non-nuclear weapon States" to carry out their own PNE programme provided they were willing to place all special nuclear materials (SNM) under effective physical control and to withdraw from such a "SNM bank" only the amount necessary for one PNE application at a time. The serious failing of such an approach is that it would enable the "PNE Power" to develop and gain experience in the use of nuclear explosive technology, even to test and refine devices tailored to the specifications of available military delivery vehicles. Restricted access to SNM would be the only factor preventing such a State from acquiring a stockpile of nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time.

Such an approach could not provide a reliable or durable barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons. The clandestine diversion or acquisition of even small quantities of SNM would be a very serious matter, since the State would already have a proven capability to use this material to fabricate nuclear explosives. Even with absolutely infallible safeguards and physical security measures, States might feel compelled to prepare for the possibility that safeguards in other States would be circumvented or that other "PNE Powers" might, especially in a crisis situation, abrogate a safeguards agreement or take over a "SNM bank". Therefore, even if it did not actually result in the diversion of devices to military applications, such an approach could be expected to result in serious instabilities.

Earlier in this paper, it was suggested that the principal arms control objective concerning PNEs should be to achieve adequate assurance that a nuclear explosion programme carried out for peaceful purposes does not provide nuclear weapons-related benefits not otherwise available to the State conducting the programme. For States that have not previously demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability, the foregoing considerations suggest that this objective cannot be achieved. There appears to be no reliable means of constraining a "non-nuclear weapon State's" PNE programme so as to prevent the acquisition of a

nuclear weapons capability (i.e., to distinguish between a "PNE Power" and a nuclear weapon State). It would seem, therefore, that the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with the development by non-nuclear weapon States of any nuclear explosive device.

At the same time, it is generally understood that these weapons development implications of PNEs must not prevent non-nuclear weapon States from sharing in the potential benefits of PNE technology. Accordingly, Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons assures non-nuclear weapon States parties which have given up the option to develop any nuclear explosive device that they will not be denied any PNE benefits that may be realized by the nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty.[3] Moreover, as was recognized in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons such benefits could also be made available to non-nuclear weapon States not party to the treaty.[4]

Implications for Existing Nuclear Weapon States

Any nuclear explosive device, as has been pointed out above, could serve in some fashion as a nuclear weapon. For an existing nuclear weapon State (NWS), however, the production of a nuclear explosive and its use in a peaceful application would not necessarily furnish significant improvements to that State's nuclear weapon capabilities. Whether or to what extent a PNE programme carried out by an existing NWS would contribute to nuclear weapons capabilities depends on such factors as the breadth and character of that State's existing nuclear weapon capabilities, the level of its PNE activity compared to the level of its weapons testing programme, and the nature and effectiveness of the constraints, if any, on its PNE programme.

If there were no constraints on a nuclear weapons testing programme, a PNE programme would be of no particular arms control concern. While an active PNE programme might, of course, result in some incidental "spin-off" benefits to the weapons programme, there would be little or no incentive for using PNEs to achieve weapon-related benefits when the full range of weapon development and testing options was available in the weapons testing programme. Indeed, it would presumably be disadvantageous to do so, since a test carried out exclusively for weapons purposes can be tailored to achieve such benefits, whereas some penalty, in terms of the acquisition of information relevant to weapons development, would be imposed on the testing Power by an engineering application. Therefore, in the case of an ongoing and unrestricted weapons testing programme, there would

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[3] For text, see *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461-465.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 146-157.

appear to be no arms control justification for placing constraints on a PNE programme. Arms control questions may be raised, however, in the event of restrictions on nuclear weapons tests. Specifically, if weapons testing were constrained and PNE activity were not constrained, the potential would be created for using the PNE programme to realize weapon-related benefits no longer available in the weapons testing programme. Therefore in order to have adequate confidence that PNE programmes could not be utilized for that purpose, it would be essential in the context of any restraints on nuclear weapons tests to place strict and effective constraints on PNEs as well.

The question of the weapons development and testing implications of PNEs has recently arisen in connexion with the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which will prohibit nuclear weapons testing above a threshold of 150 kilotons. Article III of this treaty calls for a separate agreement governing the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[5] This PNE agreement is currently being negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union. While it is too early to predict the content of the PNE agreement, both sides agree that it should contain adequately verifiable constraints on their PNE programmes to ensure that PNEs do not provide opportunities to achieve weapon-related benefits precluded by the threshold test ban treaty. It should be noted that any PNE arrangement that would be adequate for the present threshold test ban would not necessarily be adequate for more restrictive weapons testing restraints.

The ultimate extension of weapons testing restrictions, is, of course, a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. Unlike a threshold agreement, a comprehensive ban would permit no authorized weapons testing opportunities. For this reason, incentives for seeking weapons-related information in the course of a PNE programme would be much greater than under a threshold/PNE regime.

The United States is firmly committed to achieving a comprehensive test ban agreement with adequate verification provisions. If PNEs were to be accommodated under such an agreement, a verification system would have to be devised that would provide adequate assurance not only that clandestine weapons tests were not going undetected and unidentified, but also that weapon-related benefits were not being acquired from nuclear explosions carried out openly and ostensibly for peaceful purposes. To achieve the latter objective, a control system, at a minimum, would have to prevent the testing of a new weapon concept, the substitution of a stockpiled weapon for the "PNE" explosive to verify its performance, and the carrying out of nuclear weapons effects studies.

In addition, it would be important to take into account other information and experience gained in a PNE programme that could be of

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225-227.

military value. For example, any PNE programme could aid States carrying out the programme in maintaining research, testing, and industrial facilities essentially identical to those usable for nuclear weapons design, testing and production and in retaining personnel skilled in the design and fabrication of nuclear explosive devices for military as well as peaceful application. The PNE programme could also increase the State's testing experience as well as its knowledge of how to calculate the performance of nuclear explosives, including the improvement of computer codes used in such calculations. The extent to which these factors would be of military significance would have to be considered in evaluating any system for verifying a CTB with a PNE accommodation.

Further consideration of these difficult and complex verification issues could provide a better understanding of how it might be possible to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear weapons-related benefits would not be obtained if PNEs were permitted under a comprehensive weapons test ban.

Working Paper Submitted by Canada, Japan, and Sweden to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Summary Proceedings of Informal Tripartite Conference on Seismological Cooperation, July 14, 1975 [1]

1. Following the first meeting held in Tokyo in June 1972, and reported to the conference of the Committee on Disarmament in CCD/376,[2] scientific delegations from Canada, Japan and Sweden met in Ottawa and Yellowknife, 14–19 April, 1975, in order to review achievements in trilateral co-operation and to exchange information on the current status of the research and development programmes in each country in the field of seismological detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

2. Representatives of the scientific institutions in each of the three countries gave a review of the present status of and development plans for their seismological systems and reviewed the verification research projects that had been carried out since the Tokyo 1972 meeting. The research projects that were summarized by the Japanese representatives included: earthquake detection capabilities of the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory; estimation of focal depth by surface reflected depth phases; and a study of the discrimination of Soviet earthquakes and explosions using surface-wave: body-wave magnitude ratios at the Matsushiro and Hagfors Seismological Observatories (undertaken jointly with Sweden).

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[1] CCD/457, July 14, 1975.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 484–485.

The research projects that were summarized by the Swedish representatives included yield estimates for United States and USSR explosions; identification of earthquakes and explosions observed in the United States of America in 1972 (undertaken jointly with Canada); and possibilities of hiding seismic signals from explosions in signals from nearby earthquakes.

The research projects that were summarized by the Canadian representatives include design, testing and the 1974 performance of the Canadian Seismic Array Monitor (CANSAM) Yellowknife System; and a discussion of earthquake simulation using multiple nuclear explosions.

3. A review of trilateral co-operation that has taken place during the three years since the Tokyo meeting confirmed the importance of co-operative efforts. The three principal types of co-operation that have proved beneficial to the common goals of the three countries and to research objectives of the individual institutions have been the following: the routine exchange of seismic data relating to seismic event detection and location; joint research projects on topics of common interest resulting in research reports and working papers to the CCD; and longer term exchanges of personnel to undertake specific joint research projects and short term exchanges to discuss and review technical developments and research procedures.

4. The delegations agreed that the threshold aspects of the envisaged treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on the "Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests" and the measures described in the protocol to the treaty "to ensure verification by national technical means" have considerable significance for seismological verification research. It was agreed that the test calibration information described in the protocol to the treaty would be valuable to any country in furthering its research on matters related to seismological verification.[3]

5. Each delegation identified its goals for further research projects and indicated those aspects of trilateral data exchange and co-operation that would prove fruitful in achieving these goals. The participants agreed that further research on earthquake identification techniques would be of most value in improving the seismological verification capability. In particular, it was agreed that studies of earthquake source characteristics, of the estimation of earthquake focal depths employing secondary phases, and of the excitation of Love waves would be pursued toward this end. In some theoretical evasion scenarios, an ability to identify earthquakes as such is expected to limit the effectiveness of evasion techniques.

6. It was agreed that research experiments should continue for purposes of defining the operative capability of existing seismological stations for the identification of earthquakes and explosions. Limited

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[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227, 227–229.

studies of operative capabilities can be undertaken as co-operative projects with assembly of identification parameters. It was agreed that significant additional resources would be required to undertake the compilation and distribution of identification data on a broader continuing scale.

7. To strengthen trilateral co-operation and to improve the facility for research within the individual institutions, the delegations agreed to the following measures regarding data exchange within the limits of available resources: a continuation of the exchange on a routine basis of detection data extracted from key observing stations; an exchange of identification parameters for selected events in specified regions for use in projects associated with event identification; and an exchange, on request, of original seismic data in digital or hard-copy form for events of special interest.

8. The participants agreed that the most valuable form of co-operation would continue to be a direct exchange of expert scientific personnel between the institutions, as in the past. It was agreed that a general review meeting should be convened at some future date to review progress and to consider new co-operative goals.

Resolution of the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers: Strengthening the Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, July 15, 1975 [1]

Considering that the danger of nuclear proliferation will continue to increase unless the security of non-nuclear weapon States is effectively assured against nuclear attack or threat,

Recalling the resolution of the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers which recommended that the existing security assurances extended to non-nuclear States be made more credible and effective and called upon the nuclear weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States,[2]

Noting General Assembly resolution 3261 G(XXIX), calling for the consideration, without loss of time, of the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon States, in all appropriate forums, which was unanimously approved with the concurrence of the five nuclear weapon powers,[3]

Further noting that since the adoption of this recommendation, no progress has been made in this direction,

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[1] CCD/462, July 29, 1965.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 199.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 809.

Taking into account the difficulties in the way of agreement because of military strategic doctrines which envisage the possibility of a nuclear response to a conventional attack,

(1) *Urges* the Nuclear Weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances against non-nuclear weapon States which are not protected by treaty guarantees from a nuclear power against nuclear threat or attack.

(2) *Further urges* the nuclear weapon States to consider the adoption of other measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapon States.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, July 17, 1975 [1]

One of the questions directly connected with the discoveries in the field of nuclear physics which have led to the creation of nuclear weapons is the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Pursuant to a request made by the United Nations General Assembly, this problem is being considered by the Committee on Disarmament. The General Assembly resolution on this question calls for its consideration in direct connexion with the elaboration of effective measures for halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Committee should consider the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to the realization of this objective. It ought therefore to discuss the political questions arising from the working out of this problem in conjunction with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguarding international security as a whole.

Accordingly, the Disarmament Committee ought to conduct its consideration of this problem in such a way as to combine it with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their testing. Since the technical aspects of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions are mainly a matter for study by IAEA, the appropriate competent international organization, primary attention in the Disarmament Committee should be given, as we remarked earlier, to problems of a political nature.

The solution of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is linked to the task of disarmament—the creation of a firm régime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is concerned with this problem, and also provides for safeguarding the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in the

[1] CCD/PV.673, pp. 20–25.

matter of access to the benefits to be derived from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions.[2]

To solve the problem of strengthening the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime is one of the aims which States have to set themselves in their efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This problem was also dealt with by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held at Geneva in May this year. The Conference gave considerable attention to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Declaration adopted by the Conference contains provisions to the effect that the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions may be enjoyed, in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by any non-nuclear-weapon State, irrespective of whether it is or is not a party to the Treaty. At the same time it is emphasized that access to such benefits should not lead to any spread of capability to produce nuclear explosive devices.[3]

The above-mentioned Conference also determined that, within the framework of the non-proliferation régime, IAEA is the appropriate international body through which the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions can be made available to any State which does not possess nuclear weapons. This position of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in full accord with the recommendation adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which notes that "the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with its statute, is an appropriate organ to exercise the functions of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (resolution 2829 (XXVI)).[4]

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions and the implementation, in that connexion, of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides, in particular, for the conclusion of a special international agreement or agreements through which non-nuclear-weapon States could obtain the benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. The USSR is conducting a programme of scientific research and design work on the subject of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and is actively participating in the preparatory steps to provide services in that respect, in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, the Soviet side considers that peaceful nuclear explosions should be carried out in full harmony with the need to stop the arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It takes the view that the procedure for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 897–898.

should be a constituent and integral part of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet Union also supports the view that IAEA is the international body through which non-nuclear-weapon States should be helped to obtain the potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions.

In regard to States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Union, approaching the matter from the point of view of the need to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, considers that these States, too, should have access to the potential benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. The USSR considers that these States, if given access to the use of such benefits, will have no incentive to create their own nuclear explosive devices and carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. In this connexion, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to supply its services in respect of peaceful nuclear explosions even to States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on condition that such services are provided under appropriate international control and on the basis of the procedures worked out by IAEA. The provision of access to the benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions for non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be instrumental in bringing a wider circle of States within the compass of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so that it comes nearer to being universal.

Thus, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions should, in our opinion, be solved in conjunction with the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and any solution should serve the purpose of strengthening the non-proliferation régime. We therefore cannot agree with certain views put forward in the Committee on this problem. For instance, in Japan's working paper of 7 July 1975 (CCD/454), the question is raised of determining the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. The working paper states, in particular, that "NNWS parties to NPT cannot conduct their own PNE, while non-parties can under certain conditions".[5]

In connexion with this proposition quoted from the Japanese working paper it may be asked whether the presentation of such a proposition for the Committee's consideration is in harmony with the task of achieving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The presentation of this proposition may be regarded as an attempt to create, for a certain group of non-nuclear States, a special régime regulating their "rights" to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently, outside the framework of the nuclear-weapon non-prolifera-

[5] *Ante*, pp. 229–236.

tion régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We consider that the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be furthered by the Committee's consideration of such a question at the present time. Such consideration would only further the efforts of certain circles in a number of countries to gain a free hand to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. Such a course of events would not make for a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As we have already noted above, responsibility for carrying out functions concerning peaceful nuclear explosions devolves, in conformity with the decision of the General Assembly and the above-mentioned Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an organization fully competent to perform such functions. In this connexion, it is also noted that IAEA must deal with "all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes".[6] The Japanese working paper, however, raises the question of setting up a special international organization to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions. Besides increasing the number of international organizations, this proposal, if adopted, would have the effect of separating the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions from the task of achieving non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would lead to the parallel operation of two régimes—one for peaceful nuclear explosions and one for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side holds the view that the task is to ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions take place within the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime in conformity with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If peaceful nuclear explosions were to be conducted outside the framework of that article, we should have a situation in which, in addition to the States now possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, more such States would emerge in the next 5–10 years—how many more it would be difficult at the present time to foresee. The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of disarmament as a whole would become considerably more acute, so much so that its solution would be virtually ruled out.

At the present time, the only way to solve the political problems connected with peaceful nuclear explosions is to strengthen the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime by making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty calls for this, and it is to this that the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament, too, must be directed. Any attempt to deal with this matter by founding new international institutions through the creation of an independent régime for peaceful nuclear explosions can only be detrimental to the established forms of international co-operation on this issue and will offer no guarantee that the new institutions will provide, for the prob-

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 152–153.

lem of peaceful nuclear explosions, solutions in harmony with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side is aware that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions is closely related to the problem of stopping nuclear-weapon testing, and that when agreement is reached on the complete cessation of testing, it will be possible to consider peaceful nuclear explosions on another level, that is to say, against the background of a ban on nuclear testing. The Soviet Union is in favour of stopping nuclear-weapon testing everywhere, by everyone, and that applies to underground tests as well. But this problem is not being settled, because some nuclear States are unwilling to stop these tests. It is hard to foresee when a solution will at last be found. We would like to think that it will be soon.

The opinion has been voiced that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions may act as a serious obstacle to the achievement of a ban on nuclear testing. We believe, however, that the main obstacle in the way of a universal ban on nuclear-weapon testing is not this matter of peaceful nuclear explosions at all. As we have already pointed out, the obstacle is unwillingness on the part of certain States to stop testing. In our view, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is secondary to a ban on nuclear testing. The first thing we must do is to agree on the latter, and once such an agreement is reached, it will then also be possible to settle the question of the feasibility of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in conditions of a total ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

In July 1974, taking steps towards a solution of the problem of a ban on nuclear-weapon testing and peaceful nuclear explosions, the USSR and the United States of America signed a Treaty on limitation of underground tests of such weapons, and a Protocol to the Treaty which provides for specific measures to ensure compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Treaty. Both sides expressed readiness to enter into negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement to regulate underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[7] We should like to observe in this connexion that negotiations on such an agreement are at present taking place between the USSR and the United States.

In conclusion, we should like to say that the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions serves a useful purpose, for it gives an idea of the importance of the problem, of the numerous elements involved in its solution, and of the attitudes adopted by the various States. The discussion of this problem will be an important source on which to draw for establishing different approaches to its solution—approaches which will have to be borne in mind when the problem is further considered in various international forums, at the sessions of the General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament, and elsewhere.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

Press Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (De Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, July 17, 1975 [1]

This has been a somewhat disappointing round in the Vienna negotiations. I again have no progress to report today. The views of both sides are still far apart on the major issues under discussion. Nevertheless, the Western participants in these negotiations remain undiscouraged for the longer run. We still think it should be possible to reach agreement because an agreement will serve the interests of both sides.

We find it disappointing that the East has still not responded in a positive and constructive way to our basic reduction proposals. As you know, one of our basic aims is to gain Eastern acceptance of the concept that the overall goal of these negotiations should be the achievement of approximate parity between the two sides in ground forces in Central Europe in the form of a common ceiling on ground force manpower plus reduction of Soviet tanks. We think this is a fair and reasonable goal. We think that achievement of parity in ground forces would significantly enhance stability in Central Europe. It would remove incentives for expensive and potentially dangerous arms races in the area. It would substantially reduce the prospect of an outbreak of armed conflict in Europe, with the risk of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.

The concept of parity is a generally recognized principle in other important arms control negotiations. Indeed, the Soviet Union has itself insisted on it time and again. We don't understand why the East will not accept this principle in these negotiations. We do not see how it is possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on any other basis. We do not see how the East can expect the West to agree to freeze itself into a position of enduring inferiority through a binding international agreement, as the East is asking us to do.

We find it disappointing that, after six rounds of negotiations, the East has still not responded positively to our arguments on these points. The standard Eastern response is that our proposals require larger Eastern than Western reductions. But the East has a vast superiority in numbers of soldiers and tanks in the area. We don't understand why the East finds it necessary to maintain 150,000 more soldiers in the area than the West. We don't understand why the East finds it necessary to maintain two and a half times as many tanks in the area as the West. Nor do we understand how the East can reasonably claim that it would be right to preserve these disparities in an agreement, particularly when one considers that the superpower on the Eastern side—the Soviet Union—is located immediately adjacent to the area, while the superpower on the Western side—the United States—is far away across the Atlantic Ocean.

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[1] From MBFR Vienna, telegram 0364, July 16, 1975, pp. 44–46. For a statement of the Eastern position, see *infra*.

We find it disappointing that the East has not so far been willing to engage in a dialogue with us on the important subject of measures associated with reductions. As you know, the agreed subject matter of these negotiations is the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.

During these negotiations we have made a number of specific proposals for associated measures. These have included measures designed to maintain the stability of the situation resulting from reductions. When forces are reduced, it is all the more important that remaining U.S. and Soviet forces not be used in ways that could give rise to misunderstandings and miscalculations by the other side. We have yet to receive a substantive response from the East on the proposals we have made to deal with this problem.

Nor have we had a response from the East on the points we have made to them about verification. This is an important matter. One of our purposes here is to seek to overcome nearly three decades of mutual suspicion and mistrust between East and West. We do not think it enough for each side to rely solely on its national means to verify compliance with a reduction agreement. Yet the East has so far evaded discussion of this important subject.

We find it not encouraging that, throughout the negotiations so far, the East has failed to respond in an adequate manner to the many demonstrations of Western flexibility we have given. We have responded to specific Eastern criticisms of our approach by modifying it in significant respects. The East has criticized our proposal that only the two major powers—the U.S. and USSR—reduce in a first phase, claiming that the other Western direct participants were trying to avoid reductions altogether. To meet this point, we have offered assurances that all remaining Western direct participants will reduce in a second phase, after satisfactory first-phase agreement has been reached. The East has objected that our approach left open the possibility of significant increases in Western European forces, following U.S. first phase reductions. To meet this objection, we have offered a freeze on the ground force manpower of all direct participants in the area in connection with a first-phase agreement. The East has objected that the Western proposals did not cover air forces. To meet this point, we have offered to freeze the overall level of air force manpower in the area in connection with a first-phase reduction agreement. These levels are approximately equal for both sides, with a slight advantage for the East. Regrettably, the East has thus far brushed aside all these proposals as inadequate.

The East has also offered to make certain limited changes in its original reduction proposals. It has suggested a few procedural modifications. We have discussed all these in the course of the negotiations. But we still view these moves as not changing the basic substance of the Warsaw Pact approach to reductions.

We are also puzzled by the persistent Eastern refusal to discuss data

with us. We do not understand how participants can reach agreement to reduce forces without some common understanding of the facts of the situation they are negotiating about, or how one can propose as the East is doing, to reduce force levels by a given percentage while refusing to discuss the force levels to which these percentages would apply. We have given the East totals on ground force manpower and tanks in the area and offered to exchange air manpower totals. While contesting the accuracy of our figures, the East has given us no figures of its own.

Within the context of elaborating its program, the West has presented in this round proposals designed to safeguard the security of flank countries in an agreement.

Despite the disappointments I have described, we do not draw pessimistic conclusions about the prospects of reaching agreement in these negotiations. As I have said before, we consider that prospects do exist for reconciling the differing viewpoints of West and East on the individual issues, and we think we have shown ways to do this. In view of the fact that progress in these negotiations is a major test of detente and that both sides will recognize this, we are not discouraged about the longer prospects. We look forward to further intensive discussion in the next round, discussion which we hope will bring us closer to an agreement.

Press Conference Statement by the Polish Representative (Strulak) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, July 17, 1975 [1]

I would begin the evaluation of the sixth round of the Vienna negotiations with a general conclusion that the 19 participating nations have in this round energetically continued the debates on the important issues concerning a future agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Although the differences of approach to basic questions and even procedural ones, which we have often encountered in these negotiations, still divide us, much effort has again been made to clarify the respective positions.

This work has continuously been carried on in good atmosphere, with full understanding of our responsibilities. As in previous rounds, the Socialist countries have tried to make use of this atmosphere and find a mutually acceptable way to overcoming difficulties and to progress. They have come up with yet another initiative directed toward this aim.

I should like first to review some general issues which still create difficulties, being the main cause of the lack of progress.

The position of the Socialist delegations is known to all who are familiar, as you are, with the draft agreement for an over 15 percent re-

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[1] From MBFR Vienna, telegram 0372, July 17, 1975. For a statement of the Western position, see *supra*.

duction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe in the 1975–77 period. Our negotiating platform further includes a proposal for a "first step" reduction in 1975 amounting to 40 thousand soldiers and their equipment and embracing armed forces of all eleven direct participants of these talks. Subsequently, we offered amendments to our draft agreement suggesting to precede the general reductions with those of the Soviet and American armed forces and armaments in the agreed area both in 1975 and 1976. Moreover, we still maintain the proposal for the joint declaration by the eleven states, direct participants, not to increase the numerical strength of their forces in Central Europe while these negotiations are being conducted with the intention to work out a reduction agreement.

I find it necessary to recall these proposals in order to emphasize the wide range of possibilities of an agreement indicated by their authors, the delegations of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and Poland. They all contain equitable solutions to the complex problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The three latest proposals were made with a view to taking into account elements of the Western position and thus facilitate agreement on the basis of a compromise.

However, we continue to note constant refusal on the part of Western delegations to seriously consider these proposals, to build upon the elements of compromise in them. For a number of rounds now there has been no Western counterproposal. There has only been continued insistence on the original demands for asymmetrical and selective two-phased reductions, as indicated in the "outline of proposals" which are clearly meant to obtain unilateral military gains for the NATO states in Central Europe.

The desire of the Socialist states for de-escalation of military concentration in Central Europe is obvious. Equally obvious and fair is our requirement that this de-escalation should proceed without an infringement upon the existing correlation of forces in the area, to the detriment of the security of any participant in the future agreement, of any negotiating state and of European nation.

The fulfillment of this fundamental premise of any sound reduction agreement cannot take place without mutually satisfactory solution of three basic issues to which much attention has been devoted during this round:

—whose forces in Central Europe should be reduced from the beginning?
—what kinds of forces should be covered by the reduction?
—what should be the status of armaments under such agreement?

The position of Socialist states with respect to these basic questions is not only clear but also well anchored in the mutually agreed principles and provisions of the final Communique of the preparatory consultations of June 28, 1973.

Socialist delegations stand for equal and mutual character of obliga-

tions. Therefore, in the first place, we believe that the process of reduction should encompass armed forces of all direct participants from the beginning. It should not—as the West postulates—simply concentrate on the armies of the USSR and the U.S. within the area and overlook other national components of the present military concentration in Central Europe, some of them very large numerically and very significant in respect of combat potential. Were we to close our eyes to the fact that in the Western part of the reduction area in Central Europe there are large and potent forces, other than those of the U.S., and to accept the Western scheme, we would be agreeing to diminished security of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland in particular, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries in general. You may well understand that the Socialist countries, just as any other sovereign country, cannot possibly accept such a proposition, or have it endorsed in an international accord.

Socialist countries do not claim any unilateral advantages for themselves. The four Socialist direct participants are all prepared to make their contribution to reductions. Consequently, we demand that the future reduction agreement should specifically cover forces in Central Europe of eleven participants to the Vienna talks. These specific obligations of each country must be known before reductions actually start. It is the natural right of every state contemplating reductions to know in advance how much and when others will reduce.

Basing ourselves on this position of principle, we have, however, demonstrated considerable flexibility with regard to the sequence of reductions, taking largely into account the Western wishes. We have offered compromise solutions, ensuring that in 1975 and 1976 the forces of the USSR and the United States in the area will be reduced prior to other forces.

While this compromise move of ours has remained without response, Western European direct participants have in this round hardened their position and refused to contemplate specific obligations concerning the reduction and limitations of their forces even for a distant future. They kept rehearsing the idea of collective NATO obligations which would enable individual Western European states to increase their forces under the so-called common ceiling and thus nullify in practice a reduction agreement.

No wonder, this Western position has increasingly become a major obstacle on the way to agreement.

The second basic issue relates to the kinds of forces to be reduced under a future agreement. Socialist countries consider that singling out ground forces alone for the purpose of reduction of the present military concentration in Central Europe is not only insufficient, but that such a step would clearly bring unilateral military advantages to the NATO.

The Socialist delegations have again in the present round proved the artificiality of the theories of so-called "disparities" in ground forces,

theories which falsely base themselves on separating just one element from the actually very complex correlation of forces in Central Europe.

The reality in this respect is well known. The stockpiled nuclear potential in the area of Central Europe is enormous. The weight of the expanding means of modern air warfare in the military potential there is essential. To exempt these forces and armaments from the future reduction agreement would thus be denying the reality. It could, in fact, lead to an armaments race in these dangerous domains.

This view, particularly of the need to reduce and limit the nuclear weapons in the area, seems to be gaining strength in the Western public opinion just as it is strongly maintained by the peoples of Socialist countries. The realization of danger is common.

However, in spite of this, it must be said that the Western delegations have not changed their totally negative attitude on the issue of the reductions of nuclear weapons. The Western refusal to include into reductions air force and units equipped with nuclear weapons remains another major obstacle to progress in the talks.

The third basic issue discussed in the current round at some depth is the status of armaments in general, under a future agreement. The position of Socialist states in this respect fully corresponds with the agreed subject of negotiations which comprises armaments next to armed forces to be covered by mutual reductions.

It is logical to assume that reduction and ensuing limitation of this essential component of military capabilities by all direct participants is necessary to provide a guarantee against the arms race, the ban which must be a natural goal of these negotiations.

Socialist delegations cannot, therefore, but be critical of the attitude taken by some Western delegations that a future reduction program should be restricted to a unilateral withdrawal of a sizable portion of the combat equipment from the Eastern part of the reduction area while keeping intact Western armaments in the area and leaving fully open for NATO participants the possibility further to amass technical means of warfare.

Socialist delegations are firmly convinced that future reductions, to be effective, should limit not only the number of personnel of armed forces but also their arms and combat equipment.

Accordingly, in our draft agreement we propose the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe together with armaments. Only then will the process of reduction be meaningful and will effectively curb the possibilities of arms race in Central Europe.

I have in a general way delineated the differences of approach on the basic questions which the negotiators have yet to solve. From this you can gather that we still have a long road to proceed before an agreement is achieved. How quickly we can move along this road clearly now depends on the willingness of the Western participants to recognize the objective requirements of mutuality and undiminished security of us all. As you may see, we can hardly move forward as long as the Western

states attempt to restrict one side, namely the Socialist states, while at the same time they tend to secure for the NATO open possibilities to improve its military posture in Central Europe.

An important stage of the process of political detente on our continent is about to culminate in the historical summit meeting in Helsinki, when this process will be affirmed and further stimulated. The urgency to supplement and consolidate detente through concrete measures in military domain—which is our specific task in Vienna—is, no doubt, growing. At this juncture the recognition of the mutual requirements of undiminished security and continued stability in Central Europe becomes particularly essential.

Therefore, we feel, we may justifiably hope for a more constructive approach of our Western partners.

On our part, we have abundantly proved our good will and readiness to search for practical solutions to the complex problem of forces and armaments reduction in Central Europe. I have earlier recalled a series of our previous and still valid proposals and alluded to a new one in this round. Without going—for the known reasons—into any detail, I should like to tell you that guided by the desire to facilitate progress in the negotiations the Socialist delegations have again taken into account considerations voiced by the Western representatives and suggested to work out an agreed definition of what forces should, for the purpose of these negotiations, be included in ground forces and in air forces. This concrete question is of practical importance and the discussion on it, which we consider useful, shall be continued.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Mishra) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [Summary], July 18, 1975 [1]

Mr. Mishra said that going by the discussions at the informal meetings, and also the statements of various delegations at the formal meetings of the CCD, it appeared as if this exercise had not added in any significant measure to the knowledge of the arms control implications of PNE. Those who wanted this exercise to be undertaken were already committed to the framework of the NPT as far as PNE were concerned. Those who felt that the question of arms control implications was a political question rather than a technical one continued to hold that view. And, in fact, every argument heard in regard to indistinguishability between devices intended for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapons had supported his view that what one was dealing with was the question of political will of States.

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[1] CCD/474, August 26, 1975.

His delegation had been happy to listen to various interventions, and had hoped for some enlightenment on the question under discussion. However, he had to conclude that, so many hours later, the Committee was still at the same point where it started.

One fact which had been made clear earlier was that the question of arms control implications of PNE referred primarily to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT regime. Without tackling the main problem of a comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons the international community could not even begin to think about any observation or control, much less supervision, of PNE. Therefore, the main question was that of a comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons. It was only by considering that question that it would be possible to arrive at satisfactory arrangements in regard to PNE—whether they were conducted by nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT.

FRG Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Definition and Classification of Chemical Warfare Agents, July 22, 1975 [1]

I. AIM AND METHOD OF APPROACH

This Working Paper is intended to contribute towards solving the problem of *defining* and *classifying* chemical agents. Taking into account previous proposals, an attempt has been made to develop an evaluation method by which it will be possible, on the basis of objectively measurable criteria largely eliminating subjective evaluations, validly to assess the suitability of a chemical substance for use as a warfare agent.

Extending earlier proposals, the proposed method uses various toxicity categories and introduced additional (secondary) criteria indicating the suitability of agents for military use with a view to confining the number of substances to be banned to a realistic limit.

Both the toxic properties and the additional criteria are quantified. Finally, a simple mathematical formula for calculating evaluation numbers is described by which chemical substances can be classified according to military suitability.

II. EVALUATION CRITERIA

1. *Toxicity—the Primary Criterion*

Proceeding from a number of proposals made in the past (e.g., Japan:


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[1] CCD/458, July 22, 1975.

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


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CCD/374[2]; Canada: CCD/414[3]; USA: CCD/435[4]) toxicity is used as the primary criterion of the suitability of a chemical substance for use as a warfare agent. In view of the different physiological effects of the various chemical agents, it is suggested that the following toxicity categories [5] be used:

Category 1—respiratory toxicity
Category 2—percutaneous toxicity
Category 3—skin lesion

Introducing these three categories as separate criteria appears necessary because the toxicity of an agent may vary considerably between these three toxicity categories.

A number of substances will produce toxic effects of more than one category. For example, mustard gas which causes severe skin lesion is also highly toxic if inhaled, and VX is both a respiratory and a percutaneous agent.

Category 1, or respiratory toxicity is expressed as LCT_{50} (mg. min. m^{-3}) for a minute volume of 20 litres of air. Tentatively, 10 toxicity intervals have been defined and assigned index figures from 0 to 9 as follows:

Index figure IT	LCT_{50}
0	> 20,000
1	~ 20,000
2	~ 10,000
3	~ 4,000
4	~ 1,000
5	~ 500
6	~ 250
7	~ 100
8	~ 30
9	< 10

Category 2, or percutaneous toxicity is expressed as LD_{50} (mg : kg^{-1}). Again, as in the case of Category 1, 10 toxicity intervals have been tentatively defined and assigned index figures from 0 to 9 as follows:

[2] I.e., CCD/374, July 5, 1972.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 524-529.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 330-335.
[5] The use of further categories of toxicity—as routinely determined for new substances (intravenous, intraperitoneal, oral toxicity)—in the first evaluation of a substance might be considered. These toxicities would then have a sort of monitoring function and would provide first indications of the possibly dangerous nature of substances. The collection and evaluation of toxicity data through animal experiments was extensively discussed in an earlier contribution to the CCD (USA: CCD/435). [Footnote in original.]

Index figure PT	LD_{50}
0	>100
1	~100
2	~ 80
3	~ 50
4	~ 20
5	~ 5
6	~ 1
7	~ 0.5
8	~ 0.1
9	< 0.1

Category 3 effects, i.e., skin lesions, are characterized and indexed as follows:

Assuming a dose of 1 mg of substance per square centimetre of skin, the various symptoms have been tentatively assigned index figures as follows:

Index figure DT	Symptom
2	erythema
4	superficial blisters
6	deep blisters
8	necrotic ulceration

2. *Secondary Criteria*

Many substances, though highly toxic, are not suitable for military use. To determine the military suitability of substances additional easily quantifiable criteria should be applied. As a working hypothesis, the following secondary criteria have been established:

Shelf life
Perceptibility
Volatility
Explosion stability
Resistance to atmospheric influences

The secondary criteria may take the values 0.1, 1 or 2. The factor 0.1 was chosen for practical reasons. Since a factor zero in a multiplication makes the product zero, the individual secondary criterion would be overweighted if zero were introduced as a factor into the calculation proposed in Section III below.

The *shelf life* (SL) of a substance indicates its tendency to decompose as a result of intermolecular or intramolecular reactions, its sensitivity to changes in temperature, its aptness to corrode containers and the possibility of chemically stabilizing it through additions. The characteristic shelf life of a substance has been defined as the time it takes, in a 20°C environment, for 50 per cent of it to be destroyed.

Ratings:

Shelf life of under 30 days	SL = 0.1
Shelf life of up to 2 years	SL = 1
Shelf life of over 2 years	SL = 2

The *perceptibility* (P) of an agent indicates the concentration at which its odour, colour or irritant effects will betray its presence.

Ratings:

Under 10 mg/m³	P = 0.1
Up to 1,000 mg/m³	P = 1
Over 1,000 mg/m³	P = 2

The *volatility* of a toxic substance limits its suitability for military use. The degree of volatility largely depends on the boiling point which can usually be easily determined. The *boiling point* (BP) is defined in degrees Centigrade for 760 torr.

Ratings:

Boiling point under 0° C	BP = 0.1
Boiling point under 60° C	BP = 1
Boiling point over 60° C	BP = 2

Explosion stability (ES) is a measure of the stability of an agent in the event of an explosion of the carrier. It is expressed as the percentage by weight of the filler that remains effective after an explosion (a test would have to be agreed).

Ratings:

Under 10 per cent	ES = 0.1
Under 50 per cent	ES = 1
Over 50 per cent	ES = 2

The *resistance to atmospheric influences* (RA) indicates to what extent a substance is resistant to hydrolysis, the oxidizing effect of air and photochemical reactions caused by sunlight. It is expressed as the percentage by weight of a quantity of agent released which becomes ineffective within 1 minute.

Ratings:

Over 50 per cent	RA = 0.1
Up to 1 per cent	RA = 1
Under 1 per cent	RA = 2

III. CALCULATION

By combining toxicity data with quantified applicability criteria through a simple mathematical operation characteristic evaluation numbers are to be established for each individual substance.

The evaluation number N takes into account the suitability of a substance as a respiratory agent N1, as a percutaneous agent N2, and as a skin agent N3, and is obtained by addition as follows:

$$N = N1 + N2 + N3$$

	IT	PT	DT	SL	P	BP	ES	RA	N1	N2	N3	N
Chlorine	1	0	0	2	1	0.1	2	2	0.8	0	0	0.8
Mustard gas (H)	3	1	8	2	1	2	2	2	48	16	128	192
Nitrogen mustard gas (HN)	3	2	8	1	1	2	2	2	24	16	64	104
Lewisite (L)	4	2	6	1	1	2	2	2	32	16	48	96
Chloropicrin (PS)	1	0	2	2	0.1	2	2	2	1.6	0	3.2	4.8
Arsine (SA)	3	1	—	1	1	0.1	1	1	0.3	0.1	0	0.4
Hydrogen cyanide (AC)	3	1	—	1	1	1	1	2	6	2	0	8
Cyanogen chloride (CK)	2	1	—	1	0.1	1	1	1	0.2	0.1	0	0.3
Phosgene (CG)	3	0	—	2	1	1	2	2	24	0	0	24
Diphenylcyanosoarsine (DC)	4	1	—	2	0.1	2	2	2	6.4	1.6	0	8
Tabun (GA)	5	1	—	2	2	2	2	2	160	32	0	192
Sarin (GB)	7	3	—	2	2	2	2	2	224	96	0	320
Soman (GD)	7	7	—	2	2	2	2	2	224	224	0	448
VX	8	8	—	2	2	2	2	2	256	256	0	512
Q-mustard [1,2-bis-(2-chloroethylthio)ethane]	6	3	8	2	1	2	2	2	96	48	128	272
T-mustard [bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether]	5	2	8	2	1	2	2	2	80	32	128	240
Phosgene oxime	2	2	6	1	0.1	2	1	1	0.4	0.4	1.2	2
Diphosgene	3	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	48	0	0	48
Diisopropylphosphorofluoridate (DFP)	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	64	64	0	128
Iron pentacarbonyl	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	0	2
Nickel tetracarbonyl	2	0	0	2	2	1	1	1	8	0	0	8
Carbon monoxide	2	0	0	2	2	0.1	2	2	3.2	0	0	3.2
α-Chloroacetophenone (CN)	2	0	4	2	0.1	2	2	2	3.2	0	6.4	9.6
α-Bromobenzylcyanide (BBC)	3	0	2	2	0.1	2	2	2	4.8	0	3.2	8
Diphenylchloroarsine (DA)	2	0	0	2	0.1	2	2	2	3.2	0	0	3.2
Ethyldichloroarsine (ED)	3	3	6	2	0.1	2	2	2	4.8	4.8	9.6	19.2
Methyldichloroarsine (MD)	3	3	6	2	0.1	2	2	2	4.8	4.8	9.6	19.2
Phenyldichloroarsine (PD)	3	3	6	2	0.1	2	2	2	4.8	4.8	9.6	19.2
Mustard-lewisite (HL)												
HL = 63% lewisite; 73% mustard gas	4	3	8	2	1	2	2	2	64	48	128	240
Adamsite (DM)												
DM = diphenylaminochloroarsine	2	0	2	2	0.1	2	2	2	3.2	0	3.2	6.4

The suitability numbers (N1, N2, N3) are obtained through multiplying the respective toxicity numbers by the product of the secondary criteria ratings.

Thus the number N is calculated by means of the following formula:

$$N = N1 + N2 + N3$$
$$= (IT \cdot SL \cdot P \cdot BP \cdot ES \cdot RA) + (PT \cdot SL \cdot P \cdot BP \cdot ES \cdot RA) + (DT \cdot SL \cdot P \cdot BP \cdot ES \cdot RA)$$

The separate evaluation of a number of aspects provides a clear indication of the properties and the toxicity of a substance so that a characteristic military suitability profile will be obtained for each substance.

IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

To test the viability of the method described above the military suitability numbers of 30 substances [see p. 273] ranging from highly toxic commercial chemicals to agents whose data are available from scientific literature have been computed.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The approach described in this Working Paper should provide a practicable method of distinguishing between chemical warfare agents and other toxic substances.

As the table shows, the substances evaluated so far fall into two clearly distinguishable groups, one with high and one with low N values, the threshold value of the former being around 100. Substances whose N values exceed 100 might be described as particularly liable to be employed militarily. Irrespective of that, substances might be considered particularly suspicious if one of the three numbers, N1, N2 or N3, is higher than 50. Of course, the limits can be defined differently.

Thus the proposed approach would provide a sound basis both for a limited initial scheme banning only certain supertoxic agents and for a broader scheme covering a wider range of substances.

. . . . . .

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Military Expenditures, July 24, 1975 [1]

Today I would like to address some issues raised in the Secretary-

[1] CCD/PV.675, pp. 6–11.

General's 1974 report on the reduction of military budgets [2] and to table a working paper suggesting some practical steps that this Committee could take toward the goal of creating conditions under which the limitation of military expenditures might be achieved.

We are all conscious of the vast economic resources that are now devoted to maintaining and strengthening the world's military establishments. According to estimates made by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the world's military expenditures, after allowing for price changes, rose at an average rate of 2.6 per cent per year in the decade following 1963, and in 1973 amounted to approximately $275,000 million.[3] These can only be rough estimates, in view of the uncertainties in the data, but it is clear that the burden of these high levels of military expenditure is felt by virtually all countries, both developed and developing.

These levels have understandably occasioned widespread concern. Many have deplored the diversion of important resources to military programmes when there are so many pressing economic and social needs which require attention. No one can be satisfied with this situation. But merely to deplore it is not enough, and to underestimate the difficulties that must be overcome if the situation is to be changed would be self-deceiving. The world would clearly benefit if security could be achieved at less cost and resources could thus be freed for other purposes. But recognizing that such benefits might occur does not make it any less difficult to achieve agreement on limitations. Moreover, until the difficulties are resolved, it would be premature to consider such questions as the disposition of funds that might be saved through military expenditure limitations.

Military expenditures reflect each nation's perception of the effort it must make to provide for its own security and to contribute to international stability. Arms control negotiations have generally recognized this fact and have accordingly focused on the objects of military expenditures—forces, weapons, activities, and systems—rather than on the expenditures themselves. This focus has characterized, for example, the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Europe, and the multilateral negotiations in this Committee.

The United States continues to believe that, under present circumstances, agreements directly limiting military expenditures themselves are not practicable. It cannot be expected that any Government could undertake to limit or reduce its military expenditures as an arms control measure unless it was confident that doing so would not detract

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[2] U.N. Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs, *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/9770/Rev.1).

[3] Cf. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963–1973*, p. 14.

from its security. Any agreed limitations or reductions would have to provide assurance that no one country is disadvantaged and that destabilizing imbalances that could adversely affect international security are prevented. To set forth these requirements, however, is not to say that agreed limitations have no conceivable utility. Under certain conditions, agreed expenditure limitations, either as supplements to physical limitations or as independent measures, might make a valuable contribution to arms control efforts. But before their potential can be seriously evaluated, a number of basic questions must be answered. Many of these questions involve conceptual and technical problems that have not yet been resolved. In fact, until recently many of them had not even been clearly identified and their existence was not widely recognized, at least in international bodies concerned with arms control and disarmament.

This necessary first step of identifying these problems has, however, now been taken. I am referring to the report on the reduction of military budgets completed last year by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That report addresses the essential characteristics of military expenditure limitations in a disarmament context. In addition, it examines a number of alternative approaches to such limitations. The report notes that these different approaches would have "different requirements, different possible effects on security and, indeed, different consequences for the release of resources for development aid." [4] In examining these various implications, the report adds a significant new dimension to previous United Nations reports that have dealt with military expenditures and their consequences in more general terms. Moreover, the report, which was unanimously approved by experts from a wide cross-section of countries, provides a clear exposition of the problems involved in military expenditure limitations and suggests the areas in which more thorough consideration is needed if they are to become a real possibility.

The basic questions identified by the experts fall into three general areas:

First: How can one measure the military spending of different countries, with their different currencies, different fiscal and financial practices, and different kinds of armed forces, so as to permit effective comparisons among them? Second: How can limitations be formulated and applied so that no country need feel that its security interests could be endangered by an agreement? Third: How can compliance with a limitation agreement be assured and verified with sufficient confidence?

The experts' report, understandably, was not able to provide comprehensive answers to these questions. It has, nonetheless, made an

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[4] A/9770/Rev.1, par. 34.

important contribution by formulating them and pointing out the technical issues they involve. The experts agreed that:

> The various technical issues involved in an agreement to reduce military expenditures are sufficiently complex to suggest that it might be reasonable to take a step-by-step approach.[5]

Last fall the General Assembly adopted resolution 3254 (XXIX) which requested that States convey their views on the experts' report to the Secretary-General. The response of my Government commended the report, especially for its survey of conceptual and technical issues. It also noted that the report provided a sound basis for further work on the subject and suggested that such work be conducted under United Nations or CCD auspices.[6] The United States informed the Secretary-General of its willingness to engage in serious efforts to resolve the conceptual and technical problems involved in achieving agreements on military expenditure limitations that would be responsive to the security needs of the participants.

We believe that this Committee would be an appropriate body in which to undertake such efforts, particularly since all eleven of the countries that provided the experts for the Secretary-General's report are now represented here. I would suggest, specifically, that the CCD begin by focusing on the first, and most basic, of the three areas identified by the experts—that is, the question of definition and measurement of military expenditures.

The United States working paper tabled today offers our views on how the CCD could examine four major components of this question. These elements are: first, the definition of military expenditures; second, the valuation of resources in the military sector; third, the deflation of current price data; and fourth, the making of international value comparisons.[7]

A study of the definition of military expenditures is, in our view, an essential first step. As the experts said:

> A prerequisite for negotiating the reduction of military budgets in two or more countries is agreement on what is and what is not to be included in military budgets. The problem of defining the scope and content . . . is critical where a State's decision on allocations to national security and international development assistance will depend directly on the measure of comparative military budget levels.[8]

Unfortunately, there is no accepted conceptual standard of the definition and coverage of the military sectors of the economy taking account of possibilities in some areas for substituting civilian for military activities and considering the links in the chain of production leading to the military sector. Varieties of usage among nations should be examined and alternative structural classifications of military expenditures should be considered. This examination may look on the military sector

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[5] *Ibid.*, par. 56.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 784–786.
[7] *Infra.*
[8] A/9770/Rev. 1, par. 56.

as an activity consuming inputs, or kinds of resources, or as an activity providing outputs, such as types of forces, functions, or programmes.

In discussing the second basic element—the valuation of resources in the military sector—the experts noted that:

> Negotiators attempting to agree on equivalent reductions in military budgets will be concerned to ensure, as far as possible, that these cuts do represent equivalent reductions in military power. It cannot be automatically assumed that this will be so.[9]

A study of valuation would begin by assessing alternative output measurements for the military sector as well as measurements of resource costs. It would evaluate the measurement of resource costs based on the value of non-military opportunities foregone and the applicability of such valuations in an arms control context. This would include the links between military inputs and outputs and their relation to military power and national security. Reaching agreement on appropriate valuation criteria would call for an examination of theoretical and actual standards for both centrally-planned and market-oriented economies.

The inflation that has been experienced by many economies in recent years has underscored the importance of finding appropriate means to deflate military expenditures for comparative purposes. A significant problem in this connexion would involve determining ways to differentiate between expenditures reflecting qualitative improvements in military products and those simply reflecting price changes. The various methods of payment or other compensation to military personnel constitute another problem.

Finally, it would be necessary to explore means of making international value comparisons. In some ways the problems in this area—that is, price comparisons among countries—are analogous to those in the area of price-deflation, or price comparisons in one country over time. International comparisons of military expenditures appear to require purchasing power parities, or rates of transformation from one currency to another in which relative prices between countries are averaged in some manner that takes account of patterns of expenditure. The use of opportunity cost valuations might be helpful in dealing with this problem.

We believe that real progress toward a common understanding of the measurement and comparison of military expenditures could be made through careful examination of these questions. In doing this, I might add, it would not be necessary to have specific new statistical data about any country's military spending.

My delegation would welcome specific suggestions concerning procedures for organizing work along these lines. We suggest as one possibility an informal meeting with experts, perhaps early in our next session, to work toward solutions of the conceptual problems I have mentioned. An alternative approach would be to organize a study by an

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[9] *Ibid.*, par. 37.

ad hoc group of governmental experts under CCD auspices. Such a group could be charged with preparing proposals for resolving some of the problems and recommending a course of future action.

The approach of the group might be structured along the following lines. First, it would be important to search out and analyse the studies and reports published in various countries. In addition to the report of the United Nations experts, extensive work which may still be relevant was done by the League of Nations, for example. There is also a 1973 SIPRI report on the *Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditures*.[10] Secondly, experts might submit detailed technical working papers on such topics as: (a) the purpose and objectives of the study; (b) basic approaches to technical problems such as classification criteria and index number formulae; (c) the formulation of tentative models and standards; and (d) the evaluation of tentative models in the light of national conditions and policies. This last topic would take account of such factors as a nation's system of statistics and accounts, financial and pricing practices, and economic principles.

Finally, proceeding from an examination of the various technical problems, the group should make, where possible, recommendations on how we might best measure and compare the military spending of various countries. This objective should be a realistic one in this basic and relatively tractable aspect of studying military expenditure limitations. On other issues, the recommendations might point out ways by which further progress can be made. Success in this effort would form a basis for proceeding to similar efforts on the other major issues involved.

I urge our colleagues here in the Committee to give serious consideration to these suggestions. We look forward to hearing from other delegations in the weeks ahead. I expect to return to this subject at a later date.

United States Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: International Standards of Comparison for Military Expenditures, July 24, 1975 [1]

INTRODUCTION

The consideration of an international approach to military expenditures and their limitation has a long history, dating at least from the effort devoted to it by the League of Nations beginning in the late 1920's. Despite recurrent attention to this issue, however, very little progress has been made in advancing the prospects of such an approach

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[10] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Research Report No. 10*, Aug. 1973.

[1] CCD/460, July 24, 1975.

to arms control, or even, until very recently, in clarifying the problems involved.

The lack of progress can be largely attributed to the numerous unresolved technical questions involved in realizing military expenditure limitations. These questions fall into three main areas:

First: How can one measure the military spending of different countries, with their different currencies, different fiscal and financial practices, and different kinds of armed forces, so as to permit effective comparisons among them? Second: How can limitations be formulated and applied so that no country feels that its security interests could be endangered by an agreement? Third: How can compliance with a limitation agreement be assured and verified with sufficient confidence?

The unresolved questions in these areas have given rise to widespread uncertainty and doubt as to the practical possibility of negotiating and implementing limitations which would effectively promote the security of participants. The uncertainty has, in turn, discouraged many countries from taking seriously the concept of agreed military expenditure limitations in the absence of reasonable grounds for hope that a practicable arrangement might be achieved.

This situation has contributed to the continuing failure to clarify and resolve technical aspects of military expenditure limitations. A major difficulty in making progress in the first problem area, comparative measurement, has been the lack of relevant information. In all of the problem areas, there has been a lack of will to address the technical issues on the part of most countries, including some that may be inclined to favour the concept of agreed limitations. This lack of interest in the technical aspects has, in turn, been attributed to the fact that some countries were not inclined to take the concept seriously.

A promising opportunity to overcome this impasse has been provided by the recent Report on the Reduction of Military Budgets by a group of consultant experts to the Secretary General of the United Nations.[2]

In agreeing on the Report's extensive exposition of the technical issues surrounding military expenditure limitations, the experts have provided a sound basis upon which to build a structure of common understanding leading to clarification and resolution of the technical issues. The Experts' Report draws attention to the major problem areas mentioned above, namely, comparative measurement, specification of limits, and verification. The Report also examines the component issues in these areas, and offers some illustrations of the form that solutions might take.

The Experts' Report was designed to provide an overview of the major technical issues in which the list of topics and the detail of dis-

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[2] *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/9770/Rev. 1).

cussion are not intended to be exhaustive. It recognizes that detailed follow-up study of the issues is required. The report points out that "The various technical issues involved in an agreement to reduce military expenditures are sufficiently complex to suggest that it might be reasonable to make a step-by-step approach."

The CCD is well suited to carry on the work initiated by the Experts' Report. This Committee is accustomed to dealing with technical as well as political aspects of arms control issues, and its membership also includes all 11 countries which provided experts for the Secretary General's Consultant Group. Its procedures allow for participation by experts in various ways which may be appropriate to the particular issue under consideration. It would appear, therefore, that a timely opportunity is at hand through the CCD to end the impasse and to make real progress in reaching the level of common understanding on technical issues that is an essential first step to possible military expenditure limitations.

The step-by-step approach suggested by the Experts' Report offers a realistic method of overcoming the existing inertia, since it can yield a progressive build-up of mutual understanding on technical issues. As mutual understanding increases, the consequences should be an increase in the inclination of countries to regard military expenditure limitations as practicable, and in the readiness of countries to make available the information needed to produce the required confidence.

The approach recommended here is step-by-step in that the entire range of technical issues would not be addressed at once, in view of their complexity and difficulty. The first effort should be devoted to the most fundamental and probably most tractable problem area—that is, the comparative measurement of military expenditures. This approach would seek to resolve the first problem area in a systematic way designed to increase mutual confidence. When warranted by the progress made in the first area, the CCD could proceed to the subsequent problems, namely, the ways of specifying limitations and of verifying compliance.

The following sections offer more detailed observations on a systematic step-by-step approach to this first problem area by experts under the auspices of the CCD.

COMPONENTS OF THE COMPARATIVE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM

The problem of measuring and comparing the military spending of two or more countries with differing currencies, budgetary and financial practices, as well as differing kinds of armed forces, must be further broken down if it is to be dealt with effectively. The discussion in the Experts' Report provides a basis for the following breakdown into component issues:

(1) Definition of military expenditures;

(2) Valuation of resources in the military sector;
(3) Deflating current price data (or price indexing);
(4) International value comparisons (or currency conversion).

(1) *Definition of Military Expenditures*

The need for developing a standardized approach for measuring the scope and content of military expenditures is generally recognized, and the problems have been outlined in the Experts' Report.[3] In considering the question of distinguishing boundaries between the military and other sectors, attention should be paid to the desirability of developing more than one set of standards in order to serve various possible uses. This component should also include the question of standard classifications or structures of expenditures within the military sector.

(2) *Valuation of Resources in the Military Sector*

The study of valuation should consider the alternative ways in which the military sector in any country can be viewed—for example, as an output-producing activity or as a resource-consuming activity—and alternative ways of valuing these activities.

The relationships between input and output valuations should be considered. Here, too, the various purposes of international models or standards should be considered. An important concept that should be considered is that of "opportunity costs", particularly for valuing the manpower input.

(3) *Price Indexing*

The question of how to deal with differences between countries in the rates of change in prices affecting military expenditures is an essential part of the comparative measurement problem area. This question arises in measuring real expenditure trends over time in one country, and consequently is important to virtually all forms of expenditure limitation. The price indexing problem is related, of course, to the problem of valuation—what is to be priced and how? Military price indexing involves the same sort of "indexing" problems as price indexing in other sectors of the economy, but the problems of product definition and of properly taking into account new products and technological improvements in old ones are especially severe in the military sector.

(4) *International Currency Conversion*

The problem of converting from one country's set of prices to some other set is conceptually similar to the price indexing problem. However, differing possibilities exist for surrogate solutions to bridge difficulties arising from such factors as lack of data. International comparisons in a common currency are frequently made, and are

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–21 (Annex II, pars. 4–30).

probably necessary for most potential forms of limitation agreements. As the Experts' Report points out, purchasing power parities would be needed for this purpose.

APPROACH TO AN EXPERTS' STUDY BY THE CCD

In studying these questions, the experts should, in general, pursue a step-by-step approach as outlined below. This general approach could be adjusted depending on how the CCD might elect to organize the experts' study and on the requirements of each question.

(1) *Examination of Existing Research and Studies on Each Question*

In addition to the Experts' Report, other relevant and useful studies have been published in various countries. These should be searched out and made available to the CCD experts. In this regard the extensive work by the League of Nations may still be useful.[4] Another example is the SIPRI Research Report, Number 10, dated August 1973, on the *Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditures.*

(2) *Submission of National Technical Papers*

On the basis of previous research and other national resources, experts might submit detailed working papers dealing with the following topics:

(a) Purpose and objectives
  —Should the dual objectives of the measurement of military force potential and the measurement of economic effort involve the formulation of alternative definitions, classifications, valuations, etc.?
  —Should other international uses of model measurement techniques besides military expenditure limitation agreements be considered, such as publication of standard data under United Nations auspices?
(b) Basic approaches to technical problems; for example, classification criteria, index number formulas, etc.
(c) Formulation of tentative models and standards.
(d) Evaluation of tentative models in the light of national conditions and policies. This would take account of a nation's system of statistics and accounts, financial and pricing practices, economic principles, etc.
(e) Re-evaluation of subjects (a)-(c) in the light of (d).

(3) *Preparation for Further Action*

The experts' study should, where possible, make recommendations

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[4] See, among others, the works cited in para. 46 (p. 9) of the Experts' Report.

for solutions to these technical issues. This objective should be more realizable in the more tractable questions such as definition. On others, the recommendations should point out the ways by which further progress could be made.

The foregoing procedures provide a reasonable basis for the development of common understanding and agreement on the comparative measurement issue. Success in this effort would warrant proceeding to similar efforts on the other major issues involved in military expenditure limitation.

Letter from President Ford to Senator Brooke: U.S. Policy on First-Strike Capability, July 25, 1975 [1]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JULY 25, 1975

DEAR SENATOR BROOKE:

I welcome the opportunity to respond to your letter of June 26 on United States nuclear policy.[2]

The policy of this Administration has been and continues to be that we will not develop a first-strike capability or doctrine. This policy is unchanged from that of previous Administrations. We are not developing such a capability or doctrine now, and we have absolutely no plans or intentions to do so in the future.

As improved command and control and newer systems permit, we are increasing the flexibility of our forces to be more fully prepared for all possible contingencies. Because flexible options will increase the credibility of our deterrent, they will help to decrease the chance of conflict starting in the first place. However, I wish to reemphasize that this in no sense implies development of a first-strike capability.

I also want to reaffirm that our policy continues to be that the primary defense against conventional attack is the conventional capability of the United States and our allies. Although we cannot categorically rule out the tactical use of nuclear weapons in response to major nonnuclear aggression which could not be contained by convention forces,

[1] ACDA files.
[2] Not printed here.

I view such an eventuality as extremely remote.

Sincerely, .

(signed) GERALD R. FORD

The Honorable EDWARD W. BROOKE
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger [Extracts], July 25, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States initially came to the position of participating in the conference in the belief that also some parallel progress should be made in MBFR. Can you tell us now what progress is being made in MBFR?

Secretary Kissinger: No, that is not a correct description of what the U.S. position has been. The United States linked the opening of the European Security Conference to the opening of the MBFR discussion. During the course of it, it was never the position of the United States, and certainly never the position of our West European allies, that progress in both of these negotiations should be linked, and indeed on the one or two occasions that we explored the possibility of this link with our West European allies, they rejected the concept that the force reduction negotiations should be conducted in step with the European Security Conference.

So the fact that they are not linked together is primarily due to discussions within the West, and it has never been a condition that the United States made.

The question is, where do we stand on the force reduction negotiations? The United States attaches importance to the force reduction negotiations. Without question, the President will raise this in his discussion with the General Secretary.

These negotiations are now in recess. They have followed the procedures and the general atmosphere that occur in the general course of these negotiations, which is that they go through a long discussion of technical phases in which the positions of the two sides are not frequently compatible.

They are now at a point where some decisions have to be made on both sides. Some decisions have to be made on both sides modifying the positions that exist.

The positions that have been taken up to now, while they have been

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 199-201.

irreconcilable, have nevertheless enabled both sides to study the technical implications of a number of reduction proposals that have been put forward. We are now at a phase where this requires a decision—which has happened also in the SALT negotiations—to move things into a stage of more detailed negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this conference is that its purposes are so modest that it does not seem to warrant engaging the presence of the President of the United States and 34 other heads of government, to sign these papers. How do you respond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: The position that the United States took throughout the conference was that we would attend the conference at the highest level if this was the judgment of the other participants and if sufficient progress were made to justify it.

That "sufficient progress" was defined during the conference as progress in the so-called Basket 3 on human rights and progress on the military provisions of the advance notification of maneuvers and, finally, on the clause with respect to peaceful change in Basket 1 on the statement of principles. These objectives were substantially attained.

Nevertheless, the United States did not agree to the summit level until all the major West European countries had previously agreed to it, and it was our view that nuances that might separate one in one's assessment of this did not warrant breaking allied unity on the subject.

Secondly, the conference will give a very useful opportunity, of course, for the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev and also with other leaders for the President to exchange views and to make progress on outstanding issues.

So on the whole we consider the content of the conference useful, and the visit will also make a significant contribution in a number of areas.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with Brezhnev, you had talked about SALT a little bit, but can you be more specific? Has there been progress on the verification issue, and has the Soviet Union accepted American proposals on the counting of MIRV's or have they come up with a viable substitute?

And two, are you seeking Soviet forbearance for an interim agreement or for American presence, as technicians, in the Middle East? What do you want to talk about on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to SALT, I have no question that within the next weeks it will seep out of various elements in the government, uncharacteristically, but in summer our standards relax a little.

But I have promised Foreign Minister Gromyko that until the negotiations were somewhat further advanced not to go into a detailed description of the proposal.

I can only repeat what I have said before, that in some areas some significant progress has been made. In other areas, considerable differences remain. And, of course, the United States has attached impor-

tance to the verification issue, but I don't want to go into where the differences remain and where the progress has been made.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 29, 1975 [1]

Since the conclusion of the work in the CCD on the Biological Weapons Convention at the end of the 1971 session, an intense, high-priority work has been going on in our Conference with the aim to accomplish also a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. This work gained a high momentum. Before this year's session some 50 working papers have been presented on this subject. Successful meetings with experts were held in 1971, 1972 and 1974. Especially the last one left an impression of substantially increased understanding of the problems involved. Two draft conventions have been presented. One was drafted by the Soviet Union and eight other States (CCD/361, 28 March 1972),[2] virtually as a copy of the Biological Weapons Convention. The other draft convention was presented in the Japanese working paper (CCD/420, 30 April 1974).[3] A comprehensive treaty was suggested, intended to come into full effect after a number of steps. In addition to these two draft conventions, ten non-aligned countries presented a memorandum stating their firm support for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons (CCD/400, 26 April 1973).[4]

In the joint communiqué from the summit meeting in Moscow about a year ago the United States of America and the USSR announced that they were considering a "joint initiative" in the CCD with respect to the conclusion of a limited convention dealing with the "most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare".[5] This announcement was welcomed as it seemed to signify that the United States and the USSR had at last decided to find, or had even found, a way to overcome their outstanding differences on the implementation of a first step of a ban on chemical weapons. As we know, this intention was confirmed later during the summit meeting in Vladivostok last November.[6]

Thus, there was a strong feeling in the CCD last year that only a final touch now remained to give us a new draft proposal which could form the third leg of a tripod on which our further negotiations for a

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[1] CCD/PV.676, pp. 6–9.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 120–124.
[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 99–106.
[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 206–209.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 232–243.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 748.

convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons could be based. But what has happened since? A year has elapsed without any signs of a result whatsoever. Concerned questions have been put to the two delegations here in the CCD. So far we have only learnt that discussions are going on between them but not a word has been given as to what is being discussed, or how long we shall still have to wait.

The almost complete silence which this "joint initiative" has brought to CCD discussions on chemical weapons this year has certainly been detrimental to our work on this subject. We have amassed a huge amount of knowledge and insight in this difficult problem. We must see to it that this knowledge does not get dispersed and forgotten. It must continuously be renewed and kept up to date.

We must therefore not stop our deliberations while waiting for moves towards some kind of action to be made by the super-Powers. The ominous development—and after some time perhaps also the deployment—of new chemical weapons does *not* stop.

We have also to say, very clearly, that the "joint initiative" really will have to materialize at the start of next year's session at the latest, if it is not to lose its credibility. Moreover, it ought indeed to be stated that the rather limited objectives adopted by the super-Powers for the "joint initiative" by no means imply that the problems left over to discuss will be either few or small. It is high time therefore to return to the question of chemical weapons and to put forward already this year the views we feel to be most imminent. These are the results of continued efforts to analyse the problems connected with a treaty banning these horrible weapons. We shall in this way be prepared for immediate, comprehensive discussions on the matter at the start of the next session. In that connexion my delegation welcomes the contribution last week by Ambassador Schlaich of the Federal Republic of Germany presenting a working paper (CCD/458, 22 July 1975) on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents.[7] Our experts will study its implications closely, and we shall be pleased to submit our comments in due course. An early impression is that the principles discussed in the working paper might also form an important element with regard to the tasks to be performed by a verification agency.

For our part we introduce today a working paper (CCD/461) on "A model for delimitating chemical warfare agents in an international treaty".[8] This working paper relates to the already existing and, most constructive Japanese draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (CCD/420) and the discussions pursued thereafter with reference to the draft convention (e.g., by Sweden, CCD/PV.652, 15

[7] *Ante*, pp. 269-274.
[8] *Post*, pp. 293-304.

August 1974,[9] and Japan, CCD/PV.661, 25 March 1975, and also CCD/452, 8 April 1975[10]).

It might appear from the working paper that we had abandoned our persistent claim for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. I assure you that this is not so, which a careful study will show. However, since Japan in its working paper CCD/420 discussed arrangements by which we could reach a comprehensive ban through a procedure by steps, we want to show how the comprehensiveness can be kept even when proceeding in such a manner.

The means proposed in the Japanese draft for the purpose of reaching a comprehensive ban through steps were, in short:

(a) an annex to a comprehensive treaty containing one of two alternative lists of chemical agents. According to one alternative, the list would cover a vast number of mainly dual purpose chemicals to be exempted from the comprehensive ban. The other alternative implies a list of chemicals whose production would be absolutely forbidden. Either way the comprehensiveness of the treaty text would be limited and the scope given by the annex open-ended;

(b) a recognition that no production should be banned unless the ban could be effectively verified.

In principle, there is concurrence between Japan and Sweden on the ultimate comprehensive goal for a treaty. We elaborated some views on this matter in a previous statement (CCD/PV.652).[11] In particular we expressed the belief, which we still hold, that the construction of an annex with a list of agents, either to be exempted or absolutely forbidden, and which actually limits the comprehensiveness of the treaty, might lead to the unwanted notion that what is not banned is allowed. This could in its turn in the long run lead to less concern over, or even acceptance of, the fact that chemical warfare agents could be produced or retained legitimately.

As we have stated before, one way to overcome this difficulty would be to bring together both types of lists, the one of exemptions and the other of absolutely banned agents, in one annex with the explicit understanding that production and stockpiling of all agents not specifically mentioned in any of the lists would still be prohibited according to the general purpose criterion and the quantity criterion of the treaty. It is to be noted that in our view only relatively few exemptions, some of them temporary, should be necessary.

The following examples may be mentioned. Peaceful production of chemicals once recognized as chemical warfare agents, such as the World War One chemical warfare agent phosgene, will be necessary. It must also be realized that even if destruction of present stockpiles of

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 411–416.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 88–91, 100.
[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 411–416.

chemical warfare agents were to be decided upon immediately, for some countries such destruction would nevertheless take several years to accomplish. Exemptions for stockpiled agents should be asked for as long as the agents have not yet been destroyed. Some countries might claim that their security would be threatened if they were not able to retaliate with chemical weapons, and that they will not discard their chemical warfare capability until the verification effectiveness has been built up.

In analysing considerations on the delimitation of chemical agents that have been put forward since the start of the negotiations on chemical weapons in the CCD, a pattern becomes discernable, or—expressed in another way—the elements of a model are seen to emerge. Already in a working paper last year (CCD/427, 2 July 1974) the Swedish delegation made an attempt to construct such a model.[12] However, that working paper was mainly aimed at reconciling the diverging ideas of Japan and Sweden on the lists to be included in a treaty annex. It did not give particular consideration to earlier concepts. This we have tried to achieve in the working paper presented by us today, the aim of which is to show that it would be possible to construct a treaty, which although *in principle* comprehensive, nevertheless allows for a step-by-step procedure towards *effective* comprehensiveness. The model also shows dynamic properties in the content and coverage of the treaty foreseeing changes over time, still without jeopardizing the principal comprehensiveness. In this connexion I would like particularly to draw attention to the graphical presentation contained in the working paper.

The working paper underlines the fact that such technical difficulties as may arise from listing smaller or larger numbers of chemical substances have already been overcome in existing international treaties and agreements dealing with chemicals, e.g. drugs, pesticides, food additives and also actual chemical warfare agents.

The conclusions to be drawn from working paper CCD/461 would seem to be:

It should be possible to construct, on technical grounds, the scope of a comprehensive treaty banning development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in a manner meeting the political objections raised against previous attempts to this end.

The difficulties due to the fact that the chemical field is complicated and that a great number of chemicals might have to be considered when constructing the treaty can be alleviated considerably by applying to it the dynamic properties of the model described in this paper.

Likewise, the verification mechanism can be built up continuously allowing adaptive expansion to meet the demands expressed from time to time.

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[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 222-225.

We hope that the model that we have presented will stimulate further discussions. If our principal approach could gain wide acceptance, new and more constructive efforts could be devoted to the verification problems.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, July 29, 1975 [1]

I would like today to address once again the subject of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and in particular the informal meetings with experts which were held by the Committee from 14 to 18 July.

The United States delegation has carefully reviewed the material developed during these meetings with experts. This review has confirmed the impression we gained during the meetings—namely, that considerable interest was generated among many members of the Committee and a valuable exchange of information and views took place on a subject of considerable importance to arms control. I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to the delegation of Japan for its initiative in proposing these constructive meetings.

A number of countries made significant contributions to the success of these informal meetings. For its part, the United States presented a detailed working paper and made available four experts familiar with both the United States' PNE programme and the arms control implications of PNEs.

It is generally agreed, and this was confirmed by the CCD meetings on PNEs, that a fundamental problem to be faced in connexion with PNEs is that of deciding how to weigh their potential benefits against their arms control and proliferation implications. This has proved to be a difficult task because of the common characteristic of all nuclear explosive devices, the most fundamental of which is that they release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in an extremely short period of time. This characteristic is the source both of their potential utility for peaceful engineering applications and of their potential utility for military applications.

Our recent meetings on PNEs made clear the strong desire of the great majority of participants to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to move toward more comprehensive and effective forms of control over nuclear armaments. It was also clear that the PNE question must be handled in a manner consistent with progress toward these two essential goals.

The provisions of NPT were carefully formulated to further these

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[1] CCD/PV.676, pp. 15–17.

arms control objectives without, however, denying non-nuclear weapon States any potential benefits of PNEs that might be realized by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.[2] The approach taken in NPT was strongly reaffirmed by the recent Review Conference, and the United States continues to believe that the NPT régime provides the most effective and desirable approach to the PNE arms control problem. Recently, increasing attention has been given to PNEs as a major international arms control issue. This is due to a number of factors: the addition last year of a sixth State having a demonstrated nuclear explosive capability; the bilateral agreement on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty [3] and the current United States-USSR negotiations toward a PNE agreement, as provided for in the Threshold Treaty; the recent review of NPT; and assessments in many countries of the role which PNE might realistically be expected to play in their economies.

During the informal meetings, the United States experts endeavoured to respond fully to many penetrating questions relating to these complex problems. At the same time, we were not able to present detailed information on verification systems which are the subject of current United States-USSR PNE negotiations, nor to speculate on the possible outcome of those negotiations. We would, of course, expect to discuss with the CCD the content and the significance of any PNE agreement that is eventually concluded.

During the discussions of the arms control implications of PNEs, a number of speakers reaffirmed their views that procedures consistent with article V of NPT are the appropriate way for non-nuclear-weapon States to gain access to the potential benefits of PNEs. In this connexion, the important work and the central role of IAEA was often noted. It is, of course, an obvious fact that any PNEs must be conducted in accordance with existing international obligations including, in particular, the LTBT.[4]

A number of important points found general acceptance during the discussions. First of all, the United States experts made clear that they could not see how nuclear explosive devices could be developed that would not be capable of military application. It follows from this that there is no reliable way of distinguishing between a "PNE Power" and a nuclear-weapon State. There was no disagreement expressed on this essential point in our meetings.

At the same time, no disagreement was expressed with the view of the United States experts that the explosion of nuclear devices specifically designed for peaceful applications would not necessarily add significantly to the military capability of nuclear weapon testing States that already possessed a variety of sophisticated nuclear weapons. Thus, whether a PNE programme would or would not provide weapon-

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[2] For text of the NPT, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.
[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225-227.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291-293.

related benefits for a nuclear-weapon State would depend upon the extent and character of that State's existing nuclear weapons capabilities, the nature of any constraints on its weapon testing activities, and the level and nature of its PNE activity.

The general proposition was put forward that neither nuclear-weapon States nor non-nuclear-weapon States should be able to use a PNE programme to obtain nuclear weapons-related benefits not otherwise available to it. This means that any constraints on nuclear weapons tests by the nuclear-weapon States should be accompanied by appropriate constraints on PNEs, and by verification procedures adequate to assure that such constraints are being observed. None of the participants in our meetings disagreed with this general proposition.

The ultimate nuclear weapon testing constraint is, of course, an adequately verifiable CTB. During our meetings several States, including the United States, reaffirmed their commitment to this goal. If PNEs were to be accommodated under a CTB, a verification system would have to be devised capable of providing adequate assurance to all States that no weapon-related benefits were being acquired from PNE activities. Although there is general recognition of this problem, I think it is fair to say that we do not yet have a consensus on its solution. Further creative efforts to resolve the technical, legal and political issues connected with PNEs are needed in the context of further constraints on the testing of nuclear weapons. Many States, both those with and those without experience in the field of nuclear explosives, can contribute to this important task.

The United States believes that exchanges such as those that took place here this month can help to solve the difficult and important arms control problems posed by nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Swedish Working Paper Introduced in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Model for Delimitating Chemical Warfare Agents in an International Treaty, July 29, 1975 [1]

INTRODUCTION

During the negotiations on a prohibition against development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, it was realized almost from the outset that it would be a difficult task to obtain meaningful and useable delimitations between different types of chemicals.

The need for differentiation stems from the obvious facts that, relatively speaking, only a few chemicals are useful as chemical warfare agents and that the overwhelming amount of chemicals have no

[1] CCD/461, July 29, 1975.

actual or potential warfare use. It would obviously be unnecessary, or even damaging, to have too extensive a ban on chemical production. However, no self-evident principles are available for delimitation.


Many attempts have been made during the years of negotiations to solve the problem. Few attempts have been made to analyze more closely the concepts involved (see, however, CCD/414, 21 August 1973 [2]) and to relate them to each other. It goes without saying that various suggestions on delimitation have been presented, each connected with some special application. In the practical negotiation work it has turned out to be an increasingly difficult task to try to sort out and to remember to what extent and on what grounds the different approaches do or do not cover each other. A first attempt was made in the Swedish working paper CCD/427, 2 July 1974.[3]

The present working paper is an attempt at a more detailed analysis of the matter indicating some common trends in international conventions which might be useful in disarmament discussions. A model for an overall view of the problem is presented. Efforts have also been made to give the model some dynamic properties, in view of possible future alterations and of alternative outcomes of negotiations.[4]

A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL

Earlier Attempts

The presentation of the Japanese draft treaty CCD/420, 30 April 1974 with the explicit introduction of alternatives of exempted or absolutely prohibited chemical agents made it necessary to try to get a comprehensive view of all the criteria and delimitation concepts.[5] In the attempt made at this in the Swedish working paper CCD/427 a so called Venn diagram (Fig. 1) was used [6], covering the concepts of Chemical



Warfare Agents, Dual-Purpose Warfare Agents, and the Chemical Compounds for Peaceful Use. The relationship between the proposed Japanese annexes and these concepts was demonstrated. This model

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 524–529.

[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 222–227.

[4] Further discussion and references are given in J. Lundin "Description of a model for delimitating chemical warfare agents in an international treaty". FOA Reports, vol. 9, No. 4, 1975. [Footnote in original.]

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 99–106.

[6] Named after the mathematician Venn. The Venn diagram implies (in this case) that each chemical compound can be assigned to a point within a bounded surface, see figure below. [Footnote in original.]

turned out to be useful during informal discussions between experts and non-experts in chemistry.

It still seems to be widely felt that the chemical field is too complex to be covered by a treaty banning production of chemical weapons. Therefore, a wider application of the model will be made in the following, with the aim to show that this pessimism need not be justified.

Application of a Comprehensive Model

A model presented in the Swedish working paper CCD/427 did not treat all the criteria discussed earlier in the CCD nor did it indicate the dynamic aspects to be considered, i.e., a model must also describe the function and effects of a treaty over a time span. The concepts discussed in the CCD are listed in Table 1. In Fig. 1 an attempt has been made to analyze how these concepts interfere with each other and how their coverages overlap.

TABLE 1. *Concepts, criteria and conditions constituting means of delimitation of chemicals to be covered by a treaty prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.*

Purpose (of use)	Supertoxic, Toxic and
Quantity (of production)	Low-toxic (non-toxic)
Verifiable production	
Dual-purpose and Single-purpose	Exemptions from a prohibiton listed in a treaty annex
	Absolutely prohibited production of chemicals listed in a treaty annex
	Conditional and unconditional prohibition

The areas allotted to the various concepts in Fig. 1 are not intended to represent the actual relations in size between the different groups. Instead, they are meant to indicate whether many or few chemicals can be expected to be found in a group. The capital letters in the figure denote the various concepts and show, in another way, where the different areas in Fig. 1b, c, d and f represent several concepts.

The consequences of the need for verifiability presented in the Japanese draft are illustrated in Fig. 1 e and f. The letter combinations in the appropriate areas show that all the combinations from Fig. 1 d are covered.

Fig. 1 g and h illustrate what the combination of the concepts of conditional and unconditional prohibitions and annexed lists of exempted and absolutely prohibited chemical warfare agent production might look like when a treaty comes into force.

Fig. 1 h shows how possible changes, after a number of years and after continued negotiations, e.g., at future review conferences, have resulted in a treaty which is comprehensive from all practical points of view. The annexed list of exemptions has diminished, and the list of absolutely prohibited chemical warfare agent production has grown as

large as might be possible from a practical point of view. The possible direction in which this growth might have taken place is indicated by a corresponding increase of the screened field covering the various areas. It should be noted that possible future developments are marked in the model (the dots in Fig. 1 h).

The principally important feature of Fig. 1 g and h is the demonstration of a simple and easily understandable way to construct a treaty prohibiting development, production and storage of chemical weapons.

(1) *Production of temporarily exempted chemicals*, listed in an annex, is allowed when necessary for various reasons (thinly hatched area in Fig. 1 g and h).

(2) *Unconditionally prohibited* chemical warfare agent production is listed in an annex and is made dependent on the degree of verifiability (screened area in Fig. 1 g and h).

(3) Production etc. whether controllable or not, of *all* chemical warfare agents and weapons which are *not specifically mentioned* in one of the two lists of the annex, is *prohibited* according to the general purpose and quantity criteria of the treaty text, (conditional prohibition, densely hatched area in Fig. 1 g and h).

It might be possible to diminish the number of agents exempted by mentioning only those dual-purpose agents which actually have been used, or might become suitable, as chemical warfare agents and perhaps also single chemical warfare agents, explicitly needed or not yet destroyed e.g., for deterrence by retaining a limited capacity for retaliation in case effective verification measures are still being built up. It might also be necessary to make exemptions for agents which were not yet destroyed.

It should be observed that all agents, also those listed as exemptions, might still be subject to verification measures, in order to make comprehensive verification of, i.e., organophosphorus compounds.

A particular merit of such a list of exemptions would be that the number of agents would eventually decrease, subject to subsequent agreements to the effect that an increasing number of exceptions either be transferred to a list of absolutely prohibited agents, or become prohibited merely according to a general purpose criterion (see Fig. 1 h).

These advantages were discussed by Sweden in the CCD (CCD/PV. 652 15 August 1974).[7] The simplicity of the model may by some seem to be jeopardized by the risk that extensive and unmanageable lists of substances will result. Before discussing this aspect it might be illuminating to look at some other international agreements regarding chemicals, with consideration to their relation to the model discussed here.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 411–416.



Figure 1
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
α
β
γ

Fig. 1. Representation of a model for delimitation of chemical warfare agents (CWA) in a comprehensive chemical disarmament treaty. The treaty is assumed to prohibit development, production and storing of chemical weapons, the provisions covering all CWA.

(a) Chemical substances are represented by two areas covering *chemical warfare agents*, denoted A and *chemicals for other uses*, denoted B. To indicate the vastness of the latter area the boundary is not closed.

(b) When applying the *purpose criterion* to the chemicals covered by the two areas A and B, respectively, it appears that some chemicals have purpose only as chemical warfare agents. They are *single-purpose* agents and still belong to area A. Others have also other purposes than as chemical warfare agents. They are thus *dual-purpose* and belong also to area B, i.e., part of A and part of B together cover the same chemicals, and the corresponding area can be denoted AB. In this area the *quantity criterion* applies. All other chemicals without any use for chemical warfare are covered by the remaining part of area B.

(c) If a *toxicity criterion* (C) is used to differentiate between more or less toxic chemical warfare agents one might get one sub-group of *supertoxic* chemical warfare agents (AC) and one group of less *toxic* agents (AD), separated by the agreed toxicity limit.

(d) The figure shows the result when the three previously discussed criteria are applied jointly.

(e)–(f) The *verifiability criterion* implies that only the production of those chemical warfare agents the (non-)production of which can be verified (e), shall be absolutely prohibited. Application of this criterion, gives the result shown in (f). It should be noted that parts of all the previously discussed areas can be covered by the verifiability criterion. This means that if the production of a particular group of chemicals (e.g., the organophosphorus compounds, to which the nerve gases belong) can be verified. This is illustrated in the model by showing all types of chemical compounds of such a group being covered by the verifiability criterion, even those belonging only to area B.

(g)–(h) Areas covered by proposed *lists* (in an annex to the treaty) of ( ) *exemptions* of substances from production prohibition, and ( ) of substances *absolutely* (or *unconditionally*) prohibited to produce are marked by thinly hatched and screened areas, respectively. Densely hatched areas ( ) cover chemicals which are not mentioned in the envisaged lists, but which are still prohibited to produce according to the purpose and quantity criteria (*conditional prohibition*).

(g) The situation when a treaty enters into force. A large list of exemptions can be conceived of. The list of absolutely forbidden agents will probably be relatively small.

(h) Shows how the content—but not the comprehensive scope—of the treaty may have changed over x years of continuing negotiations or review conferences, and with respect to new technical developments. The result is a small list of, militarily probably insignificant, exemptions and an extended list of substances the production of which is

absolutely prohibited. The increase in the content of the latter list may be the result of improved verification methods or other means which may facilitate their transfer to the list of absolutely prohibited agents. The model also indicates that the new CWA can be discovered or developed (*dots in densely hatched area*) and may instigate further negotiations.

Application of the Model to Other Conventions

Several times during this century, regulations of the use, production and handling of chemicals detrimental to human beings or to the environment have been agreed upon internationally. An analysis of the construction of these regulations shows that nearly all delimitation criteria dealt with in this working paper have been used in one or another of these earlier treaties. Table 2 sums up the content of some treaties in this field.

It should be observed that the list comprises treaties on the abuse of chemicals in peacetime as well as on the use of chemical weapons in war. Among both types of agreement provisions occur for international verification measures and for international organizations to apply such measures, by making suggestions to member-states of the treaties. The number of substances actually covered by a treaty is substantially different for different treaties, varying from the general descriptions in the Geneva protocol [8] and the Biological Weapons Convention,[9] via the few chemicals mentioned in the Brussels Treaty (1954),[10] to the several hundred agents covered in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) [11] and the Codex Alimentarius (1969).

At present there is a strong trend towards monitoring both national and international agreements relating to the environment.

The United Nations Environmental Program is investigating the possibilities for building up an extensive International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) and an International Reference Service (IRS) on environmental information. OECD has completed a project concerning Unintended Occurrence of Pesticides in the Environment discussing also international co-operation regarding toxicological information.

On the efforts on the national level, only those in Japan and Sweden will be mentioned here. Japan has instituted the Law Concerning Examination of Chemical Substances and Control of their Manufacture, effective 16 April 1974 and the consequence here of the compilation of a List of Names of Existing Chemical Substances to be used in Japan as a basis for further toxicological investigations especially about long

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[8] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[9] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[10] *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 981–982.
[11] 18 UST 1407; 520 UNTS 204.

time effects of some of these substances. The list of 1974 comprised some 20,000 substances.

In Sweden a data-based information system on properties of chemicals to be allowed in production and in the environment is being set up. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency will then license the production and use only of such chemicals as are not detrimental to Man and Nature. Special laboratories will be charged with analyzing products as a basis for the licensing. The system is expected to cover several thousands of chemicals. Many other countries are actively working along similar lines.

Altogether it is thus obvious that the trend today of watching the production and use of all kinds of chemicals is deliberate and purposeful. Consciousness about chemical weapons is, however, necessary, also among those who only work on the problem with peaceful activities.

Discussion of the Implications of the Model

The analysis presented in this paper of existing attempts to construct the scope of a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has aimed at showing that no principal technical difficulties need arise in the fulfilment of this task.

As a means for this analysis a model has been constructed which shows how different suggestions discussed so far in the CCD are interrelated and can be looked upon as parts of a common concept.

One special feature of the model presented is that it allows for a dynamic view on a production ban. It does so by showing that changes in the coverage of the treaty can be foreseen:

(a) the number of dual purpose agents and perhaps even warfare agents that may initially have to be exempted from the ban will diminish with time;
(b) the number of chemical warfare agents the production of which shall be unconditionally prohibited will rise along with improving conditions for verification.

The dynamic approach also ensures the possibility that the treaty can be built up gradually without loss to the over-all aim of reaching a comprehensive ban.

Comparisons with other international treaties regulating the use and control of chemicals show that they apply, to varying degrees, the same criteria as those discussed in the model. It can also be observed that some of these treaties manage to cover a large number of chemicals.

The model indicates that, in principle, both international and national measures have to be taken in order to ensure a meaningful treaty. Such measures obviously concern verification and forms for continuous evaluation of changing conditions, etc. Although no political steps are identified by the model, the comparison with other international treaties shows that the necessary steps have been taken before, with respect to chemicals in general as well as to chemical warfare agents.

TABLE 2. *Types of criteria used in some international treaties covering use and production of chemicals.*

Treaty (see also list of references)	Year	Purpose	Quantity	Applied criteria (see also text)		
				Types of property or description	Graded or amendable prohibition (measures)	Verification needs
Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of CWA	1925	Yes	—	Asphyxiating, poisonous, physical properties	—	No
Brussels Treaty of the WEU prohibiting production of BWA and CWA	1954	Yes	Yes	BWA: harmful insects, other living or dead organisms, toxic products		
				CWA: asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth regulating, antilubricating, catalyzing	Yes	Verifies nonproduction
				B & CWA: lists of substances and key products, general formulas for chemicals		
Biological Convention of prohibiting production of BWA and toxin weapons	1972	Yes	Yes	Microbiological, other biological means, toxins	Yes	—
Codex Alimentarius Commission for the FAO/WHO Food Standards Program (Voluntary membership)	1962	Yes (handling)	—	Extensive description of properties and measures for handling food additives of listed substances	Yes	No verification, national acceptance of recommended standards
Single convention on narcotic drugs	1961	Yes	Yes	Schedules of drugs grouped according to degree of dangerousness and actual use	Yes	Yes

(*Continued on next page*)

TABLE 2. *Types of criteria used in some international treaties covering use and production of chemicals.*—Continued

Treaty (see also list of references)	Year	Purpose	Quantity	Applied criteria (see also text)			Verification needs
				Types of property or description	Graded or amendable prohibition (measures)		
Convention on psychotropic substances	1971	Yes	Yes	Schedules of drugs grouped according to degree of dangerousness and actual use	Yes		Yes
Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of marine pollution by substances other than oil	1973	Yes (handling)	—	Lists of substances for different uses and of different properties, in appendix	Yes		Yes
Draft treaty of Japan in CCD prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons (CCD 420, 1974)	1974	Yes	Yes	Alternative lists of exempted or absolutely prohibited substances, respectively, in appendix	Yes		Yes

CONCLUSIONS

It should be possible to construct, on technical grounds, the scope of a comprehensive treaty banning development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in a manner meeting the political objections raised against previous attempts to this end.

The difficulties due to the fact that the chemical field is complicated and that a great number of chemicals might have to be considered when constructing the treaty can be alleviated considerably by applying to it the dynamic properties of the model described in this paper.

Likewise, the verification mechanism can be built up continuously allowing adaptative expansion to meet the demands expressed from time to time.

Address by President Ford to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [Extracts], August 1, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

We have sought a structure of European relations, tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements.

We see the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom.[2]

The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the states of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the continent.

The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing, long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.[3]

I profoundly hope that this Conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 810–811, 813–814.
[2] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 27, 1971, pp. 318 ff.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–205.

Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Negotiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped. The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy. General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next 10 years.[4] We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

. . . . . .

Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, August 1, 1975 [1]

THE PARTICIPATING STATES,

Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act;

Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation

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[4] *Ibid.*, *1974*, pp. 746–747.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 327–329.

where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognizing that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

Recognizing that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

Have adopted the following:

I

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State, the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF OTHER MILITARY MANOEUVRES

The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

* * *

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

II

QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

III

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

—The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

—The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in

the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

—Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;

—The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered.

Press Question-and-Answer Session With President Ford Aboard Air Force One [Extracts], August 2, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

REPORTER. Mr. President, can you tell us where you made progress on SALT, and do you think that we will have a SALT agreement by the end of the year?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think I should get into the details of where we made progress, but the two sessions with Mr. Brezhnev and myself resulted in progress. We have referred to the technicians in Geneva our areas of agreement, and they are going to work out the details.

I am encouraged—it was constructive and friendly—and our plans are no different today for any subsequent meetings than they were before.

Q. Mr. President, progress is a bit of a vague term. Can you characterize it as significant progress, minor progress, and specifically do you still hope for an agreement to be signed by the end of this year?

THE PRESIDENT. I would say the progress was encouraging, and that is also a word that could be qualified, but it was encouraging.

It is very difficult, these negotiations, where it requires mutual give-and-take, so if we want the end result, which is peace, a reduction of the arms burden, it requires some understanding on the part of the Soviet Union and its people, myself and our people. So, when I say encouraging, I think we are edging toward that mutual objective.

Q. By the end of the year?

THE PRESIDENT. Hopefully.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 815–816.

Q. Sir, you say you are sending the technicians to Geneva to complete the areas of agreement. What about the areas in which you have not yet reached agreement? What do you do with them?

THE PRESIDENT. It is anticipated that Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko will have at least two meetings where the areas of disagreement can be more clearly refined so that Mr. Brezhnev and myself, when we sit down at a final meeting, in case there has to be a resolution of the hard and final decisions, they will be clearcut and understandable.

Q. We have been told in the past of three basic areas of disagreement. One was verification, one was cruise missiles, and one was the Backfire bomber. Can you give us a rundown on where now you're making progress and where you still don't have disagreement?

THE PRESIDENT. Those are very important areas, but I think it would be unwise for me to try to identify the particular areas of dispute in those instances. They are very precarious and are crucial points, and this is where Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger will try to more fully identify the differing positions and give us an opportunity, Mr. Brezhnev and myself, to achieve some kind of an honorable settlement.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned the give-and-take of negotiations. At Helsinki, did the Russians demonstrate a willingness to give as much as to take?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think they, by past performance and the discussions of several days ago, as well as today, indicated a forthcoming attitude. They, of course, have the same problem I have. They have to convince their people, as I have to convince the American people, that there is an area which is secure for all of us. So, I would indicate that their attitude was forthcoming within their limits and responsibilities.

U.S. DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY

Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that if the bases in Turkey remain closed down that you could still police the SALT I agreement? Are you talking about a new agreement, one that is going to make it much more difficult to police?

THE PRESIDENT. The closing of the bases in Turkey by the Congressional action makes it more difficult for us to adequately gather the necessary intelligence, which involves our security. There are, to some extent, alternative bases, but they would cost a great deal of money and they would involve some other negotiations between other parties.

I just don't think the Congress understands the problem. They want to close the bases, they want it to cost more money, they want to handicap our capability, and it makes no sense at all.

Q. Well, are you going to propose building some new bases? Is that what they have to do, give these bases?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I am going to continue my determined fight to remove the arms embargo, solve the Cyprus question, get our intelligence bases in Turkey reopened in full operation so that our security in the future is as good as it was in the past.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

Q. Mr. President, do you find the Russians are prepared to talk now about negotiating reductions of arms in Europe, conventional arms, as well as nuclear; in other words, the negotiations known as Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction?

THE PRESIDENT. I have read and listened to Mr. Brezhnev's speech. I was impressed with speeches that were made by many others during the CSCE meetings. I am convinced that we can, now that the European Security Conference is over, that we can make more meaningful progress in MBFR.

Q. Did you discuss that in your conversations with him the second time?

THE PRESIDENT. We discussed it in a very limited way because we concentrated on our SALT negotiations.

SALT

Q. Mr. President, you said earlier that you have to convince your people, as the Russians have to convince their people, of the wisdom of the SALT talks. Do you think that the American people need much convincing about SALT?

THE PRESIDENT. I am convinced the American people want their President, their Government, to make responsible and safe agreements. On the other hand, I do not believe the American people want their President to give more than he gets.

So, that is the basic problem in our negotiating process. I can assure you that we will not give more than we get, but I still feel that in the process of negotiations, compromise, we can end up with what is good for both peoples.

Q. Do the Soviets raise specific objections to some of the criticisms by Senator Jackson of the SALT agreements and the SALT negotiations when you are having these talks with them?

THE PRESIDENT. We never discuss personalities. We discuss the issues. We discuss the facts. We discuss our security, the objective of

peace, and obviously they discuss their security. We don't get into personalities on the American scene or otherwise.

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Television Interview With President Ford [Extract], August 7, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

I believe that SALT I was an outgrowth of détente. Does anybody want to tear up SALT I? I don't think so. Anything that puts a lid or a limitation on the development of nuclear weapons, the expansion of nuclear weapons—any agreement that puts a lid or controls that is good. So, détente helped achieve SALT I.

Détente may help—I hope it will—SALT II, where we will put an actual cap on nuclear weapons and other nuclear weapons systems.

MR. AGRONSKY. One of the happiest dividends that détente could possibly produce would be a reduction of forces by the Soviet Union as well as the Western allies in Western Europe.

THE PRESIDENT. I agree.

MR. AGRONSKY. Was that raised at Helsinki? Did you get anywhere at all with that with Brezhnev?

THE PRESIDENT. As you know, historically, when CSCE was originally agreed to as a program, it was also agreed to that there would be negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe—MBFR. Those negotiations have been going on now for about 2 years. They are presently stalled but now that we have the Helsinki agreement, it is my judgment that we have opened up encouraging prospects for additional movement in the MBFR negotiations.

I think the Allies and the West are getting together for perhaps a new position. I believe that the Soviet Union and its allies are taking a look at the current stalemated negotiations and may come up with some agreement.

The prospects for a mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe have been enhanced by the Helsinki agreement—no question about that whatsoever.

MR. DUKE. Well, Mr. President, to go back to SALT I for a moment, you said at a recent news conference that according to your investigation the Russians had not cheated on the agreement limiting the use of certain strategic weapons. Your old friend, Melvin Laird, had written

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 11, 1975, p. 844.

an article suggesting they had cheated. Since then, you have talked to Mr. Laird. Have you changed your mind about what you said earlier?

THE PRESIDENT. I naturally investigated the allegations that were made by a number of people, including Mel. And after a thorough investigation, I have come to the conclusion that a person might legitimately make the charge there had been violations, but on complete and total investigation I think any person who knew the facts as I know them would agree that there had been no violations of any consequence.

There are some ambiguities—I want to be frank about it—but all of the responsible, knowledgeable people in the Pentagon or in any of the other responsible agencies would agree with me there have been no serious violations, and any that have been called to their attention have been stopped.

MR. DUKE. But you are suggesting there have been some infractions, then?

THE PRESIDENT. Very minor, but we have what we call a consultative group where if we think they are violating something, we make that point. It is investigated, and, in the cases where there was any instance that might be an honest charge of a violation, they have been stopped.

The Soviet Union has raised some questions about certain activities that we have undertaken, and we have investigated them. And I think that arrangement of the consultative group has been very effective in making sure that SALT I was lived up to.

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Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, August 12, 1975 [1]

During the past week we have conducted a series of informal meetings with experts in the field of environmental modification in order better to acquaint ourselves with the problems involved in developing limitations on the use of environmental modification techniques for military and other hostile purposes. As I said during my introductory remarks at these meetings, my delegation regarded their purpose as primarily educational and, in my view, that objective was in great measure achieved. I should like to express my thanks to the delegation of Sweden for its initiative in proposing this most interesting and useful series of meetings. I should also like to express my thanks to all those delegations and experts who participated.

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[1] CCD/PV.680, pp. 21-24.

We have carefully reviewed the presentations made by participants in the informal meetings, as well as the responses to the questions put to several experts.

I would like to summarize briefly what my delegation believes we have learned about the possible means of modification of the environment for peaceful as well as hostile purposes. These means relate to four main subdivisions of the environment; the atmosphere, the oceans, the solid earth and the upper atmosphere.

Atmospheric behaviour over the short term can already be modified to some degree on a local scale. The successful dispersal of cold fogs is now carried out operationally. Other techniques, some of which are carried out on an operational basis, are on less certain scientific footing; however, while their possibilities are still very limited, they do have potentially important economic benefits. For example, the modification of precipitation (i.e., rain and snow) to enhance water supplies or to reduce damage by droughts or floods obviously could have major importance throughout the world. Despite intensive study, prospects to date are still uncertain. Individual clouds can undoubtedly be altered by seeding. Precipitation can indeed be modified locally up to perhaps 30 per cent under certain limited conditions. Research efforts continue, but too little is yet known about the detailed processes involved to permit us to draw any definite conclusions about the efficacy of this technique, particularly as it might be applied on a large scale. At present, attempts to increase precipitation have sometimes actually resulted in a decrease, and on other occasions have had no clearly identifiable effect at all.

Mitigation of severe storms such as hurricanes, and suppression of hail are the subject of study around the world. Results to date are encouraging, but still largely indeterminate, since too little controlled experimentation has been carried out to provide definitive evidence of positive results.

Climate modification amounts to producing very long-term changes in weather patterns. Many hypothetical techniques have been advanced that might influence regional climate. However, no reliable, predictable techniques for climate modification are yet known. It should be recognized that self-correcting forces in the earth's atmosphere tend to smooth out any short-term, local perturbations, however violent.

Ocean modification might involve changing major currents, or perhaps producing tidal waves. Man does not yet know how to predict with confidence the results of any scheme to divert ocean currents. With the large and poorly understood forces involved, however, the effects of any attempt might well be catastrophic and irreversible.

Modifying the solid earth by, for example, deliberately producing earthquakes is not yet possible on a significant scale. An underground nuclear explosion cannot trigger an earthquake which releases more energy than the explosion itself unless such an earthquake is already

imminent in the vicinity of the explosion. Lubrication of faults by pumping in fluid under high pressure can apparently trigger small local quakes, but a weapons use of such a scheme seems almost inconceivable. Elaborate equipment and hundreds of millions of gallons of fluid would be required, and it would not be possible to cause an earthquake in an area remote from the injection site.

Modification of the upper atmosphere might be possible by, for example, modifying the ozone layer to affect transmission of ultraviolet radiation. Again, however, there would appear to be mitigating, self-correcting effects, for example due to horizontal diffusion. Moreover, the basic scientific facts with regard to the upper atmosphere are insufficiently understood, so that the effects of attempts to modify it would necessarily be highly unpredictable.

It is evident that most of the techniques for modification of the environment that were described or hypothesized by the experts last week lie in the future. Nevertheless, we now understand enough about the potentially disastrous consequences that could follow from the use of techniques to modify the environment for hostile purposes to permit us to say that the present time is the proper time for us to give full attention to the arms control implications of this danger. As several of the participants pointed out during the course of the discussion, it is far easier and more sensible to work out measures for the control of new methods of warfare before those methods have been firmly established, rather than after considerable time, energy, and funds have been invested in their development and in the search for countermeasures. My delegation fully supports this point of view.

In carrying out this effort, it is important that we attempt to draw from our informal sessions a common understanding of precisely how we are to define the concepts of, first, environmental modification and, second, the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. It is also important to attempt to derive a common understanding of what these concepts do not imply, that is, to delimit as well as possible the subject matter at hand with a view to proceeding in the work that lies ahead for our Committee.

My delegation considers, and I think this view is shared by other delegations, that environmental modification refers, in the arms control context, to the deliberate manipulation of the natural processes of the environment. We take the term "environment" in the universal sense, i.e., what is encompassed by the planet Earth, its surface and subsurface, its waters, its atmosphere, and its living things, and outer space.

The use of techniques for modifying the environment for military or other hostile purposes then becomes the deliberate manipulation of these natural processes for the purpose of causing damage, destruction, or injury to another State. I might add that on the basis of our discussions last week, it seems clear that such use could have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects harmful to human welfare, and that

there accordingly is a need to impose effective limitations upon them.

It has become apparent in our discussions that there are types of weapons and military activities other than environmental modification techniques which can also cause environmental damage—bombs leave craters, the movement of men and equipment leaves traces on the earth's surface, and vehicles emit exhausts which can contribute to the pollution of their surroundings. It is clear, however, that these effects are not what we should call hostile uses of environmental modification techniques. Much as we would like to see the scourge of war eliminated completely, limitations on the use of environmental modification techniques for military and other hostile purposes should not be extended to cover these cases of incidental environmental damage.

Another aspect of the question of delimiting the scope of possible prohibitions which was raised during the course of the informal meetings concerned civilian modification activities carried out for peaceful purposes, but which nevertheless have an adverse impact on another State. The problem undoubtedly arises of where to draw the line in the regulation of such activities. I believe that, once we have worked out effective limitations on the military uses of environmental modification techniques, an appropriate régime to govern peaceful activities not already covered by existing international law could, if necessary, be examined in an appropriate forum. I see no reason to believe that such a régime would not interface in a satisfactory manner with the limitations on hostile use which we are able to achieve in the CCD.

The nature and scope of current efforts in research on and development of environmental modification techniques, and of current operational activities in this area, were clarified during our informal meetings. I was impressed with the much larger efforts that are continuing in the basic environmental sciences which are a prerequisite to any type of modification capability. One of the important aspects of current research and development activity in this field is the inability to distinguish between activities intended for peaceful and for hostile purposes. Therefore it seems to us that, with respect to research and development activities, we must take care that we do not inhibit those activities which are necessary and proper for the eventual development of techniques to modify the environment on a significant scale for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion, my delegation believes there are several goals in the field of environmental modification that should be pursued: first, to prevent the emergence of the dangers inherent in the exploitation for military ends of environmental modification activities; second, to preserve for mankind as a whole the natural environment; third, to preserve and to promote international co-operation in understanding how the environment works and how its components interact, and fourth, eventually to facilitate the possibility of modification of the environment on a significant scale for peaceful purposes should such modification prove feasible and valuable.

I believe our informal meetings with experts have served these goals well.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, August 14, 1975 [1]

In accordance with the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has, in collaboration with experts, examined the question of prohibiting action to influence the environment and climate for military or other hostile purposes. This new issue affects a sphere of human activity which has not hitherto been the subject of intergovernmental discussions on disarmament. The views of the Soviet side on this matter were presented by the Soviet delegation at the informal meetings, attended by experts, held by the Committee on 4 and 7 August this year. On this present occasion we should like to make a number of general observations on the matter.

The reason for considering this problem is that steps have recently been taken for the purpose of actively influencing weather conditions and climate. A number of measures in this direction are already highly developed, such as artificial rain-making, prevention of hailstorms, fog-dispersal, anti-hurricane measures, and many other measures in the same field. Progress made in influencing geophysical and meteorological processes for peaceful purposes is providing extensive opportunities for influencing the environment in the interests of human wellbeing.

At the same time, it must be stated that action to influence the environment and climate can also be taken for military or other hostile purposes. As the experts pointed out, such techniques include modification of the hydrological and thermal balance of a particular part of the earth. It was observed, for example, that rain-making can be used for hostile purposes—infliction of damage on an opponent by inducing flooding and destroying roads and dams, etc. Possibilities exist of using other, more dangerous, techniques for influencing the environment and climate, such as destruction of part of the ozone layer which protects the planet from ultraviolet solar radiation, and the melting of glaciers and of Arctic and Antarctic ice-caps, etc. The experts have told us that long-term techniques for influencing the environment are being rapidly developed. Many experts currently regard these techniques as belonging only to the realm of theory and as unlikely to be used by man at present, but there is no doubt that such techniques might eventually become feasible, and be added to the armaments of States.

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[1] CCD/PV.681, pp. 30–32.

Thus, it may be said that some of the methods of influencing the environment and climate for military or other hostile purposes which have been referred to here by the delegates and experts are already capable of practical application, while others have some prospect of being used in the future.

Many delegates and experts have emphasized with very good reason that environmental modification for military purposes could have a negative or catastrophic impact on human life on the earth as a whole. It was observed that the use of such modification techniques could entail long-lasting consequences which would have a highly pernicious effect on the state of the environment and on man's living conditions for decades. All this makes it essential to prohibit any kind of modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes.

Since means of influencing the environment for purposes inimical to man are not widely developed at present, their prohibition should be relatively more achievable and less complicated now. When, however, such methods of influencing the environment become widespread and are used for arming States, their prohibition will be far more difficult and possibly even unrealizable.

The prohibition of means of influencing the environment for military purposes must be attained by the conclusion of an international agreement. The conclusion of such an agreement would contribute to a solution of the task of preventing the appearance of highly dangerous and destructive methods of warfare, and at the same time help to solve the problem of conserving the environment.

A solution to the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes must not, of course, create obstacles and difficulties when it comes to influencing the environment for peaceful purposes, nor must it hamper research and practical work on changing natural conditions for the benefit of mankind.

The question of environmental modification for peaceful purposes is relatively recent, and many approaches and methods are only at the research and experimental stage. The same applies to the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes. The fact that many aspects of the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes have not been thoroughly investigated is bound to give rise to difficulties in dealing with the issue as a whole. But these difficulties must be overcome, so that a barrier may be constructed here and now against geophysical and meteorological warfare—something which is in the interests of all countries of the world.

The consideration of this problem at informal meetings of the Committee, with the participation of the experts, has been most useful. It has given a clearer idea of the nature, possibilities, and serious negative effects of techniques for influencing the environment and climate for military purposes. It has shown that there are great possibilities of developing highly destructive and extremely dangerous means of

warfare by influencing the environment and climate, both in the short term and in the long term. It has given members of the Committee on Disarmament the possibility of approaching with greater knowledge of the problem and its technicalities the task of working out an international agreement to prohibit geophysical and meteorological methods of warfare.

Letter From the Fijian Representative (Sikivou) and the New Zealand Representative (Templeton) to Secretary-General Waldheim: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the South Pacific, August 15, 1975 [1]

On behalf of the Governments of Fiji and New Zealand and in accordance with rule 14 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, we have the honour to request the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific".

In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure, an explanatory memorandum and a draft resolution are attached.

(Signed) S. K. SIKIVOU

Permanent Representative of Fiji to the United Nations

(Signed) M. J. C. TEMPLETON

Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Explanatory Memorandum

1. Fiji and New Zealand, along with other countries of the South Pacific, have consistently supported proposals designed to achieve agreement on a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, to ensure that any peaceful nuclear explosions were conducted under international control and, generally, to put an end to the nuclear arms race.

2. Progress in giving effect to these proposals on a global scale has, however, been meagre and disappointing. In consequence, these countries have come to attach increased importance to a regional approach to the problem of reducing the dangers associated with the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. They are appreciative

[1] A/10192, Aug. 15, 1975.

of the fact that, under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, Antarctica may be used for peaceful purposes only and that all nuclear explosions are prohibited there. They have noted the considerable progress made, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, towards the denuclearization of Latin America[2]; and they have noted also the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in support of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world. In addition, they have welcomed the emphasis placed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report of 11 August 1975 (A/10001/Add.1) on the increasing importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of enhancing regional security.[3]

3. Fiji, New Zealand and other countries of the South Pacific believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific would contribute to the security and welfare of the peoples living in that area and minimize the risks to health and environment in the region. They are confirmed in this opinion by the Declaration adopted by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I) that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and could contribute significantly to the security of those States.[4]

4. The Declaration of the Review Conference stressed the importance of the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this connexion, Fiji, New Zealand and other countries of the South Pacific have taken appreciative note of statements by nuclear-weapon States in the General Assembly, expressing support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

5. It has therefore seemed timely to these countries to seek the endorsement of the General Assembly this year for the concept of a South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Heads of Government of the independent and self-governing States members of the South Pacific Forum on 3 July 1975 called for renewed efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament. In particular, the Forum emphasized the importance of keeping the region free from the risk of nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim.

6. The Governments of Fiji and New Zealand, which are members of the South Pacific Forum, accordingly request the inclusion of an item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[3] *General Assembly, Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1A* (A/10001/Add.1), pp. 4–5.

[4] *Ante*, p. 155.

in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly. In conformity with rule 20 of the rules of procedure, they submit this explanatory memorandum and the attached draft resolution.

ANNEX II

Draft Resolution

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the urgent need for agreement on measures to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continuance of the nuclear arms race are among the greatest threats to world peace and the survival of mankind,

Noting that article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [5] acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude a treaty to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Noting further the declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and could contribute significantly to the security of those States,

Endorsing also the declaration of the Review Conference that the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone,[6]

Recalling, in particular, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964,[7] and the notable progress achieved by the Latin American States towards the denuclearization of their region,

Noting, in addition, that the Heads of Government of the independent or self-governing States members of the South Pacific Forum emphasized in their communiqué of 3 July 1975 the importance of keeping the South Pacific region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim,

1. *Endorses* the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific;

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[6] *Ante*, p. 155.
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 294–295.

2. *Invites* the countries concerned to carry forward consultations about ways and means of realizing this objective;

3. *Expresses the hope* that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will co-operate fully in achieving the objectives of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the States of the region in giving effect to the purpose of the present resolution.

Special Report by the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Study of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones [Extracts], August 18, 1975 [1]

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. *Mandate as established by the General Assembly*

1. The General Assembly, at its 2309th plenary meeting, on 9 December 1974, adopted resolution 3261 F (XXIX) under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", which read as follows:

[For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.]

B. *Organization and composition of the ad hoc group*

2. In pursuance of this resolution, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at its 661st meeting, on 25 March 1975, reached a consensus by which it:

(a) Decided to invite the Governments of the following States to designate experts: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zaire[2];

(b) Requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX):

(i) To inform the Governments of those of the above-mentioned States not members of the Conference of the Committee on

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[1] CCD/467, Aug. 18, 1975; A/10027/Add. 1, pp. 7, 8–9, 29–55.

[2] The list of participants appears in appendix I, which is not printed here.

Disarmament that they were invited to make available their experts to participate in the work of the group;

(ii) To inform the States Members of the United Nations which would not have their experts in the group that, upon prior notification, they would have the rights of access to the meetings, of addressing the group and of submitting to it written material;

(c) Requested the group of experts to begin the implementation, in Geneva, of the task entrusted to it at an early date and, if possible, not later than 7 April 1975;

(d) Decided that the group should elect its own Chairman and that whenever the group was unable to reach consensus on substantive matters, each of the experts would be entitled to incorporate in the study his own opinion;

(e) Requested the group to submit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects not later than 7 August 1975.

3. Governmental experts from the following countries participated in the discussions as observers: Canada, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

C. *Programme and method of work*

4. The *Ad Hoc* Group held six meetings at Geneva from 7 to 10 April 1975 during which the experts elected Mr. Keijo Korhonen of Finland Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group and agreed on a general outline of the study. At its second session, the *Ad Hoc* Group held 25 formal meetings and 34 informal meetings from 23 June to 18 August 1975. In the course of this session, experts, as well as observers, stated their positions in statements and in working papers. Background material was presented by the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).[3] A consultant to IAEA participated in some of the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Group. The discussion in the course of formal and informal meetings served as the basis for the preparation of draft chapters. The *Ad Hoc* Group adopted its final study at its 25th meeting on 18 August 1975.

[3] The list of documents submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Group appears in appendix II, which is not printed here.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES

A. *Objectives*

82. The dominant factor in the development of interest in the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been the desire to secure the complete absence of nuclear weapons from various areas of the globe, where suitable conditions exist for the creation of such zones, to spare the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war, to make a positive contribution towards general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and thereby to strengthen international peace and security. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has stemmed from the realization that a number of States in various regions of the world have or could have the capacity to develop a nuclear-weapon capability within a relatively short period, and that it is possible that more States may decide to do so. Should this occur it could present new threats to the security of States in areas at present free from nuclear weapons; could precipitate a ruinously expensive and perilous nuclear arms race in those areas; and could add new dangers of nuclear war to an already dangerous world situation. There has, furthermore, been the development of feeling that the efforts to date for the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation have not proved to be fully successful. The rapid increase of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and its potentiality as a material basis for the proliferation of nuclear weapons adds a powerful additional factor in the movement towards closer examination of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

83. Viewed on a broader scale, the purpose of nuclear-weapon-free zones is to provide additional means for averting nuclear-weapon proliferation and halting the nuclear-arms race. Another important benefit could be the creation of a framework for regional co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is thus argued that nuclear-weapon-free zones provide complementary machinery to other collateral measures of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Most experts felt that nuclear-weapon-free zones must not be regarded as alternatives to the principle of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [4] (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII),[5] annex), but should be entirely consistent with the objectives of the Treaty. While the practicality of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept depends upon the possibility of agreement between the States concerned, it is argued that this concept could provide a potentially useful instrument in the quest for international peace and security.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 431–432.

1. *Security of States Included in the Zone*

84. The premise upon which any nuclear-weapon-free zone must be based will be the conviction of States that their vital security interests would be enhanced and not jeopardized by participation. The perception of national security is, obviously, a matter of national policy, and these perceptions change, but it was argued by several experts that the presence of nuclear weapons in a region could threaten the security of States in that region, not excluding the possessor of the weapons or the country in which they are deployed, and that there is, accordingly, a conjunction of national and regional interests in regions where these weapons do not exist in ensuring their total absence. The situation in areas where nuclear weapons are already present will be different and will raise particular issues for the security of States. These issues would have to form a major consideration in any proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Several experts pointed out that there may be regions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones are impracticable or where their creation may not improve the security of the States of the area.

85. The differences between areas in their economic development, relations between States in the potential zone, geographical situation, and relationships with the nuclear-weapon States, make generalization hazardous, but the success of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would depend upon common agreement that the development and possession of nuclear weapons by any member would be perilous to the area as a whole. Most experts felt that the nuclear-weapon States should contribute to the effectiveness of a zone by undertaking to respect its status in all aspects, and in particular by committing themselves not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any member of the zone. The view was also expressed that these negative assurances should be matched with positive ones, namely to take, at the request of the zone, appropriate action through the Security Council or otherwise in case any State in the zone is attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. Other experts expressed the view that assurances by extra-zonal States could contribute to the effectiveness of a zone, but that their provision should be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they would have a favourable impact on the security of the region.

86. Many experts considered that, in regions where the most acute tensions exist, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, though particularly difficult, would be particularly desirable. The exponents of this argument considered that the creation of an effective zone should, in itself, reduce such tensions and could lead to regional arms limitation measures and co-operation on wider issues. On the other hand, it was argued by some experts that the reduction of tension must precede the creation of a truly effective nuclear-weapon-free zone.

87. The suggestion has also been made by some experts that examination should be made of the possibility of creating *ad hoc* nuclear-weapon-free zones similar to demilitarized zones foreseen in the

humanitarian laws of war and primarily serving a humanitarian purpose. It was argued that such *ad hoc* zones could be established by unilateral declaration by a State or group of States to make up the zones in times of severe crisis. Other experts expressed doubts about the feasibility of this proposal and noted that such unilateral declarations could not impose obligations on other States.

2. *World Security*

88. World security is interrelated with regional security. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone wherever suitable conditions exist could make a positive contribution to the achievement of the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and, accordingly, has a potential significance that could extend beyond the area covered by the zone. Thus, although the prime purpose of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is to enhance national and regional security, it should also be seen as part of the process of averting nuclear-weapon proliferation, of arresting the nuclear arms race, and of diminishing the danger of nuclear war. Thus, in this process the interests of all States are involved.

3. *Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

89. Most experts emphasized that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not to be seen as an alternative to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but rather as a potentially powerful instrument to supplement that Treaty. Other experts, however, stated that membership in a nuclear-weapon-free zone is an independent measure and indeed a more effective alternative to adherence to the Treaty, since the renunciation of nuclear weapons in a zone would go beyond the scope of the Treaty, which—among other things—does not contemplate total absence of nuclear weapons. The point was also made by some other experts that nuclear-weapon-free zones may not be appropriate in all areas, and that States may consider that their security interests are best served by other security arrangements, and that in these circumstances adherence to the Treaty régime assumed particular importance. Thus, the increased dangers to world peace should make States more aware of the importance of preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation, if not by joining nuclear-weapon-free zones then by seeking other regional or international arrangements that would have the same effect.

B. *Principles for the establishment of zones; relevance of regional consideration*

90. Conditions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones might be viable and might enhance security are bound to differ considerably from region to region. The security considerations and perceptions of States which are potential members may vary and it is not possible or realistic, *a priori*, to set out precise guidelines for the creation of zones, since

it is for Governments themselves to decide on their own security requirements and to determine their immediate and long-term national interests. Nonetheless, wherever appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist, certain principles should be taken into account, as follows:

(a) Obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by groups of States, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by smaller groups of States and even individual countries;

(b) Nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements must ensure that the zone would be, and would remain, effectively free of all nuclear weapons;

(c) The initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary;

(d) Whenever a zone is intended to embrace a region the participation of all militarily significant States, and preferably all States, in that region would enhance the effectiveness of the zone;

(e) The zone arrangements must contain an effective system of verification to ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations;

(f) The arrangements should promote the economic, scientific, and technological development of the members of the zone through international co-operation on all peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(g) The treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration;

(h) It was maintained that States members of a zone should not exercise control over nuclear weapons outside the zone, though some experts felt that part of a State could also be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone and that, in this case, the nuclear-weapon-free status would be applied only to the part of its territory which is situated within the boundary of the zone;

(i) Most experts noted as an essential principle that any arrangements for the establishment of a zone must provide for appropriate guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the zone. Other experts believed, however, that while such undertakings could contribute to the effectiveness of a zone, they should not be considered a prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but should instead be considered on a case-by-case basis;

(j) In the view of most experts, an essential principle in any nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty is the effective prohibition of the development, acquisition, or possession by parties to it of any nuclear explosive device. This prohibition should, however, not preclude access to the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions through international procedures consistent with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as with other international undertakings entered into by the States concerned, in particular the Treaty

establishing the zone. A few experts argued to the contrary and expressed the view that development by parties of nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes would not be inconsistent with the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept and that, accordingly, treaties establishing such zones should not prohibit the development of such devices by the parties,

(k) Many experts noted an additional principle that wherever the functioning of a nuclear-weapon-free zone so requires, States which are not members of the zone should establish a similar nuclear-weapon-free status in territories within the zone which are under their jurisdiction. Other experts felt, however, that this principle could be applied only to those territories, which being under the jurisdiction of extrazonal States, are within the zonal boundaries recognized by those States;

(l) Some experts considered it a basic principle that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should not interfere with existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security. The view was also expressed that participation of States situated within an intended nuclear-weapon-free zone in military alliance would not be conducive to the creation of the zone. Nevertheless, most experts maintained that if a State included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone is a member of a security alliance, its membership of that alliance cannot justify any exceptions to the obligations deriving from the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty;

(m) Many experts regard also as a basic principle that the boundaries and the provisions of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be determined in accordance with international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and in straits used for international navigation and international air space. The view was also expressed that this basic principle applies as well to the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Some other experts, however, emphasized that the provision of a nuclear-weapon-free zonal treaty should prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through the territory of the zone including the entry into ports situated there of vessels having nuclear weapons on board. Still some other experts pointed out that the matter should be referred to the individual nuclear-weapon-free zonal treaty;

(n) In the view of many experts another principle for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be that States which are expected to enter into undertakings vis-à-vis a zone, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, should be given the opportunity to participate in negotiations for the conclusion of agreements on the establishment of such zones. Other experts remarked, however, that it is for the prospective members of a zone to determine the opportunity and degree of participation of extrazonal States in the negotiations to establish such a zone.

C. *Security treaties and the establishment of zones*

91. For those States that are parties to one or more security alliances and who are potential parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, special questions will arise, especially if they belong to alliances which have nuclear-weapon States in their membership. In these cases there is often an obligation, whether explicit or implicit, for the nuclear-weapon States to come to the aid of their allies with all sufficient means if the latter are attacked. This aid need not, of course, involve nuclear weapons, but the possibility exists. Matters can be complicated in some cases by the issue of deployment, as mutual alliance treaties of this nature can—and sometimes do—involve agreement for the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon ally, or for special facilities involving nuclear-weapon-delivery systems.

92. Several experts argued that a non-nuclear-weapon State allied to a nuclear-weapon State can, under certain conditions, also be a party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. It was also pointed out by these experts that such alliances should not be regarded as being in all cases competitive with nuclear-weapon-free zones, but could be complementary to the success of a zone. It is clear, however, that each situation would have to be examined separately and that the terms of membership of a security alliance in a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be compatible. The view was also expressed that a treaty or alliance which does not envisage nuclear retaliation in support of an ally, nor include the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of that ally, need be no bar to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, moreover, that the proximity of one or more nuclear-weapon States should not be an inhibiting factor in the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Most experts expressed the view that if a State included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone is a member of a security alliance, its membership of that alliance cannot justify any exceptions to the obligations arising from the nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement.

93. The question of military bases is also highly complex. There are those who believe that the existence in a zone of military bases in which nuclear weapons are stored, or which nuclear-weapon-carrying vehicles visit, is incompatible with the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept. This is clearly a matter which must be resolved by the parties in the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but it is one on which differing views are held by the experts.

D. *Extent and composition of zones*

94. On this matter it seems both impracticable and unnecessary to attempt to establish precise requirements, but it would appear that certain characteristics would be of particular importance to a successful nuclear-weapon-free zone. So far as the size of such zones is concerned, all possibilities could be explored, ranging from whole conti-

nents to small zones. Many experts stated that although the creation of large zones would provide greater progress towards nuclear disarmament than small ones, the establishment of medium or small zones could play a significant part in enhancing regional security. On the question of composition, it was generally agreed that the participation of all militarily significant States, and preferably all States in a region, in a nuclear-weapon-free zone would enhance the effectiveness of the zone. The view was also expressed that there could be instances when a nuclear-weapon-free zone is initially established in a more limited area and later extended to other States that agree to join it.

95. It was also generally agreed that nuclear-weapon-free zones should have clearly defined and recognized boundaries, which would be determined in accordance with international law. Several experts pointed out that States cannot establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas outside their jurisdiction, particularly on the high seas, the straits used for international navigation and in international air space, in contradiction to international law. According to these experts those considerations are particularly applicable to the idea of additional safety areas put forward by some experts. Some experts emphasized that safety areas additional to the national territories of members of the zone would not contradict any principle of international law if established with the full consent of other States outside the zone.

E. *Procedures for the establishment of zones*

96. It has already been stressed that the initiatives to create nuclear-weapon-free zones should come from within the region, and it is self-evident that the nature of the negotiations for its establishment would reflect the particular circumstances of the zone and of the contracting parties. In some regions the existing regional consultative organizations might be appropriate bodies for initiating the negotiations, in others it might be necessary to establish *ad hoc* arrangements. In all cases States could request the assistance, advice, and good offices of other bodies, notably the United Nations and IAEA, if they so desired. The view was expressed that once an initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been taken, consultations to that end should be held among the States concerned. The view was also expressed that prior consultations should be undertaken with the countries concerned regarding the implications, feasibility and acceptability of the proposed zone, in order that an initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could elicit the necessary support, and that subsequent consultations could only take place among those States that might desire to join the proposed zone.

97. It was argued by some experts that the involvement of States outside the zones in the establishment process and especially those expected to undertake commitments towards the proposed zone, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential. Others held

the view that although such States need not necessarily be excluded from negotiations, their participation should not be regarded as a right. Several experts considered that such States should participate in negotiations or consultations with the zonal States at some stage, even if later in the negotiating process. Negotiations would have to be undertaken with IAEA on safeguard procedures at some point.

98. The formal instrument of the agreements would have to contain certain essential items, of which the most important would be the specific obligations of the parties, the machinery and procedures for ensuring effective compliance with those obligations, and the form and nature of any undertakings by outside States. Several experts pointed out that other matters, notably those relating to transit of nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-carrying vehicles, military bases, and verification procedures would vary, and that those matters would not necessarily be relevant to all nuclear-weapon-free zones. Some experts however held the view that such matters as transit and military bases should also be dealt with in the formal instrument.

CHAPTER IV

Responsibilities of States Within the Zone and of Other States

99. The positive impact of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on strengthening regional and global security would depend upon a proper distribution of responsibilities among zonal and extrazonal States—in the latter case particularly the nuclear-weapon States. Most experts considered that the substantial provisions contributing to a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be founded on an agreed balance of responsibilities. The nature of the responsibilities and the balances which might be struck are discussed in this chapter.

A. *Need for definition of fundamental terms*

100. Most experts felt that it was essential that the fundamental concepts underlying the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone be clearly defined in the instrument establishing the zone. But the view was also expressed that it might be difficult and even unnecessary to attempt to define various well-known terms which might also be used in a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty, and that several existing treaties on arms limitation, disarmament and collateral disarmament measures do not incorporate definitions of those terms in their texts. Some experts pointed out, however, that precisely this lack of definition may have been a partial cause of the lack of effectiveness of some of those agreements.

101. All members of such a zone must be in full agreement about the meaning of the term "nuclear weapon". Failure to agree on this point would be virtually certain to lead to serious and fundamental misun-

derstandings, and might well jeopardize the effectiveness of the zone.

102. Since, in controlling the spread of nuclear explosive technology, no distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices usable for military and for peaceful purposes, most experts believe that the term "nuclear weapon" in any nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangement should apply to any nuclear-explosive device, whatever its detailed characteristics or intended use. These experts therefore interpret the term "nuclear weapon", whenever used in this study, as referring to nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices.

103. This view is disputed by these experts who see a clear distinction between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear explosive device developed exclusively for peaceful purposes. They see no incompatibility between the development of an indigenous peaceful nuclear-explosion capability and membership of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

104. It would seem essential to define what, for the purpose of the zone treaty, is meant by "territory" of the contracting parties. Some experts specified that the term "territory" should include the territorial sea, air space and other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation, while others emphasized that any definition of "territory" must be in conformity with international law.

105. It could also be necessary to define clearly what is meant by the "zone" covered by a treaty. Most experts conceive a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a geographic area in which total absence of nuclear weapons is ensured through internationally valid covenants and whose existence as such has been recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The argument was advanced by some experts that the zone could also include international waters, if the security of States included in it is thus enhanced. However, other experts disagreed and emphasized that in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the States involved must not infringe international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and in straits used for international navigation and in international air space. These experts considered that disarmament efforts applicable to areas outside the sovereignty of States would require international arrangements quite different from the regional arrangements of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. They also pointed out that "recognition" by the General Assembly, either by adoption of a resolution or by some other action, could not be a necessary condition for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

106. Some experts felt that extrazonal States should agree to the establishment of safety areas, adjacent to the zone, in which it would be necessary to remove nuclear weapons geographically close to the zone that may be assigned to targets within the zone, or that have limited delivery ranges making them generally suitable for attacking such targets. The purpose of such undertakings, according to these experts, would be to assure the States in the zone that their objectives

will not be frustrated by the presence of these nuclear weapons in areas immediately adjoining the territory. Some other experts, however, pointed out that extrazonal States are not under obligation to agree to the establishment of safety areas referred to above, and that they might have serious difficulty, from the standpoint of their own security commitments and for other reasons, in undertaking to regard areas outside recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones as "safety areas".

107. It would also be desirable to define the terms "transit" and "transport" of nuclear weapons in the context of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Some experts suggested that "transit" means the passage through the zone of nuclear weapons, as defined in the zone Treaty, by a State which is not a party to the Treaty, including the entry into ports situated there of vessels having nuclear weapons on board, and that "transport" means the carriage of nuclear weapons in vehicles of any State belonging to the zone, even outside the zone itself.

B. *Development and production of nuclear weapons*

108. As to the specific obligations to be assumed by the States of the zone, most experts agreed that the most important obligation designed to ensure that there are no nuclear weapons in the zone is that the States of the zone should undertake not to develop, test or produce by any means whatsoever any nuclear explosive devices, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of themselves or anyone else, or in any other way. When territories in the zone which are under the jurisdiction of extrazonal States are brought within the scope of application of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, then undertakings of the same effect should become operative in those territories. It was generally recognized that for the maximum effectiveness of the zone, nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to assist zonal States in the development or production of nuclear weapons. It was also emphasized by many experts that the role of extrazonal non-nuclear-weapon States with advanced nuclear technology is as important in this regard as that of the nuclear-weapon States. Another view was expressed that this prohibition should not apply to nuclear explosive devices developed exclusively for peaceful purposes.

C. *Acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons*

109. A second obligation which the States in the zone must assume explicitly is the commitment not to acquire, possess, or receive nuclear weapons in any manner, directly or indirectly, by themselves or by anyone on their behalf, or in any other way, inside or outside the zone. This undertaking should be, in the opinion of many experts, matched by an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to fully respect the status of the zone. Some experts, however, while agreeing that this would make the zone more effective, emphasized that such undertakings would in practice require agreement between zone parties and the nuclear-weapon States.

D. *Installation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the zone*

110. States members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should undertake to prohibit and prevent, within territories under their jurisdiction, the installation and deployment, storage and stockpiling of nuclear weapons that are under the control of States outside the zone. This would require the agreement of extrazonal States in those cases where there are military bases or establishments which are not normally under the jurisdiction of a zonal State or where extrazonal States have jurisdiction over territories within the zone. Some experts stressed that this provision should be applied only to territories of extrazonal States within the zonal boundaries recognized by them.

E. *Transport of nuclear weapons*

111. It can be inferred that the zonal States, by renouncing any form of possession of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, by themselves or by anyone on their behalf, would be precluded from transporting such weapons in vehicles under their jurisdiction or control, since transport, however brief or temporary, could be interpreted to imply possession. However, in the treaty establishing the zone, clear provisions in this respect would be important for the effectiveness of the zone.

F. *Transit of nuclear weapons through the zone*

112. Some experts argued that prohibition of transit in the treaty establishing the zone would be an essential element of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and it should bind both zonal and extrazonal States, in order to prevent the possibility of introducing nuclear weapons into the zone while in transit. The same experts maintained in addition that the prohibition of transit should include the entry into ports situated there of vessels having nuclear weapons on board. Other experts expressed the view that the provisions governing a zone should not affect the existing rights of States to grant or to deny the transit of foreign military aircraft or warships with nuclear weapons through their air space or territorial waters, in accordance with international law. Still other experts maintained that although the question of transit is indeed important, its definition should not be a condition *sine qua non* for the establishment of the zone. Some experts further stressed that such provisions should not affect the freedom of navigation through straits used for international navigation. Some experts noted in addition that the provisions of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should not affect the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. The view was also expressed that while nuclear-weapon States could voluntarily undertake the commitment not to transit with nuclear weapons any high seas, straits used for international navigation or international air space that might be included in a zone, such restrictions could not be imposed on those States without their consent and that, aside from this legal

consideration, the application of nuclear-weapon-free zone prohibitions to high seas, straits used for international navigation or international air space could raise serious political and security problems and might therefore be found objectionable.

G. *Use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the zone*

113. One of the principal objectives of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is to increase the security of its prospective member States. It is a sovereign right of each State to assess its own security needs and to adopt the measures required to strengthen its security; the paramount security interest of States involved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would clearly be to spare themselves from being attacked with, or threatened by, nuclear weapons.

114. The contribution made to regional and world security by a nuclear-weapon-free zone depends greatly upon diminishing the risks of an armed conflict between the States of the area, and also between zonal and extrazonal States. Some experts believed that security assurances to the zonal States by nuclear-weapon States would constitute a major link between regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and world security and others considered that such assurances could be strengthened in certain cases by accepting the establishment of a safety area adjacent to the zone.

115. The co-operation of nuclear-weapon States with the States belonging to the zone may be attained by consultations and negotiations at an appropriate stage of the process of establishing that zone. Some experts maintained that clear and formal assurances by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against any member of the zone is an essential factor for the effectiveness of the zone. Other experts felt that while such an undertaking could enhance the effectiveness of a zone, this question should not be regarded as a prerequisite but considered at the time a particular nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement is being negotiated. The view was also expressed that one of the considerations to be taken into account is whether, in specific cases, the provision of non-use assurances could be seen as undercutting existing positive assurances.

116. While, as had already been noted, there need be no incompatibility *per se* between participation of a non-nuclear-weapon State in a nuclear-weapon-free-zone and its participation in a security alliance or in any other security arrangements involving nuclear-weapon States, such a security relationship might condition the willingness of other nuclear-weapon States to provide security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon State in question. It seems essential that any security assurances should be embodied in a binding agreement.

H. *Undertakings vis-à-vis the zone*

117. The undertakings to be entered into in connexion with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be of unlimited duration

and may concern three groups of States: those within the zone, nuclear-weapon States, and other States. So far as the States within the zone are concerned, the specific obligations entered into by them should be laid down expressly in a formal treaty establishing the zone. The obligations entered into by the nuclear-weapon States should also be embodied in a formal legally binding instrument. The attitude of other States vis-à-vis the zone could be specifically established in some cases or recommended in a general way, for example, by means of resolutions of an appropriate body of the United Nations or of a regional organ.

1. *By States Within the Zone*

118. The obligations incumbent on the States parties to a zone treaty must ensure specifically that they will not develop, test, produce, possess or acquire nuclear weapons in the territory under their jurisdiction and that they will not permit anybody to store, install, or deploy such weapons in their territories. In addition, they should agree not to give, seek, or receive any assistance in the development or production of nuclear weapons. The view was also expressed that the States within a zone could renounce all military uses of nuclear energy. Any other State which has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, but is not yet a party to it, should refrain from any activities that may run counter to or defeat the objectives of the zone. Some experts expressed the view that the commitments of States bound by the treaty establishing the zone should include the prohibition of transit of nuclear weapons through the zone, while other experts stated that zone arrangements should not affect existing rights of zonal States to grant or deny transit privileges.

2. *By Nuclear-Weapon States*

119. Most experts felt that the nuclear-weapon States should pledge themselves to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone and not to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That could imply undertakings:

(a) Not to install, deploy or stockpile nuclear weapons in the zone and, if they have done so in the past, to withdraw them from the zone immediately;
(b) To guarantee that, if they have military bases in the zone, they contain no nuclear weapons and possibly should allow the bases or establishments to be inspected;
(c) Not to provide the States of the zone any assistance in the development, production, or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
(d) To co-operate in the establishment of a safety area adjacent to the zone, if special circumstances exist.

120. Other experts, on the other hand, while agreeing that the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States could enhance the effectiveness of a zone, emphasized that such co-operation would have to be on the

basis of negotiation and agreement, that nuclear-weapon States would have to consider nuclear-weapon-free zone proposals on a case-by-case basis, and that the concept of safety areas raised serious issues of a political, legal and security character and assistance in the establishment of safety areas cannot be considered as an obligation of nuclear-weapon States.

121. Some experts felt that a nuclear-weapon State could reserve its right to reconsider its obligations concerning respect for the nuclear-weapon-free zone status if States in respect of which it has assumed such obligations commit aggression or become accomplices of aggression. Other experts pointed out that a nuclear-weapon State could reserve its right to reconsider its obligations to a nuclear-weapon-free zone party in the event of any act of aggression or armed attack by that party with the support or assistance of a nuclear-weapon State. Still other experts stressed, however, that a nuclear-weapon-free zone would lose a substantial part of its value if nuclear-weapon States, committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone, reserved their right to reconsider this commitment.

3. *By Other States*

122. The undertakings by other extrazonal States—i.e., other than nuclear-weapon States—with respect to the zone may be either specific or general. Their purpose would be to commit such States not to carry out any activity endangering the efficient functioning of the zone and, in particular, not to provide the States of the zone with any assistance which might lead to the development or production of nuclear weapons. This would have particular importance in the cases of States with highly developed nuclear technology. These undertakings might not require adherence to the treaty establishing the zone.

I. *Control measures*

123. The viability of the nuclear-weapon-free zone will largely depend on an effective system of verification and control that ensures the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone. The States participating in the zone must adopt measures which would promote confidence among themselves and in countries outside the region by ensuring that no activity of the States members of the zone would result in the circumvention of their obligations. Many experts considered that provisions should also be made to link these arrangements with the system of collective security of the United Nations.

124. It was argued by most experts that the effective operation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should include the application of appropriate IAEA safeguards to the complete nuclear fuel cycle in each country within the zone. Such safeguards would give all the States members of the zone and other States additional confidence that any diversion of fissile material will be detected in good time and thus deterred. In addition, the zone treaty should provide effective machinery to prevent

clandestine activities in violation of its provisions, to verify that no State within the zone acquires nuclear weapons by any means whatsoever, that nuclear weapons are not deployed or stockpiled in the zone, and that other relevant obligations are being complied with.

J. *Relationship between different nuclear-weapon-free zones*

125. As more nuclear-weapon-free zones are established in addition to those already existing, e.g., in the Antarctic [6] and Latin America,[7] to the extent that *ad hoc* agencies or existing regional bodies are made responsible for the control and supervision of those zones, it is clearly desirable that arrangements should be made for the exchange of information and experience, technical co-operation, and collaboration in control and supervision. It would be difficult to establish in advance precise forms of co-operation or even to decide whether this co-operation should be on a regular and formal or informal basis, or whether use should be made primarily of existing regional organizations or the United Nations. But the importance of such co-operation must be noted.

CHAPTER V

VERIFICATION AND CONTROL

A. *Objectives and scope*

126. The question of verification and control of compliance by States parties with the obligations of their agreements in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and collateral disarmament measures has always been in the focus of negotiations. The past solutions to that problem have differed from treaty to treaty, depending upon the nature and the scope of obligations contained therein.

127. An effective verification system would create confidence among the States members of the zone and in their relation to extrazonal States. It would also offer assurances that there was no diversion by zonal States of nuclear material to nuclear weapons and would thereby facilitate co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy among the zonal States and between them and States outside the zone.

128. In order to ensure that a nuclear-weapon-free zone will function effectively, it is necessary to devise a system of verification and control to ensure that all the States involved are complying strictly with their obligations. The precise nature of the verification and control system would vary from region to region and would depend upon the type of obligations which are to be undertaken by parties to a treaty establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone. Generally, the treaty would have to

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[6] The Antarctic Treaty is printed *ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

[7] For the Latin American nuclear-free-zone treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco), see *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

include provisions for verifying the compliance with obligations and the consideration or settlement of issues of non-compliance that may arise. Most experts felt, in this connexion, that the measures of verification and control should be extended to all nuclear activities in zonal States so as to prevent any diversion from peaceful purposes. Prescribed systems may include both routine and *ad hoc* procedures and should ensure a sufficient probability of detecting violations. Such systems should be based on the principle of complete equality of States.

129. An effective verification and control system might generally include fact-finding machinery, a procedure for consultations between individual States and a forum for multilateral consultations, recommendations and other actions. If other treaties on arms limitation, disarmament and collateral disarmament measures are in force for zonal States, the harmonization and co-operation between their respective control systems could be beneficial. The co-operation between control systems of various nuclear-weapon-free zones might also be of value.

130. As to the fact-finding part of a control system, States would always have the right to use their national means of verification in accordance with international law. Additional investigation measures requiring the co-operation of parties should be prescribed in the treaty in order to ensure the effectiveness of the zone.

131. The task of verifying a nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreement would fall into two main categories. One is to ensure that zonal States do not develop or produce nuclear weapons. The other is to ensure that the zone is effectively free of nuclear weapons coming from outside sources and that such weapons are withdrawn if they are present in the zone. The first aspect could be covered by applying IAEA safeguards to all nuclear materials in zonal States. Such safeguards would provide both for necessary verification on a routine basis that such materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons and also for a reporting procedure on disclosures of events of possible non-compliance. Some experts noted that the IAEA safeguards can be applied not only to the use of particular nuclear materials, but can be extended to all peaceful nuclear activities of States included in a zone in order to prevent any diversion for military purposes, as contemplated in a number of safeguards agreements concluded between States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and IAEA. Present IAEA safeguards would only verify nuclear activities that are declared to the Agency as prescribed in safeguards agreements. Therefore, a task of the zone's verification and control system should be to ensure that all nuclear activities in the zone have in fact been declared to IAEA.

132. In regard to the second aspect of verification, as there are limits to what tasks can be undertaken by IAEA, it could be necessary, depending on the provisions of the zone treaty in each case, to provide additional machinery to verify that the zone is effectively free of nuclear weapons coming from outside sources, and if such weapons are

present in the area, that they are withdrawn. Some experts felt that such additional verification could imply permitting inspectors to visit military installations, naval vessels and military aircraft within the zone and that it could also provide, if prescribed in the zone treaty, that nuclear weapons are not transported outside the zone by ships and airplanes belonging to zonal States. Some experts pointed out that adequate verification in any area of the high seas, if such areas are incorporated in nuclear-weapon-free zones and in military bases of nuclear-weapon States, if such bases are situated in nuclear-weapon-free zones, would raise specific problems which should be fully taken into account in the establishment of such zones. With reference to the idea that a nuclear-weapon-free zone could include high seas, straits used for international navigation, and international airspace, several experts noted that this idea not only raises serious, and perhaps insuperable, security, political and legal problems, but that it would be extremely difficult to verify the nuclear-weapon-free-zone status of such areas.

133. Existing regional or international organizations might be able to undertake such verification responsibilities described above. However, in many regions it might be preferable to establish standing regional bodies or special organs for the implementation of verification procedures other than those of IAEA. One of the functions of such agencies could be to monitor and co-ordinate the work of appropriate national authorities responsible for the necessary verification procedures in each country party to a nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreement. Such regional bodies or organs could carry out periodic and *ad hoc* inspections.

134. Some experts expressed the view that in establishing procedures for verification the zone arrangements could provide for a process of reciprocal investigation and inspection among members of the zone, either directly or through a standing regional body and that a detailed consultation procedure would provide an important means for dealing with questions of suspected non-compliance.

135. It might be desirable to provide for a multilateral body of States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone with the task of considering reports made by a standing control agency regarding the implementation of the provisions of the treaty and of making recommendations in respect of such implementation, on possible investigations and inspections, and on suspected violations. One important responsibility of such a multilateral body would be to consider issues of non-compliance when consultations between individual States parties to a zone treaty have failed to settle the issue. The existence of such a body should not exclude, however, the possibility that any outstanding issues arising during the course of a consultation process are referred to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly, or to other appropriate and competent international organs.

B. *Safeguards on peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

136. As already indicated, the IAEA safeguards system could play an important role in the verification of the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free-zone provisions. The exact mandate of IAEA would essentially be determined by two factors. One is the precise provisions of the agreements establishing zones and the tasks given to IAEA therein. The other is the statute of IAEA prescribing what duties the Agency can assume. The latter (article III.5) permits the Agency "to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy".[8]

137. It would thus be possible to solve one part of the verification problems of nuclear-weapon-free zones, that of assuring that the nuclear materials in zonal States would not be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons by applying IAEA safeguards to all such materials.

138. An obligation of the States included in a zone to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards would have to be expressly laid down in the constituent instrument of the zone. The necessary agreements with IAEA may be concluded in one of three ways: (a) by leaving each State to negotiate directly with IAEA; (b) by negotiating a collective agreement with IAEA at the same time as the constituent treaty; or (c) by individual but simultaneous negotiations between IAEA and the parties. It could be more efficient to conclude a collective agreement with IAEA, provided that this comes into force for each State upon accession to the treaty constituting the zone; in this way States would comply at the outset with a condition essential to the satisfactory operation of their zone. In cases where collective negotiations are not possible, provisions should be made for the simultaneous entry into force of the zone treaty and all safeguards agreements related thereto.

139. A desirable element in a verification system would be a provision that States in a zone should apply adequate standards of physical protection to fissionable material in the zone in order to prevent unauthorized groups, by theft or otherwise, from diverting such material and making their own nuclear weapons.

C. *Inspections*

140. When IAEA safeguards are applied, inspections will take place as an integral part of the procedure in accordance with the safeguards agreements in force.

141. A standing control agency of a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be empowered with the task of carrying out both routine and *ad hoc*

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[8] For text of IAEA Statute, see 8 UST 1093.

inspection within the boundaries of the zone as an element of its procedure to ensure the fulfilment of any obligation not verified by IAEA. Such inspections could be undertaken by the control agency on its own initiative, at the request of individual States parties to the zone treaty or by a multilateral body instituted by the same treaty. Some experts noted that this kind of procedure is provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco (article 16).

D. *Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, regional organizations and national organs*

142. Proper execution of verification procedures makes close co-operation between the various competent organs of the international, regional and national levels essential. Some experts suggested that such co-operation might also include seeking relevant information from outside sources, possibly on a routine basis.

143. The role of IAEA would be to assume, in accordance with its statute, the responsibility for all safeguards envisaged in the zone treaty and subsequent agreements between IAEA, regional zone authorities and zonal States. The application of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of a country could require the co-operation of a national or regional authority for accounting and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards. Moreover, a regional body or special organ responsible for verification of a zonal agreement could be given authority to investigate suspected cases of non-compliance. The precise mandate and procedure of work of such regional bodies or special organs would have to be defined in the treaty constituting the zone.

144. A nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty could include provisions, as do several other collateral disarmament measures, recognizing the right of parties to the treaty to bring any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. If an infringement or violation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty involved a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the United Nations Security Council would have the power to take such action as necessary to restore international peace and security.

145. Both IAEA and regional control agencies could be entrusted by States to assist in the co-ordination of the activities of national authorities dealing with verification and control.

146. In certain regions States parties to a zonal treaty may wish to assign all verification responsibilities of a nuclear-weapon-free zone to a special organ within the IAEA structure. However, such a provision would go beyond the task at present undertaken by IAEA and might require an amendment of the Agency's statute.

E. *Creation of ad hoc agencies*

147. *Ad hoc* agencies might be the most useful means of organizing

the execution of over-all verification and control of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This is argued for two reasons: (a) existing regional organizations may not be suited to such functions, because their aims are either too general or, on the contrary, too specialized, and (b) the composition of such organizations may not correspond to that of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, because they include either a greater number of States, some outside the zone, or a smaller number of States, some countries within the zone not being members. In such cases verification and control in a zone might more effectively be exercised by an *ad hoc* agency especially tailored to the composition and purposes of the zone and designed primarily for such verification and control.

CHAPTER VI

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and International Law

A. *Relationship with international law*

148. Arrangements for the exclusion of nuclear weapons from various areas of the globe are fully consistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and particularly with its Article 1, under which States undertake "... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ... to develop friendly relations among nations ... and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace".

149. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is also consistent with the provisions of Article 52 of the Charter, which envisages the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.

150. Some experts noted that the establishment of such zones is furthermore in conformity with the principles governing demilitarized zones.

151. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be effected in accordance with international law, with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and specifically with the following fundamental principles guiding the mutual relations of States: sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; right of self-defence; co-operation among States; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

152. In full compliance with these principles, it is unanimously recognized that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be part of a system of measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the achievement of general and complete disarma-

ment, including nuclear disarmament. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not to be regarded as an end in itself, but as a means towards the wider objectives of general and complete disarmament and of international peace and security. The view was also expressed that the treaties establishing such zones may provide for the inclusion of other States that agree to join the zone and also for the adoption of further measures of disarmament.

153. Many experts from non-nuclear-weapon States emphasized that States members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should receive adequate and effective security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the zone and maintained that States members of the zone had a right to expect such assurances on the basis both from the general principle that States should refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force, and the nature of obligations which the non-nuclear-weapon States would be undertaking in creating the nuclear-weapon-free zone. These experts stressed that from the purely legal standpoint the existence of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not depend on recognition or guarantees from outside States; a State or group of States need only decide to prohibit nuclear weapons in the territory or territories under their sovereignty and, in law, the zone comes into existence. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the mere existence *de jure* of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not sufficient unless the zone works *de facto*. Hence the advisability of appropriate recognition and guarantees.

154. Many other experts, while believing that assurances could not be considered a right under international law, recognized that certain types of assurances could contribute to the effectiveness of a zone. In their view, the question of commitments by extrazonal States could only be resolved through mutual agreements and should be considered at the time a particular nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangement is being negotiated taking into account regional factors, including existing security arrangements. The same experts considered that circumstances would vary so considerably that it was impracticable to attempt to establish general principles on the question of legal obligations of nuclear-weapon States.

155. Most experts noted that a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty cannot impair the inherent right, under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

156. Disputes arising in relation to the functioning and interpretation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty should be settled by peaceful means and the treaty should contain adequate provisions in this respect. The settlement of disputes as well as their prevention would be greatly facilitated by the existence in the treaty of provisions for effective safeguards and control.

157. Many experts emphasized that in defining the territory of a

nuclear-weapon-free zone, members of the zone must respect international law, including those principles relating to the high seas, to straits used for international navigation and to international air space. The view was also expressed that these principles also include the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. While agreeing on the importance of the above principles, other experts maintained that they should be considered in the light of the requirements necessary to the effectiveness of the zone, in particular the question of innocent passage through territorial waters. In this respect, these experts stressed that such passage by vessels carrying nuclear weapons could in fact be incompatible with the basic aim of ensuring total absence of such weapons in the zone. Some experts emphasized in particular that a zone treaty should prohibit the entry into ports situated in the zone of vessels having nuclear weapons on board.

158. Some experts suggested that consideration should be given in a zone treaty to legal questions raised by including within the zone areas outside the sovereignty of States members of the zone, or of creating what have been previously described as safety areas. They maintained that it was essential that safety areas be established adjacent to national territories in order to make a zone more effective, and argued that the establishment of such safety areas did not represent a unilateral imposition by zonal States of the nuclear-weapon-free status on such areas in violation of international law, since extrazonal States would concur in undertaking to respect such areas as nuclear-weapon free. Other experts, however, considered that such proposals for safety areas, apart from the security and political problems involved, raised legal issues that are not relevant to the issues involved in creating nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. *Relationship with existing treaties*

159. It is understood that treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be consistent with other treaty obligations of the zonal States. If such consistency is to be achieved, two types of instruments will have to be taken into account: (a) those of general application or interest, and (b) those of particular application of interest. In the first category, apart from the Charter of the United Nations, close attention will have to be paid to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,[9] the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and in the Subsoil Thereof (General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV),[10] annex),[11] the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) annex) and, from another point of view, the statute of IAEA. In the second category, it is desir-

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[10] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 680-681.
[11] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7-11.

able that consistency should be achieved with the instruments applicable in particular regions. It will also be necessary to keep closely in mind the commitments which zonal States may have made under any security alliances—multilateral or bilateral—and under such conventions or agreements as they may have concluded among themselves or with third States on such matters as nuclear co-operation. It is clear that once a State has decided it wishes to participate in a nuclear-weapon-free zone no commitments taken under other agreements can justify any exceptions to the obligations that are undertaken in a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty.

160. Most experts noted that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms, in its article VII, the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The view was also expressed that proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones should prescribe standards of compliance no less stringent than in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, and that the legal obligations for States members of such zones should be fully compatible with those under that Treaty. Other experts felt, however, that the standards of compliance and the legal obligations for States members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be established during the negotiations among those States.

161. It was suggested by some experts that States creating nuclear-weapon-free zones should be parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Other experts noted that, while adherence to the Treaty is desirable, it cannot be considered a prerequisite for membership in a nuclear-weapon-free zone and noted, as a precedent, that several States non-parties to that Treaty are, however, parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).[12]

C. *Relationship with the United Nations*

162. The United Nations can play a positive role in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Some experts maintained that a nuclear-weapon-free zone bears a double relationship with the United Nations. In the first place the world Organization should promote such zones—not impose them, but encourage them—and in the second place the United Nations can be a guarantor of those zones in the light of Chapter VII of the Charter. Other experts held that, although the United Nations could provide a forum for those who wish to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in particular regions and could also make available machinery and services to facilitate their efforts, the United Nations, as an international entity, could not be said to have a specific responsibility under the Charter to encourage the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

163. In view of the United Nations function with respect to settle-

[12] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

ment of international disputes, a nuclear-weapon-free zone could benefit from existing United Nations machinery, including the institutions mentioned in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter related to the pacific settlement of disputes and actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. Some experts consider that a stronger link between the system of safeguards and control in the zone and the system of collective security under the United Nations Charter should be created.

164. The United Nations can help in various stages of the establishment and functioning of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United Nations can also use its authority in supporting the concept, can provide assistance including, if desired and considered necessary, the machinery to enable the States concerned to make progress in their direct consultations. Some experts felt that the United Nations could also exert influence regarding the undertaking by nuclear-weapon States of obligations vis-à-vis such zones. Some other experts pointed out that this role of the United Nations would be justified only in those cases where such zones are in fact completely free of nuclear weapons and are established in full compliance with international law.

165. In view of the over-all responsibilities of the United Nations in regard to arms limitation, disarmament and collateral disarmament measures, it would be appropriate for the parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to convey to the United Nations through the Secretary-General, or in any other way, periodic information about the implementation of the purposes and provisions of the treaty.

CHAPTER VII

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

A. *Availability to States included in the zones of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.*

166. States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and would retain that right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with the aims and provisions of the zone treaty. It was also pointed out that States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty would also have to use that right in a manner consistent with the aims and provisions of any other agreements to which they are party. Other experts made it clear that it must be borne in mind that the compatibility between a zone treaty and a security alliance would have to be established in each case and that, at any rate, membership of an alliance cannot justify any exceptions to the obligations deriving from the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty.

167. The International Atomic Energy Agency should have an essential role in promoting and safeguarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy in nuclear-weapon-free zones. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free

zone and the application of an effective safeguards system in the zone could facilitate regional and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The obligation of zonal States would be to accept safeguards to ensure that such activities were not diverted to purposes not permitted by the zone treaty. Many experts referred to article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a model for provisions on peaceful nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Other experts pointed out that the supervision and control of peaceful nuclear activities in a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be extended to certain aspects that go beyond IAEA's existing safeguards systems and even beyond its statute and, furthermore, to States which are not parties to the above Treaty. Thus, they maintained, other possibilities can be explored in order to devise a control system which could effectively prevent or detect in time any diversion of such activities to warlike purposes, whether through existing regional organs or by establishing an *ad hoc* body for this purpose.

B. *Role of nuclear-weapon States*

168. Many experts felt that States members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should have the fullest possible access on a non-discriminatory basis to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions and that nuclear-weapon States and other States with highly developed nuclear technology should consider facilitating such access.

C. *Role of international organizations and arrangements*

169. It is clear that once a nuclear-weapon-free zone has been created, an element of regional co-operation has been established in the area of the zone that could be expanded to cover other possible fields of co-operation, including the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The implementation and co-ordination of such extended co-operation might possibly be carried out by the regional bodies or *ad hoc* agencies necessary for verification and control.

170. It would also be desirable to conclude an agreement on peaceful nuclear co-operation between IAEA and a competent authority representing the zone.

171. In the field of co-operation among zonal States, many experts recognized that the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres could satisfy, partly or wholly, the needs of zonal States in developing their nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection of nuclear materials and application of IAEA safeguards, and thus contributing to the purposes of the zone treaty including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These experts suggested that the creation of such centres might either make it unnecessary for States to develop enrichment and reprocessing facilities of their own or enable them to contribute the facilities they already have to the regional centre. Such centres could ensure that member States did not take delivery of enriched uranium or plutonium in excess of their require-

ments. Member States might also agree that enriched uranium or plutonium produced on their behalf and not required for early use should be held in the custody of the centre.

172. The concept of a regional nuclear fuel cycle centre has not been strictly defined, but reference has been made both to jointly operated industrial facilities and to multilateral organizations having combined administrative and operative functions. Some experts pointed to three possibilities: (a) the centre could leave member States to contract with third countries for their enrichment and reprocessing requirements subject to its approval that supply was justified on the basis of requirements; (b) the centre could accept responsibility for arranging supply, relying on the aggregation of demand to give it a special position in the market; (c) the centre could build and operate its own plants or contract with others to do so. Alternative (c) would represent a logical development when justified by demand since it would allow member States to reap the economic benefit of operation of their own regional fuel cycle without being directly involved at the national level.

173. Pending further study of the complex issues involved, it would be premature to offer firm conclusions at this stage about the relationship between such centres and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The whole question of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres raises a number of complex issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction, as well as of ownership, management and control, which go beyond the scope of this study. Thus, it is not possible to make precise suggestions on the functioning and characteristics of such centres at this stage.

D. *Peaceful nuclear explosions*

174. The benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions, should be available to States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

175. Most experts, however, held the view that nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes could also be used as weapons, and that indigenous development and production of such devices by zonal States would, therefore, violate one of the principal purposes of the zones. Accordingly, these experts emphasized that States parties to a zone treaty must not themselves produce or acquire, directly or indirectly, any nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, although they could receive peaceful nuclear explosion services from nuclear-weapon States with the assistance of IAEA in a manner consistent with the procedure envisaged by article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and by the corresponding provisions of the treaty establishing the zone. Some experts pointed out that any peaceful nuclear explosion services by extrazonal States should also be covered in the treaty establishing that zone, and that States providing such services would also have to abide by the corresponding provisions of that treaty.

176. Other experts held the different view, however, that since it is

the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the right should be available to all parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to any exploitation of such benefits, including peaceful nuclear explosions, by their own means.

177. The view was also expressed that pending a consensus on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions as a result of the studies now being carried out, it may be best to require a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions.

178. Many experts suggested that the services of IAEA and its *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes could be of great value in considering peaceful nuclear explosion projects, and that the IAEA guidelines for international observation of peaceful nuclear explosion operations, as adapted to the legal framework of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, should be followed in all such projects.

179. The view was also expressed that a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty should prescribe that any party to it intending to benefit from peaceful nuclear explosion services should, wherever appropriate, notify the relevant organ of the zone responsible for supervision and control, and provide information on and permit observation of the explosion to the authorized personnel of that organ.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

180. In endeavouring to fulfil the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly, the Group of Experts has attempted to elaborate the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, identify the principal issues involved in such zones and analyse their implications both for zonal and extrazonal States. The study does not attempt to establish any precise rules, as it is the considered view of the experts that circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case. Nevertheless, the experts have indicated certain guidelines that could be taken into account where such zones could be created. These guidelines, as well as issues on which the attitudes of Governments are divergent, have been identified for further examination by Governments and by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear-free Zones, August 19, 1975 [1]

Last night the arduous meetings—close on to 60, counting formal

[1] CCD/PV.682, pp. 6–16.

and informal meetings—of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts came to a successful conclusion; it started its task last April and the seats of the Soviet Union and the United States were occupied by no less than the heads of their respective delegations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the former accompanied by three and the latter by five officials whom it would probably be appropriate to call "assistant experts".

Our Committee is today officially receiving the study (CCD/467) that is the outcome of the deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Group,[2] deliberations in which, as you are aware, my country had the privilege of making a constructive contribution through a Mexican governmental expert—and it will shortly have to consider the form and content of the "special report" by which the experts' study is to be transmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as requested in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974.[3]

It is not my intention to go deeply into this matter, since as I stated at our last meeting my delegation is prepared to agree to whatever procedure in this regard commands general support. My present statement has a very different purpose which I shall now try to describe.

The preamble to the General Assembly resolution I mentioned a moment ago, which led to the creation of the *Ad Hoc* Group and the fulfilment of its arduous task, begins by referring to "the need to make every effort" towards achieving a cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and concludes by stating that "further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones would be enhanced by a comprehensive study of the question in all its aspects".

It follows from this that the Assembly took the initiative of calling for the study which has just been completed not for academic reasons but for purposes imbued with legal and political pragmatism which are very much in keeping with its own functions and responsibilities, such as assisting progress towards nuclear disarmament and strengthening what the resolution terms "the different efforts and achievements undertaken on a regional level with a view to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones", recalling one of them "in particular", namely, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco.[4]

The *Ad Hoc* Group, on the other hand, has, as requested, made a "comprehensive" study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones "in all its aspects". In addition, the experts in the Group, however governmental they may have been, have acted as such and, moreover, observed the consensus rule, with the added condition that, whenever consensus was impossible, all the opinions expressed should be incorporated.

The Assembly, however, in keeping with its own afore-mentioned

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[2] *Supra.*
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

resolution, will have to proceed in a totally different fashion. It will doubtless be guided by the directives of the United Nations Charter to help "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

While the Assembly's rules of procedure—it is well to bear in mind—in no sense preclude any efforts thought advisable to secure a consensus, it does not, provided circumstances so require, reject the settlement of doubts and differences of opinion by that most democratic of procedures: the vote.

The *Ad Hoc* Group has performed its duty of producing, in keeping with its express terms of reference, a virtually exhaustive compilation of every imaginable view that might be expressed on a very wide range of aspects—of greatly varying importance—of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The General Assembly, after considering the study we are to transmit to it, will, in its turn, have a duty to perform at its approaching thirtieth session. We believe that to that end it will have to employ the full weight of its moral and in many cases even its legal, authority as the most representative organ of the international community, in settling and clarifying once and for all certain fundamental questions relating to the topic under discussion.

Since a number of the members of the CCD here present will doubtless be taking part in the work of the First Committee when it comes to consider the experts' study and since I am one of those optimists who believe that the representatives of the more than 100 Members of the United Nations who are not members of the CCD still read its records, even though 1975 is now its fourth completely unproductive year, I feel that it is appropriate today to identify two of the questions which, in our opinion, ought to be given priority attention by the Assembly, and to put forward some relevant considerations.

1. Internationally valid definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

First and foremost, among the decisions which we hope the General Assembly will ultimately incorporate in the resolution it adopts in connexion with its consideration of the experts' report, should be one which gives an authorized international definition—invocable against both Montagues and Capulets—of the meaning and scope of the concept of "nuclear-weapon-free zone".

The urgent need for such a definition by the Assembly is all too apparent, in view of the content of the experts' study and more particularly of chapter III, which deals specifically with this aspect of the subject. In it, at every turn, the reader meets with more or less disguised attempts by some governments to discourage or restrict the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It talks of an essential

requirement—"where suitable conditions exist for the creation of such zones", and a little later the word "appropriate" is used; we are told that "several experts pointed out there may be regions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones are impracticable or where their creation may not improve the security of the States of the area"; the chapter adds that "it was argued by some experts that the reduction of tension must precede the creation of a truly effective nuclear-weapon-free zone"; and we are allowed to share the fruits of the meditations of other members of the *Ad Hoc* Group who argued that "nuclear-weapon-free zones may not be appropriate in all areas".

Truly, we cannot conceal our astonishment at these scruples reflected in the study transmitted to us. We fail to understand why our world which, in 1944, was one gigantic nuclear-weapon-free zone down to the last square metre of its enormous surface, must now, in the very middle of the so-called "disarmament decade", be divided not only into the territory of States having nuclear weapons and that of States without those terrible instruments of mass destruction, but also within the territory occupied by the latter, into areas which have and those which do not have "suitable" conditions in order for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be "appropriate".

Who, we also wonder, will be called upon to judge such "suitability" or "appropriateness"?

It is patently obvious that, for some States, time has stood still over the years. In reading the assertions I have quoted from chapter III, I was reminded of what I ventured to state at the 1333rd meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 11 November 1963, when I submitted to the Committee the Latin American draft resolution that later became resolution 1911 (XVIII), entitled "Denuclearization of Latin America".[5] Referring to the many statements of representatives who had mentioned the Latin American initiative, I said on that occasion:

> I must confess that I was somewhat surprised that in some of those statements, after recognizing the fact that the establishment of a denuclearized zone was something primarily within the competence of the countries composing the zone, some representatives, referring to this matter, thereupon went on to enumerate a more or less long list of conditions, many of them impossible of fulfilment, which they believe to be indispensable for such a denuclearized zone to be established.
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> Now, since the application of this procedure on a general and indiscriminate basis would in practice nullify the will expressed by States composing the zone directly concerned, and therefore would be in direct contradiction with the recognition of the fact that that will must be considered as the decisive element; and since, on the other hand, such an attitude would seem to set aside the fact that the United Nations, in chapter I of its Charter, expressly grants "the sovereign equality of all its Members", I am inclined to believe that the intention of the speakers to whom I have alluded was primarily one of enumerating the conditions which they consider indispensable for an eventual or possible denuclearization of the geographical zones in which their own countries are situated.[6]

That inference, drawn more than ten years ago, is totally applicable

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[5] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 628-629.

[6] A/C.1/PV.1333, pp. 47-48.

to the restrictive assessments that abound in the *Ad Hoc* Group's study. In any case, when its contents are studied carefully, the paternity of its contradictory pronouncements is easy to determine, despite the sybilline style in which they are drafted.

One part of them obviously reflects the position of some States—very few fortunately, amongst the impressive total of the membership of the United Nations—which do not seem to have quite understood the philosophy of the San Francisco Charter and which could be said to be trying to cling to the pre-war world. Hence the hegemonic tendencies, the systems of alliances and military blocs, of spheres of influence and of numerous nuclear bases; hence, in short, today's "balance of power", which has rightly been called "the balance of terror".

The other part of those pronouncements belongs to the legions of the young and progressively developing States which are customarily grouped under the generic title of "the Third World", States whose peoples believe and want to believe in the postulates and in the principles and the purposes of the Charter of the world organization, States, which adopt as their banner and their supreme standard of conduct the sovereign equality of States and mutual respect, self-determination and non-intervention.

Between those two theses which confront each other on every page and, it could be said, sometimes even in every paragraph of the experts' study, the United Nations cannot be neutral. If it were, it would be betraying the Charter which created it.

Accordingly, in our view the General Assembly must proclaim without further delay a definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which we consider should be couched in the following or similar terms:

> A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or agreement whereby:
>
> (a) the status of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject is defined, and
>
> (b) an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that status.[7]

The foregoing definition offers obvious and multiple advantages and reduces to a minimum those aspects which might give rise to controversy. Of the five basic elements it contains, four are among the relatively few which managed to obtain consensus in the *Ad Hoc* Group since they were agreed to by all its members: first, that the initiative for the creation of a zone should come from one or more States whose territories are to form part of the zone; secondly, that the instrument establishing the zone must be a treaty or agreement freely arrived at; thirdly, that the status of the zone defined in that instrument must be one of "total absence of nuclear weapons", and, fourthly, that the

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[7] See *infra*.

relevant instrument must also include an international system of verification and control to ensure compliance with the obligations deriving from that status.

The fifth and last of the basic elements of the definition my delegation is suggesting—namely recognition of the zone as a "nuclear-weapon-free zone" by the General Assembly—was one of the very many elements upon which it was not possible to obtain unanimity of the experts. However, since the application of such a criterion was acceptable to the majority and only a few expressed doubts in that respect, we venture to hope that the General Assembly can reach such an eminently desirable consensus.

We are convinced that recognition by the United Nations, by virtue of a declaration of its fully representative organ, the General Assembly, to the effect that a zone fulfils all the requirements needed to be regarded as a "nuclear-weapon-free zone", will constitute the best safeguard for the legitimate interests of the peoples and States of the Third World.

The capricious or self-serving objections that might be forthcoming in certain cases from members of the big military blocs, and particularly from any nuclear super-Power that sponsors them, will certainly fall to the ground before the authoritative declaration of an organ which can be considered as the spokesman of the conscience of humanity.

Moreover, it will very soon be internationally recognized—we are sure of this—that the status of [a] nuclear-weapon-free zone gives the countries and territories forming the zone not only duties and obligations, but also privileges and rights. First and foremost among these is being the beneficiaries of an undertaking on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them, a subject which I will deal with later.

Besides these primordial reasons which are more than enough to make this recognition by the General Assembly necessary, there is another very weighty reason for such recognition: the fact that "circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case", as the *Ad Hoc* Group recognizes in the very brief conclusion which appears at the end of its study. If that be so, it seems to us that, apart from the uniform indispensability of the two requirements—régime of total absence of nuclear weapons and system of verification and control—already included in the definition we have suggested, it will in fact be necessary to have an organ of unquestionable international authority, like the General Assembly, to tell us "in every case" if the "pragmatic and flexible approach" which the experts speak of has been judiciously applied and if the result of its application has been the creation of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone". Such a task is far too delicate to be left to the arbitrary judgement of the nuclear Powers.

It will be for the General Assembly to decide the specific form which

it deems appropriate for its declaration recognizing the "nuclear-weapon-free zone" character of a particular zone established by a treaty or agreement transmitted to it. As an example, I shall recall the case of the Latin American zone, in respect of which, perhaps because it was the first that was to come into force in a densely populated region, the General Assembly proclaimed its recognition in such terms of enthusiasm and conviction as would be difficult to equal, when, as we know, it declared in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 that it:

> Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples.[8]

The definition of the concept of "nuclear-weapon-free zone" which we have been describing covers any zone that is established by way of an international instrument entered into between two or more States—which will undoubtedly be the case for 99 per cent of those to be created. As regards the remaining 1 per cent, that is to say zones which might comprise the territory of one State only, it will be for the General Assembly to agree, as the occasion arises, on the procedure it considers advisable to apply for their international recognition as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2. Principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States *vis-à-vis* nuclear-weapon-free zones and the States forming them

A second question which we think it would also be extremely desirable for the General Assembly to take up at its forthcoming session is the definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon-States *vis-à-vis* nuclear-weapon-free zones recognized as such by the General Assembly and *vis-à-vis* the States forming such zones.

In that connexion, a very valuable precedent is provided by the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,[9] which, as can be gathered from the contents of chapter IV of the experts' study, was especially useful to the *Ad Hoc* Group. The same is surely true of various resolutions of the General Assembly that have dealt with this aspect, such as resolution 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, whose provisions must have had a positive influence in helping the Group reach consensus that the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon States "should be embodied in a formal legally binding instrument".[10]

The unvarying and consistent action of the General Assembly, starting in 1967 with resolution 2286 (XXII) and continuing with six other

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 621.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 847-848.

resolutions—2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,[11] 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,[12] 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,[13] 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3079 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973[14] and 3258 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974[15]—all of them adopted without a single negative vote and the large majority of them by more than 100 votes in favour, shows incontrovertibly how the General Assembly interprets its functions in this matter, on which, it would seem, the experts were unable to reach complete agreement, as may be deduced from what is stated in chapter VI of its study. In fact, in each and every one of those resolutions the General Assembly exhorted the nuclear-weapon States more or less insistently, going so far as to use the adverbial phrase "without further delay", to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The General Assembly did not take the trouble to specify the basis of the powers which it used in adopting all the resolutions I have cited. It is unquestionably true, however, that a solid legal basis for these can very easily be found in the United Nations Charter itself, whether it be "carrying out its duties under this responsibility"—to use the language of Article 24 referring to the "primary responsibility" of the Security Council—the Assembly's responsibility being its "residual responsibility" for the maintenance of international peace and security; or the powers expressly conferred upon it by Article 11 in connexion with disarmament and the regulation of armaments; or its wide powers under Article 10 to make recommendations on "any questions or any matters within the scope" of the Charter.

In the light of what I have just reviewed, it seems to us that the definition on the subject to be adopted by the Assembly might be worded as follows:

1. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, nuclear-weapon States shall have the following obligations:

   (a) to respect in all its particulars the status of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or agreement which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;
   (b) not to contribute in any way to the commission—in territories forming part of the zone—of acts resulting in a violation of the said treaty or agreement; and
   (c) not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons, against the States forming part of the zone.

2. The aforesaid obligations shall, in every case, be embodied in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, agreement or protocol, which shall be signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States.

With respect to the sources of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States—obligations which would obviously not be created by the As-

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[11] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 799.
[12] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 689–691.
[13] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 898–899.
[14] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 852–853.
[15] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 793–795.

sembly but only defined by it—it seems to me that the opinions expressed by various experts and recorded in the study of the *Ad Hoc* Group identify two that can be regarded as the main sources:

(a) The commitment entered into by virtue of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the basic principles of which, in Chapter I, is to refrain "from the threat or use of force", a commitment which must obviously and above all else embrace the commitment to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, since these represent the most destructive form of force that has been discovered by man's ingenuity; and

(b) The fact that in the case of every nuclear-weapon-free zone—the establishment of which obviously constitutes a valuable contribution to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of peace—there should be "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers", as the General Assembly stated in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 10 November 1965, in connexion with the negotiations which led to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[16] If, to make it possible for such zones to exist, the non-nuclear-weapon States assume a whole series of specific obligations, then it is fully justified that the nuclear-weapon States should, in their turn, agree to enter into a few very general and far from onerous commitments such as those included in the draft definition I read out a few moments ago.

To end this statement, which is already becoming too long, I should like to draw a few general conclusions which I shall endeavour to make very short, though without attempting to compete in brevity with the conclusion that appears at the end of the paper prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.

I shall begin by saying that, in our view, the study constitutes an eloquent reminder of the wise maxim that one should never lose sight of the wood by paying too much attention to the trees. We believe that this fulsome compilation of anonymous, often divergent opinions concerning a series of abstract hypotheses, should not cause us to lose sight of the Assembly's basic objective in deciding that the study should be made, which is clearly indicated in the relevant resolution, for example, to enhance new efforts and past achievements undertaken with a view to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

If the study is examined—as I have attempted to do, albeit very

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[16] *Ibid., 1965*, pp. 532-534.

superficially—in the light of this laudable purpose, the conclusion is inescapable that the result of the experts' laborious efforts constitutes certain proof of the imperative need for the General Assembly to intervene directly in this matter in order to decide and define, once and for all, certain basic questions relating to the question under consideration. If the experts' exercise in dialectic had produced no other result than this—and, of course, it has produced some others that are not to be disdained—it would alone be sufficient to entitle them to our gratitude.

Of these basic questions, the two which in our view deserve priority attention from the General Assembly at its thirtieth session are, on the one hand, the formulation and adoption of an internationally valid definition of the concept of "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and, on the other, a declaration spelling out the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and the States forming such zones.

In this way, the Assembly would be making an effective contribution to the establishment, in the matter under consideration, of some basic norms of that international law so frequently invoked in the study of the *Ad Hoc* Group by some of its members who seem to forget that, since the matter is not only new but very new inasmuch as the hecatombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred a bare 30 years ago, the norms of that law as might be applicable to it are either as yet non-existent or still in an embryonic stage. What is more, those norms will have to be developed with the genuine participation of all States and not, as in the nineteenth century, of an insignificant number of States. Hence the intervention of the United Nations in this case would be doubly valuable.

It should also be borne in mind that nuclear weapons and everything relating to them require exceptional treatment in terms of the law of nations in view of the fact that, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco puts it so well, such weapons "whose terrible effects are suffered indiscriminately and inexorably by military forces and civil population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species". For this reason, the most natural and appropriate procedures in such a case would be similar to those applied in the case of an epidemic, namely, an endeavour gradually to widen the zones of the world in which nuclear weapons are outlawed until the territories of the States that persist in possessing them become, as it were, contaminated islets under quarantine.

That should, in our view, be the international law applicable for solving, in the last analysis, the problems that have flourished in such an extraordinary and prolific manner in the experts' study.

We are firmly convinced that the General Assembly will be able, by the decisions it adopts in this regard at its thirtieth session, to make a decisive and invaluable contribution to the genuine encouragement and promotion of efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mexican Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Definitions of a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone" and of the Principal Obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States in Respect of Such Zones, August 20, 1975 [1]

Having examined the study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts,[2] the delegation of Mexico has reached a number of conclusions which were expounded in the statement which it made at the 682nd meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 19 August 1975.[3]

One of the most important of these conclusions is that, if, as the General Assembly of the United Nations indicated in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, "further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones" are to be enhanced,[4] it is essential that the General Assembly should adopt at its thirtieth session two internationally valid definitions: firstly, of the concept of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone", and secondly, of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The text of the definitions proposed by the delegation of Mexico is as follows:

A. Definition of the concept of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone"

"A nuclear-weapon-free zone shall be considered to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, established by any group of States in the free exercise of their sovereignty, under a treaty or convention which:

(a) defines the status of complete absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject and

(b) establishes an international system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from this status".

B. Definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones

"1. In respect of all nuclear-weapon-free zones which have been recognized as such by the General Assembly, nuclear-weapon States shall have the following obligations:

(a) to respect in all its parts the status of complete absence of nuclear weapons as defined in the treaty or convention which forms the constituent instrument of the zone;

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[1] CCD/470, August 20, 1975.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 321–349.
[3] *Supra*.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

(b) to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories that form part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention, and

(c) to refrain from using nuclear weapons or threatening to use such weapons against the States which comprise the zone.

2. The preceding obligations shall in each case be embodied in a solemn international instrument of a fully binding legal nature, such as a treaty, convention or protocol, which shall be signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States".

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 21, 1975 [1]

This is the last time that I take the floor at this session of the CCD. I want to use the opportunity to review, in rather general terms, the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the considerable number of issues related to disarmament which have been on our agenda this year. This will by necessity make my statement rather lengthy. I apologize to my colleagues.

This session has been an arduous one. CCD delegations have been kept at work and in session to a quite unusual degree, straining their resources almost to the limit. I regret to say that nevertheless concrete results of our endeavours are so far conspicuously lacking.

Let me begin with nuclear disarmament. Since the Vladivostok meeting, we have been told by the Super-Powers that strategic nuclear disarmament is near. I see no signs of anything of the kind. Instead I learn how the strategic nuclear weaponry consolidates itself on the highest level ever and how new ways of employing these forces are devised and established. These activities are said to be in the interest of stabilizing the strategic balance of terror. I think that we all would be much more reassured if this stabilization took place at a far lower level, if the danger of nuclear holocaust would be averted by concrete measures of disarmament, by finally getting rid of these most destructive weapons. That would be much better than relying on a precarious mutual understanding about correctly understanding each other's capabilities, options and choices, in a situation of utmost crisis, a situation which might, let us admit it, arise at any time as long as areas of high tension exist and present armament levels prevail.

And if it were that such an understanding really has been obtained? Why not draw the obvious conclusion that tangible measures to get rid of these weapons should be taken immediately in the present time of

[1] CCD/PV.683, pp. 13–24.

détente? This would be to the relief of all, and resources large on any scale would be freed for better uses.

The development and deployment of nuclear weapons for tactical and regional use is of particular concern to the smaller countries, certainly in Europe and also elsewhere. For those hit by a tactical or regional nuclear war, the consequences would not appear much different from those of the strategic nuclear war of particular concern to the Super-Powers. Therefore the Super-Powers should not neglect the concern of the lesser Powers. We notice disquieting technological developments, increasing the effectiveness and flexibility of these weapons and thereby bound to increase the temptations really to use them. At the same time we hear declarations about the readiness to use such weapons in support of or as a response to conventional war.

Earlier, the Swedish Government has received assurances from the three nuclear-weapon Powers represented here that there is no intention to exploit new developments in regard to the weakest of the nuclear weapons in such a way as to obliterate the demarcation, the threshold, between nuclear war and conventional war. We appreciate the fact that the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred Iklé, in a recent interview reconfirmed this position. The existence of a clear demarcation between nuclear and conventional war was and remains one of the important considerations taken into account when my country renounced nuclear weapons.

But even with this understanding I must enjoin those responsible for the introduction of nuclear weapons into Europe not to let technological and military developments run away with sound political judgement. It is disquieting, to say the least, that the in-itself frightening prospect of nuclear war in *Europe should become dependent on a combination of* extreme technology and ever more intricate multilateral political procedures. It would be much better to take steps towards tangible nuclear disarmament also at this level, lower than the strategic balance between the Super-Powers but no less repulsive a prospect to those directly concerned.

It is also so, that the existing nuclear weapons are as important a factor for many countries in assessing their attitude to the NPT as is the possibility that non-nuclear States in the future acquire their own nuclear weapons. For a European country, increases in the stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons, changes in their deployment and in the doctrines for their use are significant in this respect. After all, thousands of these weapons are ready for immediate use, which the potential weapons of threshold States are not. Such a concern was also strongly voiced by the representative of Yugoslavia at the last meeting of the NPT Review Conference.[2]

In this particular context I would like to review in a preliminary way the recent efforts by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental Experts,

[2] NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex II, pp. 32–33.

under the auspices of the CCD, to prepare a study about the principles of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[3]

The Swedish expert started his participation in the work with the notion that the Group would approach the subject in a descriptive manner. We assumed that the report would refer to all or most aspects of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is apparent in the report of the Group, however, that the subject turned out to be even more political than we had expected. This being so, I am glad to note on the other hand that the experts were able to reach consensus on many issues, some of them quite important.

This is in itself a significant result in view of the fact that various regions of the world, where nuclear-weapon-free zones could be envisaged, are indeed politically and geographically different and that, therefore, possible characteristics of potential zones must differ considerably. It is obvious to everybody that establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and in central Europe would involve entirely different parameters.

In view of our initial approach, we appreciate that the Group has referred in their report both to consensus views and to issues on which there still is disagreement. This working method has saved to the readers of the report many points of view which deserve attention on their own merits and which could be of great interest to future work in this field. I fully recommend that the CCD transmit the report to the General Assembly as it is, together with the comments that will be made by CCD delegations before we adjourn.

As to the further procedure, I don't think it would be meaningful to come back to the general problem of nuclear-weapon-free zones here in the CCD next year. The Group went as far as is realistically possible along that path. Further steps in promoting nuclear-weapon-free zones should in our view be taken regionally and with reference to concrete zone proposals.

I also want to make a few remarks in relation to specific issues reflected in the report. In some areas of the world, the primary objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone might be to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[4] In other areas with little or no internal tension, the objective would be to create a barrier against nuclear war. In many areas, of course, both objectives would apply.

In most cases, therefore, a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone would be an element of major importance. I therefore deplore that the Group was unable to reach consensus on this as a basic principle. Apparently, the nuclear-weapon States wish to reserve a right for themselves to consider such commitments on a case-by-case basis. I regret

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[3] See *ante*, pp. 321–349.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

this attitude and hope still for its reconsideration, particularly as there are reasons to believe that any case-by-case consideration should lead to the granting of such commitments.

The report also reflects the view that commitments to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of a zone, including commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against that zone, could be withdrawn if a member of the zone commits aggression or becomes an accomplice of aggression. Who would make that assessment and what would be the value of a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, if it is withdrawn in case of war? What, obviously, is most badly needed is a barrier against escalation to a nuclear war when a conventional military conflict has broken out or is imminent.

Going through the report to find something that would be of interest as a basis for discussion of possible nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, I find that many delicate and difficult problems have either been disagreed upon or left out. I can refer to the creation of safety areas in parts of the high seas and in land areas adjacent to such zones, to procedures for withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from such areas and to the verification of the implementation of provisions on transit of military vehicles, vessels and aircraft through the zone and in regard of possible military bases within the zone. The option that in certain circumstances only part of a country would be included in a zone could also have been more fully explored. I hasten to add, however, that I don't say all this in order to criticize the Group or its report. My comments are made in awareness of the fact that the Group did not have at its disposal the time necessary to cope with these difficult issues. As far as we understand, they have in part been touched upon for several years at the SALT talks and the Vienna talks on force reduction in Europe. Therefore, I must conclude that in regard to the particular problem of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group cannot serve as a fully adequate basis for a political exploration of the issues involved.

My final remark in this connexion is that it would be only natural if nuclear disarmament in Europe were to be achieved in conjunction with the general force reductions in central Europe which should be a logical consequence of the successful conclusion in Helsinki of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

I have talked about measures of nuclear disarmament directly aimed at the nuclear weapons in arsenals and in the field. Such measures would be greatly aided, indeed catalysed by an effective attack on the root of the evil, on the source from which the nuclear weapons spring, namely their continued development and testing. The achievement of an underground test ban would be such an attack. The matter of a CTB has by now been discussed and analysed for nearly two decades, technically and politically. Several countries, including my own, have contributed to the efforts to solve the technical as well as the political problems. In both ways the underground test ban is ripe since long. This

year, however, we have to our great disappointment seen only limited activity in this field of work of the CCD. It is therefore imperative that we once again try to promote these efforts towards their fulfilment. That was the reason behind my declaration, in the statement on 17 July, of the intention of the Swedish delegation to initiate a full, concrete and hopefully final discussion on all aspects of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would have to lead to renewed and successful negotiations on this priority item of our agenda. I also said that the Swedish delegation was considering to propose that the CCD for this purpose call an expert meeting next year on this issue.[5] To be able to prepare our work for the coming session I wish now to propose formally that the Committee convene in the beginning of March 1976 a meeting of experts on the remaining problems still considered to be in the way towards the discontinuance for all time of all nuclear weapons test explosions in all environments.

Before concluding my review of our dealing, this session, with nuclear disarmament, I want to assess also our meeting with experts on the arms control implications of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. We have to report on this topic to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The conclusions essential to our work here were, first, that the acquisition of the capability to make nuclear explosives, be it for the most peaceful of purposes, together with the first successful test of such an explosive, constitute the acquisition of the capability to produce, at short notice, also nuclear weapons. Secondly, such activities would therefore be contrary to the basic purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From this my Government concluded that countries without nuclear explosives but desiring to gain some potential economic benefit from the peaceful use of such explosives, should be assisted in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the principles behind that article, and that such assistance should be implemented through the IAEA. States which want to acquire a nuclear explosive capability as an aid to their political security would, on the other hand, have to be induced by political means not to enter upon such a course. One can think of pledges not to use nuclear weapons against them or guarantees of assistance. To our mind it were, however, best if relations between States were improved so that such misuse of nuclear explosives is not contemplated in the first instance.

I would now like to turn to the issue of conventional arms restraints. In a statement on 7 May 1974, the Swedish delegation pointed out that "the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and weapons systems is an extremely important problem, which merits serious international debate". At the same time, however, we were convinced that "realistic negotiations to this end can only be conducted in regional

[5] CCD/PV.673, p. 10.

forums, preferably in connexion with troop reductions, as is now being done in Vienna".[6]

This is still our conviction. We accordingly agree with the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Martin, when he said on 10 April that "it may be useful to consider restraints on conventional arms in a regional context".[7] Holding this view we certainly felt encouraged by the important declaration of Ayacucho, where countries of Latin America again showed their will and ability to set good examples to other regions in the field of disarmament.[8] Furthermore we have hopes, indeed we expect, that—as a logical consequence to the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe[9]—States carrying on negotiations on force reductions in Vienna will soon be able to arrive at some significant results. I shall quote from the statement by the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Palme, at the third stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in Helsinki on 31 July:

> What we can now rightly expect in the European context is that the negotiations in Vienna will be pursued more vigorously and with greater determination. Sweden does not now take part in those negotiations but follows them with the greatest interest, as their outcome will in the long run affect the security of the whole of Europe.

In this connexion, I want to emphasize that a regional approach to disarmament in Europe should not be a matter for military blocs only. Neutral and non-aligned countries should be given the opportunity to make their views known and to contribute actively at an appropriate time.

As to the four principles, outlined by Ambassador Martin in his April statement and intended to form a basis for a discussion on global guide-lines for the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms,[10] I shall now offer some general remarks. Our views, by the way, to a large extent coincide with those presented by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Allen, on 17 July.[11]

According to the first principle, States, when acquiring or transferring weapons, should consider whether this would have negative consequences for regional or international security. To my delegation it would indeed seem self-evident that States, in connexion with a decision to acquire weapons, deem this to be necessary for their own security. It seems further reasonable to assume that most States, when selling or transferring arms, are prepared to declare that this will not negatively affect regional or international security, and this irrespective of whether other States hold other views on the matter.

The second principle states that the acquisition of weapons by one


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
[6] CCD/PV.633, p. 12.
[7] *Ante*, p. 112.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 819–822.
[9] *Ante*, pp. 304–308.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 116–118.
[11] CCD/PV.673, pp. 16–17.

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State will affect the legitimate security interests of other States of the region and should therefore give rise to advance consultations with these States. Many States, it seems to us, would consider this an unacceptable infringement of their national sovereignty, since the principle would by implication give a right to one country to influence the arms procurement and thereby the military security of another country.

The third principle, enlarging the concept of security also to encompass progress in the social, economic and cultural fields, is in accordance with fundamental views held by my delegation. I would even say that such an enlargement of the definition of security appears to be one of the few ways to break the deadlock of disarmament, by providing an enlarged conceptual basis for the debate about national security. In the final analysis, however, as long as the world community is composed of sovereign national States, such States must retain the right to decide on their own priorities.

According to the fourth principle, States should apply the same rules for transferring technical know-how with regard to arms production as for the transfer of arms themselves. My delegation can wholly support this principle. In Sweden, transfer of know-how is in practice treated in the same way as matters concerning export of weapons. In our view, however, it belongs primarily to the main weapon-exporting countries to put restraints on themselves in this field.

After these few comments I would like to conclude my remarks on the conventional arms issue by stating that however important a solution of this question may be for the cause of disarmament, it is not yet ready for political discussions and negotiation in this forum. Therefore my delegation is convinced that the CCD must concentrate on the main problems which already since many years have been entrusted to us with the highest priority and with which we have achieved little or no progress.

I shall now turn to another matter of great concern to any disarmer, namely the reduction of military expenditure. There is no doubt that, as a means of achieving disarmament, this is a matter which is fundamental to and will influence all other disarmament efforts.

The Swedish Government has therefore with great satisfaction noted that this question again has come up for close scrutiny as a result of the report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the Group of Consultant Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets [12] last year and resolution 3254 (XXIX) of the General Assembly.[13] I would like to raise some of the points made by the Swedish Government in its letter to the Secretary-General in response to the above resolution.

The question of arms limitation is always essentially one of confidence between States. The issue is thus closely related to a Swedish proposal in the CCD advocating greater openness with regard to mili-

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[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 523–546.
[13] *Ibid.*, 784–786.

tary expenditure.[14] In this connexion I shall again quote from the statement by the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Palme, in Helsinki on 31 July:

> Sweden has pointed out a field where agreement should be in the interest of all parties. I refer to the—in our opinion—exaggerated secrecy concerning the scale and nature of military expenditures. Of course, certain aspects of a State's military preparedness cannot be made public. But we are convinced that if part of that information which is now kept secret—because of mistrust or perhaps by tradition or by bureaucracy—were released, it would be found that considerable outlays for military purposes are unnecessary. The military balance which is generally considered a guarantee of peace, could be maintained at a lower level if States knew more about one another's preparations and intentions. Confidence would deepen. Over-reaction and argument based on 'worst-case' assumptions could be avoided.

The Swedish Government shares the opinion of the experts that a proposal for reductions of military expenditures should primarily relate to the great Powers and the great-Power blocs. These States dominate up to 80 per cent the world's total military expenditure. Taking such first steps towards a durable limitation of resources for military purposes would also, of course, be conducive to creating the necessary conditions for the small States to make reductions. In such a situation, the Swedish Government would be prepared to take adequate restrictive measures.

Reductions should be made in such a way that the military balance is not upset, either globally or regionally. It should be observed that criteria such as the military expenditure share of gross national product or the military expenditure *per capita* are of interest when discussing the burden of military expenditure of different States, but are not relevant to the issue of reducing military expenditure in order to achieve internationally balanced force reductions.

In the view of the Swedish Government, a reduction of research and development resources used for military purposes would be a most essential measure to achieve disarmament. It is now estimated that about 400,000 scientists and technologists are employed in military research and development activities around the world. This use of resources, close to half of the world's scientific and technological talents and skills, is also most regrettable in the light of the enormous need for research and development resources for constructive civilian purposes and particularly for economic and social development.

The method of reducing military expenditure in order to achieve disarmament cannot, however, be a substitute for other methods of achieving similar ends. It should rather be seen as a necessary complement to the disarmament negotiations now in progress.

The Swedish delegation looks forward to the coming debate later this year at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, which we believe is the appropriate forum for handling this issue. We realize, however, that additional studies in order to resolve conceptual and technical problems involved can be required for further progress in this field. In this respect the initiative taken by the head of the United States delega-

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 123–135.

tion, Ambassador Martin, on 24 July deserves our close attention.[15] My delegation finds the approach useful and the subjects proposed generally relevant to the issue. We therefore support Mr. Martin's proposal. Regarding the procedure to be followed, we think that a study by a group of experts would be preferable to an informal meeting in the CCD, which would be too short for these highly complicated technical problems. If such a group is established, my Government is willing to contribute, as appropriate, to its work.

In this general review, I turn now, for the second time this session, to the matter of chemical weapons. In this regard the situation is most unsatisfactory. No significant progress has occurred during this session, and the situation has not therefore changed since I last discussed this matter on 29 July 1975.[16] However, I expressed the hope that delegations should take the opportunity, while waiting for the "joint initiative" of the Super-Powers, to discuss the many difficult problems in the area and present working papers on such issues. I have noted with satisfaction that since then the representative of Iran, Ambassador Fartash, in an interesting statement on 5 August has reviewed the present situation in this field.[17] Of particular interest to us, because of its bearing on the Swedish analysis of the matter, seems also to be the working paper by Japan of 8 August 1975,[18] discussing delimitation of chemical agents for peaceful purposes and the question of verification. We will devote the time available to us until our next session to study that paper carefully, together with the other ones that we have received during this session.

In my review of the business before us, as we approach the end of this summer session, I now at last turn to another new task, that of considering a convention prohibiting environmental modification for hostile purposes. Our recent meeting with experts on environmental modification has, I think, been quite useful for that purpose. Some of the methods for such modification have been explained in detail to us and we have also learned about the related environmental activities of the WMO and UNEP. The Canadian delegation provided us with a very comprehensive and usefully analysed list of such modification methods. Our experts and those of the delegation of the Netherlands could already during our meeting with the experts bring this analysis still further. Apart from gaining increased technical understanding we have also achieved a somewhat greater political understanding of the issues. In particular my delegation was gratified by the support to our notion that it should be useful to consider hostile environmental modification according to three categories of context. The first context would be a shooting war, where environmental modification would be used to assist military operations. Another and quite different context

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[15] *Ante*, pp. 274–279.
[16] *Ante*, pp. 287–291.
[17] CCD/PV.678, pp. 13–19.
[18] CCD/466.

would be conflict without a shooting war, where environmental modification is used systematically to put pressure on a society, somewhat like economic warfare. A third context one could think of is where the primary purpose of the environment modifications are not hostile but which have negative international effects, incidental to some in itself acceptable or praiseworthy domestic environmental modification. Problems in this third category would, however, be referred to the already ongoing efforts by UNEP to establish international environmental legislation. Similarly, problems in the first category would fall under the prohibition of environmental warfare being established in the context of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, as pointed out by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands during our informal meeting with the experts.

In this way the task of the CCD could be reduced to deal with the second category only, something which appears to me as a desirable delimitation and simplification of our task. The CCD will have to devote much more work to this matter and is so far only able to give a progress report to the United Nations General Assembly.

In summary I find that our meeting with experts on environmental modification nevertheless has provided us with a good basis for further work in the CCD and the United Nations General Assembly and in particular it will assist us in identifying areas suitable for international agreements.

When I compare the list of important tasks given to us, the noticeable strain on our resources during this year's work and the lack of any important results obtained, I cannot avoid to look for some ways to improve our performance. First, it is obviously necessary to increase the resources at our disposal and at the disposal of our secretariat, here and in New York, so that we really can deal effectively with all the disarmament work entrusted to us. Secondly, the political basis for our work must be improved. All nuclear-weapon States should be brought into our work. Efforts to bring about the world disarmament conference with this purpose in mind should therefore not cease. That the need for a real widening of the disarmament efforts is felt also outside the CCD is witnessed by statements here to the effect that the nonaligned countries consider to take up disarmament on their agenda. There have been indications that they consider a special General Assembly session devoted to that topic. Thirdly and finally, I think that in our present situation we could be much helped by reconsidering our over-all approach. When the work in the ENDC started in 1962, the basic task of general and complete disarmament was in the foreground. In encountering difficulties in this task, the ENDC soon branched out into a number of lesser topics, then called collateral measures. We have worked at these measures for more than a decade now, and in recent years we have branched out again, delving into what might be called subcollateral measures. I think that we would be wise to make efforts to turn back to basic, principal things again, to questions of

economics, ethics, morality and, quite simply, survival. Disarmament problems must be negotiated as an integral part of the global issues of survival in our time.

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Meerburg) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 21, 1975 [1]

Today, at one of the last meetings of the CCD this year, the delegation of the Netherlands would like to touch upon three subjects on our agenda. I would first like to say a few words with respect to military budgets and to the study on nuclear-weapon-free zones. I will later touch on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions and a comprehensive test ban.

On 24 July 1975, the distinguished delegate of the United States made an interesting proposal. He suggested that the CCD should undertake a study on certain aspects of military budgets. As a follow-up on the, at least in our opinion, excellent report by the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Martin suggested a study by the CCD on (a) the definition of military expenditures; (b) the evaluation of resources in the military sector; (c) the deflation of current price data; and (d) the making of international value comparisons.[2]

My Government fully endorses the United States proposal. The CCD could, in our view, lay a more solid and common basis under the by itself attractive idea of reducing the staggering military budgets in the world. My Government is of the opinion, however, that mutually agreed reductions, whatever their potential importance, cannot usefully be tackled as long as we do not know how we can compare military budgets of States having different budget systems, how reductions will affect the strength of military forces in different countries, how monetary changes affect budget-comparisons, etc. The CCD seems to be the right body on disarmament to study such questions in depth.

As to how the CCD could work on this question, my Government has some preference for a kind of small expert group, working within the context of the CCD. As the problems involved deal with an extremely complicated matter, we need the expertise of highly qualified people. I could imagine that, when the CCD established such a group, one would look mainly to those countries and organizations which can offer the necessary first-class expertise, instead of appointing representatives on a strictly balanced way between the different groups in the CCD. The experts, who would not necessarily have to be governmental experts, would prepare a report to the CCD as a first step. The CCD would

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[1] CCD/PV.683, pp. 24–29.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 274–279.

get the necessary time to study the report and to make comments on it. During that stage, informal sessions with the assistance of experts could perhaps be helpful. The whole scheme would be rather different from the study on nuclear-weapon-free zones in view of the considerably more technical character of a study on military budgets as compared with the mainly political nuclear-weapon-free zone concept.

This takes me directly to the study on nuclear-weapon-free zones which we received a short time ago. First of all, I want to express the gratitude of my delegation that it could participate fully as an observer in the work of the *Ad-hoc* Group of Governmental Experts, even in the informal sessions. From a personal point of view, I did not envy the experts, who had to work so hard to complete their study. My delegation thanks the experts for their untiring efforts.

My Government wishes to study the report carefully, and I am therefore not in a position to comment already on the substance of it. My Government reserves, however, its right to speak on the subject during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

During the formulation of resolution 3261 D (XXIX), which was later adopted by a great majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations,[3] it was realized that the complex problems connected with peaceful nuclear explosions could best be dealt with in different bodies: the IAEA, the NPT Review Conference and the CCD. The CCD was given the task to study the arms control implications of PNEs. On the initiative of the delegation of Japan, our Committee had informal talks on the issues involved, while in the same period and afterwards several statements on the subject were made in plenary sessions. In particular, my delegation listened with great attention to the statements made by the United States, Canada, Pakistan, India and Yugoslavia. Today, the Netherlands delegation would like to express its views formally, although I realize that most of these will sound familiar to you.

The arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions can be split up into two groups of problems: (1) how to prevent PNEs from leading to horizontal proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities; and (2) how to prevent PNEs from contributing to vertical proliferation by being misused by nuclear-weapon States to gather weapons-related information, especially under test ban conditions. The first aspect got more attention during our discussions than the second, pending the outcome of bilateral negotiations on the so-called threshold test ban. My delegation considers therefore our work in the CCD as unfinished.

Especially through the clear information given by the United States—the only nuclear-weapon State to send experts to our informal meetings—the Committee obtained considerably more insight into the proliferation aspects of PNEs. For example, our earlier feeling that many characteristics of an efficient peaceful nuclear device are more or less just those which make these devices suitable as a weapon got a

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806.

more firm base. Of course, for a country which has an extensive and sophisticated programme with respect to nuclear explosives, some different lines of research and development could exist to optimize explosives for a specific application. I suppose that the Yugoslav delegate referred to this point when he asked why two lines of explosives development, peaceful and military, existed in some countries. Those different lines of optimization do not alter, however, the basic notion that there is no essential difference between a nuclear weapon and a peaceful nuclear device. This is already clear from the fact that all peaceful devices can be used as weapons. It is therefore, as far as we can see, totally impossible to develop peaceful nuclear devices without at the same time acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Another related aspect was brought out more clearly in our discussions: to develop an economically interesting peaceful nuclear device, if that is possible at all, it is necessary to embark upon a long, expensive and sophisticated programme of research and tests. The main nuclear Powers possessed already such a programme for their nuclear weapons development, so it was not a heavy burden for them to look for peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices. For a non-nuclear-weapon State to embark upon a peaceful programme from scratch seems to be a very heavy burden indeed with respect both to financial and to human resources, in particular if we take into account that the economic benefits of PNEs are barely proven. The Japanese delegate, in his excellent final statement during the informal talks, came to the conclusion that the development of a useful explosive device for peaceful purposes by a non-nuclear-weapon State does not seem feasible. I have that same feeling also. Of course, every non-nuclear-weapon State which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty has formally not renounced the right to develop its own nuclear devices. But such a country could also try to understand the views of other countries, who, from security and arms-control considerations, look at such a development with great concern. The subject matter of disarmament negotiations is weapons capabilities, not intentions.

Perhaps I may make a side remark. As you will be aware, the Government of the Netherlands is a proponent of a new economic order, an international system of co-operation between the developed and the developing countries. Such an order would require a major effort by both developed and developing countries to narrow the present totally unacceptable gap in development between different areas of the world. In my opinion, it would be a waste of scarce financial and human resources to embark upon programmes to develop technologies of which the outcome is very uncertain and at best marginal for the economy.

For my Government, there is only one conclusion: if PNEs are on balance thought worth-while, it is by far preferable that they are carried out by the present nuclear-weapon States only, both on behalf of parties and on behalf of non-parties to the NPT. The world may not be very safe at the moment, it is certainly not going to be safer if more

and more countries are going to develop nuclear explosive capabilities.

I will turn now to the second aspect of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, the question of how to prevent PNEs from being misused for weapons tests by nuclear-weapon States, especially under test ban conditions. As I said before, the CCD was not in a position to study this question sufficiently pending the outcome of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[4] Still, the informal meetings have provided us with interesting information.

Let me first say that for a non-nuclear-weapon State like the Netherlands it is difficult to come to any definite views on the subject. However, from the discussions and our own assessment, my Government has come to the following conclusions:

(a) In the case of a threshold test ban, it is sufficient to verify the yield of an explosion. If the yield is lower than the threshold, no further verification is necessary on the character of the explosion, e.g., military or peaceful.

(b) Considerable verification problems arise, however, in the situation where the yield of the PNE is above the threshold. In this case it is not only necessary to verify that the explosion serves peaceful purposes, but also that no weapons-related information is obtained at the same time.

(c) When a comprehensive test ban is in force, the same holds for all yields, since the threshold in this case is zero kilotons.

I admit that the second and third conclusions are mainly derived from information presented by the delegation of the United States. The Soviet representative stated in this Committee that, when a comprehensive test ban is achieved, a solution for the PNE problem can always be found. My Government would certainly hope that he is right, but as long as we do not obtain more technical information on how such a system could be set up, only somewhat conflicting views can be taken into account in our observations.

As is well-known, the Netherlands considers the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban an extremely important goal in the field of arms control and disarmament. As far as I can see at the moment, PNEs would present serious verification problems in the context of a CTB. Although I admit that certain elements of a verification system could diminish the risk of misuse of PNEs for purposes of weapons development, I do not have the impression that a foolproof system can be developed. This brings us to the question whether it would not be preferable to include both weapons tests and peaceful explosions under a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Perhaps I may point out that under the Partial Test Ban Treaty of

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–227.

1963 also, nuclear weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions are treated in the same way.[5]

Under a ban on all nuclear tests, one could perhaps design a system under which, in exceptional cases, PNEs would be allowed, provided that, for example, an appropriate international organ would give its approval.

Of course, one must always balance the advantages and disadvantages of certain activities. If peaceful nuclear explosions were of extreme importance for the world economy and a ban on PNEs would consequently seriously hamper the development of States, one could come to the conclusion, in a final analysis, that the advantages of PNEs are greater than the risks. However, at the moment I do not see any such compelling reasons for the application of PNEs, a conclusion which brought, *inter alia*, Canada to suggest a moratorium on PNEs.

Some delegations have emphasized, however, that no one at the moment can foresee what possibilities PNEs present for the future and that therefore an *a priori* cut-off of all PNEs for all times would be undesirable. Also, such a moratorium would not be very worth-while if it would not help to bring a comprehensive weapons test ban nearer. In this respect I have a great deal of understanding for the distinguished delegate of India when he spoke about the subject on 31 July.[6] It would be a cynical situation indeed, if the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be banned while nuclear weapons tests would continue unabated. My delegation would like to suggest a way out from this dilemma.

As is well-known, a great majority of the world community is of the opinion that a comprehensive test ban must be concluded as soon as possible. A problem is how to make such a ban universal. In the NPT Review Conference, a solution for this problem was suggested by a considerable number of delegations, that is

> . . . that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement open to all States, and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering States for a *specified time*, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.[7]

I may now suggest that such a ban for a specified time would be coupled to a temporary ban on PNEs. This would mean:

(a) The PNE question would have a direct relationship with a ban on nuclear weapons tests, a view expressed by several countries. All nuclear explosions would be banned.

(b) There would be no need to develop a verification system to prevent the misuse of PNEs for weapons tests. Thus a possible stumbling-

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[5] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[6] CCD/PV.677, pp. 28–29.
[7] *Ante*, p. 154.

block on the way towards the temporary CTB would be removed.

(c) The possibility would be left open that after the specified time, when perhaps more compelling reasons exist for PNE applications, the situation would be completely reviewed and adequate procedures developed. Thus no country has to be afraid that possible useful applications of PNEs would be banned for always.

The whole scheme would give some breathing time and be in accordance with the very strong feeling of many countries, including my own, to stop nuclear testing as soon as possible.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 21, 1975 [1]

The Group of Government Experts has submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a comprehensive study of the problem of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[2] The Committee will have to transmit the study of this problem to the United Nations General Assembly. Since the study does not indicate the views of individual States on this problem, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to explain the position of the Soviet Union on the problem under discussion.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the problem of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and has set itself the task of promoting the establishment of such zones in various parts of the world. The establishment of these zones would promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in various regions, the strengthening of the security of States in these regions and at the same time international security as a whole. Agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones would serve as important supplements to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thus to the consolidation of the régime of the non-proliferation of such weapons. On the basis of this principle, the Soviet Union supported the proposal, at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, that a comprehensive study should be made of this question and that a special report on the subject should be submitted to the General Assembly. The Soviet delegation assumes that the purpose of such a study is to consider the positions of States concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with a view to promoting their establishment.

In the consideration of problems relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, an important part is played by the requirements to be included in the agreements providing for the establishment of the zones. The Soviet Union considers that any agreement on the

[1] CCD/PV.683, pp. 29–33.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 321–349.

establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should genuinely ensure that the territory of the States parties to such an agreement is turned into a zone entirely free of nuclear weapons and preclude any kind of loophole for violating the nuclear-weapon-free status of such zones. This type of agreement must ensure the full and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons in the territory of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Moreover, such agreements must provide for the following undertakings by the States members of the zone: not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to try to acquire direct or indirect control over such weapons and devices; not to allow the emplacement and storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the territory of the zone; and not to allow the transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and their transit through the territory of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, including entry of vessels carrying nuclear weapons into the ports of the zone.

Bearing in mind that nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes cannot be technically differentiated from military nuclear explosive devices, the above prohibitions should also extend to nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

Since the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the utilization of the benefits that can be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions, it is in favour of enabling States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones to obtain services from nuclear Powers, both on a bilateral basis and through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the matter of carrying out nuclear explosions. Such explosions must be conducted under appropriate international supervision and in accordance with the procedures evolved by IAEA. The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to examine on a practical basis proposals for rendering services to States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the carrying-out of peaceful nuclear explosions.

An important factor in concluding agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is the problem of the boundaries of those zones. The boundaries of nuclear-weapon-free zones must be determined in accordance with generally recognized rules of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and in straits used for international navigation. An agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone cannot extend the nuclear-weapon-free status of a zone to the territory of States not situated in the zone or to the high seas, since that would constitute a violation of generally recognized rules of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

As to the membership of nuclear-weapon-free zones, we should like to reaffirm the Soviet Union's opinion that obligations for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can be assumed not only by groups of States comprising whole continents or large geographical

regions, but also by smaller groups of States or even by individual countries.

An important problem relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is that of determining the range of obligations which the nuclear States must assume with regard to those zones. These must include:

—the obligation to refrain from directly or indirectly transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and control over such weapons or explosive devices to States members of the zone;
—the obligation not to help, encourage or incite any State member of the zone to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by any means whatsoever or to obtain control over such weapons or explosive devices;
—the obligation not to emplace or stock nuclear weapons in the territories of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the obligation to refrain from sending nuclear weapons in transit through the territories of these zones and from allowing vessels carrying nuclear weapons to enter the ports of the zones.

In the context of the fulfilment by States of the obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the nuclear Powers would declare that they will refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Soviet Union for its part, will be prepared to assume the obligation to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones provided they are genuinely free of nuclear weapons, and the other nuclear States will assume similar obligations. At the same time, the Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations concerning respect for the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zones if a State in respect of which it has assumed such obligations engages in aggression or becomes a participant in aggression.

In view of the fact that under agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones States possessing nuclear weapons must assume specific and important obligations in relation to those zones, nuclear States must be enabled to participate in negotiations for the conclusion of any agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Without such participation, the nuclear States cannot be expected to show willingness to assume obligations in connexion with the establishment of any particular nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important means of limiting armaments and entails important obligations on the part of States which are members of the zone and of States which do not form part of the zone. The obligations assumed by all States parties to an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone must be strictly observed. All parties to the agreement must be absolutely confident that

all other States parties to the agreement are fulfilling the obligations they have assumed under the agreement and that the nuclear-weapon-free zone is indeed what it is described to be. It is therefore essential to establish effective control for verifying the observance by States of the obligations assumed by them under the agreements on such zones. The forms and methods of control should be considered and studied in all their aspects. The extensive and positive experience in such matters acquired by IAEA, which is responsible for control of the observance of basic obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be used in solving problems of control over the implementation of agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Control over the observance by States of their obligations under agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones might be entrusted directly to IAEA in individual cases.

It is common knowledge that the solution of the problem of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone gives rise to a series of other problems. One of them is the question which arises when States intending to form or join a nuclear-weapon-free zone participate in military alliances. In this connexion, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to declare that the fact that a given State belongs to a military alliance cannot justify exemption from any of the obligations laid down for States joining a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world makes it necessary to solve in each individual case any problems which may be peculiar to the particular zone that it is proposed to establish. In this connexion, we should like to point out that the Soviet Union's position with regard to proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in any part of the world will be determined, in each individual case, by the specific content of these proposals (geographical boundaries of the zone, its status, etc.) and by the attitude to these proposals adopted by other States, particularly the prospective participants.

As to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),[3] the Soviet delegation notes that the Treaty has some important shortcomings, such as the admissibility of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions, contrary to the procedure established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[4] failure to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through the territory of the zone and the extension of the scope of the Treaty to the area of the high seas, contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law.

These are the considerations which express the Soviet Union's position on the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Soviet delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the fact that these considerations have been reflected in the study on the problem

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts, the report on which has been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament and is now being considered.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, August 21, 1975 [1]

The Soviet Union, like the United States, is today submitting for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The purpose of suomitting this document to the Committee is to pave the way for preventing the development—and the introduction into the arsenals of States—of a new, extremely dangerous weapon, namely the use of environmental modification as a means of warfare. The development of such a weapon and its use for military or other hostile purposes would mark a new and dangerous stage in the expansion of the ways and means of waging war. At this time, it is difficult to foresee all the consequences of a sequence of events in which techniques of influencing nature for military purposes might be used in practice and developed. There can be no doubt, however, that such a sequence of events would have extremely adverse effects for mankind.

In pursuance of its unremitting resolve to strengthen the peace and security of peoples and to bring about international application of extensive arms-control and disarmament measures, the Soviet Union submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session an item on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. In his statement at the General Assembly on 24 September 1974, A.A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, explained as follows the reasons for the introduction of that item:

> The achievements of scientific and technical progress have expanded the possibilities of influencing nature and the climate of the globe, and in a certain sense, of controlling the complex and powerful processes involved. Unfortunately, the latest discoveries can be used not only for creative, but also for military purposes, with extremely destructive consequences for mankind. These are not the conjectures of science fiction writers, but an actual threat that is assuming an ever more realistic shape. It is in the interests of all peoples to nip this threat in the bud.[2]

In putting forward this problem for consideration by the General Assembly, the USSR proposed that an international convention should be concluded, outlawing the military use of the environment. The

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[1] CCD/PV.684, pp. 6–9.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 514.

Soviet Union submitted a draft convention on the subject to the Assembly.[3]

The problem raised by the Soviet Union aroused great interest in the General Assembly. A large group of States supported the Soviet proposal on the need to prohibit action to influence the environment for military and other hostile purposes. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly recognizes that it is

> necessary to adopt, through the conclusion of an appropriate international convention, effective measures to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health.

The General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of such a convention and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.[4]

In pursuance of the task of preparing an international convention on this problem, the Soviet Union and the United States have held consultations, of which the Committee was informed by the representatives of the USSR and the United States. In the course of those consultations, preliminary agreement has been reached on a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In submitting the text of this draft for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to explain some of its provisions.

The preamble notes that "military use of environmental modification techniques could have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects harmful to human welfare, but that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations".[5] This provision of the preamble fully corresponds to the views expressed by experts at unofficial meetings of the Committee on Disarmament. The experts observed that modification of nature for military or any other hostile purposes would have consequences that would be extremely unfavourable to mankind.

The preamble then emphasizes the desire of the parties to the convention "to limit the potential danger to mankind from means of warfare involving the use of environmental modification techniques".

Article I of the draft defines the basic obligations of the parties to the convention as follows:

> . . . not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

Article I also contains a provision concerning the obligation of the

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 516–517.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 815–816.
[5] The text of the draft convention is printed *post*, pp. 385–388.

parties to the convention not to assist, encourage or induce others to engage in the aforementioned kind of prohibited activities. The meaning of this article is quite obvious and hardly calls for any comment.

Article II defines the term "environmental modification techniques". This term refers to

> any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space, so as to cause such effects as earthquakes and tsunamis, an upset in the ecological balance of a region, or changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms), in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, in climate patterns, or in ocean currents.

Article III states that the provisions of the convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes or international economic and scientific co-operation in the utilization, preservation, and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

Article IV lays down the obligation of the parties to the convention, in accordance with their constitutional processes, to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the convention.

Article V provides for consultations between the parties to the convention in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the convention. It also provides for the right of the parties to the convention to lodge a complaint with the Security Council in the event of a breach by any State party of the obligations it has assumed and it includes an obligation of the parties to co-operate in carrying out any investigation of the complaint by the Security Council. The article also establishes the obligation to provide assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to a party to the convention which has been harmed as a result of its violation by any of its parties.

The provisions of the draft convention relating to the proposal of amendments to the convention, its signature and its entry into force are similar to those contained *inter alia* in the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons.

The Convention is of unlimited duration.

The conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques would be of great significance for the solution of an important international problem, that of preventing the use of geophysical and meteorological methods of warfare. The solution of this problem would represent a new, important step on the road to limitation of the arms race and to disarmament.

It would be a manifestation of goodwill and intelligence in the work of improving relations between States and of intensifying and broadening international *détente*.

The USSR delegation expresses the hope that the members of the

Committee on Disarmament will give due attention to the proposal submitted for their consideration on the above-mentioned problem. We appeal to the members of the Committee to enter into negotiations on the basis of the draft convention now before them, with a view to finalizing agreement on it as soon as possible and thereafter bringing into force a new international instrument relating to the problem of disarmament and strengthening international peace and security.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, August 21, 1975 [1]

The United States today is tabling a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. A parallel draft is being tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union. We are presenting the draft convention as a basis for consideration by all governments and for negotiation in the CCD.[2]

Previous discussions in the United Nations General Assembly, in the series of bilateral meetings between representatives of the Soviet Union and my Government, and here in this Committee, have indicated clearly the serious concern felt by many States, including my own, over the potentially catastrophic dangers to mankind if environmental modification techniques were to be developed as weapons of war. Comments made by the experts at our recent informal meetings on this subject underline the need to develop effective measures to control military or any other hostile use of those techniques having major adverse effects before such techniques can be developed and perfected.

In the past few weeks, various delegations have provided data on the existing state of the art in environmental modification and have hypothesized about the nature of possible future techniques. From these data we can see that, while environmental warfare is not practical on a militarily significant scale at present, understanding and technology in the field are increasing. Significant advances may be possible in the course of time. Some scientists believe, for example, that methods might be developed for intentionally and selectively effecting harmful changes in the composition of the earth's atmosphere or in its climate, or causing floods or drought. An ambitious, incautious, or desperate State might then resort to the use of such techniques. At present there is an opportunity to prohibit such use. We should seize that opportunity.

The United States' delegation believes that development of a generally accepted convention along the lines of the draft we are tabling today would best allow us to accomplish the objectives of the General Assembly, the CCD, and of the United States-USSR joint statement of July 3,

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[1] CCD/PV.684, pp. 9–12.
[2] The draft convention is printed *infra*.

1974.[3] At the same time it would not discourage the development of peaceful and beneficial environmental modification techniques.

The formulation of a convention imposing restraints on environmental warfare presented difficult and complex problems of definition. This is the case because the development of environmental modification techniques is still at an early stage and a treaty will necessarily have to deal with future discoveries. This draft seeks to resolve such definitional problems.

The draft convention would prohibit military or any other hostile use—as a means of destruction, damage, or injury—of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The prohibition against "military or any other hostile use" covers two types of environmental warfare. First, it covers the hostile use of environmental modification techniques in armed conflict or to initiate such conflict. Secondly, it covers the use of such techniques for the specific purpose of causing destruction, damage, or injury, even when no other weapons are used or there is no other military operation taking place. We believe this draft provides a basis for distinguishing between the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons, which is covered by the prohibition, and the environmental impact of other weapons, which is not covered.

The draft deals with environmental modification techniques whose use would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. This is in order to focus on the most important aspects of the problem: potential applications of such techniques as weapons which could cause the gravest harm to man and his environment. An important consideration in this regard is that in any limitation on the hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, the attainable degree of verification of compliance with treaty constraints obviously is related to the scale of activity. Accordingly, the possibilities for verification decrease as the size, duration, or severity of the activity diminishes.

Included in the proposed Convention is an illustrative list of effects of environmental modification techniques subject to prohibition. The list includes earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; or changes in weather patterns, the state of the ozone layer, climate patterns or ocean currents.

The draft does not include a ban on military research or development. Such a ban would be ineffective in view of the dual applicability to civilian and military ends of much research and development in this field, and the difficulties which could be encountered in determining whether all parties were observing the prohibition.

Let me now comment on specific portions of the draft convention itself. The preamble briefly explains the problems that the convention is designed to address and provides a framework for the specific obligations which follow. The second paragraph expresses the point that

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 231–232.

advances of science and technology are giving rise to the possibility that deliberate actions can release significant natural forces or significantly alter the natural state, thus giving man the potential for modifying the environment to his own ends. The third paragraph highlights the essential difference between the great harm which military uses of environmental modification techniques might produce and possible benefits which peaceful uses might bring. The fourth paragraph reflects the commitment to limit the potential danger to mankind from such military activities. The fifth places the agreement in the context of the goals and objectives of the international community.

Articles I and II taken together form the operative substance of the convention. They are closely interdependent. Article I contains the basic obligation not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another State party. It also provides for an obligation not to assist, encourage, or induce any other State, group of States, or international organization to engage in such use.

Article II provides a definition of environmental modification techniques. This term refers to techniques designed to manipulate deliberately the natural processes of the Earth, its oceans and atmosphere, or of outer space. The article is, therefore, comprehensive in its coverage of the natural environment. Article II also provides an illustrative list of effects which serves to define the type of phenomena to which the prohibition applies.

Article III makes it clear that the treaty does not apply to the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and that it does not stand in the way of international co-operation in this regard.

Article IV provides for the legal implementation of the convention within individual States party, wherever needed for domestic reasons.

Article V deals with problems that might arise in applying the convention's provisions. The article sets forth the basic undertaking for consultation and co-operation among the parties and a procedure for submitting complaints to the United Nations Security Council in the event a party believes that there has been a breach of obligation.

Articles VI through IX set out provisions covering such matters as amendments, duration, and entry into force. The draft contains blanks in articles VI, VIII, and IX, where the convention's depositary or depositaries remain to be identified. In addition, paragraph two of article VI leaves open the number of instruments of acceptance of an amendment required for its entry into force for those governments that have accepted it, while paragraph three of article VIII leaves open the number of ratifications required to bring the convention into force. Article VII provides that the convention shall be of unlimited duration.

In tabling this draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, the United States believes that it can serve as the basis for the CCD's further con-

sideration of the subject. We look forward to hearing views of other delegations on the proposal, and hope that our deliberations will lead to early agreement.

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other *Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques*, August 21, 1975 [1]

The States Party to this Convention,

Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of limiting the arms race, and of bringing about disarmament, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare;

Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities with respect to modification of the environment;

Realizing that military use of environmental modification techniques could have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects harmful to human welfare, but that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations;

Desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from means of warfare involving the use of environmental modification techniques;

Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of trust among nations and to the further improvement of the international situation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provision of paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

As used in Article I, the term "environmental modification techniques" refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate

[1] The draft convention was submitted to the CCD on Aug. 21, 1975, by the USSR as CCD/471 and by the U.S. as CCD/472. The two texts are identical.

manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space, so as to cause such effects as earthquakes and tsunamis, an upset in the ecological balance of a region, or changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms), in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, in climate patterns, or in ocean currents.

ARTICLE III

The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes by States Party, or international economic and scientific co-operation in the utilization, preservation and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE V

1. The States Party to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of this Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

2. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Party to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council de-

cides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

ARTICLE VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to _____ which shall circulate it to all States Party.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Party which have accepted it, upon the deposit with _____ of instruments of acceptance by _____. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instruments of acceptance.

ARTICLE VII

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with _____.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by _____ in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For those states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The _____ shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by _____ in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IX

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with _____ which shall send certified copies thereof to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done in _____ On _____

Television Interview with President Ford [Extract], August 25, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Q. Back to an international issue, Mr. President, the continuation of détente with Russia under your Administration has been criticized that Russia has the advantage in this. How do you look at that?

THE PRESIDENT. I categorically deny that. Détente as it has proceeded is a two-way street. It can't answer every question that arises in the international scene, but détente has been very helpful in easing and relaxing tensions between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

In my judgment, there has been a balanced give-and-take by the Soviet Union and by ourselves. I can assure you that in the process of negotiating the strategic arms limitation agreement number two, there will be no unfair advantage gained by either side.

It has to be a completely fair and equitable reduction in strategic nuclear capabilities, but it is also important to understand that if we don't get a SALT II agreement, it means that the arms race continues, that we, the United States, will have to spend roughly $2 billion to $3 billion more a year to keep even with the Soviet Union in their planned strategic arms program.

So, it is to the advantage of both sides, the Soviet Union and ourselves to put a cap on the nuclear arms race, as Mr. Brezhnev and I did on a temporary basis at Vladivostok in December of last year.[2]

I can assure you that we will be tough Yankee traders, and I expect them to do the same. The net result will be a responsible cap on the nuclear arms race. If we do that, it makes our overall economic picture, our overall budget picture, a great deal sounder and better.

ARMS LIMITATION

Q. On arms limitation, how do you look at it right now? Can we be optimistic, pessimistic? We have worked on it so long.

THE PRESIDENT. I am optimistic, but I recognize there are some yet controversial issues and some technical matters that will satisfy both sides. We have to be able to have a high degree of capability of verifica-

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 905–906.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

tion as to whether or not the Soviet Union is living up to the promises made if and when a SALT II agreement is made.

We have a tremendous technical capability in this regard, through a variety of means. I am sure they feel the same way.

But if the technical problems of verification, if other matters of balance are worked out—and I think it is possible—I think we will have a SALT II agreement.

. . . . . .

Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Use of Measurements of Lethality for Definition of Agents of Chemical Warfare, August 26, 1975 [1]

SUMMARY

To arrive at a Treaty limiting or prohibiting chemical weapons it may be necessary to define what chemical agents shall fall within the terms of the Treaty in which case it will also be necessary to agree to a measure of lethality. The specific problems associated with determination of lethality of chemical warfare agents are discussed and the general concept of the LD_{50} as a measure of lethality is explained.

It is recommended that separate standards of lethality should be adopted for three groups of agents, according to their routes of entry into the human body, i.e., inhaled gases or vapours, percutaneously lethal materials, and supertoxic solids. It is also recommended that a reference toxic material be adopted by agreement for each of these three groups of agents; and that the reference toxic material should be a readily available substance chosen to have a lethality equal or slightly less than what is agreed to be the least lethal of chemical agents to be restricted or prohibited in each class.

A specific proposal based on the above general principles is submitted for discussion.

DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT SUFFIELD
RALSTON, ALBERTA

MEASUREMENT OF LETHALITY OF TOXIC MATERIALS: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LD_{50}

The lethality of a toxic material is usually determined by administering the material to several groups of uniform animals of a single species. The groups usually contain from 5 to 30 individuals, the number depending on the degree of accuracy required, and on the availability

[1] CCD/473, August 26, 1975.

of suitable animals. An accurate measurement of LD_{50} requires the use of from 30 to 100 animals; tests using groups of animals smaller than 5 individuals yield only approximate results. Within each group, the animals are equally exposed to the same toxic material: in the case of injected toxic substances, each animal receives an amount proportional to his body weight: in the case of inhaled gases, each animal is exposed to the same concentration of the gas diluted in air for the same length of time. At a selected time after the end of the exposure (from a few hours to several days, depending on the nature of the effects of the poison) the number of dead animals in the group is counted.

Each of the several groups of animals is given a different dosage level, beginning with a dosage which kills few or none of the animals in the group, and increasing for each group until a dosage is reached which kills all or nearly all the animals in the group. The stepwise increases in dosage are chosen to be sufficiently small to result in two or three of the groups having killing ratios between 20% and 80%.

A set of data obtained in this way is then subjected to a mathematical process which estimates the dose which would be expected to kill 50% of a large population of similar animals. The resulting figure is the dose for 50% kill or LD_{50} and is usually expressed as milligrams of toxic material per kilogram of body weight.

LD_{50} values for a given toxic material vary considerably, depending on a number of factors, some of which are:—

Concentration of the dosage;
Rate of administration;
Route of application;
Animal (species
(age
(sex
(genetic strain
Time of determination of death

Estimates of lethality for man are usually based on LD_{50} figures from more than one species of mammals extrapolated to a body weight of 70 Kg. When results with different species are in wide disagreement, results obtained with primate species are given disproportionate weight in making the human estimate.

Measurement of Lethality of Inhaled Toxic Materials

When the toxic material is a vapour or aerosol which is inhaled into the lungs, practical difficulties arise in determining the amount of toxic material actually inhaled by each individual animal exposed. This determination would be required in order to calculate the LD_{50} in mg. toxic material inhaled per Kilogram of body weight.

These difficulties are normally avoided by using the LCt_{50} as the measure of toxicity. The concentration of the toxic material in the air (in mgm. per cubic metre) is multiplied by the time of exposure (in

minutes). The resulting product or Ct, is a measure of the dosage breathed by each animal which allows for variations in size. The amount of air an animal breathes per minute is approximated proportional to body weight; and therefore Ct values are proportional to inhaled dosage per Kilogram.

$$LD_{50}\,(\text{inhaled}) = LCt_{50} \times \frac{\text{liters of air inhaled per minute}}{\text{Kilograms body weight}}$$

Either LD_{50} (inhaled) or LCt_{50} can be used as indices of vapour toxicity, however, the LCt_{50} has obvious practical and theoretical advantages over the LD_{50} (inhaled) for comparison of lethality of inhaled materials.

Measurement of Lethality of Toxic Material Absorbed Through the Skin

For toxic materials (usually liquids of low volatility) which cause death when absorbed through the skin, the LD_{50} (percutaneous) may be estimated by applying measured amounts of liquid droplets to the bare shaved skin of suitable animals, while at the same time preventing the inhalation of vapours. For extremely toxic materials, difficulties in measuring and applying the very small amounts of liquid may be encountered; in these cases, the toxic material may be suitably diluted in a non-toxic volatile solvent. The calculation of the LD_{50} is the same as that previously described, and is expressed proportionally to the body weight, i.e., mg. per Kgm.

Possible Approaches to Standards of Lethality for Treaty Purposes

A standard of lethality which would be suitable for international agreement should as far as possible define materials which would be attractive as chemical weapons, but exclude a number of materials in common use which, although lethal at low doses, are unattractive as weapons and have important economic and utilitarian values (or the use of the latter materials as CW agents could be banned, but their manufacture for civil purposes might be permitted).

Toxic materials which would be effective as weapons may be classified in three categories as follows:—

I. *Vapour Group*

This group of possible CW agents are toxic materials which are volatile liquids, which can be loaded into munitions as liquids but which readily vapourize on release, either because of the heat of explosion or by evaporation in air, releasing large clouds of highly concentrated toxic vapour. Examples of agents of this type are Phosgene, Hydrogen Cyanide and non-persistent nerve gases. They produce their effects by inhalation over short periods of time (seconds to minutes), either by effects on the lung itself (e.g., phosgene), or through absorption through

the lungs into the blood stream to cause subsequent systemic poisoning (e.g., hydrogen cyanide, non-persistent nerve gas).

II. *Percutaneous Group*

This group of dangerous materials are toxic substances which are absorbed through the intact skin. They are generally liquids of low volatility, which on release remain as slowly evaporating droplets. The vapours are also toxic (by inhalation), but present at low concentrations. These agents may attack the skin itself (e.g., mustard), or may be absorbed through the skin into the blood stream (e.g., persistent nerve gas), thus causing general systemic poisoning, or may be absorbed by inhalation of low concentrations of vapour over comparatively long periods of time (minutes to hours).

III. *Supertoxic Solids*

Solid toxic materials are generally not dangerous as possible agents of warfare, because they are not readily absorbed through the skin, and are not sufficiently volatile to form inhalable vapour clouds, or sufficiently heat resistant to be disseminated as toxic smoke from pyrotechnic devices. However, development of munitions for producing large clouds of inhalable aerosol of solid materials would allow these substances to become available as weapons. Solid materials would have to be considerably more toxic than persistent nerve gases to offer any military advantage. Examples of such supertoxic solid materials are found among naturally-occurring toxins; examples are snake venom, ricin, staphylococcus enterotoxin, botulinus toxin.

The approximate lethal levels of toxic materials, including agents of chemical warfare, are indicated in Table I.

In considering possible criteria for materials to be defined by treaty as potential weapons, it would appear to be impractical to use only the injected LD_{50}s as such a criterion because:—

(a) Injected LD_{50}s only very approximately reflect the toxicity of materials by inhalation or percutaneous absorption.
(b) A limiting LD_{50} high enough to include phosgene and hydrogen cyanide (e.g., about 1 mg/Kg) would also include a large number of toxic solids which need not be considered as likely weapons.
(c) LD_{50} figures by any route vary widely depending on test conditions, particularly on species and sex of animals used. In order to specify a limiting injected LD_{50}, it would probably be necessary to specify test conditions quite exactly, and these test conditions would be difficult to standardize, particularly as to the specifications of the animals to be used.

Because of the difficulties enumerated above, it would seem more practical to set up three standards of lethality, one for inhaled gases and vapours, a second for percutaneously toxic substances, and a third for supertoxic solids. If these levels were chosen to just include the least toxic of present chemical agents of chemical warfare, the degree of overlap with toxic materials necessary for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine, would be minimized.

The difficulties of standardizing animal test conditions are encountered with any toxic material. However, it may be argued that accurate LD_{50} figures are unnecessary for treaty purposes, since it is only necessary to decide whether a given material is more or less lethal than a set limit. Considerable savings in test costs could be realized and less uncertainty would exist if certain easily available chemicals were named as agreed standards of lethality.

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following scheme is proposed as a basis for discussion:

Proposed Criteria of Lethality

Materials fulfilling any of the following criteria of lethality would be considered as potential agents of chemical warfare to be subject to a general prohibition (or, more particularly, to be considered as agents sufficiently lethal and militarily useful to be made subject of a ban on their manufacture):

1. Vapour-forming materials having lethality equal to or greater than that of reference substance (suggested standard: Phosgene) when administered by inhalation to animals of any of the common laboratory species (mouse, rat, rabbit, guinea pig, cat or dog).
2. Percutaneously toxic materials having lethality equal to or greater than that of the reference substance (suggested standard: Nicotine (alkaloidal base)) when administered percutaneously to any of the common laboratory species (mouse, rat, rabbit, guinea pig, cat, dog or swine).
3. Materials having lethality equal to or greater than that of the reference substance (suggested standard: Neostigmine) when administered by subcutaneous injection to any of the common laboratory species (mouse, rat, rabbit, guinea pig, cat or dog).

The reasons for proposing these particular substances as reference materials are (a) that they are materials readily available commercially in many countries, (b) that they have levels of toxicity such as to minimize inclusion in a prohibition of less toxic materials which have legitimate uses (see Table I). It may be possible to establish a ban on

manufacture, without interference in commercial uses, on all those agents having a lethality greater than these standards.

General Description of Testing Procedures for Proposed Criteria of Lethality

The principle of comparative testing would be to subject one small group of uniform animals (mammals) to a dosage of the reference substance, by the appropriate route (inhalation, percutaneous or injected subcutaneously), and to subject a second group to an equal dosage of the chemical to be tested. The dosage used would be one known to be close to the LD_{50} for the reference substance. In most cases, all the animals in the group receiving the test chemical would either live or die, and a clear-cut decision on the lethality of the chemical could be made. In the minority of cases, some of the animals in the test group would survive and some die; this would indicate that the material was of approximately equal lethality to the reference substance, and would be considered as a possible chemical warfare agent. These borderline cases would be of minor importance, since they would not offer attractive alternatives to recognized agents of chemical warfare.

The advantages of this proposal over more accurate methods for determining LD_{50} values are that it is a much simpler and more economical test which need not be tied to any particular species or strain of animal, or to any agreed mathematical calculation.

Limitations of the Proposal

The most important limitation on the above proposal, or on others which adopt a sole criterion of lethality, is that they would not include materials which are less lethal, but which could still have military utility against forces or civilians poorly protected. (For this reason, it may be necessary to allow a category of chemical agents of lesser lethality the use of which as agents of weapons of war would be prohibited, but whose manufacture for legitimate civil uses would be permitted.)

This shortcoming could be avoided if the treaty also prohibited materials which caused disability lasting more than a few days. However, the means of verifying this property of chemicals would be much more difficult than simple lethality, and at the present time non-lethal but permanent disabling chemical weapons are only a possibility.

The treatment of chemical weapons which cause temporary disability (incapacitating agents and irritant agents) is outside the scope of this paper; however, similar principles might be applicable in defining levels of incapacitating potency as have been proposed above for defining lethality, i.e., use of known incapacitating or irritant compounds as standards of comparison for tests with experimental animals or human subjects.

TABLE I. *Approximate lethal dosages of CW agents and other toxic materials*

GROUP I—Toxic Vapours and Gases

Name of Lethal Material	Approximate Lethal Dose Inhaled	
	LCt_{50} mg min/m³	LD_{50} mg/Kg.
Carbon Monoxide	150,000	21
Ammonia	70,000	10
Sulfur Dioxide	40,000	5.6
Chlorine	36,000	5.1
Hydrogen sulfide	22,000	3.1
Hydrogen cyanide	5,500	0.790
Phosgene [1]	3,000	0.43
Ozone	2,000	0.28
Non-Persistent nerve gas	100	0.014

GROUP II—Percutaneously Toxic Liquids

Name of Lethal Material	Approximate Lethal Doses Percutaneous		
	Percutaneous mg/Kg.	Inhaled Vapour LCt_{50} mg min/m³	Injected mg/Kg.
Parathion	500		5
Diisopropyl fluorophosphate	100	5,000	4
Allyl alcohol	50	140,000	—
Nicotine (base) [1]			
Mustard Gas	20 (?)	2,000	10
Paraoxon	10		—
Persistent nerve gas	0.2	50	0.02

GROUP III—Supertoxic Solids

Name of Lethal Material	Approximate Lethal Dose Injected mg/Kg. (subcutaneous)
Strychnine	1.0
Physostigmine	0.5
Curarine	0.5
Neostigmine [1]	0.4
Digitoxin	0.3
Carbachol	0.3
Snake Venoms	0.5 → 50
Ricin	0.02
Carbamates	0.01
Bacterial Toxins	
—staphylococcus	0.00001
—tetanus	0.00000003
—botulin	0.00000002

[1] Proposed reference substance.

Statement by the FRG Representative (Schlaich) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear-free Zones, August 26, 1975 [1]

The idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones having been revitalized recently through a series of proposals relating to certain areas, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has welcomed and supported from the very beginning the Finnish initiative, which by a resolution of the General Assembly finally led to the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental Experts. The Federal Government did so because it clearly realized that in all areas where the conditions for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones exist, their establishment could mean an essential contribution towards the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation system. In view of the international discussion—unfortunately not always carried on with fully balanced arguments—on questions of security of individual States in the nuclear age, my Government's expectation that the aforementioned study would contribute towards a more objective climate in that discussion has been met to a large extent. In the drafting of the Study, room was given to a plenitude of opinions.

Given the variety of areas under consideration for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as regards geographical, political, social and economic aspects, the preponderant concentration on one certain concept surely would not have been favourable to the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus would have counteracted the declared objective of the resolution forming the basis for the work of the Expert Group.

By presenting, as the only Government not being member of the Expert Group, its principal view on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in a working paper of its own (WP/24), the Federal Government manifested its interest in this study. My delegation considers the ideas expressed in our working paper as largely confirmed by the study as it is now before us (CCD/467).[2] We appraise the study as useful. I should like, therefore, to take this opportunity to thank the Expert Group and especially its Chairman, Professor Korhonen, for the thorough and often difficult work they accomplished during the past months. I should like to include in these thanks expressly the Secretariat, which not only was charged with the difficult task of preparing the draft chapters on the basis of the respective deliberations, but which also saw to a smooth organization of the meetings of the Group.

Since the study deals with a variety of aspects that have to be taken into consideration for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and since the necessity of respecting the differing conditions in individual regions has been clearly pinpointed, my Government considers the

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[1] CCD/PV.685, pp. 20–24.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 321–349.

study a valuable decision-making aid for those governments that are examining the idea of acceding to such zones. The fact that I shall now briefly and in a preliminary way comment on some aspects of the question of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, aspects that are important to my Government, should not be taken as a criticism of the study itself or of certain views expressed in the study, but rather as serving as a clarification of our point of view.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regards nuclear-weapon-free zones as a potentially valuable contribution to the non-proliferation régime whose cornerstone continues to be the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3] Accordingly, nuclear-weapon-free zones should be considered in the first place in the light of how far their creation would supplement and thus strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Federal Government is of the opinion that, under this aspect, the accession to a nuclear-weapon-free zone by States which, for whatsoever reason have not yet deemed themselves to be in a position to become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will have to be appraised as positive.

We therefore cannot regard nuclear-weapon-free zones as an alternative to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It follows, *inter alia*, that also in the case of all or individual members of a zone not being at the same time a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone should give the question of peaceful nuclear explosions the same treatment and contain as strict provisions on safeguards for the peaceful application of nuclear energy as the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. On the other hand, nuclear-weapon-free zones can give a valuable impetus to the qualitative and quantitative co-operation of zonal States in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this context, possibly high importance attaches in our view to the suggestion to review the idea of regional fuel-cycle centres under the particular aspect of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Federal Government welcomes the fact that this line of thought has been clearly elaborated in the study.

The fact that the Expert Group has been able to achieve agreement on a considerable number of basic principles, which have to be taken into account for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, constitutes in our view an especially satisfactory aspect of the study.

Those passages of the study that deal with the relationship between non-nuclear-weapon States not forming part of the zone and the zone itself, are, however, in our view, in need of a more concrete elaboration. The obvious necessity for the attitude of non-nuclear-weapon States—especially those having a highly developed nuclear technology—*vis-à-vis* other States or groups of States to be determined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has not been taken sufficiently into account. It is, therefore, hard to imagine what additional obligations—above all those

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

restricted to a certain area—going beyond the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their interpretation in the Final Declaration of the recent Review Conference, States coming under this consideration should be ready to assume.

It is in this broader context that, in our opinion, the idea of security zones to be created adjacent to a given nuclear-weapon-free zone, has also to be considered. This not only pertains to the problem of areas whose use has been determined by international treaties or generally recognized rules of international law—such as the high seas—but also to areas belonging to the uncontested territory of States neighbouring the nuclear-weapon-free zone in question. The argument that the creation of such security zones will only be possible with the participation of the governments of the countries concerned, does not suffice in itself to highlight the complexity of the problems involved, because it is an obvious argument. In this context, too, recognized rules of international law and existing multilateral treaties, particularly treaties on military alliances, must be taken into consideration. The relevant paragraph in the study only vaguely hints at such an interpretation.

I do not think I need emphasize that the manner in which a government can best take care of its security in peaceful agreement with other governments, is up to the government concerned to decide and that accession to a nuclear-weapon-free zone is only one of several options in this regard.'

As is well known, several States, among them the Federal Republic of Germany, have decided that their security will best be guaranteed within the framework of a military alliance with nuclear-weapon States. We do not want to imply *a priori* that simultaneous membership of a military alliance and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is impossible in theory. But in our view such a simultaneous membership would give rise to considerable and practically insurmountable difficulties. One has to bear in mind above all that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is meant to contribute to peace and stability not only in the region concerned but also beyond it: it follows that the existing regional as well as world-wide security balance must be enhanced and not jeopardized by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In connexion with nuclear-weapon-free zones, it was stated in the CCD a few days ago that

> the international peace and security of States largely depend upon the stability of the mechanism of balance between the existing politico-military alliances; and no international agreement in the general area of arms control and disarmament can disregard that fact if it is to be a really effective agreement.[4]

We fully agree with that opinion. It leads us, however, to the interpretation that, for all practical purposes, the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones appears hardly realizable in certain regions for the time being.

In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental

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[4] CCD/PV.681, p. 10 (Poland).

Experts has concentrated on the problem of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any region should be regarded in the overall context of the complex problem of disarmament and arms control. That is why we regret to a certain extent that the idea expressed in the working paper of the United Kingdom, namely that

> the establishment of a NFZ could provide a basis of co-operation for further measures of regional arms control directed at controlling an arms race in conventional weapons [5]

ceased to play a role in the further process of discussion in the Group and in its report.

I should like therefore to use the opportunity of this statement to direct the outlook of the CCD to the question of a comprehensive and balanced disarmament. One initiative of this summer session appears to my delegation to be especially conducive to the necessary verification of a number of concepts certainly still requisite before discussion can once more be fully directed towards this overall complex. I am alluding to the working paper introduced by the United States delegation on 24 July 1975 on "International standards of comparison for military expenditures" (CCD/460), in which the proposal was made that the CCD should continue the work undertaken by the "Group of consultant experts to the Secretary-General of the United Nations".[6] My delegation therefore associates itself with the references made to this initiative by other delegations. It hopes that the matter, and the best way of dealing with it, will be given ample consideration in next year's session of the CCD.

Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear-free Zones, August 26, 1975 [1]

I hope that in transmitting to the United Nations General Assembly the Study on NWFZs the CCD will also agree to commend in its special report the arduous work of the Governmental Experts, but before doing so I should like to make a number of observations about the study, both of a general nature, and on points of detail.

At first sight it may be a cause for disappointment that many issues of basic importance could not be the subject of a consensus by experts. But this subject bears directly on the vital security interests of a large number of States of widely differing political strengths and defence preoccupations. It was therefore to be expected that the study would reflect many differences of approach. Nor is it likely that these differences will rapidly be resolved by further debate at the United Nations

[5] WP/9.
[6] *Ante*, pp. 279–284.
[1] CCD/PV.686, pp. 6–8.

General Assembly or elsewhere. As the study itself points out, "the circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case".[2] We should not therefore expect that a single set of precise guidelines, for universal application, could ever be established to the satisfaction of all. In any case each State considering whether to join or to endorse a proposed NWFZ will have to take its own security position into account, on the basis of its national sovereignty.

Against this background it would clearly be unprofitable to reopen the debate on issues of detail where United Kingdom views have already been made known, either in the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom experts, or in the course of subsequent discussion. Nevertheless it would be unfortunate if any misunderstandings were to arise in connexion with Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[3] As my Government have often indicated, we regard the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a valuable inspiration towards the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. But it has become clear that many States, nuclear and non-nuclear, consider that the precedents of Tlatelolco should not automatically be followed in adopting future guidelines.

One important area of controversy in the study is the question of Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices. In the opinion of my Government, this is adequately dealt with in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On ratifying Protocols I and II, my Government declared it to be their understanding that,

> Article 18 of the Treaty, when read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 thereof, would not permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in technology have made possible the development of devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes.

Another issue, highlighted in chapter II, paragraph 29 (b), is the question of transit. It is the United Kingdom view that the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes an acceptable precedent on this question by omitting any reference to the transit of a zone by ships or aircraft of a NWS which might be carrying nuclear weapons. As indicated in the United Kingdom working paper, our view is that

> There is no reason why the provisions governing a NFZ need to affect the existing rights of States in accordance with general international law to grant or deny the transit of foreign military aircraft or warships through their airspace or territorial waters.[4]

I must also make our position clear on one other point: the question of the extension of nuclear-free zones to cover areas of the high seas. As the distinguished Mexican expert reminded the group, article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides for an extension of the zone into areas of the high seas. But in connexion with the Mexican views recorded in

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[2] *Ante*, p. 349.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 82–83.
[4] WP/9, par. 17.

chapter II, paragraph 29 (c), I must emphasize that the adherence of the United Kingdom to Protocols I and II is not inconsistent with the United Kingdom's position that nuclear-weapon-free zones should not interfere with generally established principles of freedom of navigation.

On balance, we consider that the task with which the expert group was charged by the General Assembly has been fulfilled, and we are content with the way in which the CCD has carried out its supervisory role. We look forward to future consideration of detailed proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones. We will be sympathetic to any proposals which conform with the guidelines set out again in our working paper as follows:

1. The decision to form such a NFZ should be taken freely and voluntarily by the States in the region.
2. The zone should not diminish the security of any of its participants.
3. All militarily significant States and preferably all States within the region should be included.
4. There should be arrangements for impartial international verification adequate for the particular circumstances of the region.[5]

Much of the substance of these guidelines is reflected in the principles set out in chapter III of the study, paragraph 9. However, some of the agreed principles, as finally drafted, are susceptible to possible misinterpretation. In the Expert Group, for example, we agreed that,

> Obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by groups of States, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by smaller groups of States and even individual countries.[6]

I must say, however, that the United Kingdom believes that a NWFZ consisting of a single State is unlikely to satisfy the guidelines which I outlined a few months ago. It is our view that individual countries can best assume such obligations by acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

My Government has taken practical steps to support the establishment of nuclear-free zones through its accession to Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and our general support for the concept of nuclear-free zones is not in doubt. We do consider, however, that the establishment of NWFZs can only extend, and not replace, the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[7] The fundamental importance of the NPT, in our view, remains unaffected by the considerations discussed in the study before us.

I have set out these views in order that there should be no misunderstanding of the United Kingdom position. But I must also express our admiration of the way in which the experts have undertaken this exhaustive and complex study. This has certainly been a worth-while examination of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

I should also like to add my congratulations to those expressed by

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[5] *Ibid.*, par. 6.
[6] *Ante*, p. 326.
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

other delegations to the United States and the USSR for tabling the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile use of Environmental Modification Techniques.[8] We look forward to the early start of detailed negotiations in the CCD on this important initiative.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Nisibori) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, August 26, 1975 [1]

With the summer session of this Committee nearing its end, we are about to begin drafting the report of this Committee to the United Nations General Assembly. As a matter of course, this year's report is to include a part concerning consideration by this Committee of the arms control implications of PNEs in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX).[2] For this purpose, my delegation proposed the holding of the informal meetings of this Committee with the participation of experts which took place for four days from 14 July. As the object of the meetings was to provide the Committee with the clarifications and data necessary for discussing in this Committee the arms control implications of PNEs, I believe that this purpose was fully achieved. Today, I would like to present the views of my Government about this question on the basis of the increased understanding obtained through the informal meetings.

In dealing with the arms control implications of PNEs, we note that there are two aspects; the first is the relations between PNEs and CTB, and the second is the relations between PNEs and the objective of nuclear non-proliferation.

As a prerequisite for examining these two aspects, it is essential to understand why the arms control implications of PNEs is the big problem. The problem originates from the fact that it is not possible to differentiate between peaceful nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons. It is simple common sense that it is impossible to distinguish objectively between peaceful nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons since both of them can cause nuclear explosion. Is this common sense opinion justified from a sophisticated, technical viewpoint? This is the key to answering the whole question. Concerning this point, the United States working paper submitted on 10 July states as follows:

> While variations in technical characteristics may exist among nuclear explosive devices optimized for specific engineering uses and technical differences may likewise exist between devices optimized for such peaceful applications and devices optimized for military purposes, it is important to emphasize that all nuclear explosive devices,

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[8] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[1] CCD/PV.686, pp. 8–17.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806.

regardless of their intended or optimal application, have certain common characteristics.

The most fundamental characteristic common to such devices is that they release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in a time period measured in millionths of a second. Because of this inherent feature, nuclear explosive devices, whether in their crudest or most highly sophisticated forms, take on military significance.[3]

Certainly, there is the question of whether the devices can be delivered to the target. On this point, too, the United States' working paper states very clearly,

. . . although the configuration of some explosives cannot be adapted easily, if at all, to certain missile warhead applications or to some other sophisticated forms of delivery, all explosive devices envisaged for peaceful applications are "transportable" and can be carried to military targets (with differing degrees of efficiency) by a wide variety of delivery vehicles.

Then the United States experts went on to conclude,

Because of these basic characteristics, it has not been possible—and we see no basis for believing that it could be possible—to develop a "strictly peaceful" nuclear explosive device, one not capable of military application. All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could also be employed in some fashion as a weapon . . .[4]

These remarks should be carefully noted as the technical conclusions of the experts of the country that possesses by far the most advanced technology and experience of nuclear explosions in the world, though I do not wish this to be taken entirely as a compliment.

On the other hand, I am also aware that there is the minority opinion that PNEs should be distinguished from weapons by their purpose. However, the purpose of any human conduct is a subjective matter and, though subjectivity should be respected, nobody can force his subjective views upon others. This is only in the nature of things.

If we start from the premise that has just been enunciated, that PNE programmes inevitably incur military benefits, the conclusions of the review of the first aspect of the arms control implications of PNEs, namely, their relations with a CTB, would emerge automatically. That is to say that, in order to make a CTB effective, there are only two options to choose from, either (a) to impose a complete ban on PNEs, or (b) to authorize PNEs under certain conditions including strict international control. This is because the continuance of weapons testings under the cover of PNEs cannot be prevented if only nuclear weapons testings are banned and PNEs are not controlled. Certainly, we realize that the benefits nuclear-weapon States obtain by also having PNEs are not very significant at present. But circumstances will be entirely different when nuclear weapons testings are limited or banned altogether. On this point also, the United States' working paper says,

Specifically, if weapons testing were constrained and PNE activity were not constrained, the potential would be created for using the PNE programme to realize

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[3] *Ante*, p. 249.
[4] *Ibid.*

weapon-related benefits no longer available in the weapons testing programme. Therefore in order to have adequate confidence that PNE programmes could not be utilized for that purpose, it would be essential in the context of any restraints on nuclear weapons tests to place strict and effective constraints on PNEs as well.[5]

Furthermore, Ambassador Martin of the United States stated in this Committee on 29 July:

If PNEs were to be accommodated under a CTB, a verification system would have to be devised capable of providing adequate assurance to all States that no weapon-related benefits were being acquired from PNE activities.[6]

Thus, we need to recognize fully that PNEs constitute one of the problems to be solved prior to the achievement of a CTB.

In this connexion, Ambassador Roshchin of the Soviet Union stated in this Committee on 17 July:

The opinion has been voiced that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions may act as a serious obstacle to the achievement of a ban on nuclear testing. We believe, however, that the main obstacle in the way of a universal ban on nuclear-weapon testing is not this matter of peaceful nuclear explosions at all.[7]

Of course, as we all know, such problems as verification and the participation of nuclear-weapon States other than the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are the main stumbling blocks to the achievement of a CTB. However, it is hard to deny that the problem of PNEs is also one of those which must be solved. As a case in point, I would draw your attention to the fact that the question of PNEs has to be solved even for the realization of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union of July 1974.[8] As I understand, that Treaty has not come into force yet because the accompanying Protocol concerning PNEs has still not been signed. I should be grateful if Ambassador Roshchin would clarify the situation.

Next, I proceed to examining the second aspect of the arms control implications of PNEs, namely, their relations to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. On the premise that "All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could also be employed in some fashion as a weapon",[9] it is clear that the proliferation of PNEs is tantamount to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, I am completely in agreement with the statement of Ambassador Martin which I quoted earlier and in which he said, "There is no reliable way of distinguishing between a 'PNE Power' and a nuclear-weapon State." [10] Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that a *laissez-faire* principle, as it were, cannot be adopted about PNEs by non-nuclear-weapon States from the viewpoint of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation. I feel that there is consensus in this Committee re-

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[5] *Ante*, p. 253.
[6] *Ante*, p. 293.
[7] *Ante*, p. 261.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.
[9] *Ante*, p. 249.
[10] *Ante*, p. 292.

garding the recognition of this undoubted fact. I hope that this point will figure clearly in the report of this Committee.

Now, with these points in mind, I will review the present situation. The working paper submitted by Japan contains as a part of such a review a passage which says, ". . . NNWS [non-nuclear-weapon States] Parties to NPT cannot conduct their own PNE, while non-Parties can under certain conditions".[11] This is an objective description of the present situation in which, whereas the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT cannot conduct their own PNEs under the obligations of the Treaty, non-Parties can do so, at least legally and theoretically. I regret that this passage was misunderstood by some people as claiming the right for non-Parties to conduct PNEs. In this passage, we wished to point out that it was this reality that is at the bottom of the problem. Moreover, a grimmer reality was that not only the non-Parties could conduct PNEs theoretically, but that one of them did in fact do so. Ambassador Roshchin stated on 17 July:

> If peaceful nuclear explosions were to be conducted outside the framework of that article, we should have a situation in which, in addition to the States now possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, more such States would emerge in the next 5–10 years.[12]

But we should not forget that the situation which Ambassador Roshchin feared has really come to pass.

Plainly, the NPT prohibited in articles I and II all nuclear explosive devices including those for peaceful purposes for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, and on that basis, made provisions in article V on the services related to potential benefits from PNEs.[13] By these measures, the problem was rationally solved in so far as the Parties to the NPT are concerned. Also, the possibility of making such services available to the non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the NPT was indicated in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference. By this measure, it has become possible for non-nuclear-weapon States not Parties to the NPT to opt for the enjoyment of potential benefits from the PNEs, without actually causing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the independent development of PNEs. I think this is a significant *démarche*.

What I have stated above at some length was described by Madame Thorsson of Sweden in her laconical style as usual in her statement on 21 August. She said in assessing the results of deliberations at the informal meetings on the arms control implications of PNEs:

> The conclusions essential to our work here were, first, that the acquisition of the capability to make nuclear explosives, be it for the most peaceful of purposes, together with the first successful test of such an explosive, constitute the acquisition of the capability to produce, at short notice, also nuclear weapons. Secondly, such activities

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[11] *Ante*, p. 230.
[12] *Ante*, p. 260.
[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

would therefore be contrary to the basic purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From this my Government concluded that countries without nuclear explosives but desiring to gain some potential economic benefit from the peaceful use of such explosives, should be in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the principles behind that article, and that such assistance should be implemented through the IAEA.[14]

Mr. Meerberg of the Netherlands also struck a right chord when he stated on the same day:

> For a non-nuclear-weapon State to embark upon a peaceful programme from scratch seems to be a very heavy burden indeed, with respect both to financial and to human resources, in particular if we take into account that the economic benefits of PNEs are barely proven.

and also:

> For my Government, there is only one conclusion: if PNEs are on balance thought worth-while, it is by far preferable that they are carried out by the present nuclear-weapon States only, on behalf of Parties and on behalf of non-Parties to the NPT. The world may not be very safe at the moment, it is certainly not going to be safer if more and more countries are going to develop nuclear explosive capabilities.[15]

Such being the case, it is to be hoped that steps will be taken promptly by both the IAEA and the nuclear-weapon States for the conclusion of international arrangements for the concrete procedures of making available the services as provided for in article V. There may be the opinion that it will be some time before PNEs become of significant use economically and technically, and that therefore the procedures for making these services available need not be decided on forthwith. I myself am inclined to take the view that it will take some time until the usefulness of PNEs becomes a reality. Nevertheless, I believe that the procedures for making the services available should be prescribed at the present stage, because certain non-nuclear-weapon States may possibly be making a decision now as to whether they should proceed with developing their own peaceful nuclear explosive devices or whether they should rely upon the services to be provided under article V of the NPT. In order for such countries to make this decision, it is essential that international arrangements containing the concrete procedures of article V should already exist. Thus, if all the non-nuclear-weapon States renounce their independent PNEs, pinning their hope on the implementation of article V of the NPT, the problem of nuclear proliferation in the name of PNEs will naturally be solved once and for all. However, reality is always more complicated. For there is a school of thought that the right to develop and apply such useful means as PNEs is possessed universally by all States, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, and that this right should by all means be exercised. I do not object to the theory that all States have the right to develop their technology and that the sovereignty to exercise this right must be equal. I consider this to be one of

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[14] *Ante*, p. 364.
[15] *Ante*, pp. 372–373.

the most fundamental norms in the international community. However, I would say with emphasis that, when the exercise of a certain right is considered to result in bringing more damage to the international community than direct benefits, the renunciation of the exercise of this right by the State concerned of its free will also constitutes an honourable exercise of sovereignty. It is by this self-restraint of States that the international community has gradually rejected the law of the jungle, divested itself of its Machiavellian trappings and built up the international co-operation system of today. Disarmament is one of the most important examples of this. I cannot but reiterate that, for the international community to grow more reasonable, such autonomous or spontaneous restraint is badly needed. And I would appeal to all the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce of their own accord the principle of *laissez-faire* concerning PNEs.

In this connexion, I noted with interest the statement of Mr. Rowe of Canada on 15 July in which he suggested a suspension in all PNEs

> until a solution is found to the role of peaceful nuclear explosions under a comprehensive test ban and until a thorough international examination of the economic value of peaceful nuclear explosions and a re-evaluation of the world's resources and energy needs present a more compelling case for their use.[16]

We are ready to agree to the suggestion provided that it is acceptable to all. In order that this moratorium may be realized, however, it should be borne in mind that the self-restraint of non-nuclear-weapon States and the corresponding self-restraint of nuclear-weapon States are required. That is to say that the prospect of a comprehensive test ban should be made certain.

I have just examined the arms control implications of PNEs from the viewpoints of a CTB and nuclear non-proliferation. As a result, I believe that I have been able to prove that the question of PNEs is a very important one which requires to be solved in order to achieve a CTB and also to ensure nuclear non-proliferation. So, I regret that I entirely disagree with the evaluation made by Ambassador Mishra of India in his statement on 31 July:

> The arms control implication of PNEs, if any, are insignificant compared to the real and most urgent problem of a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapon testing. That problem will not be solved by showing our back to it, we must turn around and face it.[17]

I would rather emphasize the importance of solving the problem of PNEs in achieving a CTB and nuclear non-proliferation by borrowing the words of Ambassador Mishra and saying, "The problem of PNEs will not be solved by showing our back to it, we must turn around and face it".

As I stated in the beginning, I consider that the informal meetings with the participation of experts on PNEs left us very useful results for the clarification and understanding of the problem. Accordingly, I

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[16] CCD/PV.672, p. 12.
[17] CCD/PV.677, p. 20.

have submitted in the form of a working paper (CCD/468) the text of the statement I made at the informal meetings of what I understood had been discussed.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Mishra) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, August 26, 1975 [1]

Ambassador Nisibori has very kindly given us the text of his statement which he made a little while ago. Since he did me the honour of naming me in his statement, I should like to make a few brief points.

I will begin by thoroughly agreeing with his statement that nobody can force his subjective views upon others, be those views held by a majority or by a minority. This is not the place for going into an argument about what is subjective and what is objective. In my view, the distinction is artificial. Whatever be the object, all of us, without exception, have only a subjective mechanism to perceive it.

Ambassador Nisibori said that there is a consensus in this Committee regarding recognition of the fact that a *laissez-faire* principle cannot be adopted about PNEs by non-nuclear-weapon States. It will be clear to any delegation which has gone through the debate on PNEs this year that there is no such consensus; and I do not speak merely on behalf of my own delegation.

Then, Ambassador Nisibori said that he did not object to the theory that all States have the right to develop their technology, and that the sovereignty to exercise this right must be equal. I heartily agree with him. But I should like to point out that this is not a question of theory. This is a matter of principle, of practice. There are some States which insist upon exercising their sovereign rights in regard to some matters, there are others which insist upon that right in regard to other matters. But it is certainly not a theory. He went on to say, and here I would like to quote him directly:

> I would say with emphasis that, when the exercise of a certain right is considered to result in bringing more damage to the international community than direct benefits, the renunciation of the exercise of this right by the State concerned of its free will also constitutes an honourable exercise of sovereignty.[2]

I do hope he had the nuclear-weapon States in mind when he said that. There is no question of the law of the jungle here. There is only the perception of a delegation that PNEs constitute such a danger that they must be prohibited once [and] for all, regardless of whether or not the real danger, i.e., the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear weapons, is brought under control or not. So I say again, I do hope that he had the nuclear-weapon States in mind. It cannot be that certain

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[1] CCD/PV.686, pp. 23–25. For further discussion between the Indian and Japanese representatives, see *ibid.*, pp. 25–30.

[2] *Ante*, p. 407.

States are asked to forego their sovereign rights while others are not.

Ambassador Nisibori then said, and I quote him again: "I believe that I have been able to prove that the question of PNEs is a very important one which requires to be solved in order to achieve a CTB". As I said earlier, we have only a subjective mechanism to appraise what is outside us. But I must say for my delegation that he has not been able to prove anything of that kind. In fact, if we were to go through the debate, the discussion on PNEs, during the course of the month of July, and perhaps some statements made this month also, it will be clear that a majority of delegations have acknowledged the fact that whatever the problems connected with PNEs, they really cannot be tackled until the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing has been solved.

Finally, Ambassador Nisibori referred to the informal meetings of this Committee on the so-called arms control implications of PNEs, and he felt, as he has felt before, that they were very useful. On the other hand, my delegation has said it more than once that they did not really bring to light anything new on the subject. And I have also submitted a working paper on this subject, which is in document CCD/474. I should like to add here one or two words as to why I felt that nothing new had been brought to light. Firstly, during our discussions there were delegations which repeated their own views based on the NPT, i.e., the NPT itself made no distinction between nuclear devices for weapons purposes and nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Secondly, in General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) it is already stated that it has not yet proved possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.[3] During our discussion on the so-called arms control implications of PNEs, this very point has been emphasized all the time—that there is no distinction. Whether we agree with it or not, it is a fact that it has been repeated, and today in Ambassador Nisibori's statement again the same point was emphasized over and over again, using the words of the United States working paper or the United States delegation. It is for this reason that I have been saying that nothing new has been brought to light on this subject, and that is the reason why I appraise the discussion, the informal meetings on the subject, as not having been worth the time and effort we put into them.

We are coming to the end of our session. Hopefully, we will finish our work on Thursday. It is too late now to embark on a lengthy discussion of the question of a comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons. But I must reiterate our firm conviction that until we tackle that problem it would not be possible to give any worth-while consideration to the question of PNEs. And for this reason I am very glad that a proposal has already been made to begin serious work on the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing next year. It has been

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806. For text of NPT, see *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

proposed that experts should meet on that subject very early in the spring, and perhaps that is the time when we would be able to go into this question in greater detail and try to harmonize our views.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 28, 1975 [1]

Today, the Committee on Disarmament ends its summer session. During this session of the Committee there took place an important historical event, in the form of the completion at Helsinki of the Conference of thirty-five States on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This Conference constitutes a major landmark in the history of intra-European relations. It establishes the basis and lays down the principles for a new stage in those relations in conditions of international *détente* and co-operation among the States Parties to the agreement. The agreements reached as a result of the Conference marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of *détente* and thus represented an important step on the road towards the strengthening of the principles of peaceful co-existence and the general establishment of relations of equitable co-operation among States with differing social systems.

It is not the European States alone which should view the principles of international relations evolved and approved at the Conference as matters of great importance. *Détente* must expand, deepen and extend to all regions of the world. It is important that those principles should be reinforced and given effect in international life. And, of course, political *détente* must be supplemented by military *détente*, for the most pressing requirement of our age is to limit and subsequently to halt the arms race, as a means of moving towards general and complete disarmament. Application of the principles approved at the all-European Conference is bound to have considerable influence on progress towards the approval and implementation of arms-limitation and disarmament measures both in Europe and universally, in the other continents of the world.

In this connexion, we should like to point out that due attention was given to questions pertaining to disarmament in the Final Act of the Conference. Hence, it is stated in that document that the States Parties thereto will

> take effective measures [. . . .] which by their scope and nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.[2]

Reference to the importance of achieving disarmament and to the direct link between that goal and the lessening of international tension

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[1] CCD/PV.687, pp. 13–16.
[2] *Ante*, p. 307.

was made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, in his statement at the all-European Conference on 31 July. He said:

> In our view, the most important result of the Conference is that international *détente* is increasingly being given concrete material substance. It is indeed the materialization of *détente* which is at the heart of the matter and the essence of all that will make peace in Europe truly firm and lasting. And we give pride of place in this respect to the task of halting the arms race, to achieving genuine results in the sphere of disarmament.[3]

Turning to the actual work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should mention the fact that this summer session took place shortly after the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That Conference was an important link in the process of the development and consolidation of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[4] a process on which the reduction and elimination of the threat of nuclear war largely depend. The Soviet Union and numerous other States made substantial efforts to ensure the success of that Conference and welcomed its results and the final declaration it adopted.

The statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the results of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are of great interest. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the statements of those many delegations which called for the strengthening by all possible means of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supported the final declaration of the Conference of the Parties thereto. That declaration, which sums up the work of the Conference, expresses the participants' concern at the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons in the world and their earnest desire to seek effective means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime for such weapons.[5]

Considering as it does that the securing of the non-proliferation régime is one of the most important goals of our time, the Soviet Union places considerable emphasis on securing the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the greatest possible number of countries and of all the important military Powers. The universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be the best guarantee of the effectiveness of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime. In this connexion, the USSR delegation would like to stress yet again the great and positive significance of the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the spring of this year of the non-nuclear countries of EURATOM and of a number of other States, an event which confirms the Treaty's vitality and its great international importance for the reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

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[3] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, no. 31 (Aug. 27, 1975), p. 13 (variant translation); *Pravda*, Aug. 1, p. 1.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[5] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.

During the consideration of disarmament matters in the Committee, a great deal of attention was given to the question of ensuring the security of States. The USSR delegation would like to point out the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to this question in the solution of the problems of disarmament. It is imperative that no one's security should suffer through the adoption and implementation of disarmament measures. On the contrary, such measures must benefit all States which share in putting them into effect. That is an indispensable prerequisite for successful progress in the sphere of arms limitation, in the cause of disarmament. All efforts to resolve the problem through the elaboration of disarmament agreements contrary to this principle, and the efforts of the representatives of some States to insist on agreements which ignore this principle, are clearly doomed to failure. It is the task of all the organs, including the Committee on Disarmament, which deal with disarmament problems to find ways of solving them which will not harm anyone's security, but will be of benefit to all. The Soviet people, which twice within a single generation has suffered the ravages of world wars and which lost in those wars many millions of human lives, is deeply anxious that the proper security of States should be preserved in the solution of disarmament problems. It has every justification for insisting on the observance of this principle and for rejecting any proposals and projects for the solution of the problem which ignore the need not to harm the security of the States participating in the implementation of measures to limit armaments and achieve disarmament.

The summer session of the Committee on Disarmament has been a very full and effective one. Together with the large amount of attention given to the general problems of arms limitation and disarmament, there was detailed consideration with the help of experts of such topics as peaceful nuclear explosions and the prohibition of action to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes. As a result of these expert consultations, the members of the Committee gained an understanding of the substance and significance of a number of the problems discussed and were able to explore possible ways of solving them. A study was made, under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament, of all aspects of the question of creating nuclear-free zones. In addition, consideration was given to other matters, including the banning of chemical and nuclear weapons.

In connexion with the submission to the Committee by the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones of the Group's report on that topic,[6] the USSR delegation would like to express its gratitude to all the Group's members. We should like to mention the great contribution made to the work of the Group by Professor Korhonen, the expert from Finland, whose untiring efforts were largely responsible for the successful conclusion of the Group's labours. The

[6] *Ante*, pp. 321-349.

USSR delegation would like to convey to him its thanks for his work as Chairman of the Group and as the expert from Finland.

An important positive feature of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament was the submission by the Soviet Union and the United States of America for consideration by the Committee of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The submission of this draft opens the way to agreement within the Committee on Disarmament on an international agreement concerning the prevention of the use of geophysical and meteorological means of warfare. The adoption of such a measure would constitute a significant step forwards towards limiting and halting the arms race in an area in which there could be substantial weapons development, with all the dangerous consequences that implies for mankind. The consideration and adoption of the draft convention which has been submitted to the Committee would encourage the elaboration of further measures to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament.[7]

Although no agreed draft on disarmament matters is being submitted to the General Assembly as a result of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee does now have a real basis for agreement at its next session of a draft convention concerning the prohibition of harmful environmental modification techniques. The Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that the discussion of disarmament problems which has taken place within the Committee and the studies made of some of those problems will ensure progress in future negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

The active and detailed consideration of disarmament problems by the Committee on Disarmament is an indication of the interest States have in matters pertaining to the limitation and halting of the arms race, and shows the need for broader efforts by the members of the Committee to solve the problems before them. The strengthening of peace and international security, and the well-being of all countries and peoples, largely depend on success in this matter.

In conclusion, we should like to thank the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Björnerstedt, and all his colleagues in the Secretariat, including the interpreters and translators, for their great and effective efforts to assist the Committee on Disarmament in the discharge of its mandate.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 28, 1975 [1]

As the CCD concludes its summer session, it is worth-while to review

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[7] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[1] CCD/PV.687, pp. 17–20.

briefly some of the more significant developments in our work this year. Before turning to specific developments, however, I would make the general observation that the Committee in 1975 has been marked by a renewed energy, which my delegation welcomes. The infusion of new members and new subjects has clearly been an important factor in this regard.

A new subject on which progress has been made this summer is the question of restraints on military environmental modification activities. Last week the Soviet Union and the United States tabled, in parallel, identical draft conventions on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.[2] In our view this action represents an important step towards effectively precluding the dangers of the potential use of such techniques as methods of warfare. Earlier this month, the informal meetings with experts added substantially to the technical information needed for further consideration of the subject. In particular, the meetings provided useful insights into the present state of the art of environmental modification. We look forward to beginning concrete negotiations, in which we hope all delegations will participate at our Spring session next year.

Also prominent among the results of this year's work is the study of nuclear-weapon-free zones prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts under CCD auspices. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the experts who participated in the study and to commend the Chairman, Professor Korhonen of Finland, for his effective leadership in successfully completing the task. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the Secretariat for the invaluable support and assistance it provided to the experts. The result of the hard work by all concerned is a truly comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.[3]

Several delegations have commented on the approach, adopted in the study, of including differing views wherever consensus was not reached. This procedure was adopted by consensus in the CCD and included in its mandate to the experts. We believe this procedure was not only proper but essential in order to assure a thorough exploration of the many complex issues involved. It is important to recall that a substantial number of the issues that the experts explored in detail either had never surfaced before or had been addressed only in a general way. Their consideration in the study is an important achievement. We are pleased that the experts achieved consensus on a number of important points in each section of the study. We do not feel that the fact that consensus was not reached on other issues should detract from the value of the study. On the contrary, the presentation by the experts of their divergent views on many difficult questions contributes to a better understanding of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept, of its feasibility, and of its potential value as a means of promoting non-

[2] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 321–349.

proliferation objectives and strengthening regional and international security. We believe that the study will be useful to the States which are, or may be, considering the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region and to other interested States throughout the world.

Our summer session has also seen constructive developments in other areas. Among these, the Committee's informal meetings with experts on the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were particularly significant. These meetings did not, of course, provide answers to all the questions involved, but they did allow us to focus on the basic problems and to clarify further a number of critical issues. We consider especially noteworthy the general agreement that, from a technological point of view, it is not possible to develop the capability to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. The informal meetings also helped increase awareness of the problems involved if PNEs were to be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban.

Last month my delegation put forward the suggestion that the CCD undertake an effort to resolve the problems involved in the definition and comparative measurement of military expenditures. We noted that success in this effort would constitute a significant forward step in bringing about conditions that would permit serious consideration of international measures for limiting such expenditures. We also noted that such a study would conform to the step-by-step approach suggested by the Group of Consultant experts to the Secretary-General in *their report on the reduction of military budgets.*[4]

We have been gratified by expressions of support for this approach by the delegations of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In reflecting on comments made by those delegations, we agree with the view that an effort to resolve the important issues involved could best be undertaken by a small group of experts, perhaps drawn from CCD member States. It seems to us that a group of qualified experts could contribute significantly to our common understanding of this complex area. We would prefer that such a group be composed of economists or budget specialists who would be able to devote as much time as necessary to an intensive study of the issues.

In our view the General Assembly could give impetus and direction to such a study by adopting a generally acceptable resolution on the subject at its session this fall. The resolution should, among other things, take into account the replies of governments to the Secretary-General's request for views concerning the 1974 experts' report on the reduction of military budgets. My Government will give careful consideration to those replies. We look forward to working with other delegations at the Assembly in developing an appropriate resolution.

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[4] *Ante*, pp. 274–279.

My delegation continues to believe that the CCD can make an important contribution in the field of conventional arms restraints. Our interest in giving serious attention to this subject was reflected in our intervention at the end of the Spring session. We regret that during this session there has been so little discussion concerning our presentation, although comments by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Sweden have provided a starting point for further consideration of the matter. For example, concern was expressed over the implications for national sovereignty of one of the illustrative principles we suggested in our presentation—the principle concerning consultations between a State acquiring arms and other interested States that might consider such an acquisition as adversely affecting their security. It would not be the intention of such a principle to give outside States a basis to interfere in a particular State's decisions regarding its security requirements. Such decisions are indeed a fundamental matter of national policy. Rather, we believe that consultations along the lines suggested in this principle could help reduce uncertainties and suspicions regarding arms acquisitions. This in turn could create more favourable conditions for mutual self-restraint by the States participating in such consultations.

During the course of our meetings this year, a number of delegations have expressed concern about the slow pace of developments in the CCD regarding chemical weapons. We believe that the Committee's continuing consideration this year of various complex technical factors have made significant contributions to the resolution of CW issues. For example, this summer several delegations—the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Japan—have presented working papers contributing important information related to the question of definition of prohibited agents.

In our view, one particularly significant development over the past year has been the increasing acceptance of the idea that a phased approach to CW limitations may well be the most realistic one. This approach has been advocated by Japan and supported with some suggested modifications by Canada. A key consideration in establishing the extent of an initial prohibition is the nature of agents in national arsenals. Proposals have been made to deal initially only with supertoxic agents. Other proposals envision coverage of all lethal agents. There are arguments in favour of each of these approaches.

On balance, however, we believe that an initial prohibition should deal with all lethal agents. Restricting coverage to supertoxic agents would not equally constrain all countries having CW stocks if, in addition to supertoxic agents, some of these countries possessed lethal agents not usually considered supertoxic, such as hydrogen cyanide. Furthermore, it is important to remember that in some regions the possession of less toxic agents—and not supertoxic agents—represents the real threat.

On another major CW issue, my delegation has noted with particular

interest the working paper submitted by Finland.[5] The paper reports the effort under way by the Finnish Government to develop a CW verification capability for possible future international use. We consider this effort to be an especially valuable contribution in a critical area of chemical arms control, and look forward to further reports on its progress.

Before concluding, I would like to express the great appreciation of my delegation to Dr. Björnerstedt, the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who has displayed once again his excellent abilities on behalf of the Committee. Special thanks are also due to Mrs. Gill and all the other members of the Secretariat for their efforts. Like many other delegations, I would like to pay a particular tribute to the interpreters, who did so well for us in the long and complex informal meetings, both of this Committee and of the *Ad Hoc* group of experts, where most of the interventions were extemporaneous.

My delegation firmly believes that the results of our work this year have amply demonstrated the continuing vitality of the CCD. We look forward to working with other members of the Committee at the General Assembly this fall on preparations for what promises to be an active and productive session in 1976.

Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the Nuclear-free Zone Study, August 28, 1975 [1]

1. In resolution 3261 F (XXIX) the General Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects and requested that the study be carried out by an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.[2] Pursuant to the resolution, the study is transmitted to the General Assembly as annex I to this report.

2. The organization of the study, including the question of the composition of the experts' group and the group's programme and method of work, was raised at the opening meeting of the 1975 session of the Committee by the delegations of the USSR,[3] the United States [4] and Mexico (CCD/PV.655). The delegation of Romania referred to the same matter at the following meeting, during which the delegation of Burma requested formally, on behalf of the Group of fifteen countries of the

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[5] CCD/453, July 4, 1975.

[1] CCD/476, August 28, 1975. The documentary annexes are not printed here. The document with its annexes has been issued as *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects, Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament* (A/10027/Add.1), (U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7).

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

[3] *Ante*, pp. 65–73.

[4] *Ante*, pp. 73–79.

CCD, the holding of an informal meeting to give consideration to this matter (CCD/PV.656). In conformity with such request the matter was discussed in four informal meetings of the Committee between 14 and 21 March 1975. Taking as a basis the consensus reached in those informal meetings, the Committee, at its 661st plenary meeting of 25 March 1975, decided to invite 21 governments to designate experts for the study, including 16 from States members of the CCD (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Zaïre) and five from other States (Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Finland and Ghana). The Committee also requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inform all other States Members of the United Nations that, upon prior notification, they would have the right of access to the meetings, of addressing the group and of submitting written materials. It was decided that the group would elect its own chairman. It was also decided that whenever the group was unable to reach consensus on substantive matters, each of the experts was entitled to incorporate his own opinion into the study.

3. The study was transmitted to the Committee by a letter dated 18 August 1975 from the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* group, Dr. Keijo Korhonen of Finland, to the Co-Chairmen of the CCD (CCD/467).[5]

4. The delegations of Mexico (682[6]), Czechoslovakia (683), Sweden (683[7]), USSR (683[8]), Mexico (683), Romania (685), Poland (685), Canada (685), Bulgaria (685), Federal Republic of Germany (685[9]), Mongolia (685), Italy (685), United Kingdom (686[10]), Hungary (687), USSR (687[11]), the United States (687[12]) and India (687) commented on the study in their plenary statements. The full texts of all such comments are reproduced in annex II.

5. A number of delegations stressed that because of the short period between the tabling of the study in the CCD and the conclusion of its 1975 session, there had been insufficient time for consideration of the document by their governments in order to make substantive interventions in the CCD, and that they would make their comments in due course.

6. In addition, the delegation of Mexico submitted a working paper containing a draft definition of the concept of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and a draft definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of such zones (CCD/470[13]), which is appended as annex III.

7. The present report, together with its annexes, is transmitted by

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[5] *Ante*, pp. 321–349.
[6] *Ante*, pp. 349–358.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 360–370.
[8] *Ante*, pp. 375–379.
[9] *Ante*, pp. 396–399.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 399–402.
[11] *Ante*, pp. 410–413.
[12] *Ante*, pp. 413–417.
[13] *Ante*, pp. 359–360.

the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(*Signed*) A. A. ROSHCHIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(*Signed*) JOSEPH MARTIN (JR)
United States of America

Report by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, August 28, 1975 [1]

1. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 4 March 1975 to 28 August 1975, together with the pertinent documents and records.

2. This report includes accounts of the Committee's work during 1975 on further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; non-nuclear measures, including the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons; other collateral measures; and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

3. A report on the question of a comprehensive test ban agreement, including a section on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, is contained in Part III of this document.

4. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX),[2] the Committee transmitted to the General Assembly on 28 August 1975 a special report (CCD/476) containing a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.[3]

5. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3264 (XXIX), the Committee considered the question of prohibitions on environmental warfare.[4] A summary of the activities of the Committee on this subject, as well as a description of the documents submitted during the current session, can be found in paragraphs 40 to 45 of this document.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

A. *Procedural Arrangements*

6. Two sessions were held, the first from 4 March to 10 April and the second from 24 June to 28 August 1975. During this period the Committee held 33 plenary meetings at which members set forth their

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[1] CCD/477, August 28, 1975. The documentary annexes are not printed here.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[3] See *supra* and *ante*, pp. 321–349.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.

governments' views and recommendations for progress on questions before the Committee. The Committee also held 19 informal meetings without records.

7. In addition to the plenary meetings described above, members of the Committee met frequently for informal multilateral consultations on disarmament questions of common interest.

B. *Participants in the Conference*

8. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yugoslavia. On the basis of agreement reached in the Committee in 1974, as endorsed in resolution 3261 B (XXIX) of the United Nations General Assembly, five new members joined the Committee in 1975[5]: the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire.

II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING 1975

9. In a letter dated 25 February 1975, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Committee the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session, including the following resolutions which entrusted specific responsibilities to the CCD:

A/RES/3256 (XXIX)—Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons[6]

A/RES/3257 (XXIX)—Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban[7]

A/RES/3261 D (XXIX)—General and complete disarmament[8]

A/RES/3261 F (XXIX)—General and complete disarmament[9]

A/RES/3264 (XXIX)—Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health.[10]

10. Members of the Committee were assisted in their examination and analysis of possible disarmament measures by working papers and other documents submitted to the Committee (Annexes A and B) and the plenary statements of Committee members (Annex C). Annex D

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 800–801.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 790–792.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 792–795.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 803–806.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 808–809.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 814–816.

contains an index by country and subject of plenary statements made by Committee members in 1975.

11. On 4 March 1975 the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations conveyed a message to the CCD from the Secretary-General (655).[11]

12. The Committee continued work in accordance with its provisional agenda on the following measures in the field of disarmament:

(a) Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament;

(b) Non-nuclear measures;

(c) Other collateral measures;

(d) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In addition, the Committee recognized the right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.

13. Statements concerning the Committee's procedures and organization of work were made by the delegations of Canada (656), India (664), Italy (665), Japan (663), Mexico (665), Pakistan (658) and Romania (656, 658, 662, 669). On 25 March 1975, the delegation of Romania submitted a proposal (CCD/450) regarding some adjustments in the organization of the work of the CCD. The Committee subsequently agreed that, unless decided otherwise, it shall begin meetings each year on the third Tuesday in February; that it shall discuss the organization of its work at the beginning of the first session and thereafter as the need arises, and that its report to the United Nations General Assembly shall be transmitted on the last Thursday in August unless otherwise decided (665). Recognizing that the format of the current report is provisional, the Committee, after informal consultations, agreed at its 687th plenary meeting on 28 August, the format of future reports shall have to be discussed and decided at the beginning of its 1976 session.

A. *Further Effective Measures Relating to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race at an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament*

14. Members of the Committee continued their work in 1975 on the question of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Most delegations made statements in this connexion.

15. The question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement was addressed by many members of the Committee. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX), a report on the results of the Committee's deliberations on this question is set forth in Part III of this document.[12]

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[11] The reference to verbatim records of the Committee is made in the following by giving in brackets only the number of the record, e.g., (655) in place of CCD/PV.655. [Footnote in original.]

[12] *Post*, pp. 428–435.

16. Many delegations stressed the importance of progress in halting the nuclear arms race and in achieving nuclear disarmament. Statements were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (660), Canada (666), Czechoslovakia (661), Egypt (681), German Democratic Republic (676), India (664, 677), Iran (656), Japan (657), Mexico (655, 680), Mongolia (661, 677), Morocco (665), the Netherlands (662), Pakistan (658, 677), Peru (679), Poland (659), Romania (658, 669, 685), Sweden (656, 683[13]), Soviet Union (665[14]), the United States (655,[15] 666[16]), Yugoslavia (677), and Zaire (664). A number of delegations referred, in this connexion, to the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty under Article VI of that Treaty.[17]

17. At the request of the delegation of Mexico, the text of the draft additional protocol to the NPT regarding the implementation of NPT Article VI, which was submitted by 18 States to the Review Conference of that Treaty, was circulated on 8 August 1975 as document CCD/464.

18. Virtually all delegations stressed the danger stemming from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the urgent need to find a solution to that danger without hampering the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Many delegations presented their views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Statements in this connexion were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (660, 680), Canada (666), Czechoslovakia (683), Egypt (664, 681), German Democratic Republic (676), Federal Republic of Germany (664, 685[18]), Hungary (662, 671), India (658, 664, 677, 686[19]), Iran (656), Italy (665, 685), Japan (657, 666), Mexico (680), Mongolia (661, 677), Morocco (665), the Netherlands (662, 666), Pakistan (658, 677), Peru (679), Poland (659), Romania (658, 669), Sweden (672, 673, 683[20]), Soviet Union (655,[21] 666,[22] 687[23]), the United Kingdom (659, 673), the United States (655,[24] 665,[25] 666[26]), Yugoslavia (662, 677) and Zaire (664). Many of these delegations commented on the role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

19. On 31 July 1975, the delegation of Pakistan submitted, as document CCD/462,[27] the text of a resolution on strengthening the security

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[13] *Ante*, pp. 360–361.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 106–107.
[15] *Ante*, pp. 73–74.
[16] *Ante*, pp. 194–196.
[17] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[18] *Ante*, pp. 396–399.
[19] *Ante*, pp. 408–410.
[20] *Ante*, pp. 360–361.
[21] *Ante*, pp. 66–68.
[22] *Ante*, pp. 197–199.
[23] *Ante*, pp. 411–412.
[24] *Ante*, pp. 74–77.
[25] *Ante*, p. 111.
[26] *Ante*, pp. 194–196.
[27] *Ante*, pp. 256–257.

of non-nuclear-weapon States adopted by the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (677).

20. Statements assessing the results of the NPT Review Conference were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (680), Canada (666), Czechoslovakia (683), Egypt (681), the Federal Republic of Germany (687), the German Democratic Republic (676), Hungary (671), Italy (665, 685), Japan (666), Mexico (680), Mongolia (677), the Netherlands (666), Pakistan (677), Peru (679), Poland (681), Romania (669), the Soviet Union (666,[28] 687[29]), Sweden (673), the United Kingdom (673), the United States (666[30]), Yugoslavia (677).

21. The delegations of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom submitted, as document CCD/488, the Joint Anglo-Soviet Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 17 February 1975.[31]

22. The delegations of Bulgaria (660), Canada (685), Czechoslovakia (683), Egypt (664, 681), German Democratic Republic (676), Federal Republic of Germany (664, 685[32]), India (664, 687), Iran (656), Italy (685), Mexico (655, 657, 661,[33] 679, 681, 682,[34] 683), Mongolia (685), Morocco (665), Netherlands (683[35]), Pakistan (658, 675), Peru (655), Poland (681), Romania (669, 685), Sweden (683[36]), the Soviet Union (655,[37] 656), the United Kingdom (686[38]), the United States (655,[39] 665,[40] 666[41]), Yugoslavia (662, 677) made statements on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Many delegations referred to the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening security promoting non-proliferation, and contributing to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Several delegations expressed views on particular nuclear-weapon-free zones or proposals for such zones.

23. The delegations of India (664) and the Netherlands (662) discussed the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

24. The delegations of Romania (658, 669, 685), Sweden (683[42]) and Yugoslavia (677) addressed the question of nuclear disarmament at the regional and tactical level, with particular reference to the situation in Europe.

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[28] *Ante*, pp. 197–198.
[29] *Ante*, p. 411.
[30] *Ante*, pp. 194–195.
[31] *Ante*, pp. 62–63.
[32] *Ante*, pp. 396–399.
[33] *Ante*, pp. 91–97.
[34] *Ante*, pp. 349–358.
[35] *Ante*, pp. 370–375.
[36] *Ante*, pp. 360–370.
[37] *Ante*, pp. 70–71.
[38] *Ante*, pp. 399–402.
[39] *Ante*, p. 77.
[40] *Ante*, p. 110.
[41] *Ante*, p. 196.
[42] *Ante*, pp. 363–364.

B. *Non-nuclear Measures*

Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons

25. Having in mind the recommendations of the General Assembly in its resolution 3256 (XXIX), the Committee continued its efforts to achieve progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons. Members of the Committee emphasized the importance they attach to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

26. Early in the session, the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced their ratifications of the Biological Weapons Convention.[43] The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted, as document CCD/451 the United Kingdom statement on the entry into force of the Convention on 26 March. The Convention's entry into force was widely welcomed by members of the Committee. The delegations of Japan (657) and Zaire (664) announced that their Governments were preparing to ratify. The delegation of Sweden announced that it had signed the Convention on 27 February 1975 (656).

27. The delegations of the Soviet Union (666[44]), the United Kingdom (659) and the United States (655[45]) announced that, in compliance with Article II of the Convention, they did not possess any biological agents or toxins.

28. The delegation of the United States announced its ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (655[46]).

29. Statements concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (660), Canada (656, 662, 685), Czechoslovakia (661), Egypt (664, 681), the German Democratic Republic (655, 676), the Federal Republic of Germany (664, 674), Hungary (662, 671), India (664), Iran (656, 678), Italy (665, 685), Japan (657, 661[47]), Mexico (661), Mongolia (661), Morocco (665), Pakistan (658), Poland (659), Sweden (656, 676,[48] 683), the Soviet Union (655,[49] 665[50]), the United Kingdom (657, 681), the United States (655,[51] 665,[52] 666,[53] 687[54]), Yugoslavia (662), Zaire (664).

30. The delegations of the Soviet Union (655[55]) and the United States

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[43] For text of convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[44] *Ante*, p. 200.
[45] *Ante*, pp. 77–78.
[46] For U.S. announcement, see *ibid.* The protocol is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[47] *Ante*, pp. 88–91.
[48] *Ante*, pp. 287–291.
[49] *Ante*, pp. 71–72.
[50] *Ante*, p. 108.
[51] *Ante*, pp. 77–78.
[52] *Ante*, pp. 111–112.
[53] *Ante*, p. 196.
[54] *Ante*, pp. 416–417.
[55] *Ante*, p. 71.

(666[56]) reported that steps had been taken with regard to the commitment made at the July 1974 summit meeting between their leaders to consider a joint initiative in the CCD to achieve, as a first step, a convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.[57] Many delegations urged early action by the two Governments concerned.

31. Statements were made by several delegations concerning the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union in 1972 (CCD/361)[58]; the memorandum of ten non-aligned States members of the CCD (CCD/400)[59]; and the draft convention submitted by Japan in 1974 (CCD/420).[60] Japan submitted certain modifications of the wording of its 1974 draft convention in document CCD/452.[61]

32. On 4 July 1975, a working paper by Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of chemical warfare agents (CCD/453) was circulated to Committee members.[62]

33. On 22 July 1975, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted a working paper (CCD/458) on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents.[63]

34. On 29 July 1975, the delegation of Sweden submitted a working paper (CCD/461) on a model for delimiting chemical warfare agents in an international treaty.[64]

35. On 8 August 1975, the delegation of Japan submitted a working paper (CCD/466) [65] concerning the scope of chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of the national verification system.

36. On 26 August 1975, the delegation of Canada submitted a working paper (CCD/473) on the use of measurements of lethality for definition of agents of chemical warfare.[66]

Other measures

37. On 10 April 1975, the delegation of the United States made a statement reiterating its view that restraints on conventional arms might usefully be considered in a regional context and suggesting a number of illustrative principles that might be applicable on a worldwide basis to the acquisition and transfer of conventional arms (CCD/

[56] *Ante*, p. 196.
[57] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 236.
[58] *Ibid.*, 1972, pp. 120–124.
[59] *Ibid.*, 1973, pp. 206–209.
[60] For text, see *ibid.*, 1974, pp. 99–106.
[61] *Ante*, p. 101.
[62] Not printed here.
[63] *Ante*, pp. 269–274.
[64] *Ante*, pp. 293–303.
[65] Not printed here.
[66] *Ante*, pp. 389–395.

665).[67] The delegations of Sweden (683[68]), the United Kingdom (673) and the United States (687[69]) also addressed the question of restraints on conventional arms.

38. The delegations of the German Democratic Republic (655), Peru (679), Poland (659), Romania (658), Sweden (683[70]), the Soviet Union (655,[71] 666[72]), and Yugoslavia (662) made statements concerning the reduction of military budgets and the use of funds saved through such reductions to provide additional assistance for development purposes.

39. On 24 July 1975, the delegation of the United States submitted a working paper on international standards of comparison for military expenditures (CCD/460) [73] and suggested that the CCD examine technical and conceptual problems involved in the measurement and comparison of military expenditures as a first step toward creating conditions in which agreed military expenditure limitations could be achieved.[74] The delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany (685[75]), the Netherlands (683[76]), and Sweden (683[77]) commented on the idea that the CCD should examine the technical and conceptual issues involved in military expenditure limitations.

C. *Other Collateral Measures*

40. In its resolution 3264 (XXIX) the General Assembly requested the CCD to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of a convention to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being, and health.

41. At the request of the delegation of Sweden, the Committee, recognizing the complexity of this problem, decided to hold informal meetings with experts during the week of August 4 to 8. Four such meetings were held with the participation of experts from a number of CCD members. Observers from the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World Meteorological Organization also participated in those meetings. Members of the Committee regarded these meetings as highly informative regarding the status of scientific research in the field of environmental modification and as useful in their consideration of the question of possible prohibitions on the use of environmental modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes.

42. On 5 August 1975 Canada submitted a working paper which suggested a preliminary approach to considering a convention on the pro-

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[67] *Ante*, pp. 110–118.
[68] *Ante*, pp. 364–366.
[69] *Ante*, p. 416.
[70] *Ante*, pp. 366–368.
[71] *Ante*, pp. 72–73.
[72] *Ante*, pp. 198–199.
[73] *Ante*, pp. 279–284.
[74] *Ante*, pp. 274–279.
[75] *Ante*, p. 399.
[76] *Ante*, p. 370.
[77] *Ante*, p. 367.

hibition of environmental modification for military or other hostile purposes (463[78]).

43. On 8 August 1975, Sweden submitted a working paper containing a short list of methods to influence the environment for hostile purposes (465).

44. Virtually all delegations expressed the desire to take action to prohibit the modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes. Statements in this regard were made by the delegations of Argentina (686), Bulgaria (660, 680, 685), Canada (656, 678), Czechoslovakia (661, 683), Egypt (664, 681), German Democratic Republic (655, 676, 678, 684), Federal Republic of Germany (664, 687), Hungary (662, 671, 687), India (664), Iran (656, 680), Italy (665, 685), Mongolia (661, 682, 685), Morocco (665), Netherlands (662, 681), Pakistan (658), Poland (659, 681, 685), Sweden (656, 664, 683[79]), the Soviet Union (655,[80] 665,[81] 666,[82] 681[83]), United Kingdom (659), United States (655,[84] 665,[85] 666,[86] 680[87]), and Zaire (664).

45. On 21 August 1975, the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States tabled, in documents (471) and (472) respectively, identical draft conventions on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.[88] Preliminary comments on the draft convention were made by the delegations of Argentina (686), Bulgaria (685), German Democratic Republic (684), Federal Republic of Germany (687), Hungary (687), Italy (685), Mongolia (685), Poland (685), Sweden (684) and the United Kingdom (686[89]).

46. The delegation of the United Kingdom, referring to the conference to review the operation of the Seabed Treaty called for in its article VII, suggested that preparations should begin with action by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session (673).

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47. On 4 March 1975, the delegation of Peru reported the adoption in December 1974 by eight Latin American States—Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela—of the Declaration of Ayacucho, by which these States undertook to establish conditions permitting effective arms control and ending any acquisition of arms for aggressive warlike purposes, so that all possible re-

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[78] Not printed here.
[79] *Ante*, pp. 368–370.
[80] *Ante*, pp. 68–69.
[81] *Ante*, pp. 107–108.
[82] *Ante*, p. 197.
[83] *Ante*, pp. 316–318.
[84] *Ante*, p. 78.
[85] *Ante*, p. 111.
[86] *Ante*, p. 196.
[87] *Ante*, pp. 312–316.
[88] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[89] *Ante*, pp. 401–402.

sources may be devoted to the economic and social development of the Latin American countries (655).[90]

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48. The delegations of Bulgaria (680), Czechoslovakia (683), Egypt (681), German Democratic Republic (676), Hungary (687), Italy (685), Mongolia (682), Poland (681), Romania (685), the USSR (687[91]) and Yugoslavia (677) commented on the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

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49. The delegations of the German Democratic Republic (676), Mongolia (677), the USSR (666[92]), and the United States (687 [sic][93]) referred to the recent proposal by the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

D. *General and Complete Disarmament*

50. Several delegations referred to the need to make progress toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

51. The delegation of Romania submitted a working paper (449) on steps to be taken within a Disarmament Programme.

52. References to the question of a world disarmament conference were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (680), Czechoslovakia (661), Egypt (681), German Democratic Republic (676), Hungary (671), India (664), Iran (683), Morocco (665), Peru (679), Poland (659), Sweden (683[94]), Soviet Union (665[95]) and Yugoslavia (677).

53. The delegations of Egypt (681), Peru (679), Romania (685) and Yugoslavia (677) expressed the view that consideration should be given to holding a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

III: REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AGREEMENT

54. In resolution 3257 (XXIX), the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the progress achieved. Having in mind the request of the General Assembly, mem-

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[90] The declaration appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 819–822.
[91] *Ante*, pp. 410–411.
[92] *Ante*, p. 199.
[93] *Ante*, pp. 413–417; cf. p. 78.
[94] *Ante*, p. 369.
[95] *Ante*, p. 109.

bers of the Committee, during 1975, continued to discuss the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

55. Many delegations stressed the need for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and several delegations stated that a comprehensive test ban agreement was the single most important measure to contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Statements concerning a comprehensive test ban were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (660, 680), Canada (656, 666, 673), Czechoslovakia (661), Egypt (664, 681), German Democratic Republic (673), Federal Republic of Germany (664, 672), Hungary (662), India (664, 677), Iran (655, 656), Italy (665, 685), Japan (657, 666, 673), Mexico (655, 680), Mongolia (661, 677), Morocco (665), the Netherlands (683[96]), Poland (659), Sweden (656, 673, 683[97]), Soviet Union (655,[98] 666[99]), United Kingdom (659, 673, 675), United States (655,[1] 666[2]), Yugoslavia (662, 677), Zaire (664).

56. At the request of the delegation of Mexico, the text of the draft additional protocol to the NPT regarding the adoption of measures that may lead to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which was submitted by 18 States to the Review Conference of that treaty, was circulated on 8 August 1975 as document CCD/464.[3]

57. On 14 July 1975, the delegations of Canada, Japan, and Sweden tabled a working paper (CCD/457) reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means.[4] On 24 July 1975, the delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on the use of seismic monitoring techniques to distinguish multiple explosions from earthquakes (CCD/459).[5]

58. Many delegations made statements concerning the Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and its relationship to a comprehensive test ban agreement.[6] References in this connexion were made by the delegations of Bulgaria (660), Canada (656), Czechoslovakia (661), German Democratic Republic (673), Federal Republic of Germany (664), Hungary (662), Iran (656), Japan (657), Mexico (655), Mongolia (661), Morocco (655), Netherlands (683[7]), Pakistan (658, 675), Poland (659), Soviet Union (655[8]), United Kingdom (659),

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[96] *Ante*, pp. 373-375.
[97] *Ante*, pp. 363-364.
[98] *Ante*, p. 69.
[99] *Ante*, pp. 197-201; cf. p. 69.
[1] *Ante*, p. 76.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 194-196.
[3] Not printed here.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 254-256.
[5] Not printed here.
[6] For treaty text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225-227.
[7] *Ante*, p. 373.
[8] *Ante*, p. 69.

United States (655,[9] 666[10]), Yugoslavia (662), and Zaire (664).

59. The delegation of the United Kingdom referred to the joint Anglo-Soviet Declaration of 17 February 1975 in which the two sides expressed their aim of achieving the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests for all time and stated that, until the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose, they will work for agreements limiting the number of underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum (659).[11]

60. The delegations of Bulgaria (680), Czechoslovakia (661), Mongolia (661), Poland (659), Soviet Union (655[12]), called for the adherence of all nuclear-weapon States to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.[13] Some delegations welcomed the announcement by France concerning the discontinuance of its nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

Section on the Arms Control Implications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

61. In resolution 3261 D (XXIX) the General Assembly called upon the Committee, in submitting its report to the General Assembly at its 30th session on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and, in doing so, to take account of the views of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This section is contained in paragraphs 62 to 78 below.

62. In connexion with the Committee's consideration of the arms control implication of peaceful nuclear explosions, working papers were submitted by Japan (CCD/454) on 7 July 1975,[14] and by the United States (CCD/456) on 10 July 1975.[15] In addition, a letter from the Director General of the IAEA, providing relevant facts from the Agency's annual report and other documents concerning its studies of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, was circulated on 7 July 1975 as document CCD/455.[16]

63. At the request of the delegation of Japan, informal meetings were held between 14 July and 18 July 1975 to consider the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. Experts from several delegations participated in those discussions. Most members of the Committee found the informal meetings of value in promoting a clearer understanding of the many complex issues involved.

64. In addition to these informal meetings with experts, plenary statements on the consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions were made by the delegations of Bulgaria

[9] *Ante*, p. 74.
[10] *Ante*, p. 195.
[11] *Ante*, pp. 62-63.
[12] *Ante*, p. 69.
[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293; 14 UST 1313.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 229-236.
[15] *Ante*, pp. 247-254.
[16] Not printed here.

(660, 680, 685), Canada (656, 666, 672), Czechoslovakia (661, 683), Egypt (681), German Democratic Republic (673), Federal Republic of Germany (664, 672), Hungary (662, 687), India (657, 658, 663, 664, 677), Iran (656), Italy (665, 685), Japan (657, 663, 664, 666, 677), Mongolia (661, 677), Netherlands (662, 683[17]), Pakistan (658, 675), Poland (659, 681), Sweden (656, 672, 683[18]), Soviet Union (655,[19] 666,[20] 673[21]), United Kingdom (659, 673), United States (655,[22] 666,[23] 671,[24] 676,[25] 687[26]), and Yugoslavia (677).

65. The delegations of Bulgaria (680), Canada (672), Czechoslovakia (683), Federal Republic of Germany (672), Italy (685), Japan (686), the Netherlands (683[27]), Pakistan (675), Poland (681), Sweden (672, 683[28]), and the United States (671[29]), expressed the view that because of their common technical characteristics, all nuclear explosive devices, regardless of their particular design features or intended application, could be used as nuclear weapons. These delegations therefore held that it was not possible for a State previously not possessing a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a PNE programme without in the process achieving a nuclear weapons capability. A number of delegations supported the view that the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons was not compatible with the carrying out of a PNE programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State. In the light of these widely shared views, the delegation of Japan appealed to all non-nuclear-weapon States, in the interest of avoiding damage to the higher interests of the international community and to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation, to renounce their right to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose (686).[30]

66. The delegation of Yugoslavia, however, held that the only way to strengthen non-proliferation was by banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, by stopping the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon tests, and by starting nuclear disarmament, and not by focusing attention on the potential dangers of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by countries that have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons (677).

67. Most delegations expressed the view that the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions should not prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from receiving any benefits of PNE technology

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[17] *Ante*, pp. 371-375.
[18] *Ante*, p. 364.
[19] *Ante*, pp. 69-70.
[20] *Ante*, p. 197.
[21] *Ante*, pp. 257-261.
[22] *Ante*, pp. 73-77.
[23] *Ante*, pp. 195-196.
[24] *Ante*, pp. 243-247.
[25] *Ante*, pp. 291-293.
[26] *Ante*, p. 415.
[27] *Ante*, pp. 371-372.
[28] *Ante*, p. 364.
[29] *Ante*, p. 244.
[30] *Ante*, p. 407.

that may be realized by the nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion many of these delegations believed that Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the most appropriate basis for making widely available the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions without contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons. Several delegations took particular note that the final declaration adopted at the Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty indicated that the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State, whether or not party to the NPT.[31]

68. The delegation of India disagreed with the view that peaceful nuclear explosions should not be permitted outside the framework of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It held that, if such a view were accepted, it would mean the establishment of the monopoly of nuclear-weapon States in PNE technology for all times to come (677).

69. Many delegations expressed the view that any benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions made available to non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided under the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the NPT. Several delegations supported the recommendation of the NPT Review Conference that the IAEA expedite work on identifying the legal issues involved and commence consideration of the structure and content of such an agreement or agreements. In this connexion the delegations of the German Democratic Republic (673), the Federal Republic of Germany (672), Japan (686[32]), and Sweden (672, 683[33]) expressed the view that early agreements along the lines of Article V could counteract the tendencies of several non-nuclear weapon States to promote their own national developments.

70. Many delegations considered the IAEA to be the appropriate international body through which potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the adoption of a resolution by the Board of Governors of the IAEA setting up an *ad hoc* advisory group on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (673[34]). The delegation of Sweden believed that it was necessary to involve continuously the General Assembly in the performance of the essentially political task of arms control in an international regime of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (672).

71. Several delegations supported the proposition that it was necessary to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapon-State PNE programmes did not provide nuclear weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to those States. They recognized that, in order to prevent the acquisition of such weapons-related benefits, any constraints on nuclear weapon tests by the nuclear-weapon States would have to be

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[31] For text of final declaration, see *ante*, pp. 146–157.
[32] *Ante*, p. 406.
[33] *Ante*, p. 364.
[34] The text of the resolution is printed *ante*, pp. 188–190.

accompanied by appropriate constraints on PNE's, and by verification procedures adequate to assure that such constraints were being observed.

72. Several delegations referred to negotiations currently underway between the United States and the Soviet Union toward an agreement that would ensure that any peaceful nuclear explosions carried out by the two parties were consistent with the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. The delegation of Sweden expressed the hope that these negotiations would lead to international observation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to an internationally open disclosure of relevant explosion data, before and after the events (672).

73. The delegations of Canada (672), Japan (686[35]) and the United States (671[36]) pointed out that the objective of preventing the acquisition of weapon-related benefits from a PNE programme would be considerably more difficult to achieve under a comprehensive test ban than under a threshold test ban agreement, since, in the absence of any authorized weapons testing, incentives for seeking military benefits in the course of a PNE programme would be much greater than under a threshold test ban régime. The delegation of the Netherlands held, in this connexion that, while certain elements of a verification system could reduce the risk of using PNE's for weapons development purposes, PNE's would present serious verification problems in the context of a CTB. It did not have the impression that a foolproof system of verification could be developed. It further stated that, since this question was not yet properly resolved, the Netherlands considered the CCD's study of the arms control implications of PNE's to be unfinished (683[37]). The delegation of Japan stated it would not be possible to solve the question of a CTB without solving in advance the question of PNE's (677, 686[38]).

74. The delegation of the Soviet Union expressed the view that the main obstacle to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing is not a matter of peaceful nuclear explosions but rather the unwillingness of certain States to stop testing. It believed that the first priority should be a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests and that once such an agreement is reached it would then be possible to settle the question of the feasibility of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in conditions of a total ban on nuclear weapon testing (673[39]). The delegation of India expressed the view that only nuclear weapon tests were relevant to the question of nuclear arms development and proliferation and that the question of regulating PNE's could only be taken up after achieving a comprehensive test ban (677, 686[40]). The

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[35] *Ante*, pp. 402–408.
[36] *Ante*, p. 246.
[37] *Ante*, p. 371.
[38] *Ante*, p. 407.
[39] *Ante*, p. 261.
[40] *Ante*, pp. 408–410.

delegation of Yugoslavia maintained that the prior achievement of a comprehensive test ban could provide the sole genuine basis for approaching international regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions (677). The delegation of Egypt, maintaining that States should in no way be prevented from enjoying the potential peaceful benefits of PNE's, expressed the hope that the CCD would adhere faithfully to the directives issued annually by the General Assembly to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and that a solution would be found to the PNE problem within the already existing system of safeguards against nuclear proliferation (681).

75. The delegation of Canada called for consideration of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions until a solution could be found to the role of PNE's under a CTB and until a thorough international examination of the economic value of PNE's presented a more compelling case for their use. The Canadian delegation emphasized, however, that if States saw value in continued PNE experimentation and therefore did not favour a moratorium, the highest priority would have to be given by the nuclear-weapon States to finding a satisfactory way in which PNE's could be carried out under a CTB without facilitating weapons development (672). The delegation of Pakistan also suggested an agreement placing a moratorium on PNE's (675).

76. The delegation of India expressed the view that a PNE moratorium would operate to the disadvantage of non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of economic development. It maintained in addition that a PNE moratorium would result in a highly discriminatory situation, leading to the same unacceptable monopoly concerning PNE's as is sought to be established under Article V of the NPT (677).

77. The delegation of the Netherlands, noting the recommendation by a considerable number of delegations at the NPT Review Conference that the nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT enter into an agreement as soon as possible to halt nuclear weapons tests for a specified period of time, suggested that such an agreement be linked to a temporary ban on PNE's. It held that this would eliminate the need to develop a verification system capable of preventing the misuse of PNE's for weapons purposes, thus removing an obstacle in the way of a CTB and would ensure that no country need be concerned that possible useful applications of PNE's would be banned forever (683[41]). The delegation of Japan maintained that in order to ensure the self restraint of non-nuclear-weapon States under a moratorium on PNEs, the prospect of a CTB should be made certain (686[42]).

78. Various delegations expressed their views on the results of the Committee's consideration of the arms control implications of PNE's. The delegation of Japan believed that the Committee's discussions succeeded in identifying various important questions that must be settled before it is possible to solve the problem of PNE's and that the objec-

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[41] *Ante*, pp. 374-375.
[42] *Ante*, p. 407.

tive of providing the Committee with the clarification and data necessary for discussing the arms control implications of PNE's had been fully achieved (677, 686[43]). The delegation of the Netherlands held that the Committee had obtained considerably more insight into the proliferation aspects of PNE's (683[44]). On the other hand the delegation of India maintained that in the course of the Committee's deliberations nothing of importance which was not already known had been made known and that political views were propounded in the guise of expert knowledge (677, 686[45]). On 21 August 1975, the delegation of Japan submitted, as document CCD/468/Rev.1, comments on the informal meetings with the experts by the Japanese Representative to the CCD, made on 18 July 1975, summarizing the discussion that took place in these meetings. On 26 August 1975, the delegation of India submitted as document CCD/474, its appraisal of the discussion in those meetings.

* * *

79. The Committee decided to reconvene on 17 February 1976 unless subsequently agreed otherwise.

80. The present report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

(*Signed*) A. A. ROSHCHIN
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(*Signed*) JOSEPH MARTIN (JR.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Political Declaration of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries: Lima Program for Mutual Assistance and Solidarity [Extracts], August 30, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

8. The participants are aware that the international "détente" which is now taking place, offers favourable conditions for the solution to cold war problems, as well as to the problems stemming from the danger of nuclear confrontation, with its catastrophic consequences. This "détente" process, however, is still limited and precarious if it is not extended to all geographical areas and does not favour an effective democratisation of international relations, including all members of the international community in the solution of serious problems and the

[43] *Ante*, p. 402.
[44] *Ante*, p. 371.
[45] *Ante*, p. 409.
[1] A/10217, pp. 4-5, 18, 25-28, 29.

elimination of centers of tension affecting humanity, so as to ensure a lasting and stable peace conducive to full development.

9. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs consider, further, that the excellent results of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation will have a positive impact on the solution of problems deriving from the cold war and other international problems.

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12. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs observed that, in this respect, the Lima Conference is taking place at a time when the world situation is basically characterised by the successes of historical movements for national liberation and of progressive forces within a process of "détente" which is still limited in its scope by the hardening of hegemonic and imperialistic pretensions in all their manifestations as a reaction against the political awakening of the peoples of the Non-Aligned and other developing countries and by the deterioration of the world economic situation as a consequence of the old and inequitable international order.

. . . . . .

72. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs denounce and condemn the campaign of aggression carried on in Latin America by the agents of imperialism and by transnational enterprises engaged in the weapons trade, and strongly support the initiative taken by the Peruvian President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, which envisaged an agreement within the Andean Group on limitation of armaments in order to allocate the maximum possible resources to the full development of their countries.

. . . . . .

STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO INTENSIFY SOLIDARITY AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AMONG NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

. . . . . .

OBJECTIVES

99. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs considered that, to be coherent and lasting, this Strategy should, *inter alia*, pursue the following basic objectives:

a. To strengthen the coordination and joint actions of the Non-Aligned Countries in order to ensure international peace and security, to eliminate causes of international tension, to dismantle military bases, to create peace zones, to encourage general and complete disarmament and to strengthen the United Nations;

. . . . . .

MEASURES OF JOINT POLICY

100. The Foreign Ministers undertake to strengthen coordination among the Group of Non-Aligned Countries on a systematic and continuing basis in order to ensure the elimination of hotbeds of tension, the dissolution of military alliances, the end of cold war, and the dismantling and liquidation of military bases so that international security may embrace all the areas of the world and all peoples and countries and that the "detente" initiated by the great powers may extend throughout the world.

. . . . . .

103. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs, furthermore, undertake to make their cooperation and joint action closer so that seas and ocean territories do not become subjects of rivalry and competition among the great powers and to prevent these areas from being considered strategic zones of the power policy.

104. They agree to sustain a joint action against any policy of the great powers which may endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Non-Aligned Countries in the aforesaid maritime areas and, pursuant to the provisions adopted by the IV Summit Conference in Algiers shall maintain a close watch and cooperation in order to create zones of peace and cooperation in the different regions of the world and to secure respect for these so as to diminish tensions, to eliminate foreign military presence and to promote peaceful cooperation among States.[2]

105. They noted with deep concern that the Indian Ocean Declaration as a zone of peace approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations has not been respected by the great powers.[3] For example, the Diego Garcia naval air-base is being maintained and the air, naval and military presence of the great powers is being strengthened, which thus creates rivalries and tensions which endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the States in that area.

106. In this respect, they consider it important to condemn especially the installation of the Diego Garcia base and invite littoral and hinterland States to refuse to grant facilities to warships and military planes of the great powers used in the context of their rivalry and for any other purpose that may be detrimental to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of countries in the region.

107. To that effect, they undertake to initiate close cooperation and action so that a conference of countries of this region be held in order to secure the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, as approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

108. In accordance with the Political Declaration of the Summit

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, p. 631.
[3] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 901-903; *ibid., 1973*, pp. 854-855.

Conference of Algiers on the establishment of Peace and Cooperation Areas, the Non-Aligned recommend the creation in the South Pacific Ocean of a Peaceful Cooperation and Peace Zone so that the Ocean areas be free from the use of force by the States. For this purpose they deem it advisable that the necessary consultations among the countries of this area be carried out so that said proposal, which has been endorsed by the Conference, may be adopted since it constitutes an actual contribution to the strengthening of the international peace and security.

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112. The Conference notes with great concern that the arms race, especially of nuclear weapons is being accelerated and intensified, thus threatening peace and security, particularly of the Non-Aligned and other developing countries. Although initial results have been achieved in the field of the control of strategic nuclear armaments and bacteriological weapons steps toward a genuine cessation of the arms race and initiation of the disarmament process are still lacking.

113. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs agree to coordinate the action of the Non-Aligned Countries within the framework of the United Nations, in order to promote the holding of a World Conference on Disarmament, with as little delay as possible, with the participation of all States on an equal basis and during which universal disarmament guidelines, in particular with respect to nuclear disarmament, would be approved together with the utilization of resources thus freed for international economic cooperation.

114. If it becomes evident that it will not be possible to convene a World Disarmament Conference, the Foreign Ministers consider that a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament issues should be convened as proposed in the Declaration of the First Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.[4]

115. Likewise, they agree to pursue the action of the Non-Aligned within the frame of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to expedite the work of that body and to achieve agreements on prohibition of chemical armaments, the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and, above all, to progress in disarmament.

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Agreement Between Egypt and Israel, September 4, 1975 [1]

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

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[4] *Ibid., 1961*, p. 381.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 29, 1975, pp. 466–470. The agreement and annex were initialed on Sept. 1 at Jerusalem by representatives of Israel and at Alexandria by representatives of Egypt and signed at Geneva on Sept. 4.

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at _____ on the _____ 1975, in four original copies.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

_____

For the Government of Israel

_____


ISRAEL
Area of limited forces and armaments
Buffer Zone 1
SINAI
EGYPT
Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
Red Sea
Egypt-Israel Agreement
September 1975
Line E The Egyptian line
Line J The Israeli line
The lines E and J will extend 12 nautical miles into the Mediterranean Sea perpendicular to the direction of the coast and the area between the lines will be U.N. buffer zone
Line K The limit of the Israeli area of limited forces and armaments
Line F The limit of the Egyptian area of limited forces and armaments
Line M The line separating the Israeli-controlled area from the area south of line E and east of line M, and the areas of buffer zones 24 and 25
BZ 1 The buffer zone between lines E and J
BZ 24 & BZ 25 The buffer zones along the Gulf of Suez
Road section for common use
Egyptian surveillance station
Israeli surveillance station
USA WS USA watch stations 1, 2, & 3
U.N. Posts in the Mitlah Passes area

WITNESS

Annex to Egypt-Israel Agreement

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. *Definitions of Lines and Areas*

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. *Buffer Zones*

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. *Area South of Line E and West of Line M*

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indi-

cated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. *Aerial Surveillance*

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. *Limitation of Forces and Armaments*

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions

(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks

(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and

between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The Parties will not place antiaircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. *Process of Implementation*

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

Proposal

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agree-

ment will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other

specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

Accepted by:

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on Foreign Affairs Authorization Bill, Fiscal Year 1976 [Extract], September 8, 1975 [1]

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1517]

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

. . . . . .

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT (22 U.S.C. 2551)

. . . . . .

PURPOSE

SEC. 2. An ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and

[1] Senate Report No. 94-337, Part 2, 94th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1-8.

in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It is the purpose of this Act to provide impetus toward this goal by creating a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field. This organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy.

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based. [It must be able] *It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,* to carry out the following primary functions:

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;

(b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;

(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

. . . . . .

DIRECTORS

SEC. 22. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, *the National Security Council,* and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

. . . . . .

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

Sec. 36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—

(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—

(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or

(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or

(2) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1), or

(B) any program described in subsection (a) (2) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

(3) Upon the request of any appropriate committee of either House of Congress, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).

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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 45. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. [The Director] *Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director* shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-field background security and loyalty investigations of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, advisory boards, contractors and subcontractors, and their officers and employees, actual or prospective. In the event the investigation discloses information indicating that the person investigated may be or may become a security risk, or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investigation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full-field investigation. The final results of all such investigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determination. [No person] *Except as provided in subsection (d), no person* shall be permitted to enter on duty as such an officer, employee, consultant, or member of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such detail, and no contractor or subcontractor, or officer or employee thereof shall be permitted to have access to any classified information, until he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsection and the report of such investigations made to the Director, and the Director shall have determined that such person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. Standards applicable with respect to the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in this subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of such persons for such purposes shall not be less intensive or complete, than in the case of such clearance of persons in a corresponding category under the security procedures of the Government agency or agencies having the highest security restrictions with respect to persons in such category.

(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof: *Provided*, That security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than "confidential" to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: *Provided*, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency check. *Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors*

and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c).

(c) The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize any of its employees, or employees of any contractor, prospective contractor, licensee, or prospective licensee of the Atomic Energy Commission or any other person authorized to have access to Restricted Data by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 2165 of title 42, to permit the Director or any officer, employee, consultant, person detailed from other Government agencies, member of the General Advisory Committee or of an advisory board established pursuant to section 41(f), contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, or officer or employee of such contractor, subcontractor, prospective contractor, or prospective subcontractor, to have access to Restricted Data which is required in the performance of his duties and so certified by the Director, but only if (1) the Atomic Energy Commission has determined, in accordance with the established personnel security procedures and standards of the Commission, that permitting such individual to have access to such Restricted Data will not endanger the common defense and security, and (2) the Atomic Energy Commission finds that the established personnel and other security procedures and standards of the Agency are adequate and in reasonable conformity to the standards established by the Atomic Energy Commission under section 2165 of title 42, including those for interim clearance in subsection (b) thereof. Any individual granted access to such Restricted Data pursuant to this subsection may exchange such data with any individual who (A) is an officer or employee of the Department of Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or a contractor or subcontractor of any such department, agency, or armed force, or an officer or employee of any such contractor or subcontractor, and (B) has been authorized to have access to Restricted Data under the provisions of sections 2163 or 2455 of title 42.

(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States.

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APPROPRIATION

SEC. 49 (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964 and 1965, the sum of $20,000,000,

and for the three fiscal years 1966 through 1968, the sum of $30,000,000, and for the two fiscal years 1969 through 1970, the sum of $18,500,000, and for the two fiscal years 1971 and 1972, the sum of $17,500,000, and for the two fiscal years 1973 and 1974, the sum of $22,000,000, and for the fiscal year 1975, the sum of $10,100,000, *and for fiscal year 1976, the sum of $12,130,000* to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, not more than $7,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to the preceding sentence for fiscal years 1969 through 1970 may be used for the purpose of research, development, and other studies conducted in whole or in part outside the Agency, whether by other government agencies or by public or private institutions or persons: *Provided*, That this limitation shall not apply to field test activities conducted pursuant to the authority of this Act.

(b) Funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be allocated or transferred to any agency for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Such funds shall be available for obligation and expenditure in accordance with authority granted in this Act, or under authority governing the activities of the agencies to which such funds are allocated or transferred.

(c) Not more than 20 percentum of any appropriation made pursuant to this Act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last month of a fiscal year.

(d) [None] *Except as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act specified under section 2 (c), none* of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda concerning the work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

REPORT TO CONGRESS

SEC. 50. The Director shall submit to the President, for transmittal to the Congress, not later than January 31 of each year, a report concerning activities of the Agency. *Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.*

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THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED

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SEC. 414. MUNITIONS CONTROL.—(a) The President is authorized to control, in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the export and import of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, other than by a United States Government agency. The President is authorized to designate those articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, for the purposes of this section.

(b) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any arms, ammunition, or implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, designated by the President under subsection (a) shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section, and, in addition, shall pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations. Such regulations shall prohibit the return to the United States for sale in the United States (other than for the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies or for any State or local law enforcement agency) of any military firearms or ammunition of United States manufacture furnished to foreign governments by the United States under this Act or any other foreign assistance program of the United States, whether or not advanced in value or improved in condition in a foreign country. This prohibition shall not extend to similar firearms that have been so substantially transformed as to become, in effect, articles of foreign manufacture.

(c) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section or any rule or regulation issued under this section, or who willfully, in a registration or license application, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

(d) This section applies to and within the Canal Zone.

(e) Licenses issued for the export of articles on the United States Munitions List in excess of $100,000 shall be reported promptly to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, which report shall contain—

(1) the items to be exported under the license;

(2) the quantity of each such item to be furnished;

(3) the name and address of the consignee and of the ultimate user of each such item; and

(4) an injunction whenever appropriate, concerning the necessity to protect the confidentiality of the information provided.

(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT, AS AMENDED

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SEC. 42. GENERAL PROVISIONS.—(a) In carrying out this Act, special

emphasis shall be placed on procurement in the United States, but, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, consideration shall also be given to coproduction or licensed production outside the United States of defense articles of United States origin when such production best serves the foreign policy, national security, and economy of the United States. In evaluating any sale proposed to be made pursuant to this Act, there shall be taken into consideration (1) the extent to which the proposed sale damages or infringes upon licensing arrangements whereby United States entities have granted licenses for the manufacture of the defense articles selected by the purchasing country to entities located in friendly foreign countries, which licenses result in financial returns to the United States, (2) the portion of the defense articles so manufactured which is of United States origin and [(3)] *(3) in coordination with the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to* the extent to which such sale might contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

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THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

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SEC. 511. CONSIDERATIONS IN FURNISHING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. —Decisions to furnish military assistance made under this part shall [take into account] *be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to* whether such assistance will—

(1) contribute to an arms race;

(2) increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict; or

(3) prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.

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News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger [Extracts], September 9, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Now, this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels:

First, it takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—the agreement that has been concluded [2] and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude—are of prime significance. The problem of the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with that will be solved at some time—and the sooner the better.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 29, 1975, pp. 471, 474–475, 479.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

Second, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in Central Europe. That has been reasonably successful.

Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors. In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of relaxing tensions has not made as much progress as in the area of the control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas, further efforts and mutual restraint are necessary.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the interim agreement [3] *had any visible effect on the other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations? And in addition to that, whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular—what obstacles there are, if you can tell us—and what the prospects are for the visit by Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] to the United States?*

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he is here. The President will meet with him for an extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East, and at least from our side, we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist.

As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that.

We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities] claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a Presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins.[4] *What are the diplomatic consequences of this, and when did you first learn about it?*

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 202–205.
[4] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 5–6.

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning.

Q. Ambassador Helms [Richard Helms, former Director of the CIA] apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and the Church committee on this subject, but I have been away for recent weeks.

I would have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We committed ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents.

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Senate Bill to Authorize Appropriations for Foreign Affairs, Fiscal Year 1976 [Extract], September 11, 1975 [1]

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PART 2—ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 141. Section 49(c) (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended by inserting in the second sentence thereof, immediately after "$10,100,000", a comma and the following: "and for the fiscal year 1976, the sum of $12,130,000."

STUDY REGARDING IMPACT OF CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES UPON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

SEC. 142. Of the amount authorized under section 141 of this Act, not to exceed $1,000,000 shall be available for the purpose of conducting a study regarding the impact upon military expenditures of arms control agreements entered into by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than July 1, 1976, a report with respect to the study conducted pursuant to this section.

RESEARCH REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARD TECHNIQUES

SEC. 143. Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under section 141 of this Act, not to exceed $440,000 shall be available for the purpose of conducting research, in consultation with the International Atomic

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[1] S. 1517 (Rept. No. 94-337) as amended, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 16-23. The bill was passed by the Senate on September 11, 1975. For the Administration bill and the House bill, see *ante*, pp. 63-64, 239-243. The final act appears *post*, p. 706.

Energy Agency, with respect to the development of nuclear safeguard techniques.

PURPOSES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

SEC. 144. Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2551) is amended by striking out "It must be able" in the second sentence of the third paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,".

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 145. Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended by inserting ", the National Security Council," immediately after "Secretary of State" in the first sentence.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

SEC. 146. Title III of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571-2575) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

"SEC. 36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—

"(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons,

"(2) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency and the Director agree may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

"(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

"(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

"(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1), or

"(B) any program described in subsection (a) (2) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

"(3) Upon the request of any appropriate committee of either House of Congress, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

"(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director)."

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS

SEC. 147. (a) (1) The second sentence of section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2585 (a)) is amended by striking out "The Director" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director."

(2) The fifth sentence of section 45(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "No person" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), no person."

(3) Section 45 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States."

(b) Section 45(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c)."

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

SEC. 148. Section 45(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is

amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned, except that access to restricted data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section."

PUBLIC INFORMATION

SEC. 149. Section 49(d) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(d)) is amended by striking out "None" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act specified under section 2(c), none."

REPORT TO CONGRESS; POSTURE STATEMENT

SEC. 150. Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2590) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect."

CONSULTATION REGARDING ARMS TRANSFERS

SEC. 151. (a) Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements."

(b) Section 42(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2791(a)), is amended by striking out "(3)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3) in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to."

(c) Section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321(d)) is amended by striking out the words "take into account" and inserting in lieu thereof "be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to."

Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General Waldheim: Comprehensive Test Ban, September 11, 1975 [1]

The Soviet Government proposes the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, as an important and urgent question, of the question "Conclusion of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests".

The thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will take place in an international atmosphere characterized by major positive developments. The process of relaxation of tension is steadily gaining ground and embracing new spheres of international relations. The essential need in the present international situation is to supplement and consolidate political détente with measures in the military field, to halt the arms race, to achieve a reduction in arms production and, ultimately, to embark upon general and complete disarmament.

In recent years, the first significant steps have been taken towards curbing the arms race, with a positive effect on the normalization of the international situation; a number of important agreements have been concluded, including the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,[2] the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[3] the Treaties prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space,[4] on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof,[5] and the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons.[6]

At the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, agreement has been reached on mutual notification of major military manoeuvres and other confidence-building measures between the participating States.[7]

Of special importance in strengthening world peace and eliminating the threat of a nuclear conflict are the Soviet-United States agreements on averting nuclear war and limiting strategic weapons.[8] In accordance with the understanding reached at the summit meeting at Vladivostok,[9] a new long-term Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons is being worked out in negotiations at Geneva. Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe are continuing at Vienna.

Despite the measures taken to curb the arms race, especially in recent years, it has not yet proved possible to halt it altogether. Huge

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[1] A/10241, Sept. 11, 1975.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[5] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 304–308.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 634–640; *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff; and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 746 ff.

military expenditures place a heavy burden on the peoples of the world, and in a number of States military expenditures are being systematically increased. The expansion of the arms race goes on. This situation cannot but create serious concern among States Members of the United Nations and concern and alarm among all peoples.

Of great significance in the task of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and halting the nuclear arms race, is the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The Moscow Treaty of 1963, the nuclear Power signatories of which are the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, bans nuclear weapon tests in three environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Underground nuclear weapon tests are still outside the scope of the prohibition.

An important step towards the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests was the Soviet-United States Treaty of 3 July 1974 [10] on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. This Treaty holds out the prospect of further progress towards a final solution of this problem.

The Soviet Union considers it of the utmost importance to take measures at the international level on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. To this end, it would be necessary to prepare and conclude an appropriate international agreement with wide participation providing for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments by all States.

The conclusion of an international treaty outlawing all nuclear weapon tests would be a major contribution to limiting the arms race and would thus promote the further development and intensification of the process of détente and the consolidation of peace and international security.

Please regard this letter as an explanatory memorandum in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and circulate it as an official General Assembly document.

(*Signed*) A. GROMYKO

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Soviet Draft Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 11, 1975 [1]

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Proclaiming their intention to bring about, as speedily as possible, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the adoption of effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of an agreement

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–229.

[1] A/10241, Sept. 11, 1975. The draft treaty was transmitted to Secretary-General Waldheim by Foreign Minister Gromyko on Sept. 11, 1975 (see *supra*).

on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Taking into account the appeals by the United Nations General Assembly, to put an end to nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Noting that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests would be in the interests of strengthening peace and slowing the arms race and would be a contribution to the process of international détente,

Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of this Treaty,

Noting the great positive significance of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,[2]

Stressing the importance of strict compliance with the above-mentioned Treaty up to the time of the entry into force of this Treaty,

Seeking to achieve the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and to refrain from carrying out any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere under its jurisdiction or control in all environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to refrain from encouraging, inciting or in any way participating in the carrying out of nuclear explosions prohibited by paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

1. Control over compliance with this Treaty shall be conducted by the States Parties through their own national technical means of control in accordance with the generally recognized rules of international law.

2. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty shall co-operate in an international exchange of seismic data.

3. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall, when necessary, consult one another, make inquiries and receive appropriate information in connexion with such inquiries.

4. Any State Party to the Treaty which ascertains that any other State Party is acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty may lodge a complaint with the United Nations


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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

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


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Security Council. Such a complaint must contain all possible evidence confirming its validity and a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Treaty of the results of its consideration.

ARTICLE III

1. The provisions of article I shall not apply to any underground nuclear explosions conducted by nuclear weapon States for peaceful purposes on the territory under their jurisdiction and in compliance with the agreements under which, in accordance with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, non-nuclear weapon States are to benefit from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. The explosion referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be conducted as follows:

(a) In the case of non-nuclear weapon States, in conformity with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(b) In the case of nuclear weapon States, in conformity with a procedure to be established under a special agreement concerning which the nuclear weapon States will conduct negotiations with due regard for the IAEA recommendations on the subject and which will be concluded as speedily as possible.

ARTICLE IV

The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect obligations assumed by the States Parties to the Treaty under other international agreements.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, for the purpose of considering such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party depositing its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by _____ Governments, including the Governments of all nuclear weapon States.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, the latter shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference of Parties to the Treaty or of other notifications.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of limited duration.

Each State Party shall, in the exercise of its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, connected with the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give three months' notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary circumstances which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in _____ copies, in _____ on the _____ day of _____.

Report by Secretary-General Waldheim on Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use, September 18, 1975 [1]

1. By paragraph 4 of resolution 3255 A (XXIX),[2] the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, who had been invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts [3] as an observer to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on aspects of the work of the Conference relevant to the resolution, namely, the Conference's consideration of the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which might be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and its efforts for agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons.

2. The General Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, had similarly requested the Secretary-General to report at its twenty-ninth session on the work of the first session of the Diplomatic Conference (A/9726). As agreed at the first session of the Diplomatic Conference, a Conference of Government Experts on Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects was held at Lucerne, Switzerland, from 24 September to 18 October 1974, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),[4] to study in depth the question of the prohibition or limitation of the use of conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The General Assembly took note of that report in the preamble to resolution 3255 A (XXIX) and, in paragraph 3, invited the Diplomatic Conference to continue its consideration of the question and its search for agreement on possible rules to prohibit or restrict the use of the weapons under consideration.

3. The following report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3255 A (XXIX).

A. Summary Introduction

4. Within the framework of the second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held from 3 February to 18 April 1975, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Conventional Weapons (sometimes referred to as Committee IV) held 14 meetings from 12 February to 15 April. All the work of the Diplomatic Conference directly

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[1] A/10222, Sept. 18, 1975.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 788.

[3] For the report of the Secretary-General on the second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, see A/10195.

[4] For the report of the meeting, see *Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons*, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1975.

relevant to the question of prohibiting or restricting the use of certain specific conventional weapons, including napalm and other incendiaries, was carried out in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and reported by it in document CDDH/IV/204, as amended by document CDDH/220 and Add.1.

5. The *Ad Hoc* Committee considered the report of the Lucerne Conference of Government Experts, the various proposals before it, the specific questions of prohibition or restriction of use of conventional weapons in various categories and its future work, including the question of a second Conference of Government Experts and its possible programme of work. A number of delegations expressed satisfaction with the work of the Lucerne Conference, at which a consensus had been reached that a second such Conference should be held, thus obviating the necessity of any comment in depth on the subject in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. On the other hand, the opinion was expressed that a second Conference would be unnecessary and that the *Ad Hoc* Committee already had ample information to complete its work on specific rules, particularly for the prohibition or restriction of use of napalm and other incendiaries. To this end, seven delegations (Austria, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) submitted a document (CDDH/IV/201), subsequently also sponsored by Algeria, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, the Sudan and Venezuela, containing specific draft proposals for banning or restricting the use of incendiary weapons, anti-personnel fragmentation weapons, flechettes, especially injurious small-calibre projectiles and anti-personnel land-mines. Canada also submitted a formal suggestion for the marking of minefields remotely emplaced by aircraft, artillery or guided weapons (CDDH/IV/202).

6. These proposals, as well as possible measures on other categories of weapons, were discussed in some detail, but, as indicated above, many delegations held that a consensus had been reached at Lucerne that further expert study was necessary before any specific rules could be agreed upon. In fact, some delegations stated that neither the Diplomatic Conference nor the Conference of Government Experts was the appropriate forum for legislative work in this field, and suggested that the matter might be more appropriately dealt with by a disarmament body, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

7. The *Ad Hoc* Committee finally agreed that a second Conference of Government Experts should be held under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross at Lugano, Switzerland, from 28 January to 26 February 1976, well before the third session of the Diplomatic Conference. Many delegations stressed, however, that the second Conference should not be a mere repetition of the first, but should focus on such weapons as had been—or might become—the subject of proposed bans or restrictions and should specifically study the possibility, contents and form of such proposed bans and restrictions on use.

B. Work of the Diplomatic Conference related to the use of specific conventional weapons

8. The work of the Diplomatic Conference having any direct relationship to the question of use of specific conventional weapons continued to be carried out exclusively in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Conventional Weapons (also referred to as Committee IV), which held 13 meetings (8th to 20th) from 12 February to 24 March 1975, and met in a final meeting (21st) on 15 April to consider its draft report (CDDH/IV/204). The composition of the Bureau of the *Ad Hoc* Committee remained unchanged, except for the replacement of one of the two Vice-Chairmen during his absence, as follows:

Chairman:	Mr. H. Diego Garces	(Colombia)
Vice-Chairmen:	Mr. Houchang Amir-Mokri	(Iran)
	Mr. Nkeke Ndongo Mangbau (until 14 April)	(Zaire)
	Mr. Mustapha Chelbi (after 14 April)	(Tunisia)
Rapporteur:	Mr. Frits Kalshoven	(Netherlands)

9. The *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the following programme for its work during the session of the Diplomatic Conference (CDDH/IV/Inf. 201):

1. Introduction of report of the Conference of Government Experts on Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects (Lucerne, 24 September to 18 October 1974).
2. Introduction of proposals.
3. Consideration of the question of prohibition or restriction of use of specific categories of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects and, in this context, consideration of the report of the Lucerne Conference and of the following proposals:

   (a) Napalm and other incendiary weapons;
   (b) Small-calibre projectiles;
   (c) Blast and fragmentation weapons;
   (d) Delayed action and perfidious weapons;
   (e) Potential weapon developments.

4. Consideration of future work, including the question of a second Conference of Government Experts, and of the programme of work which it might follow.

C. Introduction of the report of the Conference of Government Experts on Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects

10. At the first meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, on 12 February,

the Rapporteur who had also acted as Principal Rapporteur of the Conference of Government Experts, held at Lucerne, introduced the report of that Conference.[5] He stressed the view that the debate on legal criteria at the Conference, although inconclusive, had contributed to the clarification of these criteria and that the debate on the various categories of weapons (incendiary weapons, small-calibre projectiles, blast and fragmentation weapons, delayed action and treacherous weapons, and future weapons) had yielded much information. He noted, in addition, that some of the latter information was contradictory to information already put forward, for example, in the 1973 report prepared under the auspices of ICRC entitled *Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects*,[6] as well as the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.[7] He also emphasized that, in the evaluation of the various categories of weapons, widely divergent views had been expressed regarding the need and desirability of prohibition or restrictions on the use of these weapons, but that the conclusion had been widely shared that further study and research was needed and that another Conference of Government Experts under the auspices of ICRC could usefully be convened.

11. In the ensuing discussions on the subject, several delegations held that the work and results of the Lucerne Conference had established a good basis for future progress and that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should be guided by that Conference's consensus that another such conference should be held. A number of delegations stated that they, accordingly, did not intend to comment in depth on any proposed bans or restrictions during the present session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. One delegation, much less satisfied with the results of the Lucerne Conference, held, on the contrary, that a second Conference was unnecessary and that the experts could easily complete their work at the 1975 session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

D. Proposals introduced

12. The delegations of Austria, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia introduced a working paper (CDDH/IV/201), which they described as a revised version of a working paper (CDDH/DT/2) submitted to the Diplomatic Conference at its first session. It contained proposed texts of revised rules to restrict the use of conventional weapons in a number of categories. The paper was subsequently also sponsored by Algeria, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, the Sudan and Venezuela. The various proposals made in the paper are described below under the various categories of weapons. The relatively

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[5] *Ibid.*
[6] International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1973.
[7] United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

minor changes in the texts of the original proposals (CDDH/DT/2) concerned mainly the sections (a) on incendiary weapons, where the new definition elaborated at Lucerne was now used to define the scope of the proposed restrictions, and (b) on fragmentation weapons, where the heading was now qualified by use of the word "anti-personnel" before "weapons" and where a reference to "other devices with many bomblets which act through the ejection of a great number of small-calibred fragments or pellets" had been added to the text. The delegation introducing these proposals noted that, while the heading of the section on "especially injurious small-calibre projectiles" was new, the changes in that section were not substantial and were largely for the purpose of clarification, especially since it was not intended for either the original or the revised version to cover high-velocity projectiles alone. This delegation also noted that the proposals did not include some categories of conventional weapons, such as booby traps and minefields, and hoped that other delegations might make proposals on such other matters.

13. Subsequently, Canada introduced a working paper (CDDH/IV/202), containing ideas already proposed by Canadian experts at the Lucerne Conference but not included in the Conference's final report, to the general effect that land mines emplaced by aircraft, artillery or guided weapons should be marked.

14. Several delegations considered these working papers, and in particular document CDDH/IV/201, to be a good starting point for discussions in the Committee. Some others, while commending document CDDH/IV/201, felt that it went beyond what might be feasible at the present time.

E. Debates on the question of prohibition or restriction of use of specific categories of conventional weapons

(i) *General*

15. A number of delegations noted the close interrelationship between the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons and certain general principles before Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference, such as the principle of prohibition of use of weapons that are apt to cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, the principle prohibiting perfidy and the principle against means of warfare that were apt to destroy the ecological balance. They felt that these principles would be inadequate, however, without a close assessment of various weapons or categories of weapons in the light of the principles involved.

16. Some delegations considered public opinion to be of prime importance in this context and maintained that some of the opinion expressed by experts ran counter to public opinion as reflected in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons; they further held that it would now be necessary

to take into account such opinions, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 3255 A (XXIX), which, *inter alia*, invited the Diplomatic Conference to continue its consideration of the question of the use of certain conventional weapons deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and its search for agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. One delegation, however, while recognizing the importance of public opinion, warned that this should not be regarded as the only factor in reaching a decision on the matter.

17. Some delegations also warned against attempting to ban or restrict the use of certain specific weapons without paying due regard to the close link between such bans and the over-all problem of general and complete disarmament. A number of delegations stressed the overriding importance of national security, and the need for the widest possible agreement on any restrictive measures, including the agreement of the major military Powers. To achieve such broad acceptability, more technical study and research would be required, they maintained. Other delegations held, however, that sufficient knowledge and factual data were already available to permit the consideration of specific restrictions, particularly in the case of incendiary weapons. Several stressed the view that technical competence should not be permitted to take the place of the political will to act, and emphasized the need for a constructive approach imbued with a spirit of charity and humanity towards combatants and non-combatants alike.

18. One delegation thought the Committee should concentrate only on specific points where sufficient knowledge existed to justify specific proposals, while another preferred to concentrate on all the various proposals in an effort to identify the areas of agreement or disagreement. Some delegations stated that neither the Diplomatic Conference nor the ICRC Conference of Governmental Experts was an appropriate forum for legislative work in this field.

(ii) *Incendiary weapons*

19. The debate on this category of weapons centred mainly on the revised proposal in working paper CDDH/IV/201 that a prohibition should be agreed on incendiary weapons, such as flame-throwers and incendiary shells, rockets, grenades, mines and bombs, designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injuries to persons through the action of flame and/or heat produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target, but specifically excepting (a) munitions which may have a secondary or incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminate tracers, smoke or signalling systems, and (b) incendiary munitions designed and used specifically for defence against aircraft or armoured vehicles. One sponsor of the working paper (Yugoslavia) at first stipulated that it would have preferred to see the second exception formulated somewhat more broadly, but withdrew this preference in the course of the debate. Another sponsor (Mexico) stated, on the other

hand, that it was in favour of eliminating the second exception entirely so that the ban on incendiary munitions would be total.

20. In explaining the proposal, the working paper held that the United Nations report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use* and other available evidence indicated clearly that the use of these weapons must be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering and that even small weapons of this type might be indiscriminate in their effects, except when used exclusively against aircraft or armoured vehicles. Moreover, the paper maintained, an important body of opinion held that the military value of such weapons was very low, and their effects seemed to be the greatest when their use was the most questionable. It was immaterial that the current military planning of many States might not envisage the use of incendiaries against cities, since plans could easily be changed. Moreover, even the use of incendiaries in close air support of friendly forces might, in fact, cause injuries involving excessive suffering; and to except uses of such proved military value from the general ban might seriously reduce the reliability of the ban, since abuses of the permitted use might lead to contraventions and to a breakdown of the rule. The paper also pointed out that the Lucerne Conference had reached almost complete unanimity on a definition of incendiary weapons, and that this had served as the basis for the revised proposal. Complete bans, such as that contained in the proposal, were better points of departure for subsequent efforts at the disarmament level for the elimination of production and stockpiling of the weapons than were bans on certain uses only.

21. The sponsors of the working paper and several other delegations reiterated in the debate the various views outlined in the working paper. One delegation noted that, while certain types of incendiaries might be used on the battlefield without any unduly indiscriminate effect, the great suffering they caused would still be sufficient grounds for banning their use. Another delegation stated that its Government was willing to forego the military advantages of close support with incendiaries, as well as the use of flame-throwers, in view of the suffering these weapons caused and the negative public opinion towards them. Most of these delegations also supported the form and scope of the ban as proposed in the working paper as the only viable way to achieve the desired goal. Some, however, maintained that anti-aircraft and anti-tank incendiary munitions, as all other weapons, could not be correctly described as "designed and used specifically for defence".

22. A number of other delegations were not convinced that the use of incendiary weapons invariably caused excessive suffering not warranted by the military advantage resulting from such use. In fact, the military value of such weapons might be considerable in certain situations and, before reaching any conclusions, this fact must be balanced carefully against the degree of suffering caused. One delegation pointed out that some small countries produced low-cost incendiaries for their defence, and held that a ban on such weapons would jeopardize such

defence. Another delegation maintained that, because of the large existing stocks of such weapons in a number of countries, any prohibition should provide for a phase-out period.

(iii) *Small-calibre projectiles*

23. Working paper CDDH/IV/201 called for the prohibition of use of small-calibre projectiles that are so designed or have such velocity that they (a) break or deform on, or following, entry into a human body; (b) tumble significantly within the human body; (c) create shock waves, which cause extensive tissue damage outside the weapon trajectory; or (d) produce secondary projectiles within a human body. The paper held that it was of significant importance when many countries abandoned or contemplated abandoning one common standard for small-calibre projectiles, as was currently the case. The new projectiles being adopted were of smaller calibre and higher velocity than had been common in the last 70 years. The military advantages of the change were outweighed by the much more severe wounds the new projectiles were apt to cause. It was urgent that the nations of the world concert their efforts to avoid an imminent escalation of the wounding effects of the most common weapons in the world, effects which were similar to those of the dum-dum and other banned bullets. The use of projectiles which produced injuries beyond those required to disable an adversary should be banned. The new high-velocity bullets had a tendency to tumble upon impact and should be included in the ban.

24. The sponsor introducing the working paper explained that small-calibre projectiles were not limited to the recently introduced rifle ammunition with a calibre of 5.56 mm or less, but included all calibres of commonly used rifles, machine-guns, carbines, and pistols; however, some of these weapons had properties which made them more likely than others to cause excessive injuries, which was the same criterion used to ban the "dum-dum" and other bullets in the Hague Declaration of 1899.[8] That delegation felt that projectiles with a calibre smaller than the current 7.62 rifle could be developed without the need for velocities causing unduly large wounds by reducing their maximum effective range. While not disputing the military advantages of small-calibre projectiles, that delegation stressed the urgency of further study and research.

25. Another delegation, while agreeing that the discussion should not be limited to a calibre of 5.56 mm or less but should cover all rifle ammunition, did not accept the parallel with the dum-dum bullet, which it maintained had been specifically and intentionally designed to release all or most of its kinetic energy on the target. Normal bullets, on the other hand, were not so designed and, while they could have the same wounding effects as dum-dum bullets, this was the exception rather

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[8] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915). [Footnote in original.]

than the rule. With regard to the four causes of particularly severe wounds specified in the proposed ban, this delegation felt that such specifications drew attention to the symptoms rather than identifying the cures and, therefore, did not seem to have any practical value for weapons designers. The phenomena involved were not all sufficiently understood, and the language of the various paragraphs was imprecise. Characterizing rifles as weapons designed to place *hors de combat* a human target at long range, that delegation held that, while it would be possible to reduce their maximum effective range, this would inevitably lead to a greater use of artillery, rockets, bombs, mines and other lethal devices to incapacitate the enemy at longer ranges, and it doubted that this would reduce the sufferings of the soldier in the field. That delegation also felt that the vague prohibition proposed would amount either to a prohibition of all rifles or of no rifles at all. The delegation found it difficult to visualize States agreeing to giving up all rifles, but saw a great value in continuing with research in order to determine whether it was possible, while preserving the effectiveness of rifles, to reduce the wounding effects of the bullets. One goal of such research might be to determine the necessary thickness of bullet jackets.

(iv) *Blast and fragmentation weapons*

26. Working paper CDDH/IV/201, sponsored by 13 countries, proposed prohibition of the use of "anti-personnel cluster warheads or other devices with many bomblets which act through the ejection of a great number of small-calibred fragments or pellets". In addition, it called for a ban on the use of "munitions which act through the release of a number of projectiles in the form of flechettes, needles and similar". The sponsoring delegation which introduced the working paper maintained that such weapons tend to have indiscriminate effects, to cause multiple injuries and to result in a high death rate. Another delegation held, however, that, although controlled fragmentation devices were likely to produce more wounds and thus increase the likelihood of incapacitation, they created less severe wounds and resulted in fewer deaths. Moreover, use of such weapons had the military advantage of simplifying the logistics problem, since they required less ammunition. If limitations were placed on their use, the rigours of war would be increased rather than decreased.

27. An observer from a number of non-governmental organizations, with the permission of the Committee, circulated a document showing the effects of the use of flechettes, which was said to contravene existing international law and to provide a flagrant example of the abuse of technology for destructive purposes, putting efficacy before humanitarian considerations.

(v) *Delayed action and treacherous weapons*

28. Working paper CDDH/IV/201 proposed that a rule be adopted

that "anti-personnel landmines must not be laid by aircraft". In explaining the proposal, the paper held that certain ways of employing such mines might easily lead to injuries being inflicted indiscriminately on combatants and civilians alike. The risk of such results was much higher when such mines were laid by aircraft, as the limits of the mined area were often very uncertain with this method. The results were apt to be particularly cruel if the mines were not equipped with self-destructive devices. Although the risk could be reduced by marking the minefields, this was not possible when the mines were scattered over a vast area. Several sponsors of the working paper presented the same argument in the debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. One delegation felt that the best course would be to prohibit the offensive use of delayed-action weapons. Canada submitted a working paper (CDDH/IV/202), reiterating a suggestion it had made at the Lucerne Conference to the effect that the experts should consider marking all remotely emplaced landmines with some easily identifiable and recognizable sign, such as flags or coloured pyrotechnic devices. Several delegations stressed the need for mines to be equipped with reliable self-destructive devices. Of the few delegations referring specifically to booby-trapping, one urged a ban on the booby-trapping of children's toys, while another held that the debate on such weapons at Lucerne had been inconclusive and that the best course might be to prohibit their use as offensive weapons.

(vi) *Potential weapons development*

29. Working paper CDDH/IV/201, while making no specific proposal on the subject, had referred to the need to examine how, in the future, periodic surveys could be made with a view to identifying weapons whose use should be prohibited or restricted for humanitarian reasons. The paper maintained that this would be the only means of ensuring that bans on some specific weapons did not lead to the development and use of even more inhumane weapons. In the debate in Committee, a number of delegations specifically supported this general view. It was noted that Governments had already provided for such surveys on the national level and that article 34 of draft Additional Protocol I and certain proposed amendments envisaged the setting up of such procedures in all States Parties. Although one delegation expressed a preference for the establishment of an international institution for the purpose, a sponsor of the working paper held that such a solution would pose difficult problems and preferred to leave the function to the States within the framework of an internationally negotiated agreement, which might possibly take the form of an amendment to a future protocol on conventional weapons and which might be periodically reviewed. Another delegation held that action towards such an agreement need not await the outcome of the second Conference of Government Experts. Still another delegation stressed the necessity of basing such action on existing machinery and noted that the Confer-

ence of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva was already considering the general question of machinery and that the question would also have to be considered by a world disarmament conference.

F. Conditions of future work

30. From the beginning of the Conference, there appeared to be broad agreement that a second Conference of Government Experts should be held to provide further expert information on which to base specific proposals. Many delegations stressed the view, however, that the second Conference should not be a mere repetition of the first Conference; instead, in accordance with the understanding of that Conference, as reflected in paragraph 282 of its report, a second Conference should focus on such weapons as would have been—or might become—the subject of proposed bans or restrictions of use, and study the possibility, contents and form of such proposed measures. Many of those delegations held that debate on military, medical or other technical aspects of weapons could be kept to a minimum at the second Conference. Others maintained that further clarification of these aspects would still be an indispensable basis for a fruitful discussion of bans and restrictions on the use of specific weapons. One delegation saw the development of objective legal criteria as the main task of the second Conference of Experts. Many delegations stressed the need, at the second Conference, for greater flexibility, more consultations and the organization of working groups to identify any conclusions or areas of agreement and to define concepts related thereto.

31. On the basis of the broad agreement concerning the need for a second Conference, the International Committee of the Red Cross submitted a proposed work programme for the second session of the Conference of Government Experts with annexes (CDDH/IV/203). The ICRC noted that it was prepared to convene and organize such a second Conference under the same conditions as the first one.

32. After hearing an extensive discussion of various suggested venues and dates for the Conference, as well as certain aspects of its rules of procedure, the ICRC informed the *Ad Hoc* Committee (CDDH/IV/205) that the second session of the Conference of Government Experts would be held in Lugano from 28 January to 26 February 1976. The ICRC also informed the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the changes that had to be made in the rules of procedure of the Conference (CDDH/IV/205), in order to adapt them to the requirements of the second session.

33. With regard to the procedures to be followed subsequent to the second Conference of Government Experts, some delegations held that the texts emerging from the Conference should be placed before the Diplomatic Conference which would be competent to discuss and adopt them, while others rejected this procedure on the grounds that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or other disarmament organs would be the competent bodies to consider measures concerning the use of specific weapons.

34. The draft report of the Committee (CDDH/IV/204), as amended on the basis of the suggestions of various delegations (CDDH/220), was considered at the twenty-ninth plenary meeting of the Diplomatic Conference on 17 April 1975 and noted without objection.

Address by Secretary of State Kissinger to the General Assembly [Extracts], September 22, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Peace in the world will be fragile and tenuous without a curb and eventually *an end of the arms race.* This is why the United States has embarked with the Soviet Union upon the difficult and complex negotiation to limit strategic arms. Our objectives are to prevent unchecked destabilizing competition in strategic armaments, to achieve reduction of these arms, to lessen further the likelihood of hasty decisions in time of crisis, and to ease the economic burden of the nuclear arms race.

The Vladivostok accord of last fall [2] marked a major step toward achieving these goals. When the agreement in principle is translated into a treaty, agreed ceilings will be placed on strategic force levels for a 10-year period. This unprecedented step will slow the pace of new arms programs, especially those driven by fear of major deployments by the other side. And it will enhance prospects for international stability and for political accommodation in other areas.

The United States is actively engaged in other arms control negotiations. Together with the Soviet Union, we have made progress toward establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions. And we have agreed to set a threshold on the underground testing of nuclear weapons.[3] These are significant steps toward a verifiable comprehensive test ban.

In addition, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament texts of a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.[4] These techniques are still at a primitive stage of development, but man's mastery of environmental forces continues to advance. Misuse of this knowledge might open new avenues of military competition and wreak untold and irreversible harm upon all humanity. We urge the conference to complete its consideration rapidly.

Another urgent task is a substantial reduction in the high levels of military forces now confronting each other in various parts of the world. The United States believes that the time has come to give new

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 13, 1975, pp. 550–551.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–229.
[4] CCD/471 (USSR) and CCD/472 (U.S.), Aug. 21, 1975. Identical drafts. See *ante*, pp. 385–388.

impetus to the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The significance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe depends importantly on whether we can achieve progress in this area. An agreement that enhances mutual security in Central Europe is feasible and essential. We will work toward this goal.

The world faces a paradox with respect to *the proliferation of nuclear energy.* Men have fashioned from the atom weapons which can in minutes end the civilization of centuries. Simultaneously, the atom is fast becoming a more and more essential source of energy. It is clear that the cost and eventual scarcity of oil and other fossil fuel will increasingly spread nuclear power around the world in the decades ahead.

But the spreading of nuclear power poses starkly the danger of proliferating nuclear weapons capabilities—and the related risks of the theft of nuclear materials, blackmail by terrorists, accidents, or the injection of the nuclear threat into regional political conflicts. Now is the time to act. If we fail to restrain nuclear proliferation, future generations will live on a planet shadowed by nuclear catastrophe.

Over the past year, the United States has repeatedly urged new efforts among the supplier states to strengthen and standardize safeguards and controls on export of nuclear materials. We must not allow these safeguards to be eroded by commercial competition. We must insure the broad availability of peaceful nuclear energy under safe, economical, and reliable conditions.

The United States has intensified its efforts within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other nations to broaden and strengthen international standards and safeguards and has proposed an international convention setting standards to protect the physical security of nuclear materials in use, storage, or transfer.

The United States continues to urge the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty [5] and the associated safeguard measures of the IAEA.

The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants. The United States therefore proposes—as a major step to reinforce all other measures—the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. These centers would serve energy needs on a commercially sound basis and encourage regional energy cooperation. Their existence would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient reprocessing facilities, limit the possibility of diverting peaceful nuclear materials to national military use, and create a better framework for applying effective international safeguards.

We urge that groups of nations begin now to explore this concept and that all states support the IAEA's work in this field.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968,* pp. 461–465.

Letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General Waldheim: Ban on New Weapons Systems, September 23, 1975 [1]

The Soviet Government proposes the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the following item as an important and urgent matter: "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons".

The thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly is opening in circumstances of significant positive changes in the international situation when the policy of détente in relations among States is receiving increasing support. The process of détente is creating favourable prerequisites for achieving progress in disarmament and the limitation of the arms race. In their turn, the important steps that have been taken in this field in recent years influence the international situation, facilitating the further development and extension of the process of détente.

Owing to the efforts of peace-loving States, agreements of the utmost importance, which constitute a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, such as the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,[2] the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[3] the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,[4] and others have been concluded.

Of exceptional importance to the cause of peace and international security are the Soviet-United States agreements on the prevention of nuclear war,[5] strategic arms limitation [6] and the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.[7] In the course of the Soviet-United States summit meeting at Vladivostok [8] an understanding was reached establishing a basis for the conclusion of a new agreement to curb the strategic arms race.

Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are under way with regard to

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[1] A/10243, Sept. 23, 1975. A draft agreement was annexed to this document (*infra*.).
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[5] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 634–640.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–229.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 746 ff.

certain other aspects of the problem of limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

However, despite the fact that the agreements concluded in recent years do to some extent curb the arms race in certain areas, it has not yet proved possible to check the arms buildup on the whole. The arms race, which consumes countless material and human resources and is detrimental to all States, is continuing. At the same time, the danger that scientific and technological achievements will be used to create new types of weapons of mass destruction is becoming increasingly real.

Therefore, the Soviet Union considers it important that effective measures should be taken internationally to ban the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons. This question, which is assuming an ever more acute and urgent character, has not yet been reflected in agreements between States. At the same time, science and technology today have evolved to a point where it is possible to develop and create new types of weapons of mass destruction even more dangerous than nuclear weapons.

To prevent the achievements of science and technology from being used for military purposes as a result of the development of still more destructive and formidable weapons of mass destruction, it would be necessary to work out and conclude an appropriate international agreement banning the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons. Such an agreement effectively barring the emergence of such weapons should not, at the same time, create obstacles to the economic, scientific and technological progress of the States parties.

The adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a decision which would favour the idea of concluding an international agreement outlawing the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons would constitute a major contribution to the limitation of the arms race and thus promote the further development and deepening of the process of détente, the strengthening of peace and international security.

I should be grateful, Sir, if you would consider this letter an explanatory memorandum pursuant to rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly and have it circulated as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.

(*Signed*) A. GROMYKO

Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

Soviet Draft Agreement on the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of New Systems of Such Weapons, September 23, 1975 [1]

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Desiring to contribute to saving mankind from the danger of the use of new means of warfare, limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament,

Recognizing that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Conscious that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements concerning limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to prevent the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and manufacture of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to promote the strengthening of confidence among nations and the further improvement of the international situation,

Seeking to contribute to the realization of the lofty purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons, including those utilizing the latest achievements of modern science and technology. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons shall include: (to be specified through negotiations on the subject).

In the event that new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by this Agreement emerge after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall conduct negotiations with a view to extending the pro-

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[1] A/10243, Sept. 23, 1975, annex. The draft agreement was also annexed to the Soviet draft resolution of Sept. 30 (*post*, p. 495).

hibition provided for in this Agreement to cover such potential new types and systems of weapons.

2. Each State Party to the Agreement undertakes not to assist, encourage, or induce any other State, group of States or international organizations to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Agreement shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take the necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activities contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, within the territory of such State or in any territory under its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it may be.

ARTICLE III

1. In the event that any State Party to this Agreement has any suspicions that another State Party has violated the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties concerned undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving the problems which arise.

2. If the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article fail to produce results mutually acceptable to the Parties concerned, the State which has such suspicions may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such complaint must include evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Party to the Agreement of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any State Party to the Agreement which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the States Parties to the Agreement to develop and use scientific research and discoveries exclusively for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

2. The States Parties to the Agreement undertake to facilitate scientific and technological co-operation in the use of the latest achievements and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to limit the arms race in all its forms and put an end to it, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments and circulated by them to all Parties to the Agreement, which shall inform the Depositary Governments of acceptance or rejection as soon as possible after its receipt.

The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment upon its acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement, including the Depositary Governments, and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of its acceptance of the amendment.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

Each State Party to this Agreement shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Agreement and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____ which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by _____ Governments, including the Governments designated the Depositary Governments of the Agreement.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Agreement, and of the receipt of other notices.

This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in _____ copies at _____ this _____ day of _____.

Address by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the General Assembly [Extract], September 23, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

The process of lessening tensions in the world, the very logic of its development, pose most acutely the question of the need to curb the arms race. The measures taken in this direction in recent years are to be commended. We attach great importance also to the negotiations *now under way aimed at working out a new long-term agreement* between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. Its conclusion will be a new and major step forward, not only in bilateral Soviet-American relations, but in a wider international context as well.

Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that everything that has been achieved in the field of disarmament so far represents but the first steps. Indeed, mankind so far has been unable to check the arms race or even substantially to slow down its pace. It goes on in the direction both of developing ever more destructive means of warfare and of building up the total volume of armaments.

The Soviet Union is convinced that in the conditions of a relaxation of tensions in the world the prerequisites have been created for the implementation of effective measures which would end the arms race. In other words, it is now not only necessary but also possible to supplement political détente with military détente. The States participating

[1] A/PV.2357 (prov.), pp. 53–61.

in the all-European Conference unanimously pronounced themselves in favour of this in the Final Act.[2]

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] held last May in Geneva came out for the implementation of broad measures for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament. It is precisely such specific steps towards easing the burden of armaments that become the touchstone for testing the genuine readiness of States and Governments to pursue the course of peace.

The struggle for disarmament has always been and continues to be an integral part of the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union. The USSR is a permanent and active participant in negotiations on various aspects of the disarmament problem.

We attach great importance to the lessening of military confrontation in areas where it is especially dangerous. Now, following the conclusion of the all-European Conference, one of the primary tasks is to find ways towards agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, without infringing the security of anyone. The Soviet Union will contribute in every way to the success of the talks on this problem currently under way in Vienna.

Within the framework of the United Nations we have on more than one occasion already stated in detail our position on disarmament questions. And we have not merely stated it. The Soviet Union has put forward a large number of specific proposals, many of which have formed the basis of important decisions adopted by the United Nations. We have consistently supported their implementation. This applies in particular to the resolution of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the non-use of force in international relations and the simultaneous permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.[4]

Another question raised by the Soviet Union—the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—also retains the utmost importance.

We consider it important speedily to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of techniques to influence the environment. The conclusion of such a convention would be not only a means of limiting the sphere of the arms race, but also an important means of preserving the environment, which would meet the vital interests of all States and peoples. We would like to express the hope that agreement will be reached on this matter in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, where a relevant draft is under consideration.[5]

In the field of disarmament, as in other matters, the Soviet Union adopts a realistic approach. It is constantly seeking areas of disarma-

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[2] *Ante*, pp. 304–308.
[3] See *ante*, pp. 146–157.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 848–849.
[5] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.

ment and arms-race limitation in which it is feasible to find commonly acceptable agreements.

At the same time, we have never overlooked the main objective—general and complete disarmament. We are of the view that this problem should be in the forefront of the attention of the world disarmament conference. The United Nations has already approved the idea of convening it. In that forum all countries of the world could, on an equal footing and freely, set out and compare their positions and outline ways and means of limiting and arresting the arms race. It is high time that efforts were made to complete preparations for the conference and to convene it. As is well known, this is something in which the Soviet Union will not be, and has not been, found wanting.

The Soviet delegation would like to draw your attention to two aspects of the disarmament problem on which, in our view, decisions are required and can be taken in practice at the earliest possible date. We all realize the importance of scientific and technological progress. The mission of science is noble and humane in essence. It expands the horizons of human knowledge, makes knowledge a powerful force of economic development, of raising the well-being of peoples and their cultural levels, and links countries together by bonds of peaceful co-operation.

Quite recently the entire world was given new proof of this. We are referring to the outstanding international experiment in outer space, the docking and joint flight of the Soviet and American space craft, Soyuz and Apollo. The handshake in orbit, as this experiment is now known, has rightfully become a symbol of the fruitful union of scientific achievements and the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The USSR is a consistent champion of the use of science exclusively for peaceful purposes and in the interests of mankind, and is prepared for wide, large-scale co-operation in the sphere of science and technology with all States interested in this.

However, the experience of the past shows that achievements in science and technology can be used for dangerous, even criminal purposes. With today's rapid development of science and technology in various countries, new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction could emerge in various places. One can assume with a high degree of certainty that they would be even more ominous than those existing at present.

None of this can be ignored. Further, it is well known how difficult it is to withdraw any weapon that has already been developed from the arsenals of States, and consequently how much safer and more reasonable it is to prevent its emergence in advance. If things are viewed from that angle, the need for, the urgency of, effective measures to prohibit the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should become absolutely evident.

Proceeding from this, aware of its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union proposes the inscrip-

tion in the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly as an important and urgent matter of an item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons". We propose that States, and first of all the big Powers, conclude an agreement based on an undertaking neither to develop nor to manufacture new types and new systems of such weapons and not to assist in or encourage any activities in that direction.

The need may arise to be more specific as to the categories of weapons which should be covered by the ban. The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in a detailed examination of this question in the course of appropriate negotiations. It is ready to speak out on the substance of this matter and to put forward most concrete proposals.

The draft agreement [6] which we submit to the General Assembly is worded in such a way that, while banning the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, the agreement would not at the same time impede the economic, scientific and technical development of States parties and would not infringe their right to make use of scientific research and discoveries for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of people and without any discrimination.

Such an international agreement would make a major contribution to the cause of limiting the arms race and to the cause of further easing international tensions. We should like to express our hope that our proposal will find support from the participants in this session and that other countries will join us in our initiative.

In submitting our second proposal [7] we were moved by the same concern, that of delivering mankind from the danger of war; by the desire to curb the race in the most pernicious weapons at present in the arsenals of States, nuclear weapons. Its purpose is to end completely nuclear weapon tests and thus radically to limit the practical possibilities for perfecting it further.

Major steps have already been taken towards this aim: the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,[8] and the 1974 Treaty between the USSR and the United States of America on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.[9]

In our view, conditions are ripe at present for the final step along this road: to conclude a broad international agreement imposing a ban on all nuclear weapon tests without exception. In line with this approach, the Soviet Union has already proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of an important and urgent item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

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[6] *Supra.*
[7] *Ante*, pp. 460-463.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225-229.

In accordance with the draft treaty which is submitted for the consideration of Member States of the United Nations, its adherents would undertake from now on not to manufacture nuclear weapons and to prohibit and prevent any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, including the underground environment. Such an obligation must, of course, be assumed by all States, including all nuclear Powers.

While outlawing all nuclear weapon tests, the treaty must not at the same time deny access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon countries. We hope that the General Assembly will support our initiative for the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The implementation of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union for consideration at the present session is in our view an integral part of the fulfilment of the general task which life itself has today made the cornerstone of all United Nations activities. The essence of the task is to promote the further development of the positive processes taking place in the world and to make them irreversible.

Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 23, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

Expressing its deep concern over the fact that an international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests of all kinds has not yet been reached,

Convinced that the cessation of such tests would contribute to the reduction of the nuclear arms race as well as to the further relaxation of international tension,

Further convinced of the need again to exert every effort for the early cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

1. *Takes note* of the draft "Treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (annexed hereto);

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear weapon States to enter into negotiations

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[1] A/C.1/L.707, Sept. 23, 1975. A revised resolution, with treaty text, was submitted by the Soviet Union on Dec. 1, *post*, pp. 711–712. That version was co-sponsored by Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. A further revised version, with treaty text, was submitted on Dec. 3, and adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3478 (XXX), *post*, pp. 794–799.

not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of the results of the negotiations at its thirty-first session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

ANNEX

TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Proclaiming their intention to bring about, as speedily as possible, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the adoption of effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Taking into account the appeals by the United Nations General Assembly, to put an end to nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Noting that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests would be in the interests of strengthening peace and slowing the arms race and would be a contribution to the process of international détente,

Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] and of this Treaty,

Noting the great positive significance of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,[3]

Stressing the importance of strict compliance with the above-mentioned Treaty up to the time of the entry into force of this Treaty,

Seeking to achieve the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and to refrain from carrying out any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere under its jurisdiction or control in all environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to refrain from encouraging, inciting or in any way participating in the carrying out of nuclear explosions prohibited by paragraph 1 of this article.

Article II

1. Control over compliance with this Treaty shall be conducted by the States Parties through their own national technical means of control in accordance with the generally recognized rules of international law.

2. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty shall co-operate in an international exchange of seismic data.

3. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall, when necessary, consult one another, make inquiries and receive appropriate information in connexion with such inquiries.

4. Any State Party to the Treaty which ascertains that any other State Party is acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such a complaint must contain all possible evidence confirming its validity and a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Treaty of the results of its consideration.

Article III

1. The provisions of article I shall not apply to any underground nuclear explosions conducted by nuclear weapon States for peaceful purposes on the territory under their jurisdiction and in compliance with the agreements under which, in accordance with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, non-nuclear weapon States are to benefit from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. The explosions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be conducted as follows:

(a) In the case of non-nuclear weapon States, in conformity with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(b) In the case of nuclear weapon States, in conformity with a procedure to be established under a special agreement concerning which the nuclear weapon States will conduct negotiations with due regard for the IAEA recommendations on the subject and which will be concluded as speedily as possible.

Article IV

The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect obligations assumed by the States Parties to the Treaty under other international agreements.

Article V

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, for the purpose of considering such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party depositing its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Article VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by _____ Governments, including the Governments of all nuclear weapon States.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, the latter shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference of Parties to the Treaty or of other notifications.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each State Party shall, in the exercise of its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, connected with the subject-matter of this

Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give three months' notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary circumstances which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VIII

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in _____ copies, in _____ on the _____ day of _____.

Address by British Foreign Minister Callaghan to the General Assembly: Spread of Nuclear Materials [Extract], September 23, 1975 [1]

. . . a new danger is coming to view that I now wish to discuss. It arises from the overlap between the desire of certain countries to use nuclear material for civil purposes and the increasing risk that such material may be employed for military purposes. The metals uranium and plutonium are used not solely in nuclear reactors to produce power for civil purposes, for highly enriched uranium and plutonium can also be used to make nuclear weapons. Those who possess a nuclear reactor have already taken the first step to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they then move from that to the second step and acquire plants to enrich their uranium and to reprocess the fuels that have already been used in their nuclear reactors, then they will be a long way down the road to producing nuclear weapons. Up to the present, it is the nuclear-weapon States that alone possess such plants, namely, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China. But other countries are now beginning to consider whether they too should order reprocessing and enriching plants. If and when they do so, and the plants are in working order, they will be able to produce weapons material at a rate which would enable several thousand nuclear weapons a year to be produced. To give a comparison, the present nuclear programme will accumulate more than one million—one million—kilograms of plutonium within the next 10 years; and by con-

[1] A/PV.2358 (prov.), pp. 36–40.

trast, the bomb which fell on Nagasaki and created such havoc and such destruction was the equivalent of no more than about 10 kilograms. A million kilograms within the next 10 years—and 10 kilograms destroyed Nagasaki. The spread of these plants would enable the whole of mankind on this planet to destroy itself. Clearly, the statesmen of the world assembled here have a moral duty to act before it is too late.

The United Nations should concern itself with this problem immediately and add vigour and impetus to the work that is being done in the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I put forward five points for consideration, to try to contain this problem:

1. The Members of the United Nations should solemnly affirm that each and all of them will not convert nuclear materials from civil use to military use.

2. This solemn declaration should be reinforced by an agreement to accept a common system of international inspection through the International Atomic Energy Agency. There should be one set of rules for all countries in the world.

3. All civil nuclear materials and facilities should be brought within the common inspection system.

4. The agency should assume responsibility for inspection of enrichment and processing plants, in addition to its present task of safeguarding nuclear reactors.

5. The new set of common rules should be based on monitoring nuclear material and accounting for its use at all stages through the life of the fuel.

Britain intends to make a specific proposal along these lines to the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this way we shall follow up the intentions of the recent conference on non-proliferation, although our proposals are not based on that Treaty and have a wider purpose. They are intended to give practical expression to the pledges that have already been made by many Governments that they will not convert nuclear material from civil to military purposes, and I hope that the General Assembly will give support to them.

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Letter from General Brown to Senator Symington: ABM Protocol, September 24, 1975 [1]

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

WASHINGTON, D.C., *September 24, 1975.*

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[1] *Congressional Record*, November 14, 1975, p. S20142.

HON. STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: The following information is provided in answer to the questions you raised in your letter of September 5, 1975.

The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty,[2] when ratified by the U.S. Senate, will limit deployment to one ABM site but will retain the option to relocate the permitted ABM site as an explicit provision of the Protocol. This relocation provision was advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the event there was a U.S. Government decision to seek agreement with the Soviets to limit deployment to only one ABM site. With this relocation option protected, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not oppose negotiations which led to the signing of the Protocol.

The major concern which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have regarding ratification is related to your final question of whether ratification of the Protocol would have any effect on future military programs or spending for such programs. They believe that the United States must maintain a ballistic missile defense program of sufficient breadth and depth to insure that the United States keeps pace with continuing Soviet ballistic missile defense efforts and improvements, which in recent years have been considerable. A continuation of U.S. efforts in this regard is essential in order to ensure an adequate hedge against sudden abrogation. Further, in the U.S. Unilateral Statement on ABM Treaty withdrawal, the United States stated that if more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, it would constitute a basis for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Without demonstrable U.S. competence in the ABM field which the U.S. could turn to its advantage if required, the Soviet Union could be less motivated to negotiate more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Therefore, providing that the U.S. Government continues to recognize the importance of maintaining a vigorous ballistic missile defense R&D program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support ratification of the Protocol to the ABM Treaty.

Sincerely,

GEORGE S. BROWN,
General, USAF.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 229–231.

Address by Chinese Ambassador Chiao Kuan-hua to the General Assembly [Extract], September 26, 1975 [1]

Disarmament is an old question. At a time when there is a growing danger of a new world war, it is fully understandable that the people of all countries, and those of the third and second world countries in particular, should feel more concerned about this question. After the European Security Conference, the Soviet leadership has become particularly clamorous for "complementing political détente by military détente", preaching that the most important task now is general and complete disarmament. This is making political profit out of the well-intentioned desire of the people of the world. It is a calculated fraud.

Anyone having respect for realities can see that in Europe there is no political détente at all but a fierce and all-sided contention between the two super-Powers. Immediately after the conclusion of the European Security Conference the Soviet Union violated Norway's airspace. Is this not another proof that the so called détente is just empty talk? To advocate in these circumstances the expanding, developing in depth and spreading of détente can only make people laugh their heads off.

Exploiting the developing countries' keen desire to develop their national economies, the Soviet Union recently has again trumpeted its proposal for a 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the use of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries.[2] The Soviet Union deems this proposal its masterstroke, and its representative has tried to sell it to us here for no one knows how many times. But so far he has failed to inform us just how big the real Soviet military budget is. It would probably take several years to get this clear. And who knows how many more before military budgets can truly be reduced as proposed by the Soviet Union? This magnificent Soviet plan, to use a Chinese saying, is "to draw a pie to satisfy hunger". If the developing countries were made to wait for such assistance, wouldn't they be left helpless like "the stranded fish which is promised water to be fetched from a distant sea"?

China's views on disarmament are known to all. We are for disarmament. But it must be genuine and not phoney disarmament. We are against phoney disarmament, and still more against the Soviet attempt to use a disarmament conference as a veil to cover up the truth of its

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[1] A/PV.2363 (prov.), pp. 56–60.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 876–878.

arms expansion and war preparations. The two super-Powers are quickening their pace towards a new world war. At this juncture, a disarmament conference in whatever form will only create illusions of peace, serve to deceive and lull the people of the world and bind the hands of the numerous small and medium countries. This is what we are firmly against.

As regards a world disarmament conference, China keeps to her position set forth long ago, namely, it must have a clear aim and the necessary pre-conditions. The clear aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and absolutely not the so-called limitation of strategic arms. The necessary pre-conditions are: All nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and in particular will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and that they must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries. But now the super-Powers even refuse to undertake the minimum obligation of not using nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries. How can it be said that conditions are ripe for holding a world disarmament conference?

Historical experience merits attention. The more the imperialists diffuse a smokescreen of disarmament, the bigger is the danger of war. Before the Second World War, a large-scale international disarmament conference lasting nearly three years was held under the sponsorship of the League of Nations after nearly seven years of preparation, and hundreds of proposals and suggestions were discussed. But the results? Arms expansion instead of disarmament, and war instead of peace. The only effect of that conference was to put many countries off guard and as a result, they were caught unprepared by the outbreak of the Second World War and suffered a great deal.

We hold that the United Nations should not repeat the mistake of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, as was expected, the Soviet Union tabled at this session of the General Assembly a proposal for the "complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". This is old ware in new wrappings and another of its tricks for maintaining nuclear monopoly. China's stand on this question is clear to all and we will not repeat it. As regards the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of the manufacture of what it calls new types of weapons even more formidable than nuclear weapons, its aim is none other than to divert people's attention from the immediate issues by talking about remote things. Let it be discussed by those who are prepared to manufacture such weapons. There is no need to bring it up here to scare people.

Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of New Systems of Such Weapons, September 30, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Striving to strengthen international peace and security,

Conscious of the interest of nations in continuing efforts to save mankind from the danger of the use of new means of mass destruction, limit the arms race and bring about disarmament,

Bearing in mind that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more pernicious types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Convinced that the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new, still more pernicious weapons of mass destruction would serve the goal of strengthening peace and preventing the threat of war,

1. *Considers it necessary* to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty (or agreement), for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons;

2. *Takes note of* the draft Agreement on the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of New Systems of Such Weapons, submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,[2] as well as points of view and suggestions put forward during the discussion of this question;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to work out the text of such an Agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons";

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the special item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons".

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[1] A/C.1/L.711, Sept. 30, 1975 (reissued on Oct. 2 for technical reasons). A revised version was adopted as resolution 3479 (XXX), *post*, pp. 799–804.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 479–482.

Statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Allon to the General Assembly: Middle East Nuclear-free Zone [Extract], September 30, 1975 [1]

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It is one of the anomalies of our times that Israel, which is rigorously excluded from the Middle East region in all that concerns the civilian pursuits of the United Nations and its specialized agencies—such as health, education, meteorology, trade and civil aviation—is emphatically held to be a part of the Middle East region when the discussion turns to military matters, including arms supply. If one were cynical one might almost suspect that the reason, in both cases, is to weaken Israel—in one case by boycott, and in the other by depriving it of the means of defence.

Be that as it may, the problem of arms control in the Middle East is real and urgent. The area is being swamped by a flood of new and sophisticated military hardware, such as it has never known in all its long history. Each month that passes raises the level of technology, and the price. Tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise be spent on economic and social development—and it must be realized that the population of large parts of the Middle East is among the poorest in the world—are drained off to pay for these instruments of human destruction.

Israel is forced to take part in this senseless competition because, given the circumstances in the area, if it did not it would invite immediate aggression. But Israel is ready at any time, even before peace is made, to consult with its neighbours on measures to limit the arms race, with all its dangerous consequences, without materially affecting the relative defensive capacity of any of the parties to the consultation.

Israel supports the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and will be ready to enter into negotiations with all States concerned in order to attain that objective. By negotiations we mean a process of intergovernmental consultation similar to that which preceded the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco [2] and other international instruments of like character. We do not think that so grave a matter can be settled by correspondence through the Secretary-General.

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[1] A/PV.2368 (prov.), pp. 27–30.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Press Interview with President Ford: Strategic Arms [Extract], October 1, 1975 [3]

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Q. Mr. President, your airplane landed today just a short distance from the Strategic Air Command. Fifteen years ago, this country's strategic superiority stood unchallenged in the world. Today, instead of superiority we talk of equivalency. There has been a slide on our side at the same time the U.S.S.R. has become more and more powerful and is continuing to do so. Do you expect to see the trend stopped and perhaps reversed?

THE PRESIDENT. Either through the Vladivostok agreement,[4] where we set the 2,400 limit on launchers and 1,320 limit on MIRVing, either through that process, setting a cap which will provide equivalency, or through us maintaining our program to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, we will maintain, I can assure you, as far as I am concerned, an adequate equivalency in strategic capability.

I would prefer to do it through a SALT Two agreement if we can get one. That is fair to both sides and sets a cap. But if we can't, I can assure you that I will recommend whatever the budget requirements are—adequate fundings for SAC operations and for all other related strategic programs.

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Television Interview with Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extract], October 12, 1975 [1]

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Mr. Keatley: Mr. Secretary, the second Soviet-American strategic arms control agreement is about a year or so behind the schedule once expected. What are the prospects for concluding it at any time during '75?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say it is a year behind schedule. It may be a few months behind the most optimistic schedule, which was June–July of this year.

I think the prospect of having a second strategic arms limitation agreement within the next months is good. Whether it will be in 1975 or in the early part of 1976, we will know more clearly after I receive a

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[3] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 6, 1975, p. 1093.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.
[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 658.

response to the propositions that we made to Foreign Minister Gromyko when he was here in October.

Mr. Keatley: Some people think delay is due to a Soviet effort to limit American weapons while not restraining seriously its own programs. What convinces you that the Soviets do want an agreement that restrains both sides in roughly comparable ways?

Secretary Kissinger: I think in fairness one has to point out that most of the significant concessions over the last 18 months in the negotiations have been made by the Soviet Union—with respect to equal aggregates; with respect to taking forward-base systems out of the negotiations, which means that several hundred or close to a thousand American airplanes are not counted; and with respect to the verification procedures. I do not think it is fair to say that the issue is to limit our systems while not limiting the Soviet systems. The issue is that the two forces have been designed in a way which makes it difficult to compare the weapons on both sides and to know how to bring them into relation with each other.

Finally, we are down to only two or three issues and they can be settled at any time, after which it will take about four to six weeks of technical discussions to work out the final details. About 90 percent of the negotiation is substantially completed.

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Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger by Time Magazine: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extract], October 27, 1975 [1]

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Q. If we don't have a SALT agreement this year or early next year, would that basically change the relationship between the United States and the USSR?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to give a specific deadline for the SALT agreement. But if the SALT negotiation should fail, both sides will be forced to build their strategic forces in anticipation of what the other side might do.

In our case it would mean that rather than the Soviet Union reducing their strategic forces from the approximately 2,600 units they have now to 2,400, we would have to calculate that they will stay at 2,600—or maybe go on beyond that. To match this would involve a significant

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 17, 1975, pp. 693–694.

increase in our strategic defense budget. That, in turn, can only be justified on the basis of an increased danger. So the rhetoric of both sides will become more confrontational, and I would think that it would lead to a substantial chilling in the relationship—if not to a return of the cold war.

Q. Isn't there a basic difference between the Pentagon and the State Department on our SALT negotiating position?

Secretary Kissinger: If there is a basic difference, I know about it only from the newspapers. The last position that was given to Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko was jointly worked out by the Secretary of Defense and myself. It was then approved by the President. If there should be a disagreement—and the disagreement is always much more in the press than in reality—then it will be settled by the President.

Q. Do you expect that there will be an agreement this year?

Secretary Kissinger: It's now getting rather late in the year. It would take about six to eight weeks, even after an agreement in principle, to work out all the technical details. So it may slip beyond the end of this year.

Q. Would it be possible for Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] to come to the United States before a SALT agreement is worked out?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think it's unlikely. I think his visit would be tied to a SALT agreement.

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Letter from Secretary of the Army Hoffman to Senator Young: Safeguard ABM System, October 29, 1975 [1]

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, *October 29, 1975*

Hon. MILTON R. YOUNG,
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR YOUNG: This will reply to your request for the status of the SAFEGUARD ballistic missile defense system. As you know, the

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[1] *Congressional Record*, Nov. 14, 1975, p. S20141.

House Appropriations Committee imposed a $40 million reduction of the SAFEGUARD system to $45.3 million in FY 76 and deletion of funding in the transition period will require the Army to terminate the operation of the Grand Forks site. If full dismantlement is not accomplished there would be annual recurring costs for security of these facilities which would appear contrary to the obvious HAC intent expressed by deletion of all requested transition period funding. The Army is reponding to the HAC action by beginning to plan for the dismantlement of the site by removing the equipment, filling the missile silos with earth and destroying the radar buildings in accordance with SAL agreements. A preliminary estimate of the cost to implement the HAC direction is $100 million for termination of contracts and dismantling of the weapon system.

SAFEGUARD is the only existing BMD system in the USA. It has required a great investment to bring into being. If it is immediately closed, our ability to gain valuable operational experience and our ability to counter limited attacks or accidentally launched missiles will be lost. Furthermore, we will have eliminated a considerable element of uncertainty in any potential attacker's planning and made his task much easier. Even if we wish to abandon an active defense capability, the large perimeter acquisition radar can be an important element of the national defense warning system, independent of the rest of the site. This advanced, phased array radar possesses a unique capability to accurately assess the nature of an attack and could provide needed information to our National Command Authorities thus permitting them to tailor their response and better control the conflict.

The Army had planned to reduce the level of operational readiness to minimize annual recurring costs. We believe that costs can be reduced to about $60 million per year while maintaining the capability to bring all of the longer range interceptor missiles and about half of the short-range interceptor missiles to full operational readiness within a few hours. The complete capability of the system could be achieved within a few months. It is conceivable that the ABM Treaty [2] may be extended to prohibit any form of deployed ballistic missile defense. The Army plan for a minimum cost reduced readiness posture while protecting the option to resume full readiness will support negotiations to this end as well as the more costly continuous full readiness posture.

In the interest of future strategic arms limitation negotiations and to maximize the benefits of our nearly $6 billion investment in the SAFEGUARD system, I believe the funds requested in FY 76 and in the transition period are warranted and should be restored by the Senate.

Sincerely,

MARTIN R. HOFFMAN.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 30, 1975 [1]

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Since I have the privilege of making the opening statement in the First Committee's debate on disarmament questions, I have felt it only appropriate to devote it mainly to some general remarks on a few of the fundamental points that I feel might serve as a backdrop for the discussion of the specific subjects that we shall be considering later.

Accordingly, I feel that I should deal first with a question which, although it does not appear on our agenda, I am certain would be impossible, and even dangerous, to pass over in silence. I refer to the Conference to Review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] which, as we know, took place last May after very careful preparatory work.

May I begin by stressing that the Treaty emerged by no means strengthened from that first test to which it was subjected. The disillusion among the non-nuclear-weapon States caused by five years of non-fulfillment of the commitments assumed by the nuclear Powers was clearly shown by the fact that only 58 of those States, that is, less than two-thirds of the 96 which are at present parties to the Treaty, were represented at that Conference.

That disillusion became impatience, verging at times on indignation, at the openly negative attitude of the nuclear super-Powers—to which the third nuclear-weapon State depositary of the Treaty seemed to give tacit support—to anything that might involve acceptance of obligations to support, by the adoption of tangible and concrete measures, the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[3] particularly those—and I shall quote the Treaty—that call for

> . . . the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and . . . at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and . . . nuclear disarmament,

to say nothing of the obligations concerning the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It was precisely because of the paralysis of the Review Conference imposed by that negative attitude that my delegation has felt it advisable for the United Nations General Assembly to have at its disposal, for possible use when considering the relevant items on the First Committee's agenda, the texts of the two working papers which, together with 18 other third world States, I had the privilege of submitting to the review Conference, and which contain numerous draft additional protocols to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2072 (prov.), pp. 11-37.
[2] For the final declaration of the conference, see *ante*, pp. 146-157.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

The two protocols were designed to induce the nuclear Powers depositaries of the Treaty to demonstrate their readiness "to support with tangible deeds" the pertinent provisions of the Treaty.

In the case of Additional Protocol I—whose text was circulated as document A/C.1/1055—we were trying "to bring about, in the final analysis, the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", as provided for in the tenth preambular paragraph of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, a very simple, practical and automatic procedure was provided: the three depositary nuclear-weapon States would bind themselves to decree the suspension of all their underground nuclear-weapon tests for a period of 10 years, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty reached 100. The duration of the moratorium would be extended by three years each time that five additional States became Parties to the Treaty, and the moratorium would be transformed into a permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty for that purpose, as soon as the other nuclear-weapon States indicated their willingness to become parties to said treaty.

With regard to Additional Protocol II—which was circulated in document A/C.1/1056—the provisions whose implementation we were seeking are those contained in article VI of the Treaty, in which, as you will recall, the nuclear Powers committed themselves to adopt "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . .".

As in the case of Protocol I, the entry into force of Protocol II would have automatic effects: the maximum limits provided in the Vladivostok agreements of November 1974 [4] between the two super-Powers would be reduced by 50 per cent when 100 States had become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and when that condition had been fulfilled each of the super-Powers would be entitled to possess 1,200, instead of 2,400, strategic nuclear vehicles and 660, instead of 1,320, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Furthermore, those new limits would be subject to an additional reduction by 10 per cent every time 10 more States became parties to the Treaty.

The two draft additional Protocols were very carefully worded so that their entry into force could not in any way undermine or weaken the security of the nuclear Powers, to whose signature they would be open, and that was very carefully detailed in the introductory comments to the respective working papers, the symbols of which I have just given and which can easily be consulted so that I need not go into that aspect of the matter. However, before leaving this item I should like to recall that the sponsors were extremely careful when making their official presentation of the draft protocols to stress that both the duration of the moratorium provided for in Protocol I and the reduction called for in Protocol II, as well as the conditions stipulated in that

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[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746–750.

regard in both instruments, were being presented as bases for negotiation and were certainly not in the nature of rigid requirements and immutable conditions.

Returning to the agenda of the First Committee, I should like to stress our conviction that in the course of this thirtieth regular session of the General Assembly the highest priority should be attached to the two items that have received the greatest attention from the States of the third world which participated in the Review Conference, the items that were covered by the two working papers I have just outlined: the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals, including the freezing of the qualitative race to render the weapons of mass destruction even more devastating.

It was for that reason that we were very gratified to find that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had sent to the General Assembly, under cover of a letter from its Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated 11 September last,[5] a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.[6] To that draft treaty was appended a draft resolution, dated 22 September (A/C.1/L.707), which would allow the General Assembly to take whatever steps it deemed appropriate in the matter.[7]

We are not unaware of the fact that more than six years ago Sweden placed before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) a draft with a similar aim,[8] that was considerably amended by that same delegation in 1971.[9] However, that should in no way detract from the fact that one of the two super-Powers has seen fit to take this giant step forward. But although we feel that that position is worthy of praise, it does not mean that we may not question the contents of the draft resolution. I must reserve the position of my delegation, so as to go into this matter in more detail and to suggest certain amendments to the draft, but we shall wait before doing so until we have listened to and had time to study carefully the explanations which will doubtless be given to us by the representative of the Soviet Union, perhaps in the statement he is to deliver today.

However, my delegation would like to make it very clear, even at this early stage, that we would be totally unable to accept the suggestion contained in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.707), according to which the nuclear-weapon States alone would enter into negotiations among themselves on the contemplated treaty. If in four successive resolutions adopted on the item relating to the world disarmament conference—two, incidentally, approved unanimously and the other two by consensus—the General Assembly has stressed the fact that "all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations" and that "all States should be in a position

[5] *Ante*, pp. 459-460.
[6] *Ante*, pp. 460-463.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 486-490.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.
[9] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 540-543.

to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal," [10] it would be incomprehensible, nay, absurd, to try to exclude from the negotiation of the treaty those States that do not possess nuclear weapons, States which have for 20 years been striving so hard to turn into reality the dream of the total and perpetual prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

We are fully aware that such negotiations could not appropriately be carried out in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since two of the nuclear-weapon States are not participants in the work of the CCD, nor can we foresee their becoming participants unless there are radical changes in the functioning of the CCD. Yet, this can in no way be taken to mean that if circumstances so dictated, some *ad hoc* organ might not be set up that would allow the non-nuclear-weapon States to contribute to those negotiations in the same way in which they have so often averted total paralysis of the CCD in Geneva. We are convinced that many delegations, including our own, might at the appropriate time, submit constructive suggestions on this matter.

I should also like to say at this moment that we would deem it highly unjust to those countries that have most perseveringly and selflessly worked along these lines if, in the resolution which might be adopted, only the draft treaty just submitted by the Soviet Union were mentioned. We believe that some reference of a general nature should be made to the numerous working papers that have been submitted to the CCD on this same subject, as well as all the other documents regarding the examination at this thirtieth regular session of the General Assembly of agenda items 37 and 122.

With regard to the second question, which as we said earlier we believe deserves the highest priority—namely that of nuclear disarmament—we would prefer to postpone our comments to a later date, when we start examining the implementation of the provisions of resolution 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[11] which call for the achievement of important or significant "qualitative limitations and substantial reductions" of strategic nuclear-weapon systems. For the moment I shall limit myself to expressing the hope that the representatives of the two nuclear super-Powers will very shortly submit a report to the General Assembly on the content and scope of the so-called Vladivostok agreements, and that that report will also include whatever information they feel able to give us regarding the progress of the negotiations on the implementation of the Vladivostok agreements.

I shall now go on to consider another matter which we feel also deserves priority attention on the part of the Assembly: namely, the question of nuclear-free zones, whose increasing importance is attested to by the amply significant fact that among the 19 items on our agenda regarding questions of disarmament, eight refer to the establishment or strengthening of such nuclear-free zones. This, as you know, is a

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[10] *Ibid., 1971*, p. 909; *ibid., 1972*, p. 835; *ibid., 1973*, p. 900; *ibid., 1974*, p. 797.
[11] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 801-803.

subject about which my country and Latin America as a whole can quite justifiably be proud, since we blazed a trail for the world when we achieved the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[12]

For the first time in the history of the CCD, the co-chairmen who, as is well known, are the ones who prepare the annual report to the General Assembly, were constrained to accept the concept upheld by the members of the group known as the Group of 15 that the correct interpretation of a request from the General Assembly that the CCD submit a "special report" is that that report should be separate from the regular annual report, and not merely inserted as a section of the latter.

This is the case in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) dated 9 December 1974,[13] in which the General Assembly, after deciding that a wide and "comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects" should be carried out by an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD requested the CCD to transmit such a study to the General Assembly at its thirtieth regular session in a "special report".[14]

Now the special report in question is 138 pages long and appears in document A/10027/Add.1 of 8 October 1975, and, aside from the comprehensive study to which I have just referred, also contains the observations of members of the CCD on that study and a working paper submitted by the delegation of Mexico.

Since the statements made by the members of the CCD are reproduced in the chronological order in which they were made, and since the first is the statement made by the representative of Mexico, in pages 80 to 89 of this special report, I feel that at this moment I can limit myself to examining a few of the basic elements, the others having been adequately covered in the statement I made in Geneva.

May I begin by recalling that in the preamble to the resolution I mentioned a few moments ago, which led to the creation of the *Ad Hoc* Group and its arduous work, we stressed the need to "make every effort" to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that it ends with the statement that "further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones would be enhanced by a comprehensive study of the question in all its aspects".[15]

The *Ad Hoc* Group did its duty and complied with the mandate expressly conferred upon it by making an almost exhaustive compilation of all the imaginable views that could be expressed on a very wide spectrum of the aspects, not all of equal importance, of the entire question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

That detailed compilation of anonymous and at times divergent opinions on a series of abstract hypotheses should not, however, blind us to the basic objective sought by the General Assembly when it called

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[12] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[13] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[14] See *ante*, pp. 417–419.
[15] A/RES/3261 F (XXIX), *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

for such a study. That objective was very clearly defined in the pertinent resolution, as I said earlier, namely, to "strengthen"—and I stress the word "strengthen"—the efforts newly undertaken and the existing achievements as regards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

If the study to which I am addressing my remarks is considered in the light of that most praiseworthy purpose, the conclusion is inescapable that the result of the laborious efforts of the experts proves with absolute clarity the imperative need for the General Assembly to intervene directly in this matter in order to decide upon and clearly define, once and for all, certain basic questions touching on this item. If the dialectical exercise of the experts were to bear no other fruit than this—although I would point out that it did bear other fruit which cannot be ignored—that achievement alone would earn them our acknowledgement and appreciation.

Among the fundamental questions, the two that we believe warrant priority consideration by the General Assembly during its thirtieth session are that of formulating and adopting, on the one hand, an internationally valid definition of the concept of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone", and, on the other hand, that of formulating and adopting a declaration defining the main obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the States within them.

In this way the Assembly will contribute effectively to laying down certain basic guidelines and norms of that international law which is so often invoked in the study of the *Ad Hoc* Group by some of its members, who seem to overlook the fact in quoting it that since this is a subject that is not only new but unprecedented, since the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred barely 30 years ago, the standards of such international law that might be applicable either do not as yet exist or are merely in an embryonic stage. Furthermore, such standards must be elaborated with the true participation of all States and not, as was the case during the nineteenth century, with the participation of an insignificant number of them. Thus United Nations intervention in this matter would be doubly valuable.

It will also have to be borne in mind that nuclear weapons and anything touching on them call for exceptional treatment in the field of international law since, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco points out, such weapons:

> . . . whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species . . .

It would therefore appear to us to be most natural and appropriate that in this case, as I have so often mentioned in previous statements, but which undoubtedly warrants repetition today, we may resort to procedures such as those that are applied when an epidemic rages: namely, gradually to endeavour to widen the zones of the world in which nuclear weapons have been prohibited until the territories of those States that

stubbornly insist on possessing them become contaminated islands subject to a régime of quarantine.

We believe that that is the international law that should be applied in order finally to solve the problems which have emerged from the study that the experts, with such extraordinary and remarkable care and intelligence, have submitted to us.

We are firmly convinced that the General Assembly, by whatever decisions it may adopt at this thirtieth session, can make a decisive and extraordinarily valuable contribution to encouraging and promoting true efforts for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

When the time comes for the formal submission of pertinent draft resolutions on the two basic questions I have mentioned, my delegation will, at the same time, certainly make known fully its reasons for such submission. Suffice it at the moment merely to recommend to those who may be interested in this aspect of the question, a reading of the statement I made in Geneva, to which I have already referred, as well as of the working paper submitted by the delegation of Mexico which has been reproduced on pages 128 and 129 of the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, document A/10027/Add.1.

Thus far I have dealt, admittedly in a very superficial fashion, only with the Review Conference on the Treaty on non-proliferation, with the question of the total cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, referring to the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, and with the special report containing the study of the experts with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by the CCD. Basically, this is only three items, of which only two appear among the 19 assigned to this Committee, since the Review Conference is not one of those. And yet I am about to conclude my statement, for otherwise I might justifiably be accused of seeking to monopolize this entire meeting of the First Committee. If we weigh this matter and if we consider that there are 142 other representatives with the same right as that of Mexico to be heard, not merely once but several times in the course of this debate, we shall have the most conclusive additional proof, should that be necessary, of how absolutely necessary it is for us to convene and, after adequate preparation, to institutionalize the world disarmament conference that we have been analysing in all its aspects ever since 1971. In the light of the contents of the last report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,[16] we believe that the year that will elapse between this session of the General Assembly and the next one should be the last period of time allowed for the continuation of such a study. If in the course of 1976 it should not be possible to achieve more tangible progress, then, in our view, it will be necessary for the Assembly, during its thirty-first regular session, to decide to hold a special session for the purpose among other things, of studying the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

[16] A/10028.

We believe that this would be in keeping with the spirit of the declaration recently adopted in this regard at the ministerial meeting of the non-aligned countries that was held in Lima, Peru.[17]

I should not like to conclude this statement without mentioning something to which my delegation has always attached particular importance, and that is the role that the United Nations, and its Secretariat, should play in all matters involving disarmament. In order further to illustrate our constant concern, I should like to quote what can be found in the introduction to the "comprehensive programme of disarmament", document A/8191, of 2 December 1970, which the delegations of Ireland, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico jointly submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, and which the latter recommended be taken into account at all future disarmament negotiations. In that introduction, after recalling the request on the part of the General Assembly appearing in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), of 16 December 1969,[18] in which the decade 1970-1979 was designated as a Disarmament Decade, the following was stated:

> In the light of the contents of that resolution it would seem fully justified to state that the request of the General Assembly implies that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations and other acts on this matter, in whatever forum and form they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and ensure that the United Nations General Assembly be kept informed on their progress so as to permit it the proper performance of its functions, including the constant evaluation of the situation.[19]

In this present year, when we stand at the very middle of the Disarmament Decade, it seems to us that we should stress the lasting validity of the concepts I have just cited by quoting appropriately the words contained in the introduction to the last annual report on the work of the Organization by the Secretary-General:

> One can only conclude that the role which the United Nations is playing in disarmament is far from adequate. What can be done, in practical and realistic terms, to strengthen the role of the United Nations in such a way that the necessary progress can be achieved? We may seek answers to this question in several main fields of activity. United Nations action should be based on accurate and adequate information, which must be made available in suitable form to Member States and to the public.
>
> Any basic review of disarmament will have to include the problem of how disarmament can best be discussed so that the discussion can be comprehensive.
>
> Another important issue is the structure and procedures of the United Nations negotiating machinery.[20]

I only hope that at the present session of the General Assembly we shall arrive at practical conclusions on this matter and that the General Assembly will adopt decisions conducive to progress towards the achievement of the objectives which were in mind in drawing up the comprehensive programme of disarmament five years ago, and in the

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[17] *Ante*, pp. 435-438.
[18] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 713-715.
[19] *Ibid., 1970*, p. 654.
[20] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A* (A/10001/Add.1), p. 4.

very recent statement that I have just read by the highest official of the United Nations. Among those decisions we believe should be included one to strengthen the competent staff of the Secretariat of the world Organization so that it may be capable of giving Member States which desire it—and I am sure that this includes the majority of States—effective technical co-operation in matters of disarmament and the regulation of armaments including, among other things, periodic publications giving timely and accurate information, which should be as complete as possible, on these different questions.

We are convinced that there must be no further delay in the achievement of a thorough reorganization of the machinery and procedure which have so far been used within and outside the United Nations in matters of disarmament. Thus, and only thus, will we be able to bear always in mind the ultimate goal: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Thus and only thus can the efforts of all peoples of the world be successful in banishing for ever the threat—whose tangible reality always imposes itself, despite the very human tendency not to think about disagreeable things—of nuclear conflagration which, apart from resulting in the immediate and monstrous extermination of hundreds of millions of people, because of the persistence of radioactivity generated by nuclear weapons and the danger of at least partial destruction of the layer of ozone which surrounds us in the stratosphere by the effects of large-scale explosions of such weapons, might ultimately make the entire earth planet uninhabitable.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 30, 1975 [1]

Today, 30 October, the First Committee at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly is beginning its consideration of disarmament questions, which occupy an extremely important place in the work of the current session of the General Assembly. This was proved, in particular, by the general debate which demonstrated that the idea put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries concerning the need to supplement political détente by military détente and for the adoption of measures for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament is gaining ever-growing support. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in his appeal, has also called upon all of us to make the present session of the General Assembly a disarmament session. Heads of delegations of a large number of countries expressed their wish in their statements during the general debate in the General Assembly that the agreements recently concluded in the political field should be materially consolidated and embodied in new,

[1] A/C.1/PV.2072 (prov.), pp. 37–62.

concrete agreements on the question of disarmament. We note with satisfaction that disarmament questions have attracted greater attention this year than in past years.

The Soviet delegation would now like to focus attention on the first main proposal submitted by the Soviet Union for consideration by the General Assembly: namely, "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".[2] As for the second proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests",[3] and the remaining disarmament questions on the Assembly's agenda, the Soviet delegation reserves its right to make a statement at a somewhat later stage.

We should like to recall that the original proposal that States should conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in his speech at a meeting of electors in Moscow on 13 June 1975:

> What I have in mind—said the General Secretary—is that the States, above all the big Powers, should conclude an agreement banning the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
>
> The level of present-day science and technology is such that there arises a serious danger that still more frightful weapons than even nuclear ones may be developed. Reason and the conscience of mankind dictate the need for raising an insurmountable barrier against the development of such weapons.[4]

Profoundly humanistic in its character, the idea of banning the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as expressed by Mr. Brezhnev, at once became the centre of attention of world public opinion. The new Soviet proposal was widely and positively commented upon in the press and in the statements of various statesmen and politicians, as well as by many public organizations.

The Deputy President of the Senate of Italy, Mr. Tullia Karretoni, noted in welcoming the new Soviet initiative that it was

> important both in itself, in its political significance, and also from the moral point of view, since it presupposes the use of the latest achievements of science and technology solely for the good of man.

Lord Brockway, a prominent British public figure, said:

> The British welcome the speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, which contains an appeal to prohibit the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

He stressed that he fully shared the opinion of the Soviet leader concerning the serious danger of the development of still more frightful weapons than even nuclear weapons, and said that he favoured consid-

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[2] *Ante*, p. 495.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 486–490.
[4] *Ante*, p. 192 (variant translation); cf. p. 199.

eration of the question of the prohibition of such weapons at an international level.

Senator C. Pell of the United States Congress remarked:

> This is a proposal which the United States should warmly welcome and grasp. To close the Pandora's box—that is, the development of new frightful weapons—is in the interest not of the Soviet Government or the Russian people alone; it also meets the interest of the American people and mankind as a whole.

That the Soviet initiative has attracted such steadfast attention is quite natural. Indeed, it is a question of imposing a ban on and outlawing such types and systems of weapons whose use might have even more destructive consequences than the use of nuclear weapons.

In view of the importance and topicality of the task of saving mankind from new sources of danger to its future survival, the Soviet Government deemed it necessary to submit this important and urgent matter for consideration by the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, and introduced a relevant international draft convention on it.

The substance of the proposal was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, on 23 September during the general debate at this session of the Assembly.[5] The USSR proposes that States, and above all the big Powers, having potential scientific and technological possibilities should raise an insurmountable international barrier to the development and manufacture of such new weapons. For that purpose it is necessary to conclude an agreement based on the undertaking not to develop or manufacture new types or new systems of weapons of mass destruction and not to assist or encourage any activities to that end.

Statements made by delegations during the general debate of the Assembly have already revealed considerable interest on the part of States Members of the United Nations in the specific proposal of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of an international agreement on this question. The heads of the delegations of the socialist countries expressed their full support for the Soviet proposal. Thus, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Fischer, stated that the draft convention, submitted to the General Assembly, on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons was "a basis acceptable to all and appropriate for a just and durable solution of this problem".

He went on to say:

> The adoption of the proposals made by the Soviet Union would moreover give great momentum to the process of arms limitation and disarmament as a whole. It is precisely this that can give material content to political détente.[6]

The heads of the delegations of other countries, noting the importance of the question raised by the Soviet Union, called for its attentive consideration during the current session of the General Assembly. That

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[5] *Ante*, pp. 477-478.
[6] A/PV.2360 (prov.), p. 77.

was mentioned in particular by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Callaghan, and several other speakers. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, Mr. Dennis, referring to the proposals of the Soviet Union, emphasized that they were

> both most constructive and timely, warranting the support of all Member States of this Organization and, indeed, of peace-loving peoples the world over.[7]

Numerous meetings of Soviet representatives with the leaders and various politicians and public figures in the countries with which the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations prove that this new Soviet proposal has met, on the whole, with a positive response. We can inform this Committee that the Soviet delegation recently held numerous meetings both with the regional group of States in the United Nations and with individual delegations and in the course of those meetings we provided some additional explanations on the item put forward by the Soviet Union. These meetings and conversations testify to the genuine interest evinced in the proposal of the USSR; they have contributed to a better understanding of the substance of that proposal.

Thus, the proposal of the USSR to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons has attracted extremely wide attention. That proves, first of all, the topicality and urgency of this proposal. It was dictated by life itself, with its present-day realities, and by new important factors in the development of modern science and military thought.

What are those factors? First of all, it should be stressed that the arms race, which formerly was of a predominantly quantitative nature, is now being more and more channelled at the same time in the direction of a qualitative perfection of armaments. There appear reports about work under way to create new types of weapons of mass destruction based on physical properties which differ in principle from those of the existing weapons, and also reports about the acceleration of the qualitative perfection of the existing weapons.

Over $25,000 million are spent annually on military research and development in the world. Research for military purposes requires several times more funds and specialists than vitally important research work on a peaceful nature—such as work on public health, education and agriculture; this brings about a distortion in the development of science.

The emphasis on military research and development does not so much stimulate the over-all scientific and technological progress as it limits that progress through the search for more elaborate means of bringing about human destruction, thus imposing narrow limits on that progress. Four hundred thousand highly qualified engineers and scientific workers in the world—in other words, every fourth scientist and engineer—are now employed in the field of military research. The emergence of qualitatively new types of weapons of mass destruction—in

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[7] A/PV.2358 (prov.), p. 66.

their monstrous destructive potential more frightful than even nuclear weapons—is most probable in the fields where the most intricate and costly military scientific research and experimental and design work are being carried out.

Scientists themselves are sounding the alarm over the danger of the development of such types of weapons based on the latest discoveries and achievements of science and technology. In the summer of last year, for example, the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, acting on the initiative of several scientists, launched an appeal to proclaim voluntarily a moratorium throughout the world on the carrying out of several types of research work that may result in unpredictable dangers for mankind.

Concern over the possibility of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction was also expressed by scientists at the Moscow Symposium of the World Federation of Scientific Workers devoted to "The role of scientists and their organizations in the struggle for disarmament". That symposium was held in Moscow from 15 to 19 July this year.

Existing scientific research programmes are greatly influenced by multibillion-dollar military programmes. According to the Western press, public and private organizations and companies conclude numerous contracts with universities and scientific research institutes which directly influence policy in the field of scientific research. Specialization, which is so typical of present-day research work, and the fractional nature of the contracts concluded do not always permit the researchers themselves to understand for what purposes their work is intended.

Several specialized fields in electronics, nuclear physics, toxicology, oceanography, aeronautics, operational research and so on have been imprisoned in military programmes.

The latest achievements of contemporary science are widely used for the development of military technology. Mr. J. Legay, a French scientist, and a member of the Standing Committee for the Problems of Disarmament of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, cited data at the above-mentioned Moscow international symposium to the effect that in France, for example, army purchases account for 19 per cent of the total turn-over of the electronics industry and that in Europe as a whole 70 per cent of aircraft production is intended for the armed forces.

Numerous statements made by a number of responsible figures in various military agencies and in other institutions, and by organs of the press, bear witness to the fact that military scientific thought relentlessly concentrates on the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

There is every reason to consider that now mankind is, as it was at the beginning of the nuclear era three or four decades ago, on the threshold of major scientific discoveries which can be used for military

purposes. What happened to the discoveries in nuclear physics at that time may happen again in the case of the possible discoveries in other fields of scientific and technological progress.

We are usually asked what specific new types of weapons of mass destruction we have in mind. Many varied assumptions and judgements have been expressed on this score in scientific—and not only scientific—magazines and publications. For example, one of the issues of the American newspaper *Christian Science Monitor* wrote about the possibility of developing explosive devices from an element even heavier than uranium. Such a weapon, being smaller in size than a nuclear weapon, the newspaper explained, would have a tremendous destructive power which scientists cannot even conceive of now. The theory has also been put forward that sub-nuclear physics might isolate particles smaller than the nucleus itself, for instance, protons, neutrons or quarks and make possible even more destructive new weapons.

Other hypotheses with some scientific basis have been advanced, although there are also speculations resting on the unsteady ground of purely fantastic assumptions. One thing is certain, however, that many people, including quite prominent scientists and experts, have stated with good reason that the development of science and technology in the military field could move on to different and entirely new paths.

All this points to the extremely serious and complex nature of this problem. That is why the Soviet Union holds that the identification of new types of weapons of mass destruction should become even now the subject of the most serious and thorough examination, comprehensive consideration and negotiations at the level, first of all, of highly skilled and competent specialists and experts. The Soviet Union is of course ready to participate most actively in such international negotiations and to express its opinions on this score. Be that as it may, we must all quite clearly realize the enormous scale of the potential danger which threatens mankind in this new and as yet little known sphere. In our age of headlong scientific and technical progress, the power of means of destruction can become so great that if used they can threaten the population of whole States and continents with total and complete annihilation.

We should like to hope that future history will not provide us with an answer to the question of what new weapons of mass destruction could be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons. However, to prevent this actually happening, it is necessary to prohibit the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. And this must be done immediately, before it becomes too late.

Our proposal envisages the prohibition not only of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction but also of new systems utilizing existing weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, and so on. It is after all no secret that military scientific thought continues to improve existing weapons. Thus, for example, an American scientist, Professor R. Routman,

pointing to the importance of concluding an international convention prohibiting the development of new types of and systems for weapons of mass destruction, pointed out that the binary chemical weapon is the most dangerous type of chemical weapon with which any contemporary army can easily be armed. According to him, the United States already has plans to use this weapon in the artillery. He states that another *danger lies in the development of completely new systems of biological* weapons.

Although, as we know, the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons [8] that has recently come into force envisages the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, new advances in so-called "gene engineering" have already caused great anxiety among scientists of the world.

A prominent Soviet expert in this field, Academician O. Baroyan, wrote in this connexion that

> . . . the achievements in 'gene engineering' can undoubtedly cause great trouble. Leaving temporarily aside the question of accidents, which are always possible, since they stem from our lack of knowledge, I would say the following. The effects of a misanthrope's actions, if he only sought to avail himself of what contemporary science offers him, could be really terrible.

The New York Times, in its edition of 18 March this year, reported that, as a result of the advent of a new generation of the so-called "smart bombs", which have made true the long cherished dream of the military about high accuracy weapons capable of hitting the target on the first strike, the next decade might witness a revolution in the capacities of traditional weapons.

Experts maintain that the appearance of precision guided bombs will change warfare almost to the same extent that the unexpected emergence of tanks in the First World War modified the pattern of ground combat and that radar changed anti-aircraft defence during the Second World War.

This last spring, testifying before the United States Congress, Malcolm Currie, who is the Pentagon's Director of Defense Research and Engineering, proclaimed "the coming of still another age of weaponry". "A remarkable series of technical developments," he said, "has brought us to the threshold of what will become a true revolution in conventional warfare."

All people of good-will cannot but be alarmed also by certain research trends in the field of the development of means to modify the environment. If the results of this research are used only for peaceful, constructive purposes, that, of course, is one thing. However, the same means can be used for hostile military purposes. That is why it is extremely important to prevent the development and use of new so-called geophysical methods to the detriment of mankind.

With that objective in view, the Soviet Union, at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, initiated a proposal

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.

for the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military and other hostile purposes.[9] We note with satisfaction that the initiative of the Soviet Union received general support: 126 States voted in the Assembly for that proposal, which is now being implemented. We hope to reach agreement on this important subject in the Disarmament Committee, which is now seized of the relevant draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The delegation of the USSR would like to draw attention to a further important aspect of the problem under discussion, which cannot be disregarded.

The development of fundamentally new types and systems of weapons opens up the possibility, on the one hand, of by-passing already existing international restrictions—for example, in the field of strategic armaments, biological weapons and so on—and, on the other hand, the possibility of expending further tens and hundreds of millions, or perhaps thousands of millions, of dollars on a continued and stepped-up arms race.

Meanwhile, as United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim reported to the General Assembly at this thirtieth session, ". . . global expenditures on armaments are approaching $300,000 million a year"[10]—an unprecedented amount for peace time. This, as is evident to everybody, has become the main obstacle to the solution of the problem of promoting the development of the developing countries, which is second in importance only to the strengthening of peace. Military expenditures devour the lion's share of resources in both developed and developing nations.

No funds are left over for development and assistance to developing countries. That is why all countries, both developed and developing, should be interested in solving the problem of disarmament and reducing military expenditures, as well as in preventing the growth of their expenditures on new types of weapons. And what is more, as was stated recently by an eminent statesman, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany in a conversation with Mr. Melvin Laird, a former United States Defense Secretary, who is a notorious advocate of the arms race, military expenditures are the main source of worldwide inflation. Consequently, the arms race and the continued increase in military expenditures are the principal cause of the present economic crisis affecting the peoples of all countries, both developed and developing. And that is why, from this point of view as well, it is advisable to take urgent steps to raise a solid international barrier against the emergence of new types of weapons and against the growing expenditures on their development and manufacture.

The development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is a process which is objectively related to the development

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[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 380–382, 516–521; A/RES/3264 (XXIX), Dec. 9, 1974.

[10] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*, p. 4.

of science and technology. While today it is a sort of by-product of scientific and technological progress which is dangerous for humanity, nobody knows what momentum it will gain in future. Today it is difficult to form any concrete, definitive judgement on the possible evolution of this process in its military-technological applications; scientific foresight is becoming more and more complicated and problematical.

However, let us recall in this connexion the prediction of E. Rutherford, a famous English physicist, which turned out to be incorrect: "Anyone who expects to produce energy from the transformation of atoms," he stated, "is talking nonsense." The scientist expressed that opinion in 1933, when the elaboration of the atomic theory was already in the main complete; but even such outstanding minds as that of the famous English scientist were unable to foresee that in only 12 years the atomic bomb would become a reality.

As is known, the First World War started with the use of rifles and guns, and ended—though no one could foresee it at the time—with the use of tanks and poison gases. The Second World War started with the widespread use of automatic weapons, tanks and aeroplanes, and by the end of the War—and, again, no one could predict this—atomic weapons had already emerged.

Scientists, more than anybody else, are aware of the possible consequences of modern discoveries for the creation of new types and weapons. It was for this reason that the participants in the Moscow Symposium on the Role of Scientists and Their Organizations in the Struggle for Disarmament made a special appeal to scientists of the world:

> Men of science cannot remain indifferent to the way the results of their work will be used. Today, as never before, the moral duty of a scientist and his responsibility to mankind demand that the further use of his work for destructive purposes be prevented.

It follows clearly from what I have said that the question, raised by the Soviet Union, of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons is not a purely academic issue. Political and public figures, competent scientists and experts from many countries unanimously maintain that the peril inherent in the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction now represents one of the most formidable dangers to mankind.

Yet here in this Assembly one speaker attempted, from the United Nations rostrum, to substitute for a serious approach to this problem the mouthings of an ignoramus about the alleged diversion of peoples' attention from "the immediate issues" and about scaring people. Besides, like the Delphic oracle, he prophesied the inevitability of a new world war, and so on and so forth. The thrust of his reasoning boiled down to questioning the urgency of solving this problem. What can be said about people who rant like this? Either they do not want to see an inch beyond their noses, or—and this is more probable—they want to

divert peoples' attention from the urgent task of struggling for the cessation of the arms race and for general and complete disarmament, and in so doing they are staking his wager on war. Only enemies of peace and international co-operation—war advocates and enemies of mankind—can oppose the humane and timely proposal to raise an insurmountable and eternal barrier against the use of new creations of the human genius for the purpose of the mass extermination of people.

If the development and manufacture of new forms of weapons of mass destruction had been prohibited as far back as the eve of the Second World War, then mankind would never have experienced the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and military arsenals of States would now be free from thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly submitted a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations together with the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons.[11] That proposal was supported by the Assembly and is now a decision adopted by the United Nations.[12]

Now the Soviet Union advocates that mankind should eliminate once and for all the existing danger stemming from the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and the sooner this is done the better it will be for all mankind. The Soviet Union is not pursuing the aim of obtaining any kind of unilateral advantages. It is prepared to assume exactly the same obligations in an international agreement on such prohibition as those to be assumed by all other countries, including the other permanent members of the Security Council.

Agreement on this matter would abruptly curb the possibility of the world progressing to a new, qualitatively more ominous, stage of the arms race, which is becoming increasingly the dominant trend. First of all this relates to weapons of mass destruction.

Summarizing what I have said, it is necessary to emphasize with all clarity that the danger has become more vivid, a danger with which mankind may be confronted unless urgent and effective measures are taken to prevent it. That is why the Soviet Union considers it important to take effective measures at the international level to prohibit the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The best way to attain this objective would be the achievement by all States of the world, and primarily by the big Powers, of wide international agreement on this question.

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union has submitted to the General Assembly a draft of such an agreement, the basis of which is the undertaking by States, and first of all the big Powers, not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, including those which make use of the latest discoveries of present-day science and technology. For these

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[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 664-667, 672.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 848-849.

reasons the definition and the list of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons were deliberately not included in the draft. We believe that such a definition, which must be scientifically valid and expressed in clear legal form, should be worked out by means of negotiations among the parties concerned. We are ready to give our views on concrete types and systems of weapons when such practical negotiations commence.

To deal in specific detail with this question the participation of highly qualified scientific and technical experts in this field will undoubtedly be necessary. It will also be necessary to work out the actual procedure according to which negotiations on such an important question should be conducted. To consider this question at the present stage no such concrete formulation is necessary. The main theme now is the political readiness and goodwill of States to put the relevant prohibition into effect.

In the event of identification, after the agreement proposed by us had entered into force, of new directions in the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by the agreement, its parties would conduct negotiations among themselves in order to extend the prohibition to such possible new types and systems of weapons. For this purpose the agreement could be amended as provided for in article VI of the draft agreement. The inclusion of this provision is, in our view, completely justified since, as has already been pointed out, no scientific definition at this particular time can embrace all the methods, directions and trends in the development of science and technology in the future which may be used for military purposes to the detriment of mankind.

The organ most appropriate for negotiations on this question is, in our view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has acquired positive experience in holding expert negotiations on the problems of disarmament and working out important multilateral treaties.

A relevant draft resolution sponsored by a group of States, including the Soviet Union, has been submitted for consideration in the First Committee in document A/C.1/L.711.[13] It points out that the General Assembly considers it necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international agreement, for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems for such weapons, and takes note of the draft of such an agreement submitted by the Soviet Union as well as of the points of view and considerations put forward during the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

The draft resolution also contains a request to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to work out the text of such an agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the thirty-first session of the United

[13] Identical with document submitted on Sept. 23, *ante*, pp. 479–482.

Nations General Assembly, in the agenda of which this item is proposed for inclusion.

We should like to express the hope that our proposal, which has generated such broad interest and which has been prompted by the desire to block the development of new types of weapons of unprecedented destructive power, will win the support of all peace-loving States and all Member States of the United Nations that are loyal to the main and fundamental requirement of the Charter of the United Nations: that is, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

While speaking on this main issue, I should like to make a few comments concerning the very interesting statement made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles.[14] In connexion with the item that he touched upon today in his statement, the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet delegation would like to point out that the position of the Soviet Union on this matter has been officially reflected in the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests [15] which has been submitted for consideration by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union considers that the solution of this problem should be on the basis of the cessation everywhere of all forms of nuclear-weapon tests, including underground tests; not selectively, but everywhere and of all types of such weapons. A detailed statement of the position of the Soviet Union on this question will be made by the delegation of the Soviet Union at one of the subsequent meetings of the First Committee.

I should like to make a further comment. It has become fashionable recently, almost second nature, in fact, for certain speakers in United Nations bodies, when discussing any problem, but particularly the problem of disarmament, to place the responsibility for all the misfortunes and difficulties in solving such thorny problems in the United Nations, and particularly for the failure to solve the problem of disarmament, on all the major Powers, or perhaps on only two Powers, in a completely haphazard way.

At the same time, it is well known to all of us that among the great Powers and the super-Powers—including that Power which is trying to become the mono-super-Power—there are serious divergencies of opinion on the question of disarmament and any other, including the one we discussed yesterday, that is, the Korean question. Everybody knows very well that that is true.

Why, then, does the blame have to be laid on the doorsteps of all the major Powers? Each of us understands perfectly well, and it is perfectly obvious to every one of us that among the great Powers and the super-Powers there are those who advocate disarmament, those in favour of convening a world conference on disarmament, those in favour of the non-use of force in international relations and the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and those who oppose such measures. Therefore, I

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[14] *Supra.*
[15] *Ante*, pp. 486–490.

feel it would be more honest, more objective and more reasonable on the part of certain speakers if they would draw some distinction between the various great Powers and super-Powers in their approach to these important present-day international problems.

One further comment. Certain representatives from developing countries, in discussing disarmament items and other international problems, have stated that all matters should be solved with the participation of all States, great and small. We entirely uphold that idea. However, such statements are made in the Main Committees of the General Assembly and in the plenary Assembly. But when it is a question of holding special sessions of the General Assembly—where questions of development, economic problems and finding ways and means of giving aid to developing countries for development purposes are dealt with—then we are told:

> Well, *you know, you should not connect disarmament with development.* Development is one thing and disarmament is something quite different. Let disarmament be dealt with by the great Powers, they have a lot of weapons. We are interested in development and therefore, all the decisions reached by special sessions of the General Assembly and other economic bodies should relate only to development.

We consider that an incorrect approach. Life is life, facts are facts, and all aspects of life have to be regarded as a coherent whole. It would be naive to talk about development but close one's eyes to the arms race. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report to the last session of the General Assembly, made that quite clear to us and opened our eyes when he referred to the hideous situation where, in peacetime, $3[0]0,000 million are being spent on the arms race. Are not those funds necessary for development?

Therefore, whereas we discuss the question of disarmament in the First Committee during the General Assembly, and there are *ad hoc* committees devoted to special economic problems, it would be more reasonable, sensible and just to discuss matters as a whole—development and disarmament. The questions of disarmament, peace, peaceful coexistence and détente—which are referred to in the documents adopted by the special session—should have equal emphasis as they did in the policy declarations of the Lima Conference,[16] held in August of this year in the capital of Peru. They are all matters to be discussed as a whole—development, disarmament, peace and security, peaceful coexistence, convening of a world disarmament conference and the connexion between development and disarmament. I think that United Nations decisions on questions of development and disarmament should link them very closely together, because the more success there is in solving disarmament questions the more funds and possibilities will be available for development assistance.

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[16] *Ante*, pp. 435–438.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 30, 1975 [1]

We begin the disarmament debate this year with the most extensive agenda in the First Committee's history. This heavy workload reflects the importance of the General Assembly as a focal point of the disarmament effort.

It also reflects the increasing activity at smaller and more specialized disarmament forums in recent years.

There was a pronounced upturn in the activity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. The CCD's 1975 session continued work on the important items already on its agenda, and considered a number of other disarmament issues that had not previously been closely scrutinized. The Committee made extensive use of technical experts to explore those topics. It held useful discussions leading to decisions on its future scheduling and organization of work. In all those activities, the Committee benefited from the infusion of the talents and fresh perspectives of our five new members.

Among the new items considered by the CCD in 1975 was the question of environmental warfare. As members of this Committee well know, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted, as a basis for negotiation, identical drafts of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.[2] In introducing the draft for the United States, I pointed out that, while environmental warfare is not a present practicable means of military action on a significant scale, our understanding and technology in the field are advancing. For that reason, the United States believes action should be taken now to adopt effective restraints—that is, before techniques are perfected and their potential threat materializes.

The draft convention submitted in Geneva would prohibit military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as a means of causing destruction, damage or injury to any other State party. The draft contains an illustrative list of effects of environmental modification. Included in this list are earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; and changes in weather patterns, the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, climate patterns, and ocean currents.

The framing of restraints on environmental warfare presented several conceptual challenges. We believe that the draft convention deals successfully with each of these.

First, it uses general criteria to describe prohibited activities. We believe this is essential in a field that is still largely hypothetical and

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2073 (prov.), pp. 3–22.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.

where any specific exhaustive listing of proscribed actions could be made irrelevant by subsequent technological developments.

Secondly, the draft convention focuses on the use of techniques which would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. The draft accordingly deals with activities that are the source of the most serious concern, and it recognizes that the ability to verify compliance with treaty constraints is related to the scale of the activity prohibited.

Thirdly, the draft deals with the deliberate manipulation of natural environmental processes as the means of causing damage, destruction or injury. Thus, it distinguishes between the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons, which is covered by the draft, and the incidental environmental effects of other weapons, an issue that is being dealt with by the Diplomatic Conference on humanitarian law in armed conflict.

Fourthly, the prohibition of "military or any other hostile use" covers not only the use of environmental modification techniques to supplement other means of waging war, but also the use of such techniques with hostile intent, even when no other weapons are being used.

Finally, the prohibitions would not impede the full realization of any peaceful benefits that may result from environmental modification. Because much research and development on environmental modification could have both peaceful and hostile applications, it is not possible to ensure that such research and development for peaceful purposes will not at the same time have military implications. For this reason the draft does not attempt to prohibit research and development.

We look forward to hearing the views of others on the question of environmental modification and to negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) next spring on the draft texts now before the Committee. We hope that the General Assembly will encourage this process by adopting a generally acceptable resolution.

Another new item discussed at the CCD this year was the question of agreed limitations on military expenditures. There is a long history of proposals to limit armaments through such agreements, but conceptual and practical difficulties have so far prevented serious consideration of this approach. As a result, arms control and disarmament negotiations have concentrated on measures to limit military forces and activities rather than on measures to limit expenditures.

Recently, however, useful work has been done on identifying the problems that must be solved if agreed military expenditure limitations are to become a possibility, either as an independent arms control measure or as a complement to force limitations. I refer, of course, to the experts' study of the question of the reduction of military budgets pursuant to a 1973 General Assembly resolution.[3] The Assembly last year recognized the significance of that study and asked the Secretary-General to request the views of States on the issues it raised.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 523–546; A/9770.

In replying to the Secretary-General, my Government pointed out that the consultant experts' study provided a sound basis for further efforts to solve the problems of agreed expenditure limitations. At the CCD this summer we gave our views on what we consider to be the most promising course of action for such efforts.[4] We suggested that the CCD organize a study of the questions that must be answered to determine the feasibility of agreed military expenditure limitations. These questions are the following.

First, how can one measure the military spending of different countries so as to permit effective comparisons when we must take into account their different currencies, their different fiscal and financial practices and their different kinds of armed forces?

Secondly, how can limitations be formulated and applied so that no country will feel that its security could be endangered by an agreement encompassing such limitations?

And thirdly, how can compliance with a limitation agreement be assured?

At the CCD we further suggested that a study begin with the first of those three questions, that is, the definition and comparative measurement of military expenditures. Such a study, we believe, should be carried out by a small group of highly qualified government specialists, preferably economists or budget experts. We believe that the General Assembly could give valuable impetus and direction to this effort by adopting an appropriate resolution requesting the CCD to organize such a study, and authorizing the Secretary-General to provide necessary services to the experts.

Last year resolution 3256 (XXIX) [5] invited all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the biological weapons Convention [6] and to accede to or ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The resolution further called on the CCD to continue its work on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The biological weapons Convention has now entered into force, following its ratification by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as depositaries; and the United States last spring completed its ratification of the Geneva Protocol.[7] As for the third element of the Assembly's recommendation, it is no secret to members of this Committee that the negotiation of a ban on chemical weapons has proved more complex and difficult than many of us anticipated. Because the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons can be concealed more easily than many other military activities, particularly in countries with large chemical industries, verifying compliance with a treaty can present great difficulties. Nevertheless, the goal of finding effective solutions has been pursued in good faith and, without in any

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[4] *Ante*, pp. 274-284.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 790-792.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133-138.
[7] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764-765.

sense attempting to minimize the difficulties ahead, I think it is fair to say that there has been at least some progress.

Following their summit commitment to consider a joint initiative on chemical weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,[8] the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union made contacts during 1975 with a view to finding an appropriate means of carrying out such an initiative. In addition, as I reported to the CCD last August, the United States has concluded that an initial chemical-warfare measure should deal with all lethal chemical weapons.[9] In the months ahead, my Government will continue its efforts in this field with the hope that they will point to promising approaches to a possible joint initiative at the CCD during 1976.

The United States attaches the utmost importance to reducing the threat of nuclear war, both by limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals and by preventing the spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities to additional States. The United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session identified these two related issues as being of greatest concern to the world community and made several constructive recommendations for action. Since then, important steps have been taken in various specialized forums. Nevertheless, we must again make these vital issues the centre of the General Assembly's attention and the object of our most determined efforts in the years ahead.

My Government assigns particular importance to the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. We fully recognize that all members of this body have an important stake in the outcome of those negotiations, which affect both the strategic balance between the two countries and the security of the world at large. We intend to keep the General Assembly fully informed of the results of those negotiations.

The United States hopes to conclude in the near future the negotiation of a SALT II agreement based on principles set out in the summit meeting at Vladivostok a year ago.[10] By imposing equal limits on the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side, the new agreement will eliminate many of the uncertainties that have driven the competition for nuclear arms. But frankly, curbing this competition is not enough. We must work vigorously to reduce the nuclear arsenals that have already been assembled. Therefore, my Government intends to proceed as soon as possible to follow-on negotiations aimed at achieving further limitations and reductions.

Last year resolution 3261 D (XXIX),[11] expressing the General Assembly's concern that six States had engaged in nuclear testing, called on the CCD to consider the arms-control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of its report on the elaboration of a

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[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 236, 748.
[9] *Ante*, p. 416.
[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 803–806.

treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Thus, the closely related issues of non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon testing restraints, and peaceful nuclear explosions were brought into a single focus.

The United States Government fully recognizes the importance of restraints on nuclear-weapon testing for curbing the nuclear arms race. We remain committed to the objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test-ban treaty. In view of the long-standing deadlock on means of achieving that objective, we agreed with the Soviet Union in July 1974 to take a practical step forward by signing the threshold test-ban Treaty.[12]

The Soviet Union recently submitted to the Assembly a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.[13] While we can agree that a complete halt to all nuclear-weapon testing by all countries must certainly be our objective, the Soviet draft does not appear to solve problems that must be solved if we are to achieve that objective. In particular, reliance on national means of verification is not, in our view, an adequate basis for clearing up uncertainties as to whether ambiguous seismic signals are caused by an earthquake or by a nuclear explosion. Moreover, the draft does not specify verification measures for peaceful nuclear explosions, but merely states that such explosions would be governed by a separate agreement. This approach leaves unresolved the critical question of whether, under a comprehensive test ban, an adequately verifiable accommodation for peaceful nuclear explosions can be worked out. At the CCD this summer my delegation pointed out that if peaceful nuclear explosions were to be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban, a verification system would have to be devised that, at a minimum, could provide adequate assurance that peaceful nuclear explosions did not involve (1) the testing of a new weapon concept; (2) the use of a stock-piled weapon to verify its performance; or (3) the carrying out of studies of the effects of nuclear weapons.[14] Quite frankly, no solution to this problem has yet been found.

Further consideration of that difficult problem could provide a better understanding of how it might be possible to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear weapons-related benefits would not be obtained if peaceful nuclear explosions were permitted under a comprehensive weapons test ban. We on our part look forward to the meeting of test ban experts at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament next spring—a meeting which we hope and expect will consider comprehensive test ban verification problems.

A second aspect of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions was examined last summer at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—namely, the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions for non-proliferation. As can be seen in the special section on peaceful

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[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 225 ff.
[13] *Ante*, pp. 460-463.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 291-293.

nuclear explosions in the annual report of the Committee on Disarmament,[15] there was a very wide measure of agreement in the Committee, based on evidence presented by technical experts, that acquisition by a non-nuclear-weapon State of a capability of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions is incompatible with the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Consequently, there was wide support for the idea that if peaceful nuclear explosions were to be pursued they should be conducted in a manner consistent with article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. An important step was taken recently when the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency established an *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.[16] My Government is actively participating in that Group. In our view it should not only achieve a fuller understanding of the economic, technical, legal, treaty, and health and safety aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions, but should also make substantial headway in laying the legal and procedural foundation for the international service that would be required if the remaining questions concerning the feasibility and utility of peaceful nuclear explosions should be resolved.

The possibility of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world has recently attracted a great deal of attention. It is the view of many Governments, including my own, that nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to regional and global security and that such zones could also make a significant regional contribution to non-proliferation. Depending on the specific arrangements, a nuclear-weapon-free zone could effectively complement the non-proliferation Treaty.

At the request of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was carried out under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.[17] We believe that the study, prepared under the able leadership of Professor Keijo Korhonen of Finland, merits serious consideration by Governments, and particularly by those actively considering nuclear-weapon-free zone projects. The experts carrying out this study outlined areas of disagreement as well as areas of agreement. In so doing, each reflected his own national position. That method made it possible to explore problems that otherwise would not have been considered. As a result, we believe that this study provides a more realistic and complete assessment than heretofore existed of the prospects for and potential value of nuclear-weapon-free zones. My delegation would favour a resolution commending the study to the attention of Members of the United Nations and requesting their comments on it, with a view to further discussion of the issues at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

I shall reserve comments on specific nuclear-weapon-free zone pro-

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[15] *Ante*, p. 431.
[16] *Ante*, pp. 188-190.
[17] *Ante*, pp. 417-419.

posals for the discussion of those individual items later in our Committee's schedule. However, I should like to make the general observation that while nuclear-weapon-free zone projects can be given an initial impetus by General Assembly resolutions, there is no substitute for the development of specific zone arrangements by the States concerned. The Treaty of Tlatelolco [18] would never have prospered by relying on resolutions rather than on the persevering efforts of its founders. Therefore, while my delegation will follow the debate here with interest, we shall also look at follow-up actions in the months ahead in measuring the prospects of particular projects.

Among the foremost challenges of our time is the need for nuclear power to help meet expanding energy requirements in a safe, environmentally sound, and economic manner. This challenge becomes acute, particularly in so far as non-proliferation is concerned, in the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that involve storage, transportation, and reprocessing of spent fuel.

One of the most critical steps in the final stage of the fuel cycle is reprocessing, which involves the recovery by chemical means of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. Although it is evident that nuclear power can be generated without reprocessing—and, indeed, advanced and large-scale nuclear power programmes currently exist without it—the potential value of reprocessing derives from the possibility of recycling plutonium as reactor fuel.

However, many uncertainties remain. Difficulties have been encountered in constructing plants that can be operated on a sound commercial basis. More generally, the economic benefits, as well as the feasibility and public acceptability of plutonium recycling, are yet to be proved on a commercial scale. It is impossible to project with confidence the impact of plutonium recycling on the cost of generating electrical power since several unpredictable variables are involved, such as the cost of uranium, the cost of enrichment, the cost of reprocessing and the cost of fuel fabrication. We know, however, that nuclear fuel costs represent only a small portion of the total nuclear electricity costs and that recycled plutonium will satisfy only about 20 per cent of the total reactor fuel requirements. Therefore the impact on total nuclear electricity generating costs is likely to be extremely small.

These uncertainties have clearly affected the development of reprocessing capabilities in the United States. Although there are about 55 nuclear power reactors on line in my country, no commercial reprocessing facilities are in operation.

If the recovery and recycling of plutonium eventually proves to be economically advantageous, it will almost certainly be for large reprocessing plants which will service many reactors. It has been estimated that more than forty 1,000 megawatt light-water reactors would be required before reprocessing could be an economically viable operation.

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[18] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

For smaller nuclear power programmes the construction of small, inefficient reprocessing plants would be a costly enterprise. Nor is it likely that such plants would make an appreciable contribution to a country's independence from outside sources of fuel.

In addition, the construction of many small plants, however legitimate the motivations, could only accentuate widespread concern over the growing availability of plutonium throughout the world.

Therefore, in the interest of promoting the most economical use of nuclear energy resources, as well as in the interest of ensuring that future developments do not detract from our non-proliferation objectives, a better approach should be found than building many small, national reprocessing plants. One approach, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers promising and is studying in depth, is the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centres. Secretary Kissinger, speaking to the General Assembly on 22 September, expressed strong United States support for this idea. The multinational approach appears to be economically preferable to constructing small, national facilities, since it would pool the talents and interests of several nations and take advantage of economies of scale. It would also reduce the risk of theft and diversion of nuclear material and facilitate the application of international safeguards.

The possible economic benefits as well as the environmental and safety advantages of multinational fuel centres merit serious consideration by all States. Certainly no less important to the world community, and of particular concern to members of this Committee, are the implications for non-proliferation and international security. As Secretary Kissinger also pointed out in his statement to the General Assembly:

> The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread, under national control, of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants.[19]

The United States therefore strongly urges all States in a position to do so to assist the IAEA in a thorough and expeditious analysis of the multinational regional fuel cycle centre concept. We also encourage States to explore the possibilities of such fuel cycle co-operation in their own regions.

Statement by the Finnish Representative (Korhonen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Study, October 30, 1975 [1]

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Although I have asked to speak as the representative of Finland, I have done so in order to introduce to the Committee the study prepared

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[19] *Ante*, p. 476.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2073 (prov.), pp. 37–47.

by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[2] As provided in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of the General Assembly,[3] the *Ad Hoc* Group carried out its study under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva in April, June, July and August of this year. The study was thereafter transmitted to the CCD for consideration and comments and can be found in document A/10027/Add.1, submitted to the General Assembly by the CCD.

As the Chairman of the Group, I will listen to the comments of the General Assembly with both attention and a certain amount of relief. The relief is caused by the fact that although the problems connected with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones proved to be even more complicated than expected, the Group was able, nevertheless, to conclude the study during the working session allotted to us by the CCD.

It is my pleasant duty to convey my warm thanks and to address words of appreciation to all members of the Group. The tribute which they deserve arises not only from the excellent working spirit displayed by the Experts during the arduous meetings, often held at odd hours of the day, but is caused especially by their quality and competence in carrying out the task entrusted to the Group. The members of the *Ad Hoc* Group were "qualified governmental experts" indeed, as suggested in the General Assembly resolution. They were "governmental", of course, representing the views of their respective Governments and acting under instructions. That was a prerequisite for our study to have any political and practical value. And they were "qualified experts" whose competence and intellectual capacity became a source of admiration for the Chairman. Again, the quality of the members provided the basis for all efforts to give to our paper the structure and contents of a research and a study. Whatever this Group has done and whatever comments its work ever receives, the Experts, members of the Group, can be satisfied with the knowledge that this has been a pioneer effort, the first such study that has ever been made.

I should like to extend my thanks to the members of the Secretariat at the United Nations European Office in Geneva. Their work in preparing the basic drafts and in providing all necessary facilities for the study has been indispensable for the work of the Group. My gratitude is addressed in particular to the Director of the Disarmament Affairs Division, Mr. Rolf Björnerstedt, whose experience and competence as the Secretary-General of the study Group greatly contributed to the proceedings of our work and often facilitated the task of the Chairman.

This study Group proved to be very representative in the sense that the main schools of thought on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones which are in existence among the Member States of the United

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[2] *Ante*, pp. 417-419.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808-809.

Nations obviously were also represented in the Group. I believe that this was necessary in order to ensure that the results of the study would be such as to enhance, as it is said in the preamble of the resolution 3261 F (XXIX), further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones. The fact that the main views of the international community were already represented in the study Group will also, I believe, increase the effectiveness of the discussion which is about to begin in the First Committee.

For its composition, the *Ad Hoc* Group is indebted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The consensus reached by the CCD established also the terms of reference of the Group for which we are thankful. The Group had the pleasure of enjoying the benefit of the wise paternal guidance of the CCD even at a later stage, at a moment when this kind of advice was badly needed to speed up the work and to enable the Group to conclude its study. As the Chairman, I was especially thankful for this aid.

Turning to my own conclusions about the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group, as its Chairman I have to emphasize the fact that the terms of reference prepared for us by the CCD were of essential significance. Although the goal of our endeavours was a consensus to be reached in the Group, it was clear from the very beginning that a need to solve unanimously all the problems arising from the substance of this study and thus to achieve a consensus on every important point would have prevented us from accomplishing our task in the time designated to the Group and would probably have led us to an impasse. Another possibility would have been to satisfy ourselves with bare banalities, producing empty formulas to cover the lack of substance behind them. I believe that neither of these conceivable results would have served the spirit or the substance of the General Assembly resolution which constituted this study work. Therefore, the appropriate method for the Group really was to authorize each of the experts to incorporate his own opinion in the study in case the Group was unable to reach consensus on substantive matters.

It was up to the Group to decide the moment when a consensus was out of its reach. It was my conviction as Chairman that we did not do that with an easy mind. We resorted to incorporating differing or qualified opinions only when absolutely necessary, being convinced that that was the only way to carry out the study entrusted to the Group. Be that as it may, the study resulted in a considerable number of differing opinions. Nobody liked that, but obviously it reflected the real views of the experts.

The experts did not believe it useful to identify the qualified opinions, that is, to specify who was behind those sometimes puzzling expressions "most experts", "many experts", "several experts", "some experts", "an opinion was expressed", and so on. Admittedly, this makes the task even of an enlightened reader more difficult. Sometimes this method does not contribute to the clarity of the text. On the

other hand, the difficulties of identification will probably not prove to be insurmountable. All States Members of the United Nations will have an opportunity to present their views and opinions here and to take a stand on the substantive problems evoked by the study in a specific and detailed way. After the debate in this Committee there will be less uncertainty on what are the attitudes of individual States towards those problems.

As the study Group understood its task, it was to find and to identify the general lines of thinking in connexion with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. The question is not which of the experts were behind some particular qualified opinions. The question should be: Does this or that qualified opinion reflect a major way of thinking among the States Members of the United Nations? If the study Group was composed in a representative way, as I believe it was, the answer will be affirmative. The qualified opinions as well as the consensus in the Group do reflect opinions in the world community.

At first glance, the study before us seems to be a multitude of differing opinions thus giving to the reader a feeling of uneasiness and, maybe, stupefaction. This conclusion is, however, somewhat misleading, I believe. In fact, the proportion of points of consensus to differing opinions is more favourable to the first category than one could expect. Because of our working method, the text became quite repetitious. Those repetitions, however, are almost exclusively in the area of qualified opinions. Many of the substantive issues on which a consensus was not possible are of such political significance that the experts felt it unavoidable that their qualified opinions should be incorporated in different parts of the study. Most of these matters are close to the most sensitive questions in international politics, to the question of security of nations.

Also the fact that all different ways of thinking in the field of disarmament, arms regulation and arms control were represented in the Group was bound to evoke differing opinions. Some ideas which seemed to be too much for certain experts from the security point of view were apparently too little for some others in terms of disarmament, and even this gap in the attitudes sometimes resulted in the incorporation of qualified opinions in the study.

No doubt there exists in the study an inherent conflict between expectations and reality. Admittedly, the house has been divided on several points. But that division is not permanent and it is not necessary that it should remain a deep one. And the gap between what is desirable and what is possible to achieve is familiar to everybody working with disarmament questions. We can live with that and we have to endeavour to proceed, anyway, step by step.

I believe that this study helps to identify the problems without creating new ones. I am convinced that this identification provides better

understanding and that the better understanding promotes the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which is stated as the goal in the preamble of the resolution 3261 F (XXIX) establishing the study. It is necessary to identify not only the points of consensus but also the matters of disagreement in order to design practical ways and means or progress in the future. I believe that the study, with all its qualified opinions, can be helpful in this respect.

To proceed with my introduction of the study, I should like to make some additional comments on its substance from the viewpoint of the Chairman.

The element which separates the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones from most other arms-regulation or arms-control measures is the regional approach. When considering the merits and the disadvantages of any idea of establishing such a zone, the Governments concerned keep in mind not only the global and general aspects but especially local and particular factors arising from the geographical situation, from their neighbourhood and from the historical and political facts which they consider relevant. The regional approach to the political problems was reflected also in the proceedings of the work of the study Group. The governmental experts, while agreeing that the study was not intended to be linked with any concrete proposal or idea on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, nevertheless, in their consideration of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in principle, were influenced by those particular problems which were close to their own experience. This fact is basic and inescapable considering the results of our endeavours.

Concerning the beginning of the study, the Group recognized that a substantive introduction was neither necessary nor possible in the context of our work. We agreed that the history of the nuclear age could not be presented in a few pages and that the necessity of choosing some facts and leaving some others aside would lead to trouble. Therefore the Group limited itself to accepting a formal introduction only.

On the other hand, I deeply regret the fact that the strength of the Group proved insufficient to produce a substantive, comprehensive conclusion for the study. Certainly, a good conclusion would have been of great help to all those who are interested in the work of the Group, but time was running too short for us to prepare a substantive conclusion. Much to the disappointment of myself as Chairman and of many experts in the Group, the gallant attempts made by some of our colleagues to this effect remained unsuccessful. The present conclusion is only a formal one.

The content of chapter II, the historical background, is the result of the industrious work of the Secretariat and of repeated discussions among the study Group. The history of the nuclear-weapon-free zones as presented here is more than history only; it gives an image of the preferences and priorities which prevailed among the experts.

I consider chapter III the most difficult and the most important part of the study in political terms. This particular chapter proved to be the source of both qualified opinions and points of consensus. The most arduous phases of the Group's work were devoted to chapter III. Effort and patience were needed before the text assumed its present content and form. One can realize that by looking at paragraph 9 of that chapter.

Keeping this in mind, the degree of substantive consensus in this part of the study is both surprising and remarkable. I believe that all those who witnessed our endeavours will share this opinion.

Chapter IV also is of considerable political weight. Its contents and formulas may serve as evidence of the inescapable fact that the so-called balance of responsibilities as between zonal and extra-zonal States as regards a nuclear-weapon-free zone forms part of a very complex international situation. Any attempts to separate the problems of nuclear-weapon-free zones from other problems of international security politics are doomed to failure.

This was generally accepted in the Group and is reflected as a consensus in the wording of paragraph 9 of chapter III: ". . . it is not possible or realistic, *a priori*, to set out precise guidelines for the creation of zones . . ." (*A/10027/Add.1, p. 41*). Chapter IV as such is evidence of the variety of attitudes towards balanced responsibilities in different quarters of the international community.

It is most gratifying for me as Chairman to note that chapter V, which deals with "Verification and control", represents almost complete consensus. This chapter contains a thorough analysis of some central problems connected with the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and its considerations will certainly be of great use in all practical attempts to establish such zones.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the list of agreed principles in paragraph 4 of chapter VI, adopted unanimously by the Group, and to the many useful notes on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in chapter VII. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency was highly valued and considered essential by all experts when we discussed the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in the framework of nuclear-weapon-free zones. I would note that in paragraph 4 of chapter VII one can find reference, agreed to by consensus, to the fact that a nuclear-weapon-free zone might offer an additional element of regional co-operation that could be expanded to cover different fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

With these remarks I have the honour, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group, to leave the study for discussion and evaluation by the General Assembly. I hope that the Committee will find it possible to take a positive attitude towards the study. This has been a pioneer work and, in the opinion of the members of the Group, is worthy of the efforts devoted to it.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Nisibori) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 31, 1975 [1]

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There is no need to recall in this Committee that this year marks the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. During the period since its foundation the Organization has played a markedly important role in the field of arms control and disarmament. That has been confirmed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, who has stated in his introduction to this year's report on the work of the Organization that:

> Disarmament in all its ramifications has from the outset been a major objective of the United Nations and has represented, in terms of effort, perhaps the most continuous activity of the United Nations.[2]

What, then, have been the achievements of what the Secretary-General called "the most continuous activity" of the United Nations during its first 30 years? We may have to admit that we are still only at the foot of the mountain we have to climb. That accords with the description of the present situation given by the Secretary-General himself in the introduction to the report to which I have just referred, when he said:

> That no decisive breakthrough has been achieved can only attest to the extreme dangers which the crisis of confidence among States still constitutes for our global society.

However, we should not be discouraged or disappointed by the fact that no decisive breakthrough has been recorded despite our 30 years of effort. When we remind ourselves that the passage from arms control and disarmament to world peace is long and arduous, what we have accomplished in the past 30 years is not negligible. Rather, I believe that this is a time to redouble our efforts to remove the existing extreme dangers, as the Secretary-General urged, and to continue our steady and tireless progress towards the achievement of disarmament.

The statement that the most urgent task in the field of disarmament is nuclear disarmament will meet with no dissenting voices in this Committee room. I take it that there will also be no objection to considering nuclear disarmament under three headings; first, a nuclear-weapons test ban; secondly, a reduction in number, and ultimately the destruction of nuclear weapons; thirdly, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While each of these aspects is independent, it should not be forgotten that each constitutes only one aspect of the broad question of nuclear disarmament, and that each of the three, therefore, should always be examined in conjunction with the others.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2074 (prov.), pp. 13-28.

[2] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*, p. 2.

As for the first aspect, a nuclear-weapons test ban, we deplore most deeply the fact that as yet there is no certain prospect of its realization. I would call upon the States concerned to seek a sensible solution, based on a wider perspective and considerations of high statesmanship, for the problems of a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, while bearing fully in mind the principle that all arms control and disarmament measures must be carried out under strict and effective international control.

It is also well known that, on the one hand, some of the States concerned say that the first requirement is the cessation of atmospheric nuclear-weapon tests by the States which are conducting those tests, and they are not ready to agree to a test ban unless all nuclear weapon States share the obligation equally, while on the other hand, other States concerned reply that they are not prepared to stop nuclear tests so long as the advanced nuclear-weapon States are continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests. These diametrically opposed views leave us with little hope of ever achieving a comprehensive test ban. However, these arguments can hardly escape the accusation that each side is assigning the responsibility to the other, simply to have an excuse for continuing to test nuclear weapons. I appeal to all the nuclear-weapon States to make a wise political decision, to stop putting the blame on each other, and to lay aside these arguments immediately. While I make this appeal to all the nuclear-weapon States, I feel constrained also to call upon the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to realize the importance of their historic roles, since each of these Governments inevitably bears a tremendous responsibility in keeping with its strength.

On the other hand, I must confess my astonishment that the international standard set by the atmospheric test ban, which has been recognized as positive law for no less than 12 years, has failed to obtain universal acceptance. The voluntary acceptance of the atmospheric nuclear test ban by any additional State, however belated this step may be, would help enormously to restore the diminished confidence that international public opinion now has in that State's sincerity. For this reason, I urge those nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty [3] to accede to it as soon as possible.

As for the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, we note that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was concluded at the summit talks held between the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1974.[4] Under this Treaty, both parties undertake to ban any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, beginning 31 March 1976. I hope that this Treaty will be brought into force at the earliest possible date upon ratification by both parties. Furthermore, I hope that the two countries will take the initiative and expand what was agreed in the Treaty into a broader, multilateral instrument. While

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225 ff.

the underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to be conducted by both parties are to be governed by a separate agreement to be negotiated and concluded between them, I feel I am justified in expecting that an effective agreement will soon be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union which will not allow nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to become a loophole in the Treaty restrictions on underground nuclear tests.

It is well known, of course, that the question of verification is the greatest technical obstacle to a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests. With regard to the detection of underground nuclear tests by seismological methods, the representative of Sweden at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposed during the summer session the holding of a meeting of experts in March next year,[5] within the framework of the Committee. In matters relating to the problem of verification, experts from my country have been co-operating with those of such countries as Canada and Sweden in developing seismological verification methods. Against this background, we support the proposal made by Sweden, and look forward to the discussions by experts at that meeting.

In this connexion, we note that a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests has been submitted by the Soviet Union at this Session of the General Assembly.[6] My Government intends to study the draft treaty carefully, and will make known its views on an appropriate occasion.

Turning now to the second aspect of nuclear disarmament, that is, the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons, we are all aware that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are now being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union. With regard to the much desired reduction in the number of strategic nuclear arms, a provision calling for further negotiations to this end, beginning no later than 1980 or 1981, is to be included in the SALT II agreement, according to the joint statement issued by the United States and the Soviet Union at Vladivostok.[7] We desire earnestly that these negotiations be initiated before 1980, and that an agreement be reached as early as possible. Under the circumstances, we can only hope that a new SALT agreement will be concluded as soon as possible as a result of the further talks between the two Powers. My delegation believes that this is one of the aspects of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons which should be discussed actively in a forum in which all States are represented—including the other nuclear-weapon States—in the broad context of nuclear disarmament. In any case, we earnestly hope that statesmanship worthy of the highest leaders of the world will prevail in the coming talks.

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[5] CCD/PV.673, p. 10.
[6] *Ante*, pp. 460–463.
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

The third aspect of nuclear disarmament is nuclear non-proliferation. The Review Committee of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held in Geneva last May, was naturally very important. While the Conference ended with the adoption of the Final Document,[8] the opinions expressed and the positions taken in Geneva were far apart. The Conference was finally able to reach a consensus, under the outstanding leadership of Madame President Thorsson, because the participants, without exception, recognized that it was absolutely necessary to work for the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime by overcoming differences of opinion and position, and thus ensure its success. I believe that this was one of the most significant lessons of the Conference.

However, as I have indicated, the considerable differences of opinion on the best way to administer the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [9] were undeniable. What is now most needed is the renewal of our efforts to maintain and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime, taking as the starting point the situation at the end of the first Review Conference. I would urge this course in particular on the three nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A number of the problems raised at the Conference—including the promotion of disarmament, strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, assuring non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear explosions and so forth—are not issues for which solutions can be speedily found. Only when the countries concerned redouble their efforts, in concert especially with the nuclear-weapon States Parties, towards the solution of these problems, will the Non-Proliferation Treaty be made more attractive and more universal, thus eliminating differences within the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime and further strengthening that régime.

During the general debate at the Review Conference, I referred to the balance of obligations and responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and pointed out that, in order to achieve such a balance, it was particularly important for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil faithfully their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and "through accumulation of these results, eventually to remove and destroy nuclear weapons". It is for this reason that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation should be dealt with as an aspect of nuclear disarmament.

My Government has submitted to the Japanese National Diet a bill requesting it to ratify the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Miyazawa, said in his statement in the general debate:

> The Government of Japan will continue its efforts to ratify this Treaty at the earliest possible date so we may participate in name as well as in fact in international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation.[10]

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[8] *Ante*, pp. 146–147.
[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[10] A/PV.2358 (prov.), p. 22.

As was pointed out by the Secretary-General in his Introduction to his annual report, "The danger of nuclear proliferation not only remains, but has increased".[11] Attention has focused with good reason upon peaceful nuclear explosions; understandably, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held a series of discussions concentrating on this subject in response to resolution 3261 D (XXIX),[12] adopted by the General Assembly last year.

As a result of our deliberations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I believe that the following has become very clear.

The most fundamental characteristic common to devices optimized for peaceful applications, and those optimized for military purposes, is that both types release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in a period measured in millionths of a second. Because of this inherent characteristic, all nuclear explosive devices, whether in their crudest or most highly sophisticated forms, take on military significance. All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could also be employed in some fashion as weapons.

If we start from this premise that peaceful nuclear explosion programmes inevitably offer military benefits, their arms control implications become self-evident. First, in order to make a comprehensive test ban effective, there are only two options to choose from: either to impose a complete ban on peaceful nuclear explosions, or to authorize peaceful nuclear explosions under certain conditions, including strict international control. In other words, if peaceful nuclear explosions are to be incorporated into a comprehensive test ban, a verification system is required which ensures that no State can improve its weapons as a result of its peaceful nuclear explosion activities. This is a problem which must be solved prior to an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

Second, it is clear that in a programme to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the proliferation of peaceful nuclear explosives is in no way different from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, therefore, it must be emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States wishing to gain potential economic benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should act in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the principle behind this article. Accordingly, I consider it necessary that preparatory steps be taken promptly by the International Atomic Energy Agency and by the States concerned, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to concluding the international arrangement or arrangements for the concrete procedures of making available the peaceful-explosion services provided for in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. I avail myself of this oppor-

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[11] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*, p. 4.

[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806.

tunity to appeal to all the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce, of their own accord, the *laissez-faire*, so to speak, principle regarding peaceful nuclear explosions, and thus set an example by showing a noble spirit of self-restraint. At the same time, it must be emphasized that self-restraint on the part of nuclear-weapon States with regard to all nuclear explosions, including those for peaceful purposes, is equally required to maintain the balance between mutual responsibilities and obligations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Miyazawa, mentioned the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in his statement in the general debate in the General Assembly. He said:

> I urgently request that the current session of the General Assembly instruct the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate international bodies to mobilize their expertise for the purpose of determining how the international community can control nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[13]

I earnestly hope that the discussions in this Committee will take up this goal.

While I have now stated the views of my Government on three interrelated aspects of ways of achieving nuclear disarmament, I wish to discuss also the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in connexion with nuclear non-proliferation. Clearly, the keen international attention that this question has recently aroused originated in the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to strengthen their security. Their earnest desire should be fully noted.

The special report,[14] worked out by the *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD in response to resolution 3261 F (XXIX), adopted at the twenty-ninth session, deserves careful attention as the first authoritative and comprehensive study of this problem. I wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the experts who carried out this difficult task, and particularly to the Chairman, Mr. Korhonen of Finland, whose able and judicious guidance contributed immeasurably to the work of their group.

As we see from the experts' report, they agreed that, in the regions where appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist, the establishment of such a zone would contribute to the achievement of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to halting the nuclear arms race and to strengthening international security, and also that the creation of such a zone should be effected in accordance with international law, the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the fundamental principles guiding the mutual relations of States. On the other hand, the fact that agreement was not reached on such important questions as the scope of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, what is to be banned, and the rights and the obligations of zonal and nuclear-weapon States, and that consequently the report simply enumerated the assertions put forward by various experts, showed that complicated and difficult fac-

[13] A/PV.2358 (prov.), p. 22.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 417-419.

tors are involved. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that many experts supported such important principles as the following: that nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes should be banned together with nuclear weapons, and that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be set up in accordance with the principles of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas. For our part, we submit with all emphasis that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone not only should contribute to the strengthening of security within a specific region, but also should be compatible with the objective of strengthening international security on a global scale with the requisite peace-keeping mechanism. We are convinced, therefore, that any idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, which was suggested by Fiji and New Zealand last August,[15] should take these factors fully into consideration.

Naturally, we should not underrate the urgency and the importance of disarmament measures other than those for nuclear disarmament. As for the question of banning chemical weapons, which are extremely dangerous to the security of the human race, we regret that there was no significant development in the CCD this year, despite the fact that steady efforts are being made there, as shown by the submission this year of relevant working papers from a number of countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany,[16] Sweden,[17] Canada,[18] and my own.[19] Japan sincerely desires that significant progress be made next year, and hopes and intends to continue to make as great a contribution as possible.

One of the most heartening events at the summer session of the CCD was the submission by the United States and the Soviet Union of their identical texts for a convention on the banning of the military use of environmental-modification techniques. In view of the implications of this question, my country will study the draft convention and will participate positively in the CCD's deliberations on it next year.

No less significance should be attached to the questions of the international comparison of military expenditures and of controlling conventional arms, in particular the transfer of such arms to other States. We welcome the fact that the United States delegation took the initiative on these questions in the CCD,[20] and we look forward to follow-up action in the near future.

Disarmament questions have vast ramifications, and in recent years their technical aspects have become more and more complex. For this reason, negotiations on disarmament questions require highly specialized knowledge and analysis of some of the most advanced technical

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[15] *Ante*, pp. 318-321.
[16] *Ante*, pp. 269-274.
[17] *Ante*, pp. 293-303.
[18] *Ante*, pp. 389-395.
[19] CCD/466.
[20] *Ante*, pp. 274-284.

problems. This is a situation which, in view of the progress in technology, is unavoidable. It is probably inevitable that the importance of special and minor technical problems will increase. On the other hand, we should not become so engrossed in technical problems that we lose sight of our original political objectives. In other words, the more technically complicated the problems become, the more important will be the political judgements that are made regarding these problems. Since I believe that this is the most important factor in the solution of current disarmament questions, I shall conclude by repeating my appeal to world leaders to take these facts to their hearts.

Statement by the New Zealand Representative (Templeton) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone [Extract], October 31, 1975 [1]

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There is another way of tackling the problem of horizontal proliferation—one in which the United Nations has been actively involved in recent years. That is the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As the Secretary-General has commented in the introduction to his annual report,

> . . . nuclear-weapon-free zones provide the best and the easiest means whereby non-nuclear-weapon States can, by their own initiative and effort, ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories and enhance their mutual security.[2]

This year there are no fewer than eight agenda items concerning such zones, covering proposals in all stages of development. It is very timely therefore that one of the major disarmament documents before the Assembly should be a special report by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[3] This document brings together a useful body of material on the subject and will assist us in evaluating proposals before the General Assembly.

The growth of interest in a regional approach to disarmament has clearly been prompted by the disappointment of many States that there has been an absence of significant progress on a global scale.

We in New Zealand have a positive belief in the contribution that nuclear-weapon-free zones can make to world peace. In his general debate speech at the twenty-eighth session, the late Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Kirk, made the following statement:

> The small Powers may also wish to consider carefully the possibilities of partial disarmament or demilitarization on a regional basis where circumstances and geography make it appropriate. One of my Government's first acts after election last year was to change New Zealand's vote at the Assembly in order to express its sympathy

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2074 (prov.), pp. 36–45.
[2] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*, p. 4.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.

with the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. At a recent meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government, New Zealand joined in a unanimous endorsement of the action of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in adopting a declaration to make South-East Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. In the words of the Commonwealth communiqué, we regard that initiative as a positive contribution towards peace and stability in that region. New Zealand looks with favour also on the establishment by treaty of nuclear-free zones such as that accorded by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and we intend to consult with our Pacific neighbours about the feasibility of establishing a similar kind of nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific region.[4]

Since that statement was made, New Zealand has consistently supported every proposal of this type which has come before this Assembly. Some of these proposals go further than we ourselves at present envisage in our own part of the world. We believe, however, that every State in every region has the right to do what it can to free itself from the danger of nuclear conflict over which it can have no control. Every region whose Member States have a common approach has the right to formulate proposals for regional disarmament and to expect the most careful and sympathetic consideration of such proposals by the international community.

New Zealand's support for a regional approach is demonstrated by the fact that we have this year co-sponsored a draft resolution about the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The text can be found in document A/C.1/L.719.[5] I should like at this stage to introduce the draft on behalf of the regional co-sponsors, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, and also to make some comments about the way in which my Government views the proposal.

One point on which there seems to be a virtual consensus—and which is stated as a principle in the study by the Committee on Disarmament—is that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned. It is a principle to which we attach great importance and to which effect has clearly been given in this case.

In July this year the Heads of Government of the South Pacific Forum met to discuss, among other subjects, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The member countries of the South Pacific Forum comprise all independent and self-governing States within the area—namely, Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa. In the final communiqué issued at the end of the meeting the Heads of Government included the following statement:

The Forum reiterated its strong opposition to nuclear weapons tests in all environments and called for renewed international efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament. In particular, the Forum emphasized the importance of keeping the region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim.[6]

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[4] A/PV.2129 (prov.), p. 32.
[5] Substantially the same as resolution 3477 (XXX), *post*, pp. 792–794.
[6] *Ante*, pp. 228–229.

As other regions have done, the South Pacific countries considered that the first step towards the establishment of a zone in their area would be to secure the endorsement of the concept in principle by the United Nations. Since a number of members of the Forum are small countries which are not Members of the United Nations, the responsibility for putting the matter before the General Assembly has been assumed by three which are Members—Fiji, New Zealand, and, I am glad to say, one of the newest members, Papua New Guinea. It is significant that Papua New Guinea's first political act on being admitted to membership was to co-sponsor this proposal.

The draft resolution we have submitted in document A/C.1/L.719 is a simple one with a simple objective. The co-sponsors seek an endorsement by the General Assembly of the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific and ask the General Assembly to invite the countries concerned to carry forward consultations on the subject. We express the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will co-operate fully, since we believe that their co-operation is essential for the full implementation of our objective. The co-sponsors conceive their initiative as being complementary to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[7] by which almost every member of the South Pacific Forum is bound. We are encouraged by the fact that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons declared that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone represented an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and could contribute significantly to the security of those States.[8]

We have been further encouraged by the positive approach which for the most part the nuclear-weapon States have adopted to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. For example, at the twenty-ninth session the United States delegation put forward a number of criteria on the basis of which the United States would feel able to encourage the development of regional arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation objectives. First, the initiative should be taken by the States in the region concerned. Secondly, the zone should preferably include all States in the area whose participation is deemed important. Thirdly, the creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements. Fourthly, provision should be made for adequate verification. Fifthly, any regional treaty should not permit non-nuclear States in the area to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices.[9]

Very similar criteria have been advanced by the United Kingdom. My delegation sees no difficulty in meeting these criteria—indeed, the first criterion has already been met. We should be more than willing to

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[8] *Ante*, p. 156.
[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 563.

discuss with the nuclear-weapon States how reasonable criteria of these kinds should be put into effect.

In the informal discussions that my delegation has had with other delegations which have been kind enough to express interest in our initiative, and whose support we have solicited, a number of questions have been put to us, very natural and relevant questions, about the details of our proposal.

In offering the following comments on some of the questions most frequently asked, I should like to make two things clear. The first is that I am speaking only for New Zealand. The countries of the region have so far talked about the concept only in general terms and there has been no attempt as yet to grapple with specific issues. We have envisaged—and this point is reflected in our draft resolution—that the detailed consultation on these issues should take place only after we have received the endorsement and backing of the Assembly. Individual countries may thus have different ideas on how the proposal should be developed. They will of course have complete freedom to express those ideas; indeed, we expect that the zone will take shape from the consensus of the views of the countries concerned as it emerges. The second thing I want to make clear is that our own ideas about the zone are neither fixed nor rigid. We realize that we are embarking on a process of exploration and we have no precise blueprint to lay before you. We realize too that, as the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) committee of experts has shown, some of the issues involved are complex and we do not delude ourselves that the process of consultation will be short or simple. We can look for guidance from the zones that have already been established in Antarctica and Latin America, but that does not mean that we shall be unwilling to consider new approaches that may prove more suitable to the particular characteristics of our region.

The questions we have been most often asked concern the geographical scope of the proposed zone, the means by which it will come into effect and, since the South Pacific contains a very high proportion of sea to land, the consequences of establishing the zone for traditional freedoms of the seas.

These are all highly relevant questions which will have to be worked out in future consultations.

As New Zealand sees it, a South Pacific zone is by definition in the South Pacific, that is, south of the equator. Its southern boundary would presumably coincide with the northern boundary of the Antarctic Treaty area, that is, 60 degrees south. As for its eastern and western boundaries, these would undoubtedly be a matter for discussion and negotiation. We note, of course, that there is already a nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaty area to the east, although that Treaty is not yet fully in force over the whole geographical area defined in the Treaty.

I think that the most important point for me to stress is that, as we envisage it, participation in the zone would be a wholly voluntary and

sovereign act by all the States concerned. Naturally, we would hope and expect that all the States situated wholly within the area would wish to participate. But, as to States on the periphery of the area, the question whether they would regard themselves as within our zone, or as part of another zone, or would not wish to regard themselves as in any zone would be entirely a matter for their own choice and decision.

Thus it is not possible to give any final or categorical answer now to the question of what would be the boundaries of a South Pacific zone.

The second question concerns the means by which the zone is to be established: what is to be its legal status. Although this is obviously a matter for determination in future consultations, we are naturally influenced by the fact that there are two nuclear-free areas bordering on the South Pacific which have been successfully established by international treaty. The Antarctic has been completely demilitarized in one of the most successful and faithfully observed treaty arrangements to have been concluded since the Second World War. It was, of course, relatively easy to demilitarize Antarctica because of its remoteness and the absence of a permanent population. We have been impressed, however, by the ingenuity with which the Latin American countries have pioneered the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Treaty of Tlatelolco [10] makes what we see as essential provision for the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States, but at the same time allows the countries of the region to give effect to the provisions of the Treaty in their own territories while awaiting the ratifications by nuclear-weapon States necessary to bring the Treaty fully into force.

It is of course an unpalatable fact that the conclusion of a treaty, from the preliminary preparations to final ratification, is a lengthy and even cumbersome process. It is nevertheless a process that has stood the test of time. On the one hand, it produces binding commitments; on the other, those commitments are voluntarily given. No State is obliged to forgo any right that it now has under traditional international law, except by its own free and sovereign decision.

We would not be surprised therefore if the full establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone took some years to implement. Nor would we be disconcerted or discouraged by that fact. Although work on it was begun 12 years ago, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is not yet fully in force. Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made towards freeing the peoples of Latin America from the apprehension of nuclear conflict in their area. Even a partially ratified treaty brings a substantial deterrent to bear against nuclear ambition—the deterrent of neighbourly opinion.

The third question which has frequently been put to us concerns the effect of the establishment of the zone on the traditional freedoms accorded to maritime nations on the high seas. Let me emphasize again that as far as New Zealand is concerned it is not our aim arbitrarily to abridge the sovereign rights of any State. I draw attention to the state-

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[10] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69-83.

ment of the Deputy Prime Minister of Fiji in the general debate in the plenary Assembly, when discussing this issue, that:

> . . . it is not the intention of my Government to deprive any State, against its will, of its right to free and unimpeded passage in the high seas or the right of innocent passage in other waters.[11]

That is also the position of New Zealand. Any treaty may, of course, involve acceptance of a restriction of the sovereign rights of the parties; but to attempt to impose such a restriction on unwilling third parties is, in our view, neither proper nor realistic. Our preliminary view, therefore, is that if it were decided to proceed with a treaty this could usefully take into account the Tlatelolco precedent and provide in the first instance for entry into force in respect of the territories of States ratifying the treaty. As to a further stage, in which no nuclear weapons would be stationed anywhere in the area, this would clearly require to be accepted by all the nuclear-weapon States before it could come into effect. We would therefore envisage a need for a separate but related instrument which would come into effect only when it had been ratified by those States. We do not consider it Utopian to suggest that, if negotiations among the nuclear Powers for the limitation of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons they possess continue and are extended, agreements should also be possible to limit their deployment in ways which meet the most earnest wishes of non-nuclear States in our and other parts of the world. Nor do we consider it Utopian to urge that, in receiving proposals such as ours for regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Assembly should attach the greatest weight to the clearly expressed wishes of the Governments and the peoples of the region in question. There can be no doubt that the peoples of every region—not only the South Pacific—desperately want to be rid of the looming threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

The then Prime Minister of New Zealand, addressing the General Assembly in 1973, put it like this:

> In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, accepted by all the nuclear Powers and backed by the overwhelming weight of world opinion, there must remain an acute and continuing danger that still more countries will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons measurably advances the certainty of nuclear war, and only a universal ban on weapons testing can eliminate this grave threat. I am convinced that the people of every country are sick of war and the threat of war. They do not want nuclear weapons and their attendant threats. They want peace and they want more progress towards it. Is it impossible for Governments to be moved by the desires of ordinary people? [12]

It is timely to repeat that question now: Is it impossible for Governments to be moved by the desires of ordinary people?

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[11] A/PV.2380 (prov.), pp. 38–40.
[12] A/PV.2129 (prov.), pp. 28–30.

News Conference Remarks by President Ford: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extract], November 3, 1975 [13]

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Q. Mr. President, the Pentagon and Secretary Schlesinger have been less than enthusiastic about the Administration's SALT policies. Can we expect to see an acceleration toward an agreement now that this power shift has occurred?

THE PRESIDENT. The Defense Department, Secretary Schlesinger and the others, were very forthcoming and very strong in endorsing the agreement that I reached at Vladivostok.[14] They wholeheartedly agreed with the decisions that were reached there. We expect to continue to pursue, but not under any pressure, negotiations with the Soviet Union in strategic arms limitations. We have differences. But I think it is in the national interest for us to continue to work toward a SALT Two agreement. But we are under no time pressure to do so.

Q. But you do see the possibilities for a second-stage agreement, then?

THE PRESIDENT. I think it would be in the national interest if we can get mutual concessions by the Soviet Union on the one hand and by us on the other.

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Statement by the Finnish Representative (Pastinen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Study [Extract], November 3, 1975 [1]

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Recently, there has been a remarkable revival of interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and that interest continues. Altogether eight of the disarmament items on our agenda deal with such zones, the newest being the proposal by Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.[2]

The situation prompted the Finnish delegation at the last General Assembly session to take the initiative which led to the adoption by the Assembly of resolution 3261 F (XXIX),[3] instituting a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. In introducing that draft resolution last year the Finnish representative

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[13] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 1238.
[14] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2075 (prov.), pp. 13–20.
[2] A/C.1/L.719; substantially the same as resolution 3477 (XXX), *post*, pp. 792–794.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

expressed the hope that the study would clarify the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as such and provide such assistance and guidance as might be needed and asked for by any group of countries in the future. The same idea is reflected in the fifth preambular paragraph of resolution 3261 F (XXIX), by which the Assembly considered that further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones would be enhanced by a comprehensive study of the question in all its aspects. In other words, the aim was not an academic exercise but a practical study; that is to say, to be of assistance to those who are interested in nuclear-weapon-free zones by analysing both the opportunities and the problems connected with them. On the other hand, as we made clear at the time, it was not our intention to link the study, either in time or in substance, with any concrete consideration regarding the establishment of any such zone under consideration at present or contemplated earlier.

The study has now been completed.[4] It was introduced in this Committee at its 2073rd meeting by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts which prepared it. It is submitted for the consideration of the Assembly, together with the comments of the CCD. The Finnish delegation has initiated consultations with other delegations with a view to the formulation of an appropriate resolution on the matter. We hope that a draft will in due time be adopted by consensus, as was the case with resolution 3261 F (XXIX), which initiated the study.

On behalf of the Finnish Government I should like at this time to offer some brief comments on the contents of the study, but before doing so let me pay a tribute to the experts who participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group and to the representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, the IAEA and other international organizations who contributed to it. We in Finland are, of course, gratified that the chairmanship of the Group was entrusted to the Finnish expert.

It is our impression that the study is indeed comprehensive and that it covers all the aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones will henceforth be firmly anchored among the arms control and collateral disarmament measures designed to avert the threat of nuclear war and ultimately to promote the goals of general and complete disarmament.

The experts were able to reach a consensus on several important principles relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as appears from chapter III, paragraph 9 of their report. Though most of these principles are self-evident, and contain no novelties as such, this is the first instance that they have been authoritatively formulated on the international level and for the purpose of universal validity.

One of the most essential questions on which consensus was reached relates to the security of the States belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones, which obviously must be a basic premise for the consideration

[4] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.

of the establishment of any such zone. In the words of the report, the purpose of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is

> . . . to spare the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war . . . [5]

It goes on to say

> . . . that their vital security interests would be enhanced and not jeopardized by participation.[6]

and yet again, that

> One of the principal objectives of the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone is to increase the security of its prospective member States.[7]

It is also significant that the experts were able to reach near unanimity on the term "nuclear weapon" and also on the conclusion that the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibits not only nuclear weapons but also any other nuclear explosion device in the area of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, and that access to the potential benefits of the peaceful nuclear explosions must be through international procedures consistent with article V of the NPT.[8]

The vast majority of the experts consider that for the purposes of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war, the idea of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the NPT complement and support each other. While we accept this, we also agree with those experts who consider that the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zones has purposes beyond the scope of the NPT. This indeed becomes clear from the NPT itself which, in its article VII dealing with the nuclear-weapon-free zones speaks of "total absence of nuclear weapons". The restraints of a nuclear-weapon-free zone therefore go further than the NPT by also excluding from the territory comprising the zone nuclear weapons possessed or controlled by extra-zonal States. The Finnish delegation feels that this basic distinction between the NPT and the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone should have received even greater emphasis in the report.

The experts now say that

> . . . the success of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would depend upon common agreement that the development and possession of nuclear weapons by any member would be perilous to the area as a whole.[9]

This is true as such, but it should have been further clarified in our minds, by a statement that any presence of nuclear weapons is perilous to the area.

Since the basic purpose of any nuclear-weapon-free zone is to enhance the security of the States belonging to it, it is natural that the question of security guarantees by the nuclear weapon States beyond those

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[5] A/10027/Add.1, Chap. III, par. 1, p. 38.
[6] *Ibid.*, par. 3, p. 39.
[7] *Ibid.*, Chap. IV, par. 15, p. 50.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.
[9] A/10027/Add.1, Chap. III, par. 4, p. 39.

envisaged in Security Council resolution 255 [10] becomes central in any discussion of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. This is clearly reflected in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group.

As far as the Finnish Government is concerned, we concur in principle in the conclusion of most experts that any arrangements for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

> . . . must provide for appropriate guarantees by the nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the zone.[11]

This conclusion in fact is only a logical extension from a number of other statements in the report adopted by consensus, such as the one saying that the purpose of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is ". . . to spare the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack . . . " [12]

We regret therefore that no consensus could be reached in the *Ad Hoc* Group on the acceptance of the principle relating to the security guarantees. We regret this absence of consensus all the more, since we feel that it is not due to any irreconcilable controversy on the principle itself, but rather to a reluctance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves in advance to a generalized and abstract undertaking with possible claims for its instant and automatic application in all cases. The latter again, we believe, was not really the intention of those who insisted that the principle of security guarantees is indeed essential to the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In the final analysis, therefore, the differences on this crucial question may well be more apparent than real. It seems to be particularly so since the balance of rights and responsibilities between the zonal States and extrazonal States—of which the security guarantees is an essential element—has to be defined in each case separately in negotiations where all interested parties obviously would fully have to participate.

Statement by the Iranian Representative (Hoveyda) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 3, 1975 [1]

It is indeed an honour for me to address the First Committee again in my capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in order to introduce its report.[2]

I am pleased to be able to say that, against some odds, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was able to submit to the General Assembly a consensus report in conformity with its mandate. Before dwelling on the content of this report, allow me to touch briefly upon some procedural aspects

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[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, p. 44.
[11] A/10027/Add.1, Chap. III, par. 1, p. 39.
[12] *Ibid.*, par. 1, p. 38.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2075 (prov.), pp. 21–28.
[2] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/10028)*.

of the work of the Committee. The Committee was guided by the mandate entrusted to it in resolution 3260 (XXIX) [3] of the General Assembly. By this resolution, the General Assembly invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their comments on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference in the light of the views and suggestions compiled in section II of the summary annexed to the 1974 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. By the same resolution, the General Assembly decided that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should resume its work in accordance with the procedure established in General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII) [4] and that, in discharging its assigned task, the *Ad Hoc* Committee should give priority to the preparation, on the basis of consensus, of an analytical report, including any conclusions and recommendations that it might deem pertinent concerning the comments received from States.

As you know, the composition of the *Ad Hoc* Committee follows a somewhat unusual pattern. In addition to 40 States appointed to serve on the *Ad Hoc* Committee as members, the nuclear Powers have been invited to co-operate or maintain contact with the *Ad Hoc* Committee with the same rights as other members. Under this procedure, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union participated in the work of the Committee, while China and the United States maintained contact with it through its Chairman.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, in its deliberations, had before it the replies received from States (A/AC.167/1 and Add. 1-5 and A/10068, 10069, 10083, 10090, 10098) pursuant to paragraph 1 of resolution 3260 (XXIX), as well as the 1974 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly (A/9268) to which were annexed the detailed views of States on all aspects of convening a world disarmament conference.

At its meeting on 4 April, the Committee decided that the Working Group established in 1974 as an open-ended body should resume its work with the aim of preparing the draft report of the Committee. The Working Group held meetings between 4 June and 18 July under the able chairmanship of the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Antonio Elias of Spain.

On this occasion, I should like to acknowledge gratefully the important contribution made by Mr. Elias and his colleagues in the Working Group in preparing the groundwork and greatly facilitating the task of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by producing a preliminary draft report.

Parallel with the deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations were conducted which eventually enabled the Committee to submit to the General Assembly a consensus report including the consent of the two non-participating nuclear Powers.

The report as thus finalized performs a variety of functions within the narrow limits of the Committee's mandate.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 797-798.
[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 899-901.

Firstly, it meticulously defines the area of consensus on the convening of a world disarmament conference among a cross section of the membership of the Organization, including those of the nuclear and the militarily significant Powers. In so doing, the report underscores the essential complexity of the problem arising mainly from conflicting viewpoints among the great Powers. This becomes readily apparent in the introductory section of the report where, in attempting to find a common denominator with respect to the world disarmament conference, the Committee comes up with the following appraisal:

> . . . although a world disarmament conference convened at an appropriate time with adequate preparation and with universal participation, including especially that of the nuclear-weapon States, continues to be supported by a large majority, there are differences of emphasis over some aspects of such a conference among the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, however, basic divergence of opinion on many aspects of the convening of a world disarmament conference continues to exist among the nuclear-weapon States (*A/10028, para. 9*).

This loaded passage epitomizes the complexities that have heavily restrained the ability of the Organization to advance the objective of a world disarmament conference. Any judgement on the performance of the United Nations, and that of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, would be simplistic unless it is made with an incisive eye to the realities that this appraisal represents.

Secondly, the report identifies the possible objectives of a world disarmament conference, as seen by Governments. Part I of the report provides a summarized and generalized version of the views of the States Members on the main objectives without necessarily indicating their order of priority or a measure of agreement on them. An assessment of comments received from Governments on this subject identifies two broadly defined approaches with respect to the possible objectives of a world disarmament conference.

According to the first approach, a world disarmament conference should have as its aim the realization of some concrete measures of disarmament.

On the other hand, another group of States conceives of the world disarmament conference as a forum that can review and appraise the progress achieved in the field, re-examine the methods, priorities and guidelines, and revise and overhaul the machinery for the conduct of disarmament negotiations. The objective of a world disarmament conference according to this line of thinking would therefore be to give a boost to the slow and frustrating process of arms control negotiations. As such the world disarmament conference would not be a terminal but rather a recurring event.

A third feature of the report is the link between the objectives and other aspects of a world disarmament conference, notably the conditions under which such a conference could be convened. This stemmed from the position adopted by several Governments to the effect that the objective of the conference cannot be considered in isolation from

the whole set of conditions under which a meaningful world disarmament conference could be convened. Part II of the report originates from this mode of thinking.

Given the analytical nature of the report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has attempted to sum up in its conclusions the salient points and to draw some inferences from the emerging trends.

But before attempting to elaborate on these conclusions, I would like to make a cautionary remark. The conclusions of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee are the result of extensive and painstaking negotiations and represent a very delicate balance that cannot and should not be tampered with. Any elaboration on my part of these points should not, therefore, be construed either as an attempt to disturb this balance or as indicating any preference for one idea over another.

I feel duty-bound, nevertheless, to offer certain clarifications because I recognize that, because of the nature of the problems and the particular circumstances surrounding negotiations, delegations not involved in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee might find some areas of obscurity, which is not uncommon in documents of this nature.

With one exception, the conclusions deal mainly with what I have already described as the two different approaches to a world disarmament conference: one that would lead to a world disarmament conference with loftier goals, and the other to a conference the aim of which would be limited to expediting the process and streamlining the machinery of disarmament.

In its third conclusion, the report takes note of the opinion that the conditions required for the convening and the success of a conference of the first type, might not of necessity be applicable to a less ambitious type of conference.

One of the arguments frequently made—and with some justification in my opinion—to discourage an early convening of a world disarmament conference is what has been described as the inadequacy of the political conditions for the successful conclusion of a world disarmament conference. It has been said that a world disarmament conference can raise expectations that it cannot fulfill. It can readily be seen that this argument loses much of its attractiveness when applied against a conference with limited objectives.

For obvious reasons the report has not gone as far as trying to make a case for this type of conference. But it seems to be the feeling of some delegations that if the idea of a world disarmament conference has any chance of getting off the ground, it must opt for limited and essentially auxiliary objectives.

The Committee has avoided any undue optimism. In the same paragraph where this opinion has been expressed—or I should rather say where this hint has been dropped—the opposing viewpoint has also been expressed to the effect that, barring the realization of certain preconditions, there could be no world disarmament conference or preparatory work for it. This approach assumes particular importance in the

light of the subsequent paragraph, wherein the participation of all nuclear Powers and militarily significant States in any type of conference is portrayed as an essential condition.

Finally, the last conclusion of the report deals with the result of contacts made by the *Ad Hoc* Committee with the nuclear Powers in discharge of its mandate under paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 3260 (XXIX). As a result of such contacts, it was made clear to the *Ad Hoc* Committee that the respective positions of these States on all aspects of the convening of a world disarmament conference remain unchanged.

These were some clarifications that I felt I should offer in introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. As I have indicated already—and I do not want to overstress the point—these clarifications can neither add to, nor detract from, the actual language of the report, which is the product of a difficult and delicate compromise.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee also explored the possibilities of including in its report recommendations of a substantive nature. This, however, did not prove possible. The *Ad Hoc* Committee therefore confined itself to making a single recommendation of a procedural nature. In this recommendation the *Ad Hoc* Committee has suggested to the General Assembly that it examine the advisability of the continuation of its work under an appropriate mandate.

By having carefully chosen neutral language, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has refrained from influencing a decision which it regarded as essentially the prerogative of the General Assembly alone.

As a whole, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee reflects the current state of thinking within the international community on a world disarmament conference. While the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been careful not to overstep the narrow confines of its mandate, it has been thorough and probing in its search for solutions that could assist the Assembly in charting a course for the future. I commend this report to your attention.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 3, 1975 [1]

A few weeks ago the Foreign Minister of Sweden stated before the General Assembly that in his opinion disarmament represents the area where the United Nations has made least progress during its three decades of existence. This evaluation is an expression of frustration which I know is acutely felt by many of us present in this room, and it calls for serious reflection about our present situation.

Hopefully, this commonly shared concern about the gravity of the situation might provide an impetus for renewed efforts. Let me recall that in his statement celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the sign-

[1] A/C.1/PV.2075 (prov.), pp. 31–45.

ing of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General said, *inter alia*, the following:

> I address a most urgent appeal to all nations, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, to exercise unilateral restraint, to slow down their arms races, and to limit the traffic in arms. At the same time they should urgently, and as a matter of priority, broaden the scope and intensify the pace of their efforts to negotiate truly effective arms control and disarmament agreements. Unless they do so, human survival as well as human welfare will be in grave jeopardy.[2]

What lessons have these past 30 years provided? First, although we have been spared another world war, every day of this period saw a war somewhere in the world. It has been estimated that the total duration of these conflicts in the years 1945–1969 exceeded 250 years, causing incalculable sufferings, devastation, human and material losses.

Further, disarmament negotiations during the post-war period have not been much more successful than they were in the 1930s, one decisive difference being the vastly more complex and dangerous situation in the weapons field today. We have survived in the nuclear age so far not through any agreed concept of international order, but through crisis diplomacy and that uncanny substitute for a concept of order known as the balance of power.

In the age of nuclear weapons only one breakdown could result in a catastrophe leading to the destruction of civilized human life in much of the world. It is tragic that several opportunities were lost during the post-war period to lay a foundation for real disarmament measures and a new international order. I am thinking, for instance, of the fate of the Baruch proposal in 1946 [3] for an international régime for the management of fissile material. The negotiations preceding the non-proliferation Treaty in the middle of the 1960s also come to mind.

The situation today is well documented and it is hard to contribute any new facts in this forum, be it in terms of the incredible waste of resources in the armaments field or the capacity of destruction raised beyond imagination. But let us agree that multilateral disarmament negotiations are at a deadlock. Where could that lead us? Will it paralyse our capacity for action? Or will it provide opportunities for new initiatives?

There are some positive signs in the dark picture I have painted. One is the growing determination of the developing countries to have a decisive influence on their own future. My Government welcomes this new trend in world politics, which cannot avoid having its ramifications in the disarmament field. The statement on disarmament by the recent Lima meeting of Foreign Ministers [4] representing the non-aligned countries confirms this development.

The international community as a whole has a common stake to find joint and reasonable solutions to the problems of disarmament. This is

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[2] Press release SG/SM/2207.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, Vol. I, pp. 7–16.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 435–438.

evident not least in the light of the enormous resources, particularly human resources, wasted on armaments, which could have been put to work for economic and social development. Thus, all States and the entire international community have the duty to press for energetic endeavours and to contribute to the success of disarmament efforts.

In this task a widening of the definition of national security to encompass also progress in the social, economic and cultural fields appears to be one of the few ways to break the deadlock of disarmament. This important aspect was emphasized by the representative of the United States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in a statement before that forum in April this year.[5] At the same time it must be clearly understood that the main responsibility for taking concrete steps towards real disarmament lies with the super-Powers.

My Government has expressed its satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union have started a process of negotiations to reach agreement on strategic arms limitation measures.

I certainly do not underestimate the difficulties involved in such a process, without disturbing the delicate strategic balance. We cannot but express our regret, however, that the agreements reached so far do not represent a contribution to disarmament. On the contrary, they permit further increases in already formidable strategic missile forces and almost unlimited possibilities for qualitative developments aimed at greater destructive capability. No reductions are yet foreseen. This situation may seriously obstruct the chances of achieving effective disarmament measures with regard to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it constitutes a clear defiance by the super-Powers of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.[6]

A particular problem lies in the fact that no attempt at all has been made to reduce the prestige of nuclear weapons in international relations. As I have stated before in the CCD, the political status value attached to the possession of these weapons is one main reason for the resentment felt by several non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear-weapon States for refusing to give up something themselves which they try to keep others from acquiring.

The outcome of the recent non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference clearly demonstrates that the international community cannot afford further delays in nuclear disarmament. The international community stands at a crucial turning point in the non-proliferation issue. If the non-proliferation régime, which my Government has always strongly supported and will continue to support, is to survive, the two leading great Powers must urgently make definite nuclear disarmament commitments coupled with appropriate undertakings not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.


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[5] *Ante*, p. 116.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Our ability to create an effective barrier against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons also depends on the condition that the peaceful use of nuclear energy—everywhere, (I repeat "everywhere") and thus also in the nuclear-weapon States—is subjected to as efficient measures of international safeguards as possible. Furthermore, States which have not done so must now adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty. I will discuss these latter aspects in the following paragraphs.

The high priority attached by the Swedish Government to reaching effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was again underlined in the Government statement presented by the Prime Minister of Sweden at the opening of the Swedish parliament on 15 October 1975.

As I said, it is obvious that we now stand before a turning point. The way we act or fail to act will have far-reaching consequences. If the present situation gives rise to pessimism or even alarm, this must not lead to apathy. I am convinced that the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation can still be dealt with successfully, provided that enough stringent measures are taken. We cannot passively just accept a process whereby nuclear explosive capabilities are spreading at an ever increasing rate without adequate safeguards being applied.

In my view, the single most effective measure, failing a universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, would be to start implementing now the recommendation of the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference calling for a strengthening of common export requirements relating to safeguards.[7] The recommendation proposes to extend the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in an importing State not party to the non-proliferation Treaty. Sweden is prepared to participate actively in efforts aimed at this goal. The interests of preventing a further proliferation of nuclear weapons must prevail over commercial interests. And I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough: the interests of preventing a further proliferation of nuclear weapons must prevail over commercial interests. It is high time to take action.

An indication of the utter seriousness of the situation is the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Sigvard Eklund, at the recent General Conference of that organization, which will be charged with much of the responsibility for the follow-up of he non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In his statement the Director General asserted the following:

> I have said it before, and I repeat, that I do not think that we shall have an overall satisfactory safeguards system operating until suppliers of equipment and materials make it a condition for delivery that the entire nuclear activity in the receiving country is placed under IAEA safeguards. The Review Conference's recommendations on common export requirements relating to safeguards aim towards this direction and are to be welcomed as they give recognition to a problem which is essential to the success of the non-proliferation Treaty régime. I however personally regret that these recom-

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[7] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.

mendations do not go far enough; in leaving the question open for further examination, the Conference may have aggravated a situation where commercial interests may prevail over long-term political goals.[8]

The Swedish delegation also wishes to place on record its strong support for an energetic follow-up by the IAEA of certain other recommendations of the Review Conference. I am thinking of the studies on multi-national or regional nuclear fuel cycle centres and the task of elaborating further concrete recommendations with regard to the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit.

The Conference further expressed its support for effective IAEA safeguards. The Swedish delegation strongly favours all realistic measures to strengthen the efficiency of the safeguards system which, in our view, should be continuously developed to cover such areas as consequences of utilization of specified technological information as well as reprocessing and enrichment techniques.

I have the impression that during the course of the past year an increased political interest has emerged in several States, whose actions in these matters carry a particular weight, to take international measures for an improved management of fissile material. This development confirms that the acute concern which prompted the Swedish delegation to the CCD in the summer of 1974 to make certain far-reaching suggestions in this field is shared by a growing number of Governments.[9] It is now a question of political will whether the recent manifestations of concern are going to be transformed into effective action. I hope that important steps in this direction will be taken during this General Assembly session.

My delegation further welcomes the fact that opportunities will be provided during the General Assembly sessions of 1976 and 1978 to consider the implementation of the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Review Conference. This will enable us to assess the real impact of the Conference, which was expected by some to be the most important event in disarmament in recent years.

As an ominous reminder of how little has been achieved in the disarmament negotiations so far stands the fact that the CCD has not been able to register any progress for years with regard to one of its two top priority items, that is, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

Now, a new factor has been introduced in this picture. I am of course referring to the Soviet proposal for a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the accompanying draft resolution.[10]

My delegation welcomes this proposal in the sense that now a nuclear-weapon State finally has initiated a discussion on this subject in the United Nations on the basis of a draft treaty text.

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[8] Cf. GC (XIX)/OR.176, Dec. 30, 1975, p. 5, par. 40.
[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 363–364, 569–571.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 460–463, 486–490.

At the same time we must emphasize, however, that the proposal contains elements which tend to reduce its general acceptability. The provisions of the draft resolution which calls for early negotiations between all nuclear-weapon States without mentioning the role of the CCD represents, in the opinion of my delegation, one such element. Another is the fact that the draft treaty does not solve the problems of peaceful nuclear explosions. Still another is the proposed complaints procedure through the Security Council, which would have the effect of formalizing inequalities between States in international relations, which my delegation always has found, and still finds, hard to accept for reasons of principle and efficiency.

Nevertheless, I hope that the new proposal will provide an added impetus to the efforts to achieve finally a comprehensive test ban.

I wish to mention here that the Swedish delegation has taken the liberty of asking for the circulation of a working paper presented by the Swedish delegation to the CCD in 1971,[11] containing suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. We hope this will further stimulate the discussion.

I might also add that the Swedish CCD delegation last August proposed the convening of an expert meeting within the CCD in early March 1976 to deal with the remaining problems still considered to be in the way of the discontinuance for all time of all nuclear weapons test explosions in all environments.

In the area of peaceful nuclear explosions, valuable studies have been carried out by the IAEA and the CCD on the basis of last year's General Assembly resolution.[12] The technical mandate of the IAEA to study this problem has been broadened and the IAEA Board of Governors has established an *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group which recently held its first meeting.[13] The Group will consider a broad range of problems, among which the complex issues related to the special international agreement or agreements under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty merit particular attention. The CCD considered the arms limitation aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions during a meeting of experts this summer.

It seems clear that further studies are necessary in these fields. My delegation hopes that the General Assembly this year will adopt a resolution of a procedural character, which should contain provisions for a continuation of the work of the IAEA and the CCD along the lines indicated.

As is well known, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the CCD has transmitted to the General Assembly its study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects,[14] a study on which my colleague, Ambassador Pastinen of

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[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 540–543.
[12] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 803–806.
[13] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.

Finland, so ably commented earlier this morning. A Swedish governmental expert participated actively in the work of the Group. Detailed comments by my Government on the contents of the study were given in a Swedish statement in the CCD on 21 August.[15]

In this forum I should like only to state that the study has, in our view, provided a useful summary of the many views represented in the international discussion on nuclear-weapon-free zones. The study is now completed and a continued role for the CCD in this matter seems not to be called for at present. In our opinion, further work should now best proceed in connexion with concrete zone proposals.

As regards the particular question of possible nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, my delegation finds that the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group does not constitute a fully adequate basis for a political exploration of the issues involved. The reason for this evaluation lies in the fact that several delicate and difficult problems in this context have either been disagreed upon or left out.

I wish to wind up this statement by making a proposal. Although the United Nations during its 30 years has for various reasons made little or no progress in the field of disarmament, the fact remains that disarmament is one of the fundamental objectives of this Organization. I have tried to point to the vital need for action both within and outside the United Nations. The Secretary-General has devoted much attention to this problem in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly,[16] something which has been greatly appreciated by the Swedish Government.

I need not repeat here the contents of the observations of the Secretary-General. I can only say that my delegation agrees with him that a basic review ought to be carried out of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field. This session of the General Assembly, convening on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, should, in our view, decide to undertake such a review with the aim of strengthening the resources and the effectiveness of the Organization in the field of disarmament.

The Swedish delegation has initiated informal consultations with other interested delegations on the best way to carry out the review which we intend to propose. It seems to me that an intergovernmental committee, established by the General Assembly at this session, could well perform this task and report its findings and proposals to the Assembly at its next session.

The precise composition of the committee could be left open for consultations. In our view, the committee should look into such matters as ways and means of improving the flow of information on disarmament and related matters from the United Nations to Member States and the public, possible new approaches for achieving a more comprehen-

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[15] *Ante*, pp. 360–370.

[16] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*, pp. 3–5.

sive participation in the disarmament discussions of the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, a possible improvement of the structure and procedures of the United Nations negotiation machinery, ways and means of strengthening the follow-up by the United Nations of disarmament agreements and so on.

As my delegation sees it, such a committee should not be considered as prejudicing possible future decisions, for example, on a world disarmament conference—on which the *Ad Hoc* Committee,[17] under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, has performed such arduous and excellent work. Nor should it prejudice the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament matters. The committee would, rather, provide material as a basis for both immediate decisions to strengthen the resources of the United Nations in this area, and decisions of a more far-reaching nature, for instance, the convening of a conference or a special session.

My delegation intends to return to this matter, as well as to take up certain other important items of our agenda, at a later stage of our debate.

In conclusion, I want to say the following. It is my sincere belief that, besides carrying out detailed and, of necessity, highly technical step-by-step disarmament negotiations—a process in which we shall always risk being overpowered by the military technological establishments—we shall have to return to some basic and fundamental questions. I think that in doing so, the absurdity of the present situation will appear very clearly to us.

Let me put forward some such questions. How is it possible that so many still believe in the myth that possession of nuclear arms means added national security and prestige when all evidence and political wisdom points or should point to the opposite? What is the rationality behind a situation where the two main nuclear Powers are constantly increasing their nuclear arsenals, which are already many times more than sufficient to extinguish not only themselves but also the rest of human civilization? What does it mean to world economic and social development, that is, the welfare of individual human beings, that close to half of the world's scientific and technological talent, knowledge and resources are used to cause devastation, suffering and death instead of development, welfare and human happiness?

It is obvious to me that the situation calls for a redefinition of the concept of national security, a concept under the protection of which so much death, suffering and destruction has been caused to this frail planet and its poor human beings. In our interdependent time this concept will have to be redefined to encompass security for all in the broadest sense of that word, that is, human survival under fair and equitable conditions for everyone.

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[17] See *supra*.

If we should fail in efforts to gain wide acceptance of such a basic and concerted goal, it is my conviction that the law of averages is going to catch up with us and, eventually, end the human experiment.

That is the reason why I very seriously believe that we find ourselves at present in a position of new opportunities similar to those lost in the past to which I have referred. There is a chilling suspicion that if we do not make good use of them now they might prove to be the last ones.

Disarmament problems must therefore, at this crucial moment, be finally brought out of their isolation, examined and negotiated as an integral and important part of the global issue of survival in our time.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, November 3, 1975 [1]

The Soviet Union has submitted for consideration by the General Assembly as an urgent matter the proposal on the "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". The purpose of this proposal, as was pointed out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, in the general debate of the General Assembly is:

> . . . to end completely nuclear-weapon tests and thus radically to limit the practical possibilities for perfecting it further.[2]

The question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is not a new one. It is inseparably connected with the creation of these weapons. Of course the most radical solution of the problems arising from the emergence of nuclear weapons would be their complete prohibition and destruction. Proposals on this subject, as we know, have been repeatedly made by the Soviet Union in the United Nations. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly decided to prohibit the use of force in international relations, at the same time permanently prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.[3] However, this decision, too, has not yet acquired the force of international law, and the world still continues to witness the continuing nuclear-weapon race.

Since, in view of the position of other nuclear Powers, difficulties have appeared in the way of the complete prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons, the gradual—that is, a stage-by-stage—approach to the solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war has become the only one practically feasible. This, of course, in no way removes from the agenda the

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[1] *A/C.1/PV.2075* (prov.), pp. 57–71.
[2] *Ante*, p. 485.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 848–849.

historical task of achieving general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional weapons.

In recent years, the first substantial steps have been taken towards the curbing of the nuclear-weapons race, and these have had a positive influence on the improvement of the international climate. Treaties were concluded on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on the sea-bed and ocean-floor, as well as the Soviet-American agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and on the limitation of strategic weapons.

Despite these initial positive steps, the arms race continues, the military arsenals of States are being replenished with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and nuclear-weapon tests still continue to be carried out. An important measure which would result in the suspension of this extremely dangerous process and contribute to a downward trend in the curve of the arms race, would be the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known.

The Soviet Union for many years has been making considerable efforts to bring about the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The Peace Programme adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union paid particular attention to this question of considerable significance. The Programme stressed that the USSR was in favour of the cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear-weapon tests, including, of course, underground tests.

In 1963, with the most active participation of the USSR, the Moscow Treaty was concluded which banned nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.[4] In 1974, at the high-level Soviet-American talks in Moscow, the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests was signed.[5] Thus, one more step was taken towards the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. However, it has so far not proved possible to resolve this extremely important and urgent problem.

Consequently, at the present time our task is to reach a concrete international agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, without exception, by all States. The Soviet Union has repeatedly made official statements about its readiness to come to agreement on such a prohibition. So the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stated in Warsaw on 21 July 1974,

> The Soviet Union is ready, in particular, to conclude an agreement on the complete cessation of all underground nuclear-weapon tests.

This position of the USSR enjoys wide support and understanding. It is shared by a large majority of States. The countries of the socialist

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[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225 ff.

community are firm and consistent advocates of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The non-aligned countries also favour the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as is proved by the decisions of their Conferences held in Georgetown, Algiers and Lima. Thus, the Political Declaration of the Algiers Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries proclaimed:

> The Conference declares itself in favour of general and complete disarmament, and especially . . . the total cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments in all regions of the world.[6]

The Political Declaration adopted in Lima last August expressed the determination of the non-aligned States to continue their actions directed to the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.[7]

Expressing the will of the absolute majority of United Nations Member States, the General Assembly in recent years has adopted a number of resolutions calling for the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Soviet proposal on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests [8] has been supported, at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, by representatives of the socialist States and many non-aligned and Western countries, and we would like to express our gratitude to them.

To put an end, immediately and everywhere, to all nuclear-weapon tests by all States is the will of the overwhelming majority of States, and of all peoples of the world. This is an undeniable fact. Nevertheless, there are some people who not only oppose the cessation of nuclear tests but are also attempting to prove the unprovable—that the continuation of nuclear tests, as they see it, is in the interests of the peoples. They claim that they, if you please, must keep pace with or overtake somebody or other in the nuclear-weapons race.

Well, what are we to say about this kind of assertion? The gist of these statements is obvious: they are designed to whip up war hysteria, to heat up international tension and to accelerate the unbridled arms race.

We in the Soviet Union will continue untiringly to strive for disarmament and come forward with new initiatives aimed at achieving the main final and noble objective, general and complete disarmament.

In the period after the signing and coming into force of the Moscow Treaty, attempts were made, and are still being made, to solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments on the basis of what I would call a selective approach to the solution of this problem. Proposals were put forward to halt nuclear tests unilaterally. It was proposed that such partial measures should be carried out only

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[6] *Ibid., 1973*, p. 632.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 435-438.
[8] *Ante*, pp. 460-463.

by some nuclear Powers, while the conducting of tests by other States, including tests in the atmosphere, would be, in practice, legitimized. The question arises—and I would like to ask those who make these proposals—does the continuation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere not represent the greatest threat from the standpoint of the pernicious radioactive contamination of our planet?

This kind of proposal, of course, could not and cannot solve the problem of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests by everyone. They would lead only to the creation of one-sided advantages for some States to the detriment of the interests of others. The carrying out of such measures would not only fail to promote the strengthening of international peace and security, but in our view—and we are firmly convinced of this—would create grounds for complications and friction among States. We would like to stress particularly that in the course of actually bringing about concrete disarmament measures no harm should be done to the security of anyone at all. I should like to stress that: "anyone at all". This principle is an indispensable condition for successful progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, as well as in the field of the cessation of nuclear tests. Our task is to find ways of solving the disarmament problem without jeopardizing the security of anyone at all, and for the benefit of all.

With a view to the goal of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union has prepared an appropriate international draft treaty which has been submitted for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

This draft treaty provides for the prohibition of test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and under ground. This obligation must be assumed by all States, and, of course, by all nuclear Powers without exception. It is only with the participation of all nuclear States that the task of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can be accomplished. That is precisely why our draft resolution provides that the treaty enter into force only after it has been ratified by a certain number of States, including all nuclear-weapon States.

Of great significance are the questions of control over compliance with the treaty. The Soviet draft provides that control over compliance by all States parties to the treaty with the obligations assumed by them not to carry out test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment will be based on the use of modern national technical means of control, together with certain international procedures. The development of international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data among the States parties to the Treaty should be an important means of control.

The Soviet delegation considers that the time has come to abandon the approaches and criteria of the past—when tension, mistrust and suspicion prevailed in relations among States—in matters of control over compliance with international agreements on disarmament questions. Of course, we cannot not [sic] fail to bear in mind the tremendous

leap forward that has taken place in the field of science and technology and that has significantly extended possibilities for the use of technical means of control which guarantee full detection of nuclear tests in violation of the treaty. There is also another factor that must be borne in mind, namely, that a tremendous amount of positive experience has been accumulated in the use of national technical means of control over compliance with the important agreements in the field of the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons.

The Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests provides that if any party whatsoever to the Treaty violates the obligations that it assumed not to carry out such tests, the Security Council of the United Nations must undertake an inquiry upon receipt of a complaint from the State which has ascertained a violation of the treaty.

The general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must not, of course, be allowed to create obstacles to the enjoyment of the benefits flowing from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Of course, the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions must be in conformity with the goal of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Non-nuclear-weapon States will benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions in accordance with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[9] However, in the case of nuclear-weapon States, the procedure for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions will be established under a special agreement which should be concluded as quickly as possible. In determining this procedure, due regard must be paid to the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the most competent and qualified international organ for producing recommendations of this kind. The IAEA, as is well known, is doing a great deal of work on the practical implementation of the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As is pointed out in the Secretary-General's note, document A/10316, various agencies and organs are undertaking a broad and serious review of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. This was mentioned, incidentally, in the course of the debate in the First Committee.

The Soviet Union is carrying out a broad programme of scientific research and development on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, and is accumulating data on the economic effectiveness of this new technology and on safety measures in conducting such explosions. The Soviet Union is actively participating, through IAEA, in the taking of preparatory steps to provide services to non-nuclear countries in carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions pursuant to article V of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As is well known, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to provide services on peaceful nuclear explosions to non-parties to the non-proliferation Treaty as

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

well, on condition that this will be done under appropriate control and on the basis of procedures worked out by IAEA.

A relevant draft resolution, co-sponsored by a group of States including the Soviet Union, has been submitted in document A/C.1/L.707, for consideration by the First Committee. It calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and to inform the thirty-first session of the General Assembly of the results of those negotiations. Consequently, we are calling upon the nuclear-weapon States, without further delay, to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a solution to this exceptionally important problem.[10]

These are the considerations which the delegation of the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to put forward in submitting, for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly and its First Committee, its proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In submitting this proposal, the Soviet Union expresses the hope that it will be most carefully studied, in a spirit of goodwill, by all Member States of the United Nations.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth anniversary session on the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests will prove to be a significant contribution to the cause of progress in negotiations on disarmament problems.

A complete ban on tests will be of the utmost importance for curtailing the nuclear-weapon race even further. The conclusion of a treaty, the draft of which has been introduced by the Soviet Union, would make it possible drastically to limit practical possibilities for the further perfection of nuclear weapons and prevent the emergence of new generations of nuclear explosives even more powerful, more destructive and more sophisticated. The cessation of all nuclear tests undoubtedly would be a major contribution to averting the threat of a nuclear war, to curbing the arms race and to disarmament. This measure would be in the interests of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, and promote the further development and intensification of international détente and the strengthening of peace.

U.S.-Egyptian Joint Statement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, November 5, 1975 [1]

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the United States of America have agreed in principle to conduct a program of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy

[10] See *ante*, pp. 486–490 and *n.* 1; *post*, pp. 794–799.
[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 24, 1975, p. 732.

pursuant to a proposed agreement for cooperation in accordance with the following principles:

1. The agreement is expected to cover cooperation in fields pertaining to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including design, construction and operation of research and power reactors, desalinization, the beneficial uses of radio-isotopes and radiation sources, the exploration and development of uranium resources, and related health and safety considerations.

2. The agreement for cooperation will enable Egypt at the outset to purchase from the United States nuclear power reactors having an approximate total electrical capacity of 1200 MWe and the slightly enriched uranium necessary to fuel these facilities.

3. Such cooperation will be under the terms fully compatible with the non-proliferation objectives of the two governments including their desires to assure that the introduction of nuclear power for civil uses into the Middle East will occur under carefully safeguarded conditions. These conditions will be designed to assure that the US-supplied facilities, materials, and their products, as well as the associated relevant technology, are used for peaceful purposes only and will include the following main provisions to ensure that:

a. None of the assistance provided will be employed for any military purposes, including the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

b. The materials and facilities to be supplied as well as the produced plutonium will be subjected to international safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, designed to assure their continued uses for peaceful purposes.

c. The plutonium produced in the agreed upon 1200 MWe power reactors under the agreement or derived from the US fuel supplied for these facilities will be reprocessed, fabricated and stored outside Egypt.

d. Facilities utilizing relevant nuclear technology obtained from the United States will be under effective safeguards.

e. The government of Egypt guarantees to apply effective physical security measures to the facilities and nuclear material covered by the agreement.

It is the intention of the United States that at such time as negotiations are completed the same safeguard provisions and special measures will be included in both the US Cooperation Agreements with Egypt and Israel respectively. If certain provisions are modified or altered in one agreement, it is the intention of the United States Government to introduce such modifications or alterations in the other agreement.

Both Governments will consult closely with their respective legislatures on the nature and details of their proposed new agreement, bearing in mind the importance that such an arrangement will hold for their peaceful nuclear cooperation, and their respective non-proliferation policies.

After finalization of the text of the Agreement for Cooperation, it will enter into force after the completion of statutory and constitutional requirements of both parties.

Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: Nuclear Proliferation, November 5, 1975 [1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. The occasion for these hearings is the House Concurrent Resolution 371.[2] This resolution has its origins, of course, in your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman.

My colleagues in other agencies of the executive branch have already given you detailed comments on this resolution. I find myself essentially in agreement with them. I will, therefore, discuss the resolution only briefly and then add some general observations about nuclear proliferation.

Adoption of House Concurrent Resolution 371 would be a highly constructive step for Congress to take. We have only a few comments to offer. The first paragraph addresses the limits on strategic arms announced last year at Vladivostok [3] and urges immediate follow-on negotiations for a mutual 20-percent reduction.

We support, of course, the objective of reducing the high levels of strategic offensive arms. A 20-percent reduction would be a significant step, but even larger reductions should not be precluded.

Permit me to point out that the negotiation of further reductions will be greatly facilitated by President Ford's accomplishment at Vladivostok of reaching agreement on equal numbers for United States and Soviet forces.

Without such a benchmark, the task of finding mutually acceptable reductions would be much harder. In the negotiations in Vienna, by contrast, on force reductions in Central Europe—the MBFR negotiations—we lack such an equal benchmark, and this fact has caused us added difficulties.

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[1] *Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session*, pp. 216–219.

[2] The text of the resolution can be found *ibid.*, p. 2. A similar resolution introduced in the Senate, Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, can be found *ibid.*, pp. 5–6. Neither resolution was passed by the Congress.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

COMMENT ON PARAGRAPH 2

The second paragraph of House Concurrent Resolution 371 urges an adequate verified ban on all nuclear explosions if all nuclear weapon states will join.

The United States remains committed to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that has adequate verification provisions, but it has not determined that such an agreement would require the participation of all nuclear weapon states.

I would prefer that this issue be left open in the resolution.

In calling for an agreement banning all nuclear explosions, the resolution would prohibit peaceful explosions as well as weapons tests. This was the approach taken successfully in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1968 [1963].[4]

So far, no solution has been found to the complex problem of how to have adequate assurance that weapons-related benefits would not be obtained from peaceful nuclear explosions permitted under a comprehensive test ban. Unless adequate verification measures can be developed, the ban on weapons tests would have to extend to peaceful nuclear explosions as well.

SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR REMAINING PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION

The third and fourth paragraphs of House Concurrent Resolution 371 address the danger that the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology might be diverted to weapons purposes and recommend several measures. I believe our current efforts are fully consistent with these measures, and we welcome such congressional support.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the executive branch have briefed you, or will brief you, on our current efforts to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons; in particular, our programs for export controls and international safeguards.

I do not wish to take your time to cover the same ground. Rather, I will give you my assessment of the long-term trends in nuclear proliferation.

It is the long-term prospect that one must keep in mind in order to judge the adequacy of our policies and to determine the need for further legislative or budgetary initiatives.

For the next few years, nuclear proliferation will not injure U.S. interests or cause us any direct harm. The threat of damage—the threat of disaster—lies in the future.

Today, as a result of the spread of civilian nuclear power, some 20 countries possess enough plutonium—if separated from spent fuel elements—to produce a few nuclear weapons.

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[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291-293.

Ten years from now the spread of nuclear reactors will likely see some 40 countries in possession of enough plutonium for a few nuclear weapons, while about 35 of these will have the material for a few dozen.

What could happen in such a world if the current restraints against weapons proliferation should be weakened? Let me raise two possibilities.

One possibility is that one or a few countries might abandon their self-restraint and produce nuclear explosive devices. If one such country produces a nuclear explosive, whether called peaceful or not, another may follow suit—and then others—for reasons of status or some military rationale or simply because of the growing attention to national nuclear explosive programs.

This could happen in violation of existing legal, economic, or political constraints.

"GRAY MARKET" AS ROUTE TO PROLIFERATION

A second route of proliferation could be a "gray market" for the means of making nuclear bombs, or for the bombs themselves. Unfortunately every new nuclear weapons state, or nuclear industrial state, is a potential exporter of nuclear explosives, or the materials needed to make them.

Materials, even weapons, could begin to be transferred between some countries without adequate restraint, so that a country even without a reactor program could come into possession of this means of mass destruction.

Of course, it is U.S. policy to prevent such developments. We have been successful in encouraging adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [5] and in tightening controls on the export of nuclear technology.

With our current policies—with the policies recommended in House Concurrent Resolution 371—we can postpone trouble. Given time and good luck, our other efforts toward a more stable peace might help reduce the tensions and conflicts that lead to competition in nuclear weaponry to begin with.

But since it does not lie within our power to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons technology, much less to reverse the spread that has already occurred, we must have the means to cope with these new dangers.

IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCES IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. Chairman, we have to face these prospects squarely.

For the foreseeable future, our alliances are essential in preventing a

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[5] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

massive spread of nuclear weapons. For many nations, protection through a strong alliance is now the only alternative to a desperate search for security by acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

Indeed, several nations with the greatest potential for nuclear arms now refrain from building weapons because of our alliance commitments. I believe Congress is well aware of this relationship between our alliance structure and nuclear proliferation.

But, there is something else needed to cope with the dangers of nuclear proliferation and to protect our country from nuclear damage in a world where the destructive potential of the atom has become widely available.

CONCERN FOR ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Chairman, this is the requirement for good intelligence. House Concurrent Resolution 371 does not mention this requirement. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this need will get the attention and support it deserves in the context of congressional activity on intelligence matters.

As of now, for example, we do not have good data on the size of plutonium stocks in some countries, the portion of plutonium that has been separated from spent fuel—and is therefore usable in weapons—or the location of plutonium stocks.

There is a widespread misunderstanding that the task of intelligence can now all be done by some technical instruments in celestial remoteness and antiseptic isolation from people, and in a manner for everyone to see and share meteorological data collected and fully disseminated on a world-wide basis. This, of course, is not the real situation, particularly not in the area of nuclear proliferation.

Peaceful nuclear technology provides the means as well as the cover for acquiring the nuclear bomb. Peaceful technology is sold and purchased through business channels, managed by thousands of people who work for many different industries.

The line between peaceful uses and the nuclear bomb is getting so thin and complex that we cannot expect to discriminate on the basis of remote physical observations alone.

What provides the critical discrimination is what people do and say. Intelligence about proliferation, therefore, cannot be divorced from intelligence about people, and by people.

DANGER OF DESTROYING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

However, instead of nurturing and improving intelligence capabilities that can do this job, we are now in danger of partially destroying them.

Mr. Chairman, prior testimony in these hearings has shown the fragility of the mutual restraints and international agreements that keep nuclear technology in check.

To maintain these restraints, we need good intelligence. If this structure should ever begin to crumble, one of our principal lifelines will be good intelligence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of State Kratzer to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, November 5, 1975 [1]

It is a privilege to appear before your committee today on behalf of the Department of State to offer testimony on the important subject of nuclear proliferation and, specifically, on House Concurrent Resolution 371.[2]

At the outset, I should like to reaffirm the strong commitment of the Department of State to the policy of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secretary Kissinger has expressed personally, on a number of occasions, the importance of this goal and has proposed for international consideration several important measures designed to reduce the risks of further proliferation.

While House Concurrent Resolution 371 deals with several aspects of the control of nuclear weapons, I should like to concentrate my testimony today on the problem of nuclear proliferation as that term is generally used; that is, the acquisition by additional nations of a nuclear-weapons or nuclear explosive capability. In particular, I will deal with the question of the proliferation risks arising out of the application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

Before commenting on the specific features of House Concurrent Resolution 371, I believe it may be useful to review the historical background of the proliferation issue, as well as some of the technical considerations which bear on it.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. policy has been to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan,[3] put forward by the United States at the United Nations in the days immediately after World War II, foreshadowed the efforts we have made for the past 30 years to lessen the likelihood of proliferation. This plan proposed the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the placement of sensitive peaceful nuclear activities under international ownership and control.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 8, 1975, pp. 832–837.

[2] See *Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session*, p. 2. A similar resolution introduced in the Senate, Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, can be found *ibid.*, pp. 5–6. Neither resolution was passed by the Congress.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, Vol. I, pp. 7–16.

When the plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, we moved to a policy of strict secrecy as a means of containing proliferation. In less than a decade, it became evident that this approach would not succeed.

By 1953, both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had developed nuclear weapons. Major peaceful nuclear programs had been established by Canada and France and were beginning in many other countries. These facts made it clear that, like all scientific knowledge, nuclear science, which indeed had its origins in Europe, could not remain an American monopoly.

Late that year, President Eisenhower, in a speech before the United Nations,[4] laid the foundation for the approach that has governed our nonproliferation policy ever since. In brief, he proposed worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This was to be accomplished under effective controls so as to insure that other countries could receive the peaceful benefits of the atom without establishing independent programs which could lead to the development of nuclear weapons.

The Congress endorsed this approach in 1954 by fundamentally amending the Atomic Energy Act to permit our engaging in nuclear cooperation under strict procedural and substantive controls, including congressional review and oversight.

The revised act provided that certain forms of nuclear cooperation should take place under agreements for cooperation between the United States and each cooperating country or group of countries. Each agreement, including any amendments, must be personally approved by the President in writing on the basis of a determination that the agreement will promote, and not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Subsequently, each agreement is submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which must report on it to the Congress. The Congress may prevent the agreement from coming into force by adopting a concurrent resolution to that effect within a 30-day period thereafter.

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

I noted earlier that the approach we have followed since the early 1950's has been nuclear cooperation under "effective controls." These controls consist, basically, of assurances by other governments with whom we have agreements that materials and equipment provided by the United States will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or for other military purposes, with these assurances being independently verified by measures which we designate "safeguards."

Thus, this much-misunderstood term refers to the mechanism which has been developed to assure and demonstrate the observance of governmental guarantees against the diversion of nuclear materials and

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 393–400.

equipment to military purposes. They rely upon independent and objective measures, including onsite inspection, applied by personnel from outside the inspected country and designed to detect any diversion of nuclear material to unauthorized purposes.

This concept of independent verification of sovereign undertakings through such measures as inspection by foreign personnel was a novel one at the time; and the rights to make these inspections were achieved with considerable difficulty through vigorous use of the bargaining power the United States could exert as a provider of nuclear assistance.

In the early days, and indeed up until the mid-1960's, safeguards were applied by U.S. personnel. For the past decade the responsibility for the application of safeguards was assumed largely by the International Atomic Energy Agency, located in Vienna. The need for such an international safeguards system was accentuated by the growing number of nuclear supplier countries. Today more than 50 IAEA inspectors are applying safeguards, including onsite inspection, to more than 60 major facilities in some 50 countries.

One of the common misconceptions concerning safeguards is that they involve only a system of materials accountability, or "bookkeeping." In fact, the safeguards system of the IAEA includes three basic elements: materials accountability, containment, and surveillance.

All three elements are necessary for an effective safeguards system; and each of them depends upon the actual physical presence of safeguards inspectors, supplemented in many instances by instruments, seals, and other technical measures. As an example, at nuclear power reactors, not only are discharged fuel rods accounted for through physical inventories by visiting inspectors, but seals may be installed on reactors (containment) to insure that there has been no unauthorized fuel removal between inspection visits and cameras may be employed (surveillance) to detect any unauthorized fuel movements in the spent-fuel storage area.

NATIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS

It is important to recognize that international safeguards have a different and more difficult task to perform than do domestic control systems. The former cannot rely on the presumption that no massive conspiracy directed by the government itself exists. At the same time international systems can and do rely on the fact that a government itself has an overwhelming self-interest in insuring that nuclear material in its possession is not diverted by unauthorized persons. The two systems therefore complement each other.

Safeguards, as I have attempted to make clear, are designed to verify the faithful observance by governments of their assurances against diversion of materials to unauthorized uses. However, the objective measures which they employ for this purpose are equally effective in detecting diversion arising from any source—national or subnational.

However, safeguards do not possess the capability of preventing theft, seizures, or diversions of nuclear material by unauthorized groups or individuals, in contrast to detecting such actions. This is the role of physical security systems employing guard forces, physical barriers, and related measures applied by national authorities.

The United States is engaged in an active and extensive program of consultation with nations which receive U.S. nuclear material to strengthen physical security measures. We have found that our partners are well aware that their own interests in preventing the theft or seizure of materials within their borders is at least as strong as our own and they are cooperating fully in this endeavor. The International Atomic Energy Agency is also assisting in this effort by developing authoritative advice on the establishment of effective national physical security regimes.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES

How effective have our measures been against proliferation resulting from peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy? Today, more than 30 years after the commencement of large-scale production of fissionable materials by the United States, five additional countries have developed and tested nuclear devices. Only one country, India, has detonated a nuclear explosion making use of material produced under a program which was substantially assisted by outside sources under arrangements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the Indian case, the plutonium utilized was produced in a research reactor and was separated in a reprocessing plant built by India. These facilities were supplied under peaceful uses assurances that were not sufficiently clear to rule out the use of material for a nuclear explosion which was described as being for peaceful purposes. While there were provisions for inspection and reports, these did not have the effectiveness of current safeguards.

While the diversion of materials produced in the nuclear power fuel cycle is one possible route to proliferation, the facts I have cited indicate that the way employed so far has been the construction of simple facilities specifically designed for the production of fissionable materials. It was partly in recognition of this problem that the United States formulated, proposed, and actively supported the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),[5] which requires non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons from any sources and to subject even their independent and indigenous nuclear programs to peaceful use undertakings verified by safeguards.

We can conclude from the experience of the past that peaceful nuclear cooperation undertaken under sufficiently strong assurances and safeguards need not lead to proliferation. The one case where such co-

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[5] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

operation contributed to the development of a peaceful explosive device, as I have indicated, involved arrangements made at a very early stage of international nuclear cooperation which have not been duplicated in later arrangements.

Nevertheless, we cannot afford to be complacent about a risk of the magnitude entailed by possible further proliferation. Accordingly, we and other leading nuclear nations have been engaged in a thorough and fundamental review of policies relating to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

TECHNOLOGIES FOR REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT

Much of the concern in this respect has centered on the acquisition of facilities for reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear fuel, since it is these steps in the fuel cycle which allow the production of material of immediate usability in nuclear explosives.

Because there has been so much current discussion of the proliferation risks involved in the international transfer of facilities or technology for reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear fuel, I believe we should clearly understand the differences between them.

Reprocessing technology has long been unclassified, and there is much general information about it available. Our ability, therefore, is not unlimited as to how effectively we can restrain the spread of reprocessing capabilities.

On the other hand, the technology of uranium enrichment has remained for the most part classified and is not generally available. Furthermore, unlike reprocessing, the processes and equipment employed in uranium enrichment are far from conventional. Thus there is no readily available basis for undertaking uranium enrichment in most countries.

There are also significant differences among various enrichment processes and reprocessing as to the readiness with which weapons-usable material is obtainable. One of the purposes of reprocessing is to recover plutonium in usable form. An enrichment plant for producing light water power reactor fuel, however, need not produce highly enriched uranium. The conversion of enrichment plants designed to produce low-enriched uranium to the production of highly enriched material is not impossible; but it is, for some processes, very difficult and probably quite detectable.

REDUCING PROLIFERATION RISKS OF REPROCESSING

Much of our current effort in the field of nonproliferation is directed toward restraining the spread of reprocessing facilities under national control, while seeking concurrently to develop arrangements under which this step of the nuclear fuel cycle can take place with a minimum risk of proliferation.

Toward this end, in his U.N. speech of September 22 of this year, Secretary Kissinger called for the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers, which would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient reprocessing facilities, limit the possibility of diverting peaceful nuclear materials to national military use, and create a better framework for applying effective international safeguards.[6]

The IAEA is currently studying this concept, including the economic and technical factors related to such regional centers. The establishment of such centers involves difficult technical, economic, and political issues which cannot be resolved quickly. Nevertheless, their potential advantages, not only to the achievement of nonproliferation but to the economic development of nuclear power, clearly justify the most determined possible effort.

Another important and constructive development in reducing the proliferation risks of reprocessing is the proviso in recent agreements the French and Germans have negotiated with their nuclear customers that applies safeguards to the transfer of nuclear technology. Under this approach, the recipients of sensitive nuclear technology are required to place under safeguards not only the facilities which they receive from a nuclear supplier but any future facilities, including those built entirely on their own, which incorporate any of the sensitive technology originally supplied to them. This approach thus could bring under safeguards sensitive fuel cycle facilities which might otherwise come into existence without outside assistance.

The United States strongly favors this restraint on the export of any technology in sensitive areas, when such export takes place. At the same time, we believe additional restraint which will avoid the spread of sensitive fuel cycle facilities under national control is called for at the present time. It is for this reason that Secretary Kissinger, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly, made the proposal for the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers, a concept which, of course, is explicitly endorsed in House Concurrent Resolution 371.

Another area of importance is the evolution of international safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency has done an impressive job in establishing and implementing an effective safeguards system—the first of its kind in the world. As additional facilities and materials become subject to IAEA safeguards and especially as the more complex and sensitive facilities such as reprocessing plants are brought under safeguards, vigorous efforts will be required on the part of the Agency and its members to insure that effective safeguards are devised and applied. While the safeguarding of reprocessing plants and similar fuel cycle facilities is a technically difficult task, we believe there is no reason in principle why safeguards of a practical nature

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 475–476.

cannot provide a high degree of assurance that significant diversion will be detected.

While our policy of nuclear cooperation has as its primary goal the avoidance of nuclear proliferation, nuclear cooperation has other important goals. The economic and technical interdependence which results from the supply of U.S. reactors and nuclear fuel to other nations can strengthen political ties and can have an important stabilizing influence on international relations. Additionally, the sale of nuclear equipment and services is of substantial economic benefit to the United States, with sales to date estimated at more than $2 billion and cumulative sales through 1990 estimated at over $40 billion.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 371

Let me turn now to House Concurrent Resolution 371, introduced by you, Mr. Chairman [Clement J. Zablocki], (and the similar Senate Concurrent Resolution 69). First of all, I would like to reaffirm the commitment of the Department of State to the principles underlying both these resolutions.

With specific reference to the House resolution, operative paragraph 1 urges that after the provisos of the Vladivostok accord of November 1974 [7] are embodied in a treaty, immediate negotiations take place looking toward a further verifiable 20 percent reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and in the number of strategic missile launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

The Department of State does not believe it desirable or prudent to specify in advance a particular degree of reduction, since the size of the reduction would itself be one of the principal subjects of negotiation. The Department of State suggests the resolution be amended to urge a "substantial" reduction rather than specify a particular percentage to be achieved. (This same reservation applies to operative paragraph 1 of the Senate resolution.)

Operative paragraph 2 urges an adequately verifiable comprehensive agreement ending underground nuclear explosions, provided all nuclear-weapon states enter into such an agreement. The relevant paragraph in the Senate resolution omits the adherence question.

As you know, the United States is committed to the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty provided adequate verification measures can be achieved. The executive branch, however, has not determined that the adherence of all nuclear-weapon states is a prerequisite for the conclusion of such an agreement. The Department of State therefore would prefer that the resolution note the U.S. commitment to an adequately verifiable comprehensive test ban but leave open the adherence issue in order to avoid prejudging our position.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

Operative paragraph 3 of House Concurrent Resolution 371 urges a halt on further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology, and equipment to any country which has not accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear programs or which by January 1976 has not become a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty if all other major nuclear suppliers agree to a similar halt on such transfers. (The language of the comparable paragraph in Senate Concurrent Resolution 69 is virtually identical.)

The Department of State fully subscribes to the objective of universal NPT adherence and/or acceptance of IAEA safeguards and will continue to strive for this objective. As the resolution implicitly notes in the final clause of this paragraph, this objective is not currently shared by all consumers and suppliers. Hence, we welcome the resolution's recognition that an essential element is agreement among all other major nuclear suppliers on this question. In the absence of such agreement, the United States, by adopting such a policy unilaterally, would not only be relinquishing a major part of the international nuclear market to other suppliers, but also it would be seriously weakening its influence on the policies both of suppliers and recipient nations. Accordingly, we regard it as essential that we not unilaterally withdraw from nuclear supply to countries who are prepared, as the NPT requires of us, to accept safeguards on our assistance. By so doing, I think we are better able to exert influence toward the achievement of our nonproliferation objectives in countries that are non-NPT parties.

Operative paragraph 4 of House Concurrent Resolution 371 urges an agreement providing that the reprocessing of plutonium resulting from any transfer between countries of nuclear fuel, technology, or equipment be performed in regional facilities which are heavily protected and guarded under the strictest possible multinational safeguards. (The comparable paragraph in Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, while differing in language, is not substantively different.)

As I noted earlier in this statement, the establishment of such multinational centers is a U.S. objective; and we are working actively with the IAEA and in studying their economic and technical feasibility. We must recognize, however, that there is no unanimity as yet on the desirability of multinational centers, and there may be formidable economic, technical, and political problems which are as yet not well or widely understood. I believe that we should continue to work toward their establishment in a diligent way but would not immediately go so far as to require their use on a mandatory basis for all plutonium reprocessing. We also need to take into account that without general acceptance of the multinational concept, such a requirement could drive nations to develop indigenous and unsafeguarded reprocessing plants, thereby defeating our objectives. I would also note that paragraph 4 as written exempts from its provisions countries which could develop indigenous reactors utilizing indigenous fuel.

I hope these comments on the resolution will be helpful to the committee.

To return to the more general purpose of this hearing, I wish to emphasize my strong personal view that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not inevitable. But to avoid such proliferation will require diligent pursuit of a variety of complex political and technical measures which minimize the pressures for proliferation and at the same time erect effective controls against it.

We in the Department of State, along with our sister agencies in the executive branch, have been and will remain committed to such a course. I look forward to close and continuing cooperation with the Congress in this most important endeavor.

Television Interview of President Ford on Meet the Press: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extract], November 9, 1975 [1]

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MR. WILL. Mr. President, the Vladivostok agreement [2] limits the U.S. and the Soviet Union each to 2,400 strategic vehicles. That includes missiles and bombers. Studies done within our Government indicate that the Soviet Union's Backfire bombers are capable of taking off from Soviet bases and bombing U.S. cities. Is it your firm position that each Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted against that Soviet total of 2,400?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't believe I should discuss one of the most controversial issues in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Backfire is a weapons system that has a potential, although there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not its primary mission is one of intercontinental bombing. It is a very difficult decision among several others. And I don't believe that with the importance of those negotiations that I should make a categorical statement on this program as to how we might handle the problem of the Backfire.

MR. WILL. Is it a fair inference, from the fact that you won't take a firm position on that, that that is a position we are willing to negotiate away?

THE PRESIDENT. There are a number of other issues of equal importance where there might be some trade-off—I am not saying there will be—but there are some very complicated problems and the Backfire is one of them. But for me to make a decision here and to make an announcement on this program, I think, would not be the proper way for a President to handle these very sensitive negotiations.

MR. SPIVAK. We have less than 3 minutes, gentlemen. Mr. Broder.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 17, 1975, p. 1262.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

MR. BRODER. Just to follow on that, Mr. President, is SALT negotiations in a state that you have had to give up your hope of having a summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev this year?

THE PRESIDENT. There is far less likelihood that we will have a summit meeting this year. We are continuously negotiating here and with the group of technicians. But the timetable doesn't look encouraging for 1975. I don't think that is necessarily bad. Under no circumstances do I feel under pressure to get an agreement at a date certain. I want a good agreement rather than to be pressured into having an agreement by a precise date. And it seems to me that we are making headway slowly—very complex, very complicated problems, and Mr. Will brought up one of the most difficult ones.

We have to work at it because a SALT Two agreement is in the best interest of this country and the Soviet Union and the world at large. But we are not going to be pressured to get a bad agreement by a date certain.

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News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extracts], November 10, 1975 [1]

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Q. Mr. Secretary, where does the shakeup and the Soviet rejection of the latest American SALT proposal leave the negotiations now?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the shakeup is concerned and its impact on foreign policy, SALT and otherwise, the foreign policy of the United States is not conducted on the basis of personality. It is related to the permanent interests and values of the United States. And while it is absolutely inevitable that senior advisers of the President will disagree from time to time, we have the machinery by which decisions can be made, and those decisions should not be seen in terms of the prevalence of a particular individual or be conducted in terms of personalities.

Therefore our SALT position will reflect the best judgment of the President and of his advisers of what is in the long-term national interest of the United States. We believe that a SALT agreement, if it is balanced and reciprocal, is in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union and in the interests of world peace. And we will continue to pursue a SALT agreement.

Q. Is it now up to the United States to come up with a new proposal to present to the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't believe that the mere fact that the Soviet Union has rejected an American proposal requires us to come

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 1, 1975, pp. 776–777, 779–780.

forward with another one. We still are expecting some sort of reasoned response to our last proposal, and we cannot make a new decision until we see some modification in the Soviet position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in terms of the foreign policy you are talking about —the President's trip to China appears to be in some trouble; at least it is not going smoothly.

Secretary Kissinger: I read that in the press. It is not the case, but I don't want to contradict such a distinguished group.

Q. Well, it appears at least arrangements are not going smoothly. Your trip to China did not apparently go all that well. The summit with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] appears deferred until next year at least. And in an election year there is some doubt about getting an arms control agreement at all with the Russians. Where does that leave the whole structure of foreign policy today?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I cannot accept your premises. I don't accept the premise that my trip to China did not go well within the framework of what was possible and compared to other trips that other leaders of other countries have taken to China.

Secondly, the trip by the President to China is on schedule, and the appropriate announcements will be made in due time.

With respect to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, I do not believe that they should be accelerated because of elections nor should they be delayed because of elections. We will make those agreements that we consider in the national interest of the United States and without regard to the electoral process.

So I believe that the basic structure of American foreign policy is sound, that the essential elements are in place and will be continued to be pursued in the months ahead.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, your responses on SALT suggest that there is a a large chasm between our position and the Soviets'—so large, in fact, that we can't make another proposal until they modify their rejection. Could you elaborate for us exactly what went wrong? And wouldn't you agree that détente and SALT is in some crisis now?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I have said previously that I believe that 90 percent of the SALT agreement is substantially—or of the SALT negotiation—is substantially agreed to. The remaining 10 percent is of course of considerable significance. Now, it doesn't mean that the chasm is very wide or is unbridgeable. What it does mean is that when we make a serious proposal without getting a substantive response, we cannot establish the principle that all the other side has to do is to reject an American proposal in order to elicit another proposal.

I believe that the differences between us and the Soviet Union on SALT are bridgeable. I believe that an agreement on strategic arms limitations is in the national interest and is in the world interest, especially if you compare it with the alternatives that the nation will face and that the world will face if an arms race continues unchecked. So I am confident that, with a serious effort on both sides, these differences can be bridged.

As far as détente is concerned, I can only emphasize again what I have said repeatedly in public statements. Détente is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. Détente reflects an assessment of the basic national positions—in which strategic arsenals exist on both sides capable of destroying humanity; in which the United States must be able to demonstrate to its own people that if a confrontation occurs we will have done everything on our side to preserve the peace; in which if we look ahead at the problem historically, we do not want to be in a position where millions of people get killed in a war and afterward no one will be able to explain exactly what produced it except mock rhetoric.

If the Soviet Union threatens our national interests or the national interests of any of our allies, the United States will resist. The United States will not hold still for any hegemonial aspirations, but the United States will also make an effort to transcend the conflicts and the controversies of the cold war in order to build a better future for the people of this country and for the people of the world. That policy will continue.

As it stands now, on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, there is the stagnation that I have described. It is a stagnation which we are prepared to break. We are prepared to look for an honorable compromise. But it is up to the Soviet Union to be prepared also to make a compromise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, had you ever considered resigning from your office as Secretary of State because of the differences that occurred that have been alluded to by both the President and yourself this morning?

Secretary Kissinger: Never.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I may follow back that point, the President yesterday seemed to be hinting that he might be prepared to accept some sort of a compromise involving the Russian "Backfire" bomber. Would you discuss that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of the Backfire is a rather complicated technical issue which raises a number of questions. There is no dispute that the Backfire, on one-way missions, flying subsonically, can reach the United States from the Soviet Union. It is also a fact that the United States possesses many planes that are not being counted that on one-way missions can reach the Soviet Union. And therefore the problem concerns what categories—it falls into the issue of what categories

of weapons should be counted, especially when we get into what one really has to call "hybrid" systems that are designed for one mission but are also capable of carrying out another mission.

That is an important subject that has existed in the negotiations in which we are trying to find a solution and are prepared to listen to reasonable proposals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that it would require a meeting either between yourself and Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister] or Brezhnev and Ford to overcome the impasse itself. Is that under consideration, and would you conceive of a summit without a SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not conceive right now of a summit without a SALT agreement, certainly not a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States without a SALT agreement.

Q. Would that mean that Mr. Ford would meet him somewhere else?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no such plan. But a meeting between Gromyko and me, when either side has something important to say, we are of course prepared to do.

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Statement by the French Representative (Taittinger) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 10, 1975 [1]

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The thirtieth anniversary of our Organization gives us an opportunity to draw up a balance sheet of the efforts we have made and the results they have achieved. At the beginning of this session the Secretary-General painted a realistic picture of the situation existing at present. In regard to disarmament his observations are frankly discouraging. Before this Committee eminent representatives such as the representative of the Government of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, have also described the state of our world very realistically.

I do not wish to repeat here the analyses that have been made with such talent and insight. The idea I should like to emphasize is this: there is among the Members of this Assembly a convergence regarding the diagnosis to be made concerning disarmament.

First of all, the arms race proceeds apace, whether in nuclear or conventional armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This remark has become banal because it is obvious: every year the great Powers develop new weapons of mass destruction which are more accurate and perfected; they improve conventional systems as well; they

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2081 (prov.), pp. 33-46.

keep millions of men under arms. New States vie with one another in various parts of the world and in turn have access to the most sophisticated weapons.

This determination to over-arm entails a considerable squandering of manpower, intelligence and resources of all kind, at a time when the world is suffering from serious economic difficulties and when development and nutrition problems require urgent solutions.

I believe it is a good thing to repeat these truths and it is not unreasonable that many voices should be raised to denounce what, from a world point of view, is a scandal and a dangerous absurdity, at a time when unquestionable progress is being made in the field of political détente.

The President of the French Republic, in the course of his recent trip to Moscow, reminded us of this. Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said:

> It is desirable that détente in political relations among States be extended in due course to two levels: détente in the field of armaments which can only be validly achieved on a world-wide level and under effective control, while respecting the capacity of the countries concerned to ensure their security independently, and détente in ideological competition to ensure that the rivalry between economic and social systems which are different by reason of the nature of the peoples and objective facts does not lead to undue tension.

And now, let us look at our agenda. At the present session we shall have to deal with 19 disarmament items. Within a few weeks we shall probably have added about 30 new resolutions to the hundreds which our Organization has already adopted on the subject.

I cannot help asking myself a number of questions: is there not a close correlation between the lack of concrete results in the field of disarmament, and this disturbing proliferation of items and resolutions? Further, what is the impact of our work on the ongoing arms race? In what way can we relate and articulate all of the reactions and counter-reactions in our deliberations with reality? In a word, to what extent is our Organization, by its procedures and methods, responsible for the almost unanimously recognized failure of disarmament?

To these questions, the replies one might give are likely to give rise to lengthy disputes.

Nevertheless, I should like to submit some considerations to the Committee. First of all, our Organization cannot be held responsible for our failure to control the arms race; we must blame the selfishness and lack of foresight of States, and also the prevailing sense of distrust in international relations. I do not believe that this is the place to go into details on this subject. What I wanted to stress before going any further is that the responsibility of our Organization—if responsibility there is—is due not to action, but to omission. We might perhaps be criticized for not having done either exactly what should have been done or all that should have been done.

This criticism in itself is grave because disarmament constitutes one of our essential preoccupations under the Charter. In the case of the

General Assembly, does not Article 11 require it to study this problem in particular?

There are but three possible attitudes:

Some say that our Organization adequately fulfils its role and exercises both a positive and beneficial influence. Last year the representative of the Soviet Union endorsed this view with eloquence and conviction, by listing the agreements and the treaties in the preparation of which our Organization co-operated, presenting these as so many successes, and considering them to be evidence of effectiveness. I do not share this optimism, which, unfortunately, seems to me to be contrary to the facts. If we are to pronounce judgment, it must be global. Disarmament is in bad shape. If we wish to be indulgent, let us say that it would be in even worse shape without action by our Organization. Is that any consolation?

Others are more severe. They feel that our Organization exercises no influence, either good or bad. Going even further, they maintain that disarmament has not even begun. While States continue to arm in line with their interests, we continue useless discussions, viewed with indifference and scepticism of world public opinion, cynical theologians of a Byzantium expanded to cover the dimensions of the whole earth.

I rather fear that in certain circles that is the impression we give, and the reason for it lies in our refusal to give issues the importance they deserve and to take up the only item which should be on our agenda: the limitation, the reduction and finally the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Compared with this problem, the others lose much of their significance: however desirable partial measures may be, and sometimes they are indeed desirable, in studying them we are not taking up genuine disarmament, which would really deliver mankind from nuclear terror and this omission deprives them of effectiveness and meaning, measures which in another context might be positive.

Actually, we are going round in circles, ignoring the central problem of nuclear disarmament without which there cannot be genuine and complete disarmament, and all our attempts boil down to trying to proceed by oblique means and biased methods which are doomed to failure.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty will perhaps prevent some States from acquiring nuclear weapons. It does not mean that there will be a single nuclear missile less in the arsenals, nor that States will refrain from increasing the number of weapons and from perfecting them. The prohibition of nuclear tests will have no impact on delivery systems of Powers which have already fully mastered the techniques involved.

Herein resides the weakness of our work. For many years my Government has expressed its concern on this point. It is our firm conviction that by refusing to consider this fundamental problem of nuclear disarmament, our Organization and our Committee remain condemned to paralysis. It may be that this problem cannot be dealt with because

of the opposition of certain Powers or because of considerations of world balance. If that is so, should we not state it clearly?

Others, finally, believe that the partial measures which we have been seeking for 15 years have helped to create an erroneous impression of progress, thus distracting our attention from the true problem. The balance sheet of our efforts is therefore not non-existent but negative.

I would not go that far, but, frankly, I fail to understand how we can be pleased at the multiplication of agenda items. On the contrary, this trend seems to be dangerous and likely to accentuate the short-comings from which our system is supposed to be suffering. Ultimately, we cannot escape a judgment of conscience. Action must be assessed in terms of the results. Despite the multiplication of our resolutions, and despite the signature of new agreements on partial points, and despite the implementation of new regulatory measures bearing on certain conventional weapons, we have not accomplished and we are not going to accomplish, in the immediate future, the mission entrusted to us, and inevitably we shall be judged severely.

Now, Marcel Proust, in his book, *"A la recherche du Temps Perdu"*—a title which would inspire us to do some serious thinking—wrote: "The 'notwithstandings' are, after all, only the 'becauses'". I feel that under this formula we will be blamed for having rendered more difficult the solution of the problems which we ought to solve.

While this analysis is obviously arguable, none can challenge the fact that the disarmament is blocked and that chances for global settlement have never seemed more remote. What are the consequences of that stagnation?

The two most important military Powers continue conversations between themselves so as to arrive at a balance in the field of strategic weapons. The results obtained are certainly positive because nothing would be more dangerous than a disorderly and uncontrolled escalation of nuclear weapons. We must be pleased and wish success to these Powers for their decisions of principle arrived at during the Vladivostok talks in November 1974,[2] setting ceilings to their nuclear delivery systems and expecting to go on to a reduction of the atomic stockpiles, as they have indicated that they intended to do.

However, how can we not consider that the SALT talks, because of the very balance that they established, are the negation of nuclear disarmament? These balances by definition require maintaining nuclear strategic weapons at a high level.

Faced with this situation, a number of less powerful States have decided to acquire, in turn, their nuclear deterrent force. As regards my country, the limited character of this force removes all offensive meaning from it and makes it an instrument solely intended to discourage a possible aggressor and to preserve the independence of our nation.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746-750.

There is a third category of countries which are suffering directly from the effects of this situation. I am speaking of States which, because of their natural resources, or their industrial development, have mastered the basics of nuclear technology, or are about to do so, and are therefore able, or will be shortly, to acquire nuclear weapons.

How can these countries not be tempted also to acquire a nuclear deterrent force? What valid reasons have been given them so far to divert them from their choice? What advantages and what counterparts have been offered them? I see none. The continued nuclear arms race, on the contrary, constitutes for these States an encouragement to proliferation. The scope of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [3] would certainly have been different if the commitments entered into by the nuclear Powers had been carried in a manner more in keeping with the letter and the spirit of that treaty.

In this connexion, I should like to state that my country has always complied with the principle which it set for itself, not to encourage nuclear-weapon proliferation in any way even though we have not signed the Treaty because of its discriminatory character. In regard to the criticisms that have been made in respect to this judgment, I shall simply point out, so as to avoid vain and useless polemics, that the criticisms seem to be groundless. Furthermore, since in the course of this debate questions have been raised regarding the sale by France of nuclear equipment to South Korea, I wish to make it clear that these deliveries were subject not only to all IAEA controls, but also to even stricter additional provisions.

One cannot in this field claim both one thing and its opposite. The developing countries are anxious, and rightly so, to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes so as to promote the economic and social progress of their populations. One cannot envisage excluding them, South Korea no more than the others, from these benefits, it being understood that every precaution must be taken to prevent the diversion of techniques and fissionable materials for military purposes.

Other States, to solve the problem of their security, seek to become isolated from the nuclear peril. They believe that they will thus exorcise it. This is the view that has led to the proposals on denuclearized zones, which have increased substantially since last year. In due course, I shall state my Government's position regarding them.

May I today refer to them merely in the context of a conflict between great Powers. It is true that such a conflict does not appear to threaten the world at present, but it is on such an assumption that we must base ourselves to be able to appreciate the nuclear peril. The experience of the last two world wars has taught us that armed confrontation between great Powers knows neither limits nor boundaries. The barriers which some thought they had raised, by proclaiming their neutrality, were less respected in the course of the Second World War than in the

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[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461-465.

First. Why believe that they would be more protected in the future when the range of modern weapons is such that they can reach any part of the world?

And what would remain of the countries which believe themselves to be neutral if the thousands of missiles which the great Powers possess, raise hundreds of tons of radioactive dust, which will be carried by the winds and the waters to the four corners of the world? In reality there is only one solution and everybody knows it: world security can only come about through the implementation of general and complete disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament carried out under effective international control.

Removal of obstacles to this enterprise does not depend upon us. My country is always prepared to join with any reasonable effort which it deems likely to lead to a resumption of the search for real and effective disarmament. Thus, when it was proposed, we indicated our support for the idea of having a meeting of the five nuclear Powers to discuss nuclear disarmament among themselves. We favourably viewed and supported the idea of a world disarmament conference which could define new objectives and new procedures for action. In this connexion, I shall quote from the Franco-Soviet Declaration of 17 October:

> The two parties pronounce themselves in favour of convening a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all nuclear Powers in the preparation and work of this conference, which is to make an essential contribution to progress toward general and complete disarmament and to freeing mankind from the burden of armaments.[4]

Were new initiatives to be proposed in this spirit and with this determination, my country would consider them with the same interest and the same will to help make them a success.

Those are the general considerations which I wished to develop before this audience. My delegation, in respect of certain specific agenda items, will have an opportunity to make more detailed observations.

To some, this statement may seem excessively pessimistic. I shall proffer no apologies. I think that nothing could be more dangerous in present circumstances than an optimism by command, which is regularly denied by facts.

Only a clear-sighted pessimism, an impelling doubt, with full regard for the demands of realism and based on analysis without complacency, can enable us to arrive at this awareness, which remains the prior condition for the necessary renaissance of a genuine disarmament enterprise.

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[4] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXVII, no. 42 (Nov. 12, 1975), p. 15.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 10, 1975 [1]

Questions of disarmament in contemporary international life are assuming ever growing importance. They are becoming particularly important and significant because progress towards solving these problems promotes a further easing of international tension and helps to convert it into an irreversible process. The broad range of questions on disarmament under consideration at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and also the great attention which almost all delegations devoted to these questions in the general debate at the beginning of the session indicate the tremendous interest of the overwhelming majority of States in the problem of disarmament and is an expression of their tireless determination to strive for a cessation of the arms race, the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the creation of conditions for strengthening international peace and security.

The Soviet Union attaches particular significance to questions of disarmament and is persistently striving for progress in the solution of these problems. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement in the general debate at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 23 September, stressed that questions of disarmament occupy an important place in the foreign policy of the Soviet State. He said:

> The struggle for disarmament has always been and continues to be an integral part of the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union. The USSR is a permanent and active participant in negotiations on various aspects of the disarmament problem.[2]

We note with satisfaction that the present international situation is propitious for the consideration of the question of disarmament in the Assembly, as evidenced in particular by the successful conclusion of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in which the leaders of 35 States took part. That Conference and the Final Act which was unanimously adopted was the beginning of a new stage of the easing of tension not only in Europe but throughout the world, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

As we know, a great deal of attention was also devoted at that Conference to questions of strengthening trust and stability, restraining the arms race and bringing about disarmament. The Final Act provides that States parties will

> take effective measures . . . which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.[3]

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2082 (prov.), pp. 3–20.
[2] *Ante*, p. 483.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 304–308.

Summing up the results of the Conference, the General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, in his statement of 31 July this year, stated that:

> It is precisely the materialization of détente which is the essence of everything that is needed to make peace in Europe genuinely stable and unshakable, and we regard as a corner-stone of this task the halting of the arms race and the achievement of real results in disarmament.[4]

In pointing to the important events which have occurred recently in the growth of the process of international détente and in the carrying out of individual measures in the realm of the limitation of armaments and in disarmament, we must nonetheless note the inadequacy of the progress made towards disarmament as a whole. We believe that all that we have been able to do so far in the field of disarmament represents merely the first steps. Indeed, mankind has not yet been able to call a halt to the arms race, or even substantially to reduce its pace. It is continuing, in terms not only of the expenditure of ever growing financial and material resources, but of the creation of ever more destructive means of waging war, as well as the accumulation of the general total volume of armaments.

Agreeing on and putting into effect measures on the limiting of armaments and on disarmament are extremely complicated processes which require great efforts, good-will and readiness to co-operate on the part of States. In order to make progress in solving the important problems in the field of disarmament, we need readiness to co-operate in this matter by all States possessing a considerable military potential, and above all by the nuclear Powers.

Without the participation of a broad range of States in the preparation, acceptance and implementation of such measures, a major advance in disarmament is difficult to envisage. Disarmament affects all States without exception, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. At the same time, we must acknowledge that special responsibility in solving the problem of limiting the arms race and disarmament is borne primarily by the major military Powers, including of course all the nuclear Powers.

In solving the problems of disarmament an important principle must be observed, that is, the principle of ensuring that no damage is done to the security of anyone whatsoever, as well as the principle that any benefit flowing from such measures should go to all States participating in their implementation. Any efforts to solve the problem of disarmament without observing this principle and insisting on agreements in disregard of this principle are doomed to failure.

When we come to tackle the problems of disarmament, our task is to find ways of putting them into effect, in keeping with the interest of the security of all States parties to the agreement. To make progress towards a solution of the problems of disarmament, we must intensify

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[4] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXVII, no. 31 (Aug. 27, 1975), p. 13 (variant translation).

the work of existing international forums which are dealing with these problems. At the same time, it is important to endeavour to involve as many States as possible in these activities.

The delegation of the USSR is firmly convinced that in order to bring about a global solution to these problems there must be an early convening of a world disarmament conference in which all States, without exception, would take part on an equal footing and in accordance with the principle of equality. The convening of that conference would promote the development and strengthening of the favourable trend in international relations which has been emerging in recent years as a result of efforts to ease international tension and the conclusion of a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements on the problem of limiting armaments, and on disarmament. At that conference, all countries could set forth and compare their views on the questions of disarmament, comprehensively, as they relate to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional types of weapons and armed forces. A comprehensive exchange of views at the conference would make it possible to identify more clearly the position of all States on the various aspects of the problem of disarmament and by our joint efforts to determine the most effective ways and means of solving this problem.

The work of the conference would, of course, promote more purposeful activity by States towards coming to an agreement on measures in the field of disarmament. It would facilitate a determination of the most urgent aspects of the problem of disarmament which require immediate solution and indicate practical ways and means of limiting and halting the arms race. The convening of a world conference has become a necessity.

Four previous sessions of the General Assembly have favoured the idea of holding a world disarmament conference. The appeal for convening it has been heard in the most important forums of the non-aligned countries: those held in Cairo, Georgetown, Lusaka, Algiers and Lima. A world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries would represent the most authoritative international forum on problems of disarmament.

The Soviet Union once again confirms its readiness actively to cooperate with all States, both within the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and outside it, in a search for a successful solution of the problems of preparing and convening the conference.

The time has come to make energetic efforts to conclude the preparatory work for the conference, including the preparation of the conference's agenda. In the light of the work already done over two years by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, there is every ground for believing that the world conference can be and should be convened as soon as possible.[5]

An important event directly connected with the problem of disarmament was the Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-

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[5] For the Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 485–492.

tion of Nuclear Weapons, held in May of this year.[6] That Conference made a great and useful contribution to strengthening of the régime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The preparatory work for convening that Conference has already encouraged accession to the Treaty by new parties. The number of States parties to the Treaty is now close to 100.

At the same time, we cannot fail to be concerned at the fact that a number of so-called near-nuclear States have not become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have not yet assumed international obligations with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further efforts are necessary to strengthen that Treaty, to enhance its effectiveness and to increase the number of parties to it.

A solution of the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons will, to a considerable extent, determine the reduction and elimination of the threat of nuclear war. We must also make efforts to ensure fuller participation by States in other international agreements which relate to arms limitation. The broad participation of States in international instruments in this field enhances their greater effectiveness in achieving the goals which have been through the conclusion of appropriate international agreements.

Turning now to the consideration of individual questions of disarmament which are on the agenda of this session, I should like first of all to point out two important initiatives of the Soviet Union whose purpose is to achieve new agreements in the field of arms limitation.

It is well known from previous statements of the USSR delegation in the First Committee that we have in mind proposals to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons [7] and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.[8] I therefore do not intend, in this statement, to go into those questions.

To turn to the disarmament problems considered in the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the USSR delegation would like first to emphasize a problem on which considerable progress has been achieved—that is, the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes. The need for such a prohibition is occasioned by the fact that recently, as everyone is now aware, the possibility has emerged of actively influencing the natural environment and climate. At present, that possibility is being used for purposes fundamentally useful to mankind. However, the advances in the development of means and methods for taking action to influence the natural environment make it possible to use such means and methods for military and other hostile purposes. The use of certain means of influencing the natural environment can have results that in the long term, over a period of decades,

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[6] See *ante*, pp. 146–157.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 479–482, 495.
[8] *Ante*, pp. 460–463, 486–490.

can have a devastating effect on the state of the environment and human living conditions. At present a solution to this problem is more attainable and less complicated. If, however, such means of influencing nature become more widespread and are introduced into the arms races of States as a means of waging war and for other hostile purposes, the prohibition of such means clearly will become more complicated.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, a resolution was adopted at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly containing a demand that effective measures be taken to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, and also requesting the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to the achievement of agreement on the text of an appropriate convention.[9]

In subsequent talks between the USSR and the United States, the text of a draft convention on that problem was agreed upon, and on 21 August this year it was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.[10] The introduction of that draft convention to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States has opened the way to the development of an international agreement prohibiting action to influence the natural environment for military or other hostile purposes. The implementation of such a measure would be a useful, indeed an essential step towards calling a halt to the arms race in this area which is so dangerous to mankind because it could be significantly developed as a means of waging war.

The USSR delegation would like to express the hope that this, the thirtieth, session of the General Assembly will devote the proper attention to this problem and will call on the Committee on Disarmament to make every effort to accelerate the achievement of a final agreement on a draft convention on the subject, to be submitted to the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly for its approval.

For a number of years the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament have been considering the question of the total prohibition of chemical weapons. So far, however, there has not been any real progress towards a solution. But the problem of prohibiting such weapons is an urgent one. To solve it would considerably facilitate the elimination of the threat of war in which such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons would be used. The Soviet Union is in favour of the total prohibition of all chemical means of waging war. That position was expressed in the draft convention submitted in 1972 to the Committee on Disarmament by the socialist countries.[11]

Since it has so far not been possible to solve this problem on the basis of the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the USSR believes that as a first step towards that end it is important to conclude an international

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[11] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 120–124.

convention relating to the most dangerous and deadly chemical means of waging war. With that purpose in mind the USSR and the United States have agreed to consider the question of a joint initiative with regard to the conclusion of such an international agreement.[12] The Soviet side would like to express the hope that such an agreement will be put into effect very rapidly.

The USSR delegation believes that the General Assembly, after having comprehensively considered the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, should recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it accelerate the discussions on this problem in order to prepare and agree on as soon as possible an international agreement prohibiting, as a first step, the most dangerous and deadly forms of chemical weapons.

An important event, of historical significance, this year in the realm of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war was the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.[13] It can be pointed out also that the United States ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.[14] Efforts must be made to ensure that all the other States that have not yet done so become parties to that Protocol.

The Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that the consideration by the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the problem of chemical weapons will finally make possible progress towards the complete and effective prohibition and destruction of these dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

Among the disarmament questions, considerable significance attaches to the task of implementing the General Assembly's recommendation on the reduction of the military budgets of the five permament members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries.[15] Taking such a measure would represent an important step towards limiting the arms race, and that would very substantially facilitate the economic and social progress of all countries, including the developing countries. Such a step would have a positive effect on the international situation as a whole and would promote the further easing of tension in the world. The Soviet Union has already stated its readiness to agree to such a measure if all the other permanent members of the Security Council are equally ready to do so.

A concrete disarmament measure, the reduction of the military budgets of the five Powers who are the permanent members of the Security Council, cannot be replaced by various forms of technical research into

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[12] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 236.
[13] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133-138. The treaty entered into force on March 26, 1975.
[14] See *ante*, pp. 6-7.
[15] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 784-786.

the comparative structures of military budgets, by studying the idea of their standardization or by determining what is a military budget, and so on. And we would point out with regret that in the history and practice of considering problems of disarmament, we have quite often seen instances in which the taking of a specific step has been replaced by various kinds of trumped-up research work which does not advance the cause of disarmament one inch, which simply diverts attention from the solution of any given practical task in the field of disarmament and serves as a kind of smokescreen to cover up reluctance not only to disarm but also to take partial disarmament measures.

Moreover, in certain developed and, unfortunately, in certain developing States, too, an active escalation of military budgets is taking place. Ministries of Defence are making tremendous efforts to urge the legislative bodies to make even larger appropriations for swelling military budgets. The Soviet Union considers that the trend should be quite the reverse: measures must be taken to implement the decisions of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly with regard to the reduction of the military expenditures of the permanent members of the Security Council.

At the previous session of the General Assembly and at sessions of the Disarmament Committee this year, a great deal of attention was devoted to the question of creating nuclear-free zones. A comprehensive study on this question, prepared by a group of governmental experts under the aegis of the Disarmament Committee has been presented at this session of the General Assembly.[16]

As already stated by representatives of the USSR at various international meetings, the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the problem of nuclear-free zones, and has as its goal encouragement of the creation of such zones in various parts of the world. This attitude is based on the belief that the creation of nuclear-free zones would facilitate efforts directed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would strengthen both the security of States in these areas and international security as a whole. Agreements on nuclear-free zones would be a valuable supplement to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [17] and would thus help to consolidate the non-proliferation régime.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly set forth at various international meetings, and particularly in the Disarmament Committee, its position on the creation of nuclear-free zones. The USSR believes that any agreement creating such a zone should genuinely ensure the converting of the territory of the States in question into a zone totally free from nuclear weapons, and exclude any possible loop-holes for violating the nuclear-free status of the zone in question. Such an agreement should ensure the full and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons in the

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[16] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.
[17] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

territory of nuclear-free zones and, of course, in the territory of all States forming part of the zone, thus transforming the area into an atom-proof zone. Every participant in the agreement must be absolutely certain that the States Parties to the agreement are fulfilling the obligations they have assumed under these agreements and that the nuclear-free zones will really remain nuclear-free.

The position of the Soviet Union in regard to the proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones in any part of the world will be determined in each individual case in the light of the specific content of these proposals, and also of the attitude of other States towards it, particularly the States which would form part of a proposed zone. The study prepared by the Group of Experts will, in the view of the Soviet Union, promote the proper understanding of the positions of States on the question of creating nuclear-free zones and is a useful analysis of the problems relating to the creation of nuclear-free zones, an analysis which will undoubtedly be much used in the taking of specific steps in this field by the States of the various zones.

The Soviet delegation would like, before concluding its statement, to point out that there are many other important questions which require solution. These include the question of the implementation of the solemn declaration of the General Assembly on behalf of the States Members of the Organization renouncing the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (resolution 2936 (XXVII)).[18] The Security Council must take appropriate measures to implement this declaration of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, the USSR delegation would like to stress that the Soviet Union, as a champion of the limitation and reduction of armaments and of disarmament ever since the Great October Socialist Revolution and from the very first days of the founding of the United Nations, is striving for the implementation of concrete measures which will make it possible not only to halt the arms race, to prevent the creation of new forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction, but also to undertake a radical reduction of armaments and armed forces in the interests of all States and peoples, without exception—the whole of mankind.

The delegation of the USSR would like to express the hope that the consideration at this session of the General Assembly of the broad range of disarmament questions on the agenda of the session, will be a new and important step forward and provide momentum for further concrete talks on these problems. We expect Member States of the United Nations to show themselves ready to seek practical ways of making progress towards the limitation and cessation of the arms race and towards disarmament.

The agenda of this session of the General Assembly contains many important items relating to the problem of disarmament. In setting

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[18] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 848-849.

forth the views of the Soviet Union on a number of these questions, the delegation of the USSR intends to touch upon other questions, too, at subsequent meetings of the First Committee.

Statement by Swedish Prime Minister Palme to the General Assembly [Extract], November 11, 1975 [1]

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One remaining process must now be set in motion. The immense and growing technological capacities must be reoriented in order to fulfil basic human needs. The human, technological and economic resources squandered on armaments are the most glaring example of misuse. Annual expenditure on armaments now approaches the level of $300 billion. This equals the total income of the countries where the poorest half of mankind live. Roughly half the world's scientific and technical manpower is now employed in improving existing weapons and developing new ones. Who can defend a world order based on such grotesque priorities?

Never in history has the capacity of man to destroy himself, his civilization and his physical environment been greater than today. And it is constantly growing. Yet, no solution has been found to break out of this vicious process. The record of past efforts is depressing. Already before the First World War attempts were made to achieve agreements on the reduction of armaments. They failed. The League of Nations devoted many years of hard work to the task of disarmament. In vain. And we as Members of the United Nations committed ourselves to work for disarmament. The history of our Organization is replete with the records of our failure.

What went wrong as we strove so hard to prove the rationality of this or that disarmament measure? In my opinion the answer is only partly to be found in the inadequacy of negotiating methods or the technical solutions offered for complicated disarmament problems. The reasons for failure in breaking the deadlock are basically political and related to what the Secretary-General has termed "a crisis of confidence" among States. The climate of distrust between nations has always nourished irrational behaviour on security matters. When distrust reigns, Governments tend to regard any changes in the external situation in the perspective of potential threats to their national security. Few politicians wish to attract criticism for negligence or lack of foresight in matters as serious as those of national security. Even in cases where all experts may agree that a reduction of armaments is possible and necessary—let us say for economic reasons—there is a strong reluctance on the part of the political decision makers to tie the new level to an inter-

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[1] A/PV.2401 (prov.), pp. 37–45.

national commitment. It is inevitably argued that times may change and that national freedom of movement must not be curtailed.

Impediments to agreements on disarmament seem to be built into the very structure of our societies. This is how, in a climate of distrust, the world continues on the absurd course of spiralling armaments.

Looking back at the last 30 years, we find that some stages of the history of disarmament could properly be described as moments of lost opportunities. But the glimmer of hope has always been followed by failure and disillusion. In my opinion, we are today facing another moment of similar significance. Only this time the price for failure seems higher than ever. Détente and the tide of democratization of the international community give rise to the expectation that it will prove possible to curb the nuclear arms race. At the same time, however, the potential danger of a new round of nuclear arms proliferation stemming from the widespread fission technology for peaceful energy purposes is imminent.

This time we cannot allow events to get out of hand. Mankind must become the master of technology, not its victim. The newly manifested will for mutual confidence and for a just world order must be mobilized. Pretensions to supremacy based on the possession of nuclear arms are, in the long run, inconsistent with a world in search of independence and equality. We must mobilize a new political momentum for progress in disarmament. Every country must view the problem of its own security in a broader context than that of military defence against an armed attack. Investments in political confidence are often as important to national security as investments in armaments.

It is true, of course, that most of the countries which live in peace with their immediate neighbours nevertheless build up costly defence establishments. This is due, as is the case in my own country, to fear that a conflict between the great Powers may spread also to territories of countries not directly concerned. Détente between these Powers, accompanied by measures of genuine disarmament, would consequently remove most of the basic motives for military expenditure in various parts of the world.

Another problem has been the exaggerated secrecy surrounding the size and the use of government expenditure for military purposes. I realize that certain details of a country's military preparedness cannot be made public. But I am convinced that, if at least information on the main chapters of military expenditure which are now kept secret—mainly because of mistrust but perhaps also by tradition or bureaucracy—was released, and realistic means of international comparison were devised, it would be found that considerable outlays for military purposes were unnecessary.

Attention must also be focused on a particularly objectionable trend in military technology. As in the case of nuclear weapons, great human and technological resources are employed to improve existing conventional weapons and to develop new ones. In this process, we know, there

is a risk of producing not only effective but also exceedingly cruel weapons. From a humanitarian point of view, it is of great importance that increased attention be paid to existing and new particularly cruel conventional weapons and that efforts be made to achieve restrictions or prohibitions of use of such weapons and, eventually, agreement on their elimination.

A considerable expansion in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is now going on throughout the world. This provides us with great resources of energy which is cheap and much less detrimental to the environment compared with fossil fuels, which at present are the main alternatives. At the same time, the use of nuclear power involves considerable problems. Partly, new factors come into play. This means that caution must be observed when extending the use of nuclear power and that intensive efforts must be made to solve the manifold problems of security. It does not mean, however, that we should refrain from further developing this source of energy.

A problem on which we must now focus international attention is the risk that the accumulation of plutonium can facilitate the production of nuclear weapons. This is also the most urgent disarmament problem facing us at present.

Each of us has to shoulder his particular responsibility in this context—nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, parties and non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),[2] exporters and importers of nuclear materials, small as well as big countries. We all have some measure of responsibility for the turn of events and we must act together in this matter, in which the shape of the future of all of us is at stake.

How can the danger of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons be averted? The obvious prerequisite is, of course, that those two Powers which started the nuclear race assume the responsibilities which are theirs. They have to comply with their treaty obligations and solemn pledges to the world community to reach real results in their talks on nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers are entitled to demand such compliance.

The great Powers have acquired the potential to destroy each other completely and many times over, and the rest of the world as well. Still they continue their nuclear arms race as if they could somehow gain added security or leverage. And all these outlays are made on weapons the use of which, according to their possessors, must be avoided at all costs. Détente must provide the opportunity for the two nuclear giants finally to break out of this deadly spiral. And other countries which possess nuclear weapons must follow.

The States contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons have to face the responsibilities which are theirs. If they should choose to step over the threshold, they would disrupt the efforts to uphold the non-

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

proliferation régime to which the majority of the members of the world community adhere. They would increase the probability of the outbreak of a nuclear war, which could not but cause disaster to all of us.

Exporters of nuclear material have their particular responsibility. It is imperative that they follow the recommendation of the NPT Review Conference [3] and agree on arrangements to the effect that exports of nuclear material will take place only if all the peaceful activities of importing States not parties to the NPT are placed under safeguards.

Importers of nuclear material and equipment should accept this obligation in the interest of all of us. This is a matter of equity. The majority of the world community has accepted the obligations which the NPT imposes on them. The others should follow.

We must all work towards further improvements of the existing safeguards against nuclear proliferation. In the long-term perspective, an international system for the management of the whole nuclear power cycle from the uranium mine to the final storage of highly radioactive waste should be aimed at. National solutions will not be adequate.

There is a clear connexion between disarmament and the quest for a new economic order. The human, material and technological resources spent on armaments represent an immense potential source for development. If we succeeded in halting the arms race and starting the process of disarmament, this source could be utilized for progress on the road to greater economic and social justice. This, in its turn, would strengthen our possibilities for dealing in a more effective way with the political, economic and social injustices which are the ultimate causes of war.

What is now needed is a world-wide recognition of this interconnexion. I am optimistic enough to believe that, if the question is put in such a perspective, people everywhere who now look upon the insane armaments race with feelings of helplessness will claim a halt in the race as their right. That is a new situation which statesmen everywhere will have to take into account.

Finally, the United Nations is our central political forum. It is here that we must mobilize the political determination necessary for breaking the present deadlock in disarmament. Sweden is therefore fully behind the Secretary-General when he emphasizes the necessity to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to cope with this tremendous task.

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[3] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Huang) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 11, 1975 [1]

In his speech at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chairman of the Chinese delegation already expounded our principled position on the question of disarmament. Now I would like to elaborate further our views on some related questions.

The Chinese delegation has repeatedly pointed out that the current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and that the situation is excellent. A serious capitalist economic crisis plagues most parts of the world. All the basic contradictions in the world are further sharpening. The trend of revolution by the people of the world is actively developing. Meanwhile, the contention between the two super-Powers for world hegemony has become more and more intense. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing.

In making a judgement one always has to base himself not on the words of some people but on their actual deeds, from which one derives an assessment in keeping with the objective reality and formulates the correct policies. The stark reality is: Those who shout themselves hoarse about "détente" and "disarmament" are precisely the super-Powers which are stepping up the arms race. For instance, in 1962 the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by the United States were approximately four times those of the Soviet Union. Yet since the successive conclusion between the Soviet Union and the United States of the partial test ban Treaty in 1963,[2] the Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic arms in 1972 [3] and the Agreement of Vladivostok in 1974,[4] the Soviet Union has kept on accelerating its nuclear arms expansion, and the ICBMs possessed by the Soviet Union have now reached a level at least more than a dozen times that of 1962, which has already exceeded the present level of the United States.

The agreement in principle reached at the United States-Soviet summit meeting last November on the "limitation" of strategic offensive arms is in effect an agreement on expanding and improving strategic arms. Immediately upon the signing of this agreement, the two sides started a new round in their nuclear arms race. The more Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the more new-type weapons, such as MIRVs, cruise missiles and Backfire bombers, and not the fewer! As for the European Security Conference, which the Soviet Union has lauded to the skies, we have long dubbed it a European Insecurity Conference. The European Security Conference has not in the least changed the tense situation of prolonged armed confrontation in Europe. What is more, even when the European Security Conference was being pre-

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2084 (prov.), pp. 18–32.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 202 ff.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746–750.

pared and when it was in session, the Soviet Union renewed its equipment and reinforced its armed forces in Eastern Europe, concentrating more military forces in the seas of northern Europe and the Mediterranean and even stretching its tentacles to the Iberian Peninsula. Immediately after the conclusion of the Conference, the Soviet Union violated Norway's airspace several times and unscrupulously carried out military provocations in the Barents Sea. How can one find here a shadow of the so-called "irreversibility of détente"? As to its clamour for "complementing political détente by military détente", it is all the more downright deceptive talk.

In fact there is no political détente, still less military détente, in the world today. What persists is the intensified contention between the two hegemonic Powers and their frenzied arms expansion, as well as the increasing factors for war arising therefrom. If this is not the case, why should the Soviet Union frantically develop conventional armed forces in addition to energetically developing nuclear arms, and maintain an offensive posture far exceeding its defence needs? The actual situation is: not only in certain aspects of the development of nuclear weapons has the Soviet Union surpassed the United States, but in the conventional arms race the former has expanded faster than the latter. The tonnage of Soviet naval warships and vessels has doubled, and the total amount of its nuclear submarines has exceeded that of the United States. The Soviet Union is also stepping up the construction of aircraft carriers, expanding its naval force into one capable of attacking in distant oceans. Its fleets have penetrated into various oceans and seas, grabbing military bases and installations everywhere. The global naval exercise carried out by the Soviet Union last April was a military rehearsal with the aim of a pre-emptive global war.

At the same time, the Soviet naval chieftain openly clamoured that the Soviet fleets had become "a long-distance offensive military service" ready to sail to "all places called for by Soviet security interests". Soviet official circles have boasted that the Soviet Union is now "on a historic offensive along the entire front of the global confrontation" and that the Soviet armed forces have already acquired "capabilities for a global war", ready to deal "crushing blows" at the opponent "in surprise".

People understand what the super-Powers are up to when they try to outstrip each other in constant arms expansion and in making such a huge quantity of weapons which cannot be used as food or clothing. In their speeches in the general debate, the representatives of some third-world countries pointed out that the super-Power policy of "domination and hegemony . . . is at the basis of the incessant arms race"; that "certain people are deceiving themselves" when they say "détente is the magic key that opens all doors"; and that "the risk of a war has thus increased". They have penetratingly concluded that in these circumstances all the empty talks about disarmament between the super-Powers are merely a "dialogue of the deaf".

Quite a few third-world countries and other small and medium-sized countries have discerned ever more clearly the super-Power fraud of disarmament. While exposing and criticizing the super-Power policy of arms race, war preparations, aggression and expansion, they urge the super-Powers to destroy the nuclear weapons and to pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear States. Some countries have proposed the establishment of "nuclear-weapon-free zones" or "peace zones" in the regions where they subsist respectively, and demanded that the super-Powers undertake due obligations in regard to these zones.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, we have supported the countries concerned in their efforts for the establishment of "nuclear-weapon-free zones" in Latin America, south Asia, the Middle East and Africa and of the Indian Ocean "peace zone". We maintain that the super-Powers should at least undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-free zones and withdraw all nuclear forces and nuclear bases therefrom. Otherwise the establishment of nuclear-free zones would be merely nominal. But it is precisely that super-Power which has been talking profusely about disarmament that has thus far refused to sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.[5] Take another example, since 1971 the Indian Ocean States have demanded that the super-Powers remove their increasing military presence from the Indian Ocean, yet the super-Powers have totally ignored them. Under the pretext of protecting "the freedom of navigation" and the "natural ocean lanes" of Soviet fleets, the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its naval strength in the Indian Ocean for wanton expansion by grabbing overt and covert military bases and installations everywhere in a desperate effort to attain superiority over the other super-Power. Take one more example, the Mediterranean States have repeatedly declared that the Mediterranean belongs to the Mediterranean States, and they have asked the super-Powers to withdraw their fleets from the Mediterranean.

The super-Powers have likewise turned a deaf ear to all this. The Soviet Union, which is not a Mediterranean State in any way, has gone so far as to pose itself as the master of the Mediterranean by sending huge fleets to ply the Mediterranean while clamouring that "We are no guests in this sea". Even during the European Security Conference, the Soviet Union wantonly lashed out against a Mediterranean country which put forward the reasonable proposal for the withdrawal of the super-Powers' military force from the Mediterranean and even slanderously charged the aforesaid country with "small-nation chauvinism". These undeniable facts have fully revealed the true behaviour of sham disarmament and real arms expansion on the part of the super-Powers.

China is in favour of real disarmament and not phoney disarma-

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

ment. We are opposed to the super-Power fraud of sham disarmament. We are even more opposed to the Soviet attempt to use a disarmament conference as a veil to cover up the truth about its frantic arms expansion and war preparations. In our opinion, at the present juncture, when the two super-Powers are quickening their pace towards a new world war, a disarmament conference in whatever form will only create peace illusions, serve to deceive and lull the people of the world and bind the hands of the numerous small and medium-sized countries. Therefore, it will do no good, but harm.

As regards a world disarmament conference, China keeps to her position set forth long ago, namely, the conference must have a clear aim and the necessary pre-conditions. The clear aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and absolutely not the so-called limitation of strategic arms. The necessary preconditions are: all nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances and in particular will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and that they must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries. Now that the super-Powers have even refused to undertake the minimum obligation of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries, how can it be said that the conditions for convening a world disarmament conference are already available? In fact some countries have expressed similar views and are opposed to using the convocation of a world disarmament conference as "a mere forum for propaganda or misleading utterances made in order to camouflage the arms race and thus deceive the people of the world."

At the current session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union again put forward with great fanfare a new proposal for the "conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".[6] People can see at a glance that this is nothing but old ware in new wrappings.

As is known to all, over the years the Soviet Union has conducted innumerable nuclear tests of different kinds. Its nuclear arsenal has expanded to a huge extent. In these circumstances the mere cessation of nuclear tests does not in the least prevent it from continuing the production and use of nuclear weapons. The proposal for a so-called complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in isolation from the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons can neither prevent a nuclear war nor eliminate super-Power nuclear monopoly and nuclear threat. On the contrary, it can only deprive other countries of their legitimate right to resist super-Power nuclear threat and

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 486–490.

weaken the world people's struggle for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. To put it bluntly, the real aim of the Soviet Union in putting forward this proposal is simply to ask all others to recognize the super-Powers' right to preserve their nuclear monopoly.

With regard to the other new draft resolution on the so-called "prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons" [7] which the Soviet Union has been so delighted in talking about, it is all the more a clumsy fraud. One may ask: since the Soviet Union has refused even to undertake the minimum obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, what is its purpose in talking profusely about the prohibition of future new types of weapons of mass destruction that are even more formidable than nuclear weapons? Its purpose is none other than to divert people's attention from the immediate issues by talking about remote things. How can such a clumsy hoax of intimidation by way of deliberate mystification pull the wool over people's eyes? Year in year out the Soviet Union has racked its brain to peddle its hoax of phoney disarmament in the United Nations, but it is becoming less and less seemly as time goes by. The two new proposals dished up by the Soviet Union this year have fully revealed the deplorable plight of the Soviet Union, which is at its wit's end on the question of disarmament.

The content of imperialist politics is world domination, and the continuation of this politics is imperialist war. This is the irrefutable truth repeatedly borne out by the development of contemporary world history. In order to prepare for new wars, imperialism invariably uses such high-sounding words as peace to deceive the people. The "peace", "détente" and "security" trumpeted by imperialism and social-imperialism today are in essence hypocritical rhetoric used as a means to cover up their war preparations. Did Hitler not assure the whole world at the time that he was completely ready to give up all offensive weapons, to disband all his troops and to guarantee peace in Europe? However, before long Hitler started the Second World War. Now that the super-Powers have been engaged in fierce contention and rabid arms expansion, they are bound to go to war against each other some day. This is independent of man's will. If one faces up to the reality instead of evading it, it is not difficult to realize that in recent years the danger of war has increased rather than decreased. The super-Powers are preparing for a nuclear war as well as a conventional war. Otherwise, why are the super-Powers, which are already in possession of huge nuclear arsenals, desperately engaged in the development of conventional arms? Why is it that the Soviet army has rapidly expanded from some 3 million a few years ago to more than 4 million all of a sudden? The contention between the two super-Powers for hegemony extends to all parts of the globe, and the focus of the contention is in Eu-

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[7] *Ante*, p. 495.

rope. In the present world, only the two super-Powers are capable of launching a third world war. They are the source of a new world war, and the danger of war comes mainly from the wildly ambitious social-imperialism which, albeit a latecomer, has been quickest in the pace of its arms expansion.

It is very dangerous to believe lightly in the deceptive super-Power propaganda about détente and disarmament and to mistake peace hopes or wishes for reality. To rely on the "balance of power" or the so-called "equilibrium of terror" for the maintenance of the *status quo* is "to quench one's thirst by drinking poisoned wine", as the Chinese saying goes. In our view, it is imperative to inform people of the truth about the increasing danger of war, so that the people will heighten their vigilance. If someone is prepared he will be safe; if not, he will suffer.

It is fully understandable that the people of various countries who have experienced two world wars desire peace and security. China is a developing socialist country belonging to the third world. The Chinese people likewise wish to have a favourable international environment in which to build our country. However, while the trees may prefer calm, the wind will not subside. We have to remain soberly vigilant vis-à-vis the reality of the increasing danger of war. In accordance with the teaching of Chairman Mao, our policy is: "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." Obviously tunnels, however deep, will never encroach upon another country. On the other hand, we certainly can never tolerate super-Power aggression against us. In their speeches, the representatives of a number of third world countries have pointed out that "the oppressed and exploited countries are today still exposed to all kinds of intervention and aggression", and that in these circumstances "any country has the right and duty to defend itself". Uniting unswervingly with the other third-world countries and the numerous small and medium-sized countries, we will firmly oppose the super-Power policies of aggression, expansion and hegemonism. Justice is on the side of the people of the world and not on the side of the hegemonists. After all, the development of the present world situation is increasingly favourable to the people of all countries and unfavourable to the super-Powers. Beset with troubles both at home and abroad, the super-Powers are heading towards decline. It is not the one or two super-Powers, nor nuclear weapons, or the so-called new types of weapons systems, but the people of all countries, including the American and Soviet people, that will determine the future of the world. We are firmly convinced that in the end it is not nuclear weapons that will destroy mankind, but mankind that will destroy nuclear weapons. "A just cause enjoys abundant support, while an unjust cause finds little support." If any super-Power should dare to unleash a new world war in defiance of the universal will of the people, it will put itself in the wrong before the people of the world. The truculence and rampancy of the aggressors spell their own doom. For they are bound to evoke the

strong resistance and resolute struggle of the people of the world. Final victory certainly belongs to the defenders who rise against aggression, and the aggressors will eventually end in complete defeat.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 11, 1975 [1]

Following the example of past years, the representative of China has made a very negative statement [2] in which he has tried to depict in a distorted and slanderous way the policy of the Soviet Union and the position of my country on questions of disarmament. The purpose of such a statement is to endeavour to impede the development of the process of détente in the world, to give a distorted picture of the role of the Soviet Union in the struggle for the strengthening of international peace and security and disarmament, and at the same time to conceal from world public opinion the negative, subversive policy of China on the questions of maintaining international peace and security and international co-operation in the cause of disarmament.

China is clearly conducting a policy aimed at blocking all disarmament measures. Not only is China not a party to the international agreements on disarmament concluded in the period since the coming into being of the People's Republic of China, but it undermines the agreements on disarmament, trying to impede and prevent their implementation. China has not adhered to the 1963 Moscow Treaty [3] banning nuclear tests in three environments, and is violating the standard of international law established by that Treaty not to conduct any tests in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space by conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere and thus poisoning with radioactive fall-out the populations of China, the neighbouring States and all the other countries of the world.

China does not participate in but ignores other agreements and conventions which relate to the limitation of the arms race and which lead to disarmament, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[4] the Treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and ocean floor,[5] the Convention concerning bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,[6] and so on.

In recent years the Soviet Union and other countries have come forward with important initiatives relevant to disarmament and to reducing the threat of nuclear war: such as the proposals concerning renunciation of the use of force in international relations, and a perma-

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2084 (prov.), pp. 32-41.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461-465.
[5] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7-11.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133-138.

nent ban on nuclear weapons.[7] In the statement he made today, the representative of China tried to represent matters in such a way as to imply that the Soviet Union objects to the proposed ban on nuclear weapons, and I wanted to ask this question. I am wondering why, despite the views expressed by the whole of the General Assembly, despite the solemn declaration of the General Assembly on behalf of all the Member States of the United Nations that all States must refrain from the use of force in international relations and renounce forever the use of nuclear weapons, China ignores this decision of the General Assembly? Why is China now weeping and wailing and asking why the Soviet Union does not want to stop the use of nuclear weapons?

I should like to ask why China ignores the resolutions of the General Assembly, which have solemnly placed a ban on the use of force in international relations and a permanent ban on nuclear weapons. Why, I ask?

Despite all the efforts and all the attempts made in the statement of the representative of China today to depict the policy China is conducting as one of struggling for disarmament, in fact that statement showed that the policy of that country in the international arena is aimed and directed at creating the worst possible conditions in the world and, seeking thus to achieve its own sombre objectives in international policy and relations.

The Chinese representative said at the very outset of his statement that the present international policy is characterized by widespread disruption and disorderly conditions and that that is an excellent situation. Well, I do not know how it can be assessed thus: that the situation is characterized by disorderly conditions—and that, apparently, this is none the less to the liking of China, just as, in the general debate, the representative of China stated that war is inescapable and the present situation is excellent. Given such reasoning, of course we can only perceive that China is certainly not struggling for the establishment of genuine peace; it is in fact struggling against the establishment of a durable and stable peace.

It opposes the policy of relaxation of international tension. It opposes international co-operation in all matters. It opposes co-operation also on the question of disarmament.

The statement made here today by the representative of China has very clearly shown that he is certainly not interested in developing international co-operation in the matter of disarmament. The representative of China, speaking of the convening of an international conference on disarmament, alleged that it was necessary for us to approve and adopt certain pre-conditions for the convening of such a conference. What are those conditions? He specified one of them: that the nuclear Powers should give up the use of nuclear weapons. Why cannot China come to the world disarmament conference and raise that question

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 672, 848–849.

there? China does not want that question to be discussed. It does not want to be brought to the world disarmament conference, because there China will be forced to say what its constructive proposals are. During the whole period of China's presence in the United Nations, despite the fact that the Charter imposes the duty on all Member States to co-operate in seeking peaceful solutions to problems, including, among others, the problem of disarmament, China not only has made no proposals for peaceful co-operation in the area of disarmament, but has unambiguously rejected all proposals aimed at that objective.

When in 1971, the Soviet Union proposed the convening of a conference of the five nuclear Powers in order to consider the problem of nuclear disarmament,[8] China rejected that proposal outright.[9] It said it was impossible to convene the conference without the participation of the non-nuclear States. The Soviet Union then proposed the convening of a world conference with the participation of all States, including non-nuclear States,[10] but that too was not to China's liking. Now China is promoting various artificial proposals which are represented as pre-conditions. We agree to the convening of a conference so that any question can be discussed, and if China considered the question of convening a world conference with goodwill and good intentions it would say, "We will come to that conference; we are going to raise certain problems there, and we shall struggle to solve those problems." That would be a normal approach. Does China act thus? No, it does not. It engages in all kinds of manoeuvres in order to avoid any normal discussion of the questions of disarmament, in order to avoid international co-operation in the field of disarmament and its problems.

The Soviet Union has put forward many other proposals on the manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.[11] There has been no response from China. There has been no co-operation in connexion with a ban on chemical weapons. When we took a vote last year [12] and the year before [13] that on the draft resolutions on chemical weapons, how did China vote? Did it support those draft resolutions? No. China opposed them. And that discloses its real intent, despite the fact that the Charter provides for co-operation. We had hoped China had joined the United Nations in order to co-operate in these matters.

The Soviet Union proposed the reduction of the military budgets of permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent so that a part of the resources thus saved could be used for assistance to developing countries.[14] Who is impeding the implementation of that proposal, may I ask? China: China has categorically opposed the reduction of military budgets.

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[8] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 313-315.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 453-455.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 544-545.
[11] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 120-124.
[12] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 790.
[13] *Ibid., 1973*, p. 847.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 855-863.

In the Chinese delegation's statement in the general debate [15] the duplicity of the Chinese representatives became very evident, because it engaged in violent attacks on the Soviet proposal, which is very obviously contrary to the plans of his own country to continue the arms race. The representative of China then said that the Soviet Union does not disclose the size of its military budget. In that context it may be noted that the USSR publishes annual data on defence expenditure, while it is China that always keeps such data and figures secret from the whole world. Therefore, certainly, such criticisms and words sound very strange coming from the representative of a country such as China, which is opposed to the reduction of military budgets and the publication of any figures related to military budgets in general.

China engages in violent attacks on any initiative proposed by anyone, and especially by the Soviet Union, in disarmament matters. It is also opposed to the prohibition of the use of the natural environment for military purposes. And in his statement this afternoon the representative of China has also opposed the proposal to ban new types of weaponry. He also opposes a general ban on all nuclear-weapon tests. May we ask the reason for the negative position of China in matters of disarmament? What is the cause of the policy of opposing all proposals which are made in the general area of disarmament by the Soviet Union and by other socialist countries? The reason and the cause is this: the leadership of China is not interested in the task of relaxing international tension. It is not interested in the implementation of any measures of disarmament.

The path followed by China is to make the situation more acute, to undermine all the measures which could effect a slackening of tension. The leadership of China makes every effort to make it more difficult to achieve a normalization of conditions in Europe, in Asia and in other regions of the world, to undermine the process which is now being developed and which is aimed at international détente. That process is very much disliked by the leaders of China, who follow the path of fanning the flames of conflict and who are trying to impede in every way the process of détente which is now advancing throughout the world.

It is impossible to overlook the danger which this policy of China constitutes for the whole of the international community of nations, for the developing and for the developed countries, for small and for large nations, for nuclear and non-nuclear States. The policy of China is pushing the peoples, not towards the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Charter, but to the violation of those principles. The policy of China is directed, not towards international peace and security, but towards international conflict and war. It is aimed not at the solution of the disarmament problem, but at undermining any solution; and today's statement of the representative of China was extremely convincing as an illustration of the fact that China wants

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[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 867-870.

the world to be beset by more disorder, by more trouble, and that the prospect of war seems to China to be the most desirable, the most brilliant, the most excellent prospect.

From this position the Soviet Union and all the peace-loving States must dissent. They reject it; both we, the Soviet people, and like us, the other countries too which wish for peace, can certainly never agree with this kind of policy, with this kind of position which was expressed and defined today by the representative of China.

General Assembly Resolution 3386 (XXX): Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, November 12, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1974/1975 and the addendum thereto,[2]

Aware that the statement of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 12 November 1975 [3] provides additional information on the main developments in the Agency's activities,

Recognizing that in the course of 1975 it was made abundantly clear that further measures should be taken towards the full realization of the goal of an international non-proliferation policy,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of the addendum thereto;

2. *Notes* that the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency will henceforth be based on the calendar year for the purpose of simplifying the evaluation of programme implementation;

3. *Welcomes* the action taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase further the level of the target for voluntary contributions to the general fund of $5.5 million in 1976 and the continuing increase of total contributions of member States towards the realization of targets;

4. *Notes with appreciation* the increased and continuing emphasis which the International Atomic Energy Agency places in its technical assistance programme on the introduction of nuclear power and its technology in developing countries for the peaceful needs of these countries, in particular the series of training courses on nuclear power project planning and implementation;

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[1] A/RES/3386 (XXX), Nov. 25. The resolution was submitted to the General Assembly by Argentina, the Netherlands, and Yugoslavia on Nov. 10. It was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus on Nov. 12.

[2] International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1974–30 June 1975* (Vienna, July 1975) and corrigendum and addendum; transmitted to the General Assembly by notes of the Secretary-General (A/10168 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.).

[3] A/PV.2403, p. 2.

5. *Notes with satisfaction* the intensification of work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with its statute, in the fields of reactor safety and reliability, the disposal of radio-active waste, the safeguarding and physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and the comprehensive studies of fuel cycle facilities, including the possibility of establishing regional fuel cycle services;

6. *Commends* the International Atomic Energy Agency for its implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2829 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 [4] and 3213 (XXIX) of 5 November 1974 [5] regarding nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and, in this connexion, for establishing the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes [6] to identify possible applications of peaceful nuclear explosions and to study safety, environmental and economic aspects as well as the legal implications and the procedures for assistance in carrying out peaceful explosion projects;

7. *Urges* all States to continue to co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to take all necessary measures to enhance the recognized efforts of the Agency in the fulfilment of its tasks in the various fields of the peaceful uses of atomic energy;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

Thirteen-Nation Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, November 12, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3261 D (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[2]

Recalling also its resolutions on the urgent need for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and for an effective comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban,

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proved possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and that, consequently, it is not

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 897–898.

[5] General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-Ninth Session, Supplement no. 31 (A/9631)*, pp. 3–4.

[6] *Ante*, pp. 188–190.

[1] A/C.1/L.721, Nov. 12, 1975. The draft resolution was submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, the FRG, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. Introduced by the Netherlands on Nov. 13 (*post*, pp. 638–641), it was revised twice (*post*, pp. 677–678) before its adoption by the General Assembly on Dec. 12 as pt. A. of resolution 3484 (XXX), (*post*, pp. 803–806).

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806.

possible to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes without at the same time acquiring a nuclear weapon capability,

Conscious of the fact that the testing and application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes can have significant arms control implications both for the spread of nuclear weapons, and their technology, to States which do not already have them and, in the context of limitations of nuclear weapon testing, for the refinement of the arsenals of existing nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of ensuring that the wider dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear materials for the economic and social benefit of mankind will not increase the risk of diversion to military purposes and the consequent danger to world peace and security,

Noting that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] have the right to enjoy any benefits which may accrue from the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures as contemplated in article V of the Treaty,

Noting further that any benefits which may accrue from the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and appropriate international procedures called for in article V of the Treaty and in accordance with other applicable international obligations,

Convinced of the need for the international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in respect of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions,

1. *Notes with appreciation*

(a) The consideration given by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the role of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as provided for in that Treaty [4];

(b) The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [5] concerning both its studies of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, and the establishment by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes [6];

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[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] See *ante*, pp. 146–157.
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1974–30 June 1975* (Vienna, July 1975); corr. and add.
[6] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.

(c) The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes[7];

(d) The observations of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report submitted to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly[8];

2. *Notes with satisfaction* the conclusions of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with respect to article V of the Treaty;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to keep under review the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons;

4. *Stresses* the need to ensure, particularly in the context of a comprehensive test ban, that any testing or application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the testing or refinement of the nuclear weapon arsenals of nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability of other States;

5. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue its studies of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, to give consideration to the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and to the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to report on progress in all these areas to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

6. *Calls upon* all Member States to support and assist in the fulfilment of these tasks.

Congressional Conference Report on Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976 [Extracts], November 13, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 1517) [2] to authorize appropriations for the administration of foreign affairs; international organizations, conferences, and commissions; information and

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[7] See *ante*, pp. 430–435.

[8] General Assembly *Official Records—Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1)*.

[1] House rept. 94–660, 94th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1, 3–6, 21, 25–27, 32. For the final act, see *post*, pp. 706–710.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 239–243.

cultural exchange; and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:

That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976".

TITLE I—ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

. . . . . .

Part 2—Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AUTHORIZATION

SEC. *141. Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a))* [3] *is amended by inserting in the second sentence thereof immediately after "$10,100,000," the following: "and for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 the sum of $23,440,000 (and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs),".*

STUDY REGARDING IMPACT OF CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES UPON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

SEC. *142. Of the amount appropriated under the amendment made by section 141 of this Act, not to exceed $1,000,000 shall be used by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to conduct a study of the impact upon military expenditures of arms control measures mutually agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate—*

(1) from time to time, reports with respect to such study, and

(2) not later than December 31, 1976, a final report setting forth the findings and conclusions of such study.

RESEARCH REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARD TECHNIQUES

SEC. *143. In addition to amounts otherwise available under the amendment made by section 141 of this Act, $449,000 may be used for the purpose of conducting research, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, with respect to the development of nuclear safeguard techniques.*

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482–495; *ibid., 1963*, pp. 622–623; *ibid., 1965*, p. 206; *ibid., 1968*, p. 396; *ibid., 1970*, p. 213; *ibid., 1972*, p. 465; *ibid., 1974*, p. 281.

PURPOSES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

SEC. *144. Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2551) is amended by striking out "It must be able" in the second sentence of the third paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,".*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. *145. Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended by inserting ", the National Security Council," immediately after "Secretary of State" in the first sentence.*

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

SEC. *146. Title III of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571–2575) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:*

"ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

"SEC. *36. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—*

"(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons,

"(2) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—

"(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or

"(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or

"(3) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

"(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and

shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

"(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

"(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1) or (2), or

"(B) any program described in subsection (a) (3) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

"(3) Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise such committee on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

"(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director)."

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS

SEC. *147. (a) (1) The second sentence of section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(a)) is amended by striking out "The Director" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director".*

(2) The fifth sentence of section 45(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "No person" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), no person".

(3) Section 45 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States.".

(b) Section 45(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the forego-

ing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c).".

PUBLIC INFORMATION

SEC. *148. Section 49(d) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(d)) is repealed.*

REPORT TO CONGRESS; POSTURE STATEMENT

SEC. *149. Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2590) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.".*

CONSULTATION REGARDING ARMS TRANSFERS

SEC. *150. (a) Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:*

"(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.".

(b) Section 42(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2791(a)), is amended by striking out "(3)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3) in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to".

(c) Section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321(d)) is amended by striking out the words "take into account" and inserting in lieu thereof "be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to".

. . . . . .

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of

the House to the bill (S. 1517) to authorize appropriations for the administration of foreign affairs; international organizations, conferences, and commissions; information and cultural exchange; and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

The House amendment struck out all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text, and the Senate disagreed to the House amendment.

The committee of conference recommends that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House, with an amendment which is a substitute for both the Senate bill and the House amendment.

The differences between the Senate bill, the House amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by reason of agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

The following tables show the provision of the Senate bill, the House amendment, and the conference substitute, with respect to the authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 1976 and fiscal year 1977:

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ACDA STUDY REGARDING IMPACT OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES UPON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Senate bill

The Senate bill earmarked "not to exceed" $1,000,000 for a study regarding the impact on military expenditures of Soviet-American arms control agreements and required a report to Congress on the study by July 1, 1976.

House amendment

The House bill in slightly different language also earmarked "not to exceed" $1,000,000 for the same study but differed by requiring a report to Congress every 3 months.

Conference substitute

The conference substitute requires the same study with periodic reports and a final report by December 31, 1976. The conferees note their intent that this study be funded from a supplemental appropriation, authority for which is contained in this bill, rather than from the Agency's already programed and appropriated research budget.

ACDA Study Regarding Development of Nuclear Safeguard Techniques

Senate bill

The Senate bill stated that "not to exceed" $440,000 shall be available for research by ACDA, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with respect to nuclear safeguard techniques.

House amendment

No provision.

Conference substitute

The conference substitute is essentially the same as the Senate version but with deletion of the phrase "not to exceed," the intent of the conferees being to indicate why an increase of $440,000 was authorized for the ACDA budget but to avoid placing any ceiling on useful research in this vital area.

Availability of Arms Control Information to ACDA and Congress

Senate bill

The Senate bill established the requirement that ACDA receive full and timely information from any government agency preparing any legislation or budgetary proposal for—

> "(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons; or
>
> "(2) any other program which such government agency and the (ACDA) Director agree may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations."

The Senate bill also required that a complete impact statement be submitted to Congress in connection with any program described above.

House amendment

The House amendment established a similar requirement but for programs of this description:

> "(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—
>
> "(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000 or

"(B) an estimated annual program in excess of $50,000,000 or

"(2) any other program which such government agency or the (ACDA) Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations."

The House amendment also required that a complete impact statement be submitted to Congress in connection with any program described above, except that statements on programs in paragraph (2) need be submitted only when such programs are found by the National Security Council to have a significant arms control impact.

Conference substitute

The conference substitute combines the two versions so as to require that ACDA receive such full and timely information on all programs described in paragraph (1) in the Senate version and paragraphs (1) and (2) in the House version. The conference substitute also requires the submission to Congress of impact statements on all such programs, with the same exception for programs described in paragraph (2) of the House version.

CONSULTATION OF ACDA DIRECTOR WITH CONGRESS

Senate bill

The Senate bill stated, with regard to the programs on which an impact statement has been submitted, that—

"Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise such committee on the arms control and disarmament implications * * * "

House amendment

The House amendment stated, with regard to the programs on which an impact statement has been submitted, that—

"Upon the request of any appropriate committee of either House of Congress, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise the Congress on the arms control and disarmament implications * * *."

Conference substitute

The conference substitute is the same as the Senate provision.

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Senate bill

The Senate bill authorized the ACDA Director to grant access to classified information to contractors on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense.

House amendment

The House amendment provided the same authority using briefer language.

Conference substitute

The Conference substitute is the same as the House amendment.

ACDA PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Senate bill

The Senate bill amended section 49(d) of the permanent ACDA legislation as follows:

> *"Except as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act specified under section 2(c),* none of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda concerning the work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

House amendment

The House amendment repealed the section entirely.

Conference substitute

The conference substitute is the same as the House amendment.

. . . . . .

THOMAS E. MORGAN,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
WAYNE L. HAYS,
L. H. FOUNTAIN,
DANTE B. FASCELL,
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
WM. BROOMFIELD,
PAUL FINDLEY,
JOHN BUCHANAN,

Managers on the Part of the House.

JOHN SPARKMAN,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
FRANK CHURCH,

STUART SYMINGTON,
CLAIBORNE PELL,
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
CLIFFORD P. CASE,
J. K. JAVITS,
HUGH SCOTT,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

Statement by the Romanian Representative (Ene) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, November 13, 1975 [1]

On 5 November last my delegation had an opportunity to present Romania's position on the disarmament problems as a whole. It drew this Committee's attention to the basic reasons for the Romanian Government's position, as well as to a number of proposals on the subject that have been distributed as a United Nations document.

In my statement today I should like to dwell on one of the questions included in our agenda—namely, "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security". I do so not only because an initiative taken by my country five years ago is at the origin of this item but also, and above all, because, in the Romanian delegation's opinion, the question of the consequences of the armaments race give us a synthetical approach to the basic reason for the present efforts to trigger genuine action on disarmament.

From time immemorial States have relied on their military forces to further their interests and to enhance their security. Today is no exception. However, with the emergence of nuclear weapons and the swift technological changes, the inherent dangers created by the armaments race have become [so] acute that it is no exaggeration to say that the effect of that evolution has been to provide man with the means of exterminating his own species.

This was the basic conclusion in the Secretary-General's 1971 report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures.[2]

The report prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts and qualified consultants, upon the request of the General Assembly, has brought into relief the horrifying dynamics of the armaments race and the burden it imposes on all nations. It thus defined the urgent need for broad, resolute and responsible action to halt and to

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2086 (prov.), pp. 14–23.
[2] A/8469; *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 644–686.

curb the arms race, which the report itself regards as being by far "the most dangerous single peril the world faces today." [3]

Since the publication of that report, the views of the Secretary-General have been fully confirmed. We have in mind the fundamental subjects studied by him, namely, the qualitative aspects of the arms race and the resources swallowed up by it, the dynamics of military research and development, the national and international consequences of the armaments race and military expenditures. There was only one thing that the Secretary-General was unable to foresee. He estimated that the figure of $300 billion, representing the world's annual military expenditures, would be reached in 1980. Unfortunately, that forecast has been surpassed, inasmuch as the figure in question was already reached in 1975, that is to say, five years earlier.

If we consider that military expenditures in 1960 amounted to $150 billion and that 10 years later, in 1970, the figure had risen to $200 billion, it follows that during the last five years, the rate of growth of military expenditures has been four times greater than that of the preceding decade.

This leap accounted for in particular in the nuclear field, underlines the fact that during a relatively short period of five years, important changes have occurred in the dynamics of the armaments race phenomenon.

In our view the consideration of the armaments race and its effects is of particular importance. The conclusions that may be drawn offer significant points of departure for the disarmament negotiations. At the same time, they have the force of conviction and the capacity of political mobilization which is so necessary in this field.

It is in the light of the foregoing that the Romanian delegation wishes now to offer some considerations.

First of all, since the preparation of the Secretary-General's report, the situation in the armaments race has continued to deteriorate at a growing pace. The order of magnitude has changed so much that any comparison with past periods in the history of mankind is to be excluded.

There is great concern, as shown moreover by the positions taken in our Committee, by the magnitude of the nuclear armaments race, the development, diversity and stockpiling of nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear weapons, as the Secretary-General pointed out, represent the most fearful category of armaments to which military expenditures are devoted, and these post [pose] the greatest threat which mankind now faces. Resources spent throughout the years on nuclear armaments have led to the stockpiling of weapons, with a destructive capacity infinitely greater than that of all other weapons taken together, and much greater than would be necessary for any conceivable purpose.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 684.

The further accumulation of such destructive potential can add nothing to national security. At present even the most extreme theories of deterrence cannot offer a rational reason for continuing the stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

It is in this spirit that Romania shares the widely expressed conviction that the interests of peace and security demand, above all, that the armaments race be halted. That is why we also maintain that in the disarmament negotiations the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, new substantial developments have taken place in the internal dynamics of the armaments phenomenon. In the general evolution of the armaments race, the specific laws, which act independently, carry ever greater weight in relation to political or military factors. Technological improvement of nuclear weapons begins to be governed more and more by the need to perfect new weapon systems.

The most active factor in the internal dynamics of the armaments race is the research and development of weapons, which gives that race a truly technological character. Military research and development is characterized by continued efforts to surpass earlier discoveries; in practice this leads to a multiplication and an unending refinement of the destructive effects of the newest conquests of man. Even before a new weapon is assimilated, its creator already anticipates, as a rule, a new model that is much more effective and less vulnerable.

The armaments race thus has a vertical character, weapons becoming more perfect, more rapid and more accurate. Research and development, therefore, hold an increasingly more important place in military budgets.

It has already been stated that half the total number of scientists and engineers engaged in research and approximately 40 per cent of the sums allocated by all nations in the world to scientific research and technological development are used for military purposes.

These facts make it impossible to draw up a strategy in the field of disarmament unless it contains measures concerning military research and development.

Finally, the armaments race is taking a new twist in the context of efforts aiming at the establishment of a new international economic order.

Between the armaments race, particularly in the area of nuclear weapons, and the new international economic order, there is a structural incompatibility. The establishment of a new international order demands, among other things, remedies in the machinery and structures of international relations with a view to ensuring respect for the equality of rights and interests of all nations. Armaments belong to the law of force; their stockpiling acts as an incentive to the policy of interference in the internal affairs of other States and maintains hotbeds of tension and conflict in different regions of the world.

The incompatibility of the arms race with the new economic order is also obvious where it relates to the actual content of that order.

Military expenditures represent a heavy burden for all the peoples of the world. They hinder economic and social progress, the development of co-operation among States and represent an obstacle in the way of the elimination of underdevelopment and economic differences, as well as the solution of other problems on which the future of mankind depends. Armaments swallow up large proportions of the material and human resources that could all be used to ensure the economic and social progress of each State and support the efforts of the developing countries.

At the same time, the arms race entails distortions in the economic development of all States, nurtures inflation and imbalances in the balance of payments, raises artificial barriers to the transfer of equipment and technology and the development of trade between nations, and leads to an irrational management of human resources and raw materials.

It is difficult to conceive of a rapid change in the structure and content of international economic relations leading to a more just and equitable distribution of the world product among the nations of the world in a situation where a large part of what is produced every year by mankind as a whole is used for military expenditures.

To sum up the arguments I have just put forward; we believe that at least three new elements have emerged at the present state of the arms race in terms of its effects—in the past five years military expenditures have increased at a rate unprecedented in peacetime; the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons, has taken on a markedly technological character, evolving on the basis of its own particular laws along an independent path; the arms race now appears clearly as a major obstacle to the plans to establish the new international economic order, and is incompatible with that order.

These factors, as well as the important developments that have occurred since the Secretary-General's last report on this subject, in our view justify a new consideration of the complex consequences of the arms race at the national and international level, with a view to elucidating the specific aspects of the present stage. That could affect the disarmament negotiations. I shall confine my remarks to only one of these aspects.

Technological competition and the place occupied by military research are such that the pace of the improvement and production of new types of weapons and systems for such weapons is very rapid. Seen objectively, the procrastination in the negotiations dooms them to ineffectiveness, since during the negotiations new weapons may emerge which render pointless negotiations undertaken in a different context. That is why the pace of negotiations must exceed that of weapon improvement.

At the same time, the updating of the Secretary-General's study of the consequences of the arms race would meet the need to keep Governments and world public opinion informed of the disarmament situation.

Such information, provided through the United Nations, on the course of the arms race and its consequences, and on the disarmament situation would clearly show the need for effective and vigorous disarmament measures above all nuclear disarmament. It would also help to mobilize world public opinion which may well represent an important support and an effective catalyst in the search for solutions.

Starting from these premises, the Romanian delegation has always spoken out in favour of including the study of the economic and social consequences of disarmament among the main concerns of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament. The useful conclusions drawn from the Secretary-General's report on this subject fully justify this reasoning.

The General Assembly in resolution 3075 (XXVIII) requested the Secretary-General:

> to pursue the study of the consequences of the arms race, paying special attention to its effects on the economic and social development of nations as well as on world peace and security, in order to enable him to submit, upon the request of the General Assembly, an up-to-date report on that matter, on the basis of the information released by Governments;.[4]

It is to that end that the Romanian delegation at present is holding consultations with a number of delegations in order to draw up a draft resolution which we intend to put forward and which we hope will receive general support.[5]

Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly [Extract], November 13, 1975 [1]

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One benefit of speaking towards the end of this general debate on disarmament is that it has given me an opportunity of listening to the statements made by my colleagues here, many of whom have long experience in this frustrating, but immensely important, field. This has been both instructive and rewarding.

As a general point, it seems to me that while one can understand the discouragement and even, perhaps, the disillusionment of some of those who have spoken about the slow progress made on disarmament, there is also much to be thankful for. Nuclear weapons have not been used since the Second World War and I think most people would agree that the threat of nuclear war has significantly receded in the last few years. This is a hopeful sign and it is also an indispensable first step towards some real reduction in nuclear armaments. But if we cannot achieve real disarmament until there have been great and lasting im-

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[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 843-844.
[5] Cf. *post*, pp. 664-667.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2086 (prov.), pp. 46-61.

provements in international confidence, we shall be caught in a vicious circle. No one will take any significant step towards disarmament because of their lack of confidence, and the level of armaments will itself be the main reason for that mistrust.

Many States, my own amongst them, believe that peace and their own security are under threat. All of us have the right and the duty to provide for our own defence. But we all have another duty also, and that is to eliminate through negotiation and by peaceful means threats against ourselves and also to eliminate whatever threats others may believe hang over them.

We should therefore look upon disarmament and arms control as one of the principal ways of increasing the security of nations and peoples. With that thought always in mind, I should like to set out briefly some of the principles which guide British disarmament policy.

First, my Government recognizes that there are no short cuts to disarmament. The way there, the long way, lies through thorough, detailed and expert consideration and negotiation. We have to proceed step by step, and this takes time. But it can be done. Since the Second World War a number of treaties which put restraints on nuclear arms have come into force, but by no means all eligible States have yet acceded to them. We hope that those which have not acceded will very seriously consider doing so. The wider the membership of these treaties, the greater will be our mutual confidence and the greater the incentive to make further progress towards disarmament.

We consider it perfectly natural, and justified time and again by history, that the parties to a disarmament or arms control treaty should feel the need for an assurance that all other parties to that treaty are faithfully complying with it. In a matter so critical for their survival, we cannot expect nations to take this on trust. We recognize that there are practical limits. But surely we can all accept the obligation to give others confidence that we are carrying out our treaty obligations. It is, in the view of my Government, too easy to describe any form of international inspection as an infringement of sovereignty. For our part, we will accept verification techniques designed to give the necessary confidence, provided that they do not add to the dangers of, for example, nuclear proliferation.

We also emphasize the importance of a fair balance in the effect of disarmament measures. We must all be sure that they will not have the effect of weakening the security of some States more than others. And of course my Government believes that no aspect of disarmament should be neglected. We all need to try to limit armaments in quality and in quantity, nuclear armaments and conventional armaments, both universally and regionally.

Up to now, the most destructive arms known to man are nuclear weapons, and much attention is rightly devoted to nuclear disarmament. Progress is painfully slow, but the picture is not as black as it might be. As I have already said, no nuclear weapon has been used for

over 30 years now. So far as we know, only five States actually possess these weapons.

There are no grounds for complacency, but one factor which encourages us is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Like others who have spoken before me in this debate, we hope that confidence between the two super-Powers will increase and that it will enable them first to limit further and then to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

My Government would welcome a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests. We have worked for this for many years and we shall continue to do so. The Soviet Union has submitted a draft treaty for consideration by this Committee.[2] We share the declared objective of the treaty, but I wish I could say that we thought our Soviet colleagues had found the answer that has eluded us all so far. Unfortunately and very frankly, we do not believe that they have found the answer. In its present form, the draft treaty appears to us defective in two important respects. First, it does not include verification provisions which would meet the very real need for confidence that a test ban was being respected by all parties. Second, it does not seem to us to deal adequately with the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, and in particular the problem of ensuring that these explosions do not contribute to weapon development. Moreover, whilst my Government is always willing to proceed towards a universal nuclear test ban, the probability that all nuclear-weapon States will be prepared to do so on the basis proposed by the Soviet Union seems to us doubtful, to say the least.

This Committee is also considering nuclear-weapon-free zones, both as a general concept and in connexion with particular areas of the world. My Government believes that this year's expert study [3] carried out under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) resulted in a worth-while report. We are grateful to the Government of Finland for taking the initiative which led to this study. The report includes a number of differing views, and we regard that as natural and even healthy. We hope that groups of States wishing to form a nuclear-weapon-free zone will find the report useful. We also hope that they will concentrate first on discussing among themselves treaty arrangements which are within their rights as sovereign States. Only then can the role of others outside the prospective zone usefully be considered.

It seems unreasonable—to put it no higher—that States outside the region should be asked to give commitments in advance. We are all sovereign States. None of us, individually or collectively, can ask a Government to sign a blank cheque.

Many of these aspects of nuclear arms control are dealt with in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[4] Earlier this year that Treaty was the sub-

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[2] *Ante*, pp. 460–463.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

ject of a four-week review at the Conference of the parties held in Geneva.[5] No one expected that there would be unanimity on every aspect of the Treaty's operation. But my Government believes that the Conference was worth while. There is no reason to belittle the amount of common ground that was found. The Conference succeeded also in giving a new urgency to the measures needed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. My Government believes that we all should take positive action now to provide greater security against this danger. The proliferation that the United Kingdom fears is not just that of nuclear weapons: it is the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability generally. My Government believes, like many of the previous speakers in this debate, that there is no real distinction between the technology of nuclear weapons and that of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Nuclear power is a mixed blessing, but it has become more attractive despite its many problems. It has dangers also. Perhaps the greatest danger is distrust. Nuclear energy is still an emotive subject. A power reactor is not a bomb, but if a country embarks on a nuclear power programme its neighbours may fear a secret programme for developing nuclear explosives. Public opinion often assumes that the one automatically brings the other in its train.

To overcome this distrust we all need to demonstrate, to our neighbours and to the whole world, that we are doing what we say we are doing and no more. We need to devise procedures whereby that can more effectively be demonstrated. That task, in the view of my Government, is best done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For this—the establishment of trust based on full knowledge—is the purpose of any system of safeguards.

The Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons included this recommendation:

> that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards . . . .[6]

In his speech to the General Conference of the IAEA on 22 September, as has already been recalled here by the representatives of Finland and Sweden, the Director-General of the Agency said:

> It is essential that Agency safeguards should be applied to all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear-weapon States.[7]

My Minister told the General Assembly on 23 September that the United Kingdom Government intended to invite the IAEA to undertake the task of giving effect to these suggestions.[8] I can inform the Committee that we intend to submit a draft resolution for this purpose at the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. Specifically, my Gov-

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[5] See *ante*, pp. 146–157.
[6] *Ante*, p. 149.
[7] *International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin*, vol. 17, no. 5 (Oct. 1975), p. 3.
[8] *Ante*, p. 491.

ernment hopes that the Agency will examine the early preparation of safeguards which would cover all civil nuclear activities and which all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not, could accept as an affirmation of their intention not to divert nuclear material from civil nuclear facilities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.

If in that way we can establish greater mutual trust and confidence between States, our peoples can enjoy without danger the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy. That is an aim which I am confident we all share. I have explained the action my Government proposes to take. It hopes that all countries will support this action.

I have mentioned peaceful nuclear explosions as one of the problems connected with the spread of civil nuclear installations. We believe that peaceful nuclear explosions ought not to be allowed to obstruct progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. There is a real and imminent danger that the exploitation of peaceful nuclear explosions not only could prevent further progress in non-proliferation but could also threaten some of the results already achieved. Here again we must create conditions of trust.

None of us knows enough about peaceful nuclear explosions. We need to study the economics of different possible applications and to compare them carefully with conventional techniques for obtaining the same result. We need the fullest possible knowledge of the legal aspects and of the possible hazards to health and safety. The IAEA has already done expert work on these questions. We welcome the recent setting up of an Advisory Group of governmental representatives at the Agency to study these questions further and work out international machinery for programmes of peaceful nuclear explosions.[9] We hope that the work of the Advisory Group will provide a framework for any useful exploitation of peaceful nuclear explosions to take place in accordance with existing treaties. That is another example of the importance of creating conditions of mutual trust and the exchange of ideas and expertise.

I turn now from nuclear non-proliferation to other measures of arms control and disarmament. Since 1959 the General Assembly agenda has included an item called "General and complete disarmament". That is a constant reminder of our ultimate goal. In nuclear non-proliferation there has already been real, if limited, achievement and, as I have said, we hope that more achievements are on the way. Outside that field, we must face the fact that we have accomplished very little.

The Secretary-General has reminded us of the huge sums that the world is spending on armaments. An increasing proportion is being spent on conventional weapons. As my Minister said in his speech to the General Assembly, this waste of resources is appalling.[10] We must stop and then reverse this process. The reduction of military expenditure is on our agenda. This again is a subject where progress depends

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[9] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.
[10] A/PV.2358 (prov.), p. 34.

upon trust. The first requirement is to agree on a definition of military expenditure so that we have a basis for meaningful comparison. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has proposals before it and we hope that this Assembly will encourage further work on the question.

We also have proposals before us for prohibiting specific weapons or for limiting their use and for preventing the future production of more terrible weapons of war.

Both these objectives are served by the Biological Weapons Convention.[11] This at last came into force in March of this year. The Convention is a good example of what can be done by hard work, including expert studies, leading to an atmosphere of trust. In the past year the number of parties to the Treaty has doubled, but we note that the total is still only 57. As with the different treaties on nuclear weapons, I urge those Governments which have not yet done so to consider acceding soon. Every new party to these treaties adds to the confidence of other States.

We should like to see other weapons brought under international control. The CCD has for many years been trying to find an answer in respect of chemical weapons. We hope that Governments represented there, especially those which possess these weapons, will redouble their efforts in the coming year and will have some good news for the next General Assembly.

Another, more recent, approach to conventional arms limitation is to examine in detail the characteristics of particular weapons from the humanitarian standpoint. We are encouraged by the determined efforts that many Governments have put into these international discussions. We look forward to the meeting in Lugano early next year which is being organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross for whose efforts we are duly grateful. This meeting will again bring together the military, legal and medical experts whose combined knowledge is essential if we are to find broad agreement on which effective restrictions can be based. My Government hopes to present at Lugano a draft convention to limit the indiscriminate effects of certain categories of mines and booby-traps. We believe progress must be made on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that any prohibitions will genuinely reduce unnecessary suffering.

In controlling the development of new and indiscriminate means of warfare, there has been one very welcome response to a General Assembly resolution of last year. The United States and the Soviet Union have submitted in the CCD a draft treaty to ban the use for military purposes of techniques to modify the environment.[12] I believe that we can reasonably expect the CCD to make real progress with negotiating a treaty in 1976, and my Government will certainly make every effort to help.

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[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[12] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.

The Soviet Union has this year presented us in this Committee with another new proposal for a treaty which would ban the development of new weapons of mass destruction, or new systems of such weapons.[13] Ambassador Malik devoted much of his speech to this Committee on 30 October [14] to this subject. He recognized that many other Governments wish to know more precisely what such a treaty would cover. This is fundamental. All arms control work hitherto has been directed to known, definable, or at least conceivable weapons. It has thus been based on discussion of specific problems and specific weapons. On such a basis it has been possible to work out the terms of new agreements. The new Soviet proposal seems to require a reversal of this process. That does not necessarily mean that it cannot work. But I suggest that we first need a methodology of forecasting future developments of weapons.

I would urge also that such preventive measures, dealing with possible future weapons, should not divert our attention from the need to deal with the vast quantity of armaments held now by many nations. We must get our priorities right.

The Secretary-General and a number of representatives have questioned whether we have the right negotiating machinery for making progress on disarmament. There are several suggestions for additions or improvements to the present arrangements. One of them is for the calling of a world disarmament conference. My Government has consistently said that such a conference might give fresh impetus to the negotiation of disarmament. But we believe that the attendance of all significant military States, and certainly all nuclear Powers, would be essential. Otherwise, it would not be a true world conference and its results might well be a great disappointment.

An alternative which has been suggested is a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Here again, my Government would need to be convinced that a special session would be likely to make a useful contribution going beyond that of the First Committee's annual debates.

When progress is slow, it is natural to ask whether the machinery is right. The United Nations itself has produced some disarmament agreements; others have come from discussion among the States of particular regions. The most specialized forum we have is the CCD which has negotiated some important international treaties and which has others under discussion. There is really no lack of machinery, and it is arguable that it would be perfectly adequate if we all had the will to use it properly.

But my Government has an open mind on this question; it is important to be flexible and to suit the arrangements to each particular case. It may be that for organizational reasons certain Governments are absent from discussions in which they could play a useful part. Or it is

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[13] *Ante*, pp. 479–482.
[14] *Ante*, pp. 510–515.

possible that certain important subjects are not properly being discussed at all. If this is so, by all means let us so adapt the organization as to get the desired result—and quickly. But let us not imagine that there is a single organizational solution, and let us not exaggerate questions of form at the expense of getting on with the substance of real disarmament.

There are many items on this Committee's agenda and I have not done full justice to them all. Each of us has to concentrate on that particular field of disarmament where he considers that action is most needed and most easily achievable. So I conclude by urging that we should all work for early action in a field where my Government believes it is practicable now, namely, the field of safeguards. Safeguards are not the complete answer to the problem of nuclear proliferation. They do not put an end to all the dangers. But they can prevent new dangers, which many of us already see on the horizon. We all should support the IAEA in its safeguards operations in every way—politically, financially and technically. If IAEA safeguards are not made stronger, we shall all be the losers. This is one way of creating the atmosphere of trust which my Government believes to be so vital if we are to get the results which all of us want to see. If we can develop mutual trust in more and more areas of our work, there must be a better chance of more solid achievements in the later years of this Disarmament Decade. This is my Government's hope, and I am sure that it is shared by everyone here.

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Kaufmann) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, November 13, 1975 [1]

By an overwhelming majority the General Assembly adopted last year resolution 3261 D (XXIX) [2] on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. In that resolution several bodies were entrusted with tasks connected with different aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) was asked to study the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was requested to continue its technical studies on PNEs, including legal, health and safety aspects. The hope was also expressed that the Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would give consideration to the role of PNEs as provided for in that Treaty.

What happened in 1975? In our opinion a great deal of important work was accomplished.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2086 (prov.), pp. 61–66.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803–806.

Following a proposal made by Japan, the CCD held technical meetings on the arms control implications of PNEs. In both the informal and formal debates in the Committee, many detailed views were given on the subject and several technical working papers were presented. With respect to the proliferation aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions in particular, many technical and political issues were clarified. However, in our view, the CCD did not complete its task. It did not deal sufficiently with the question as to how PNEs could be applied under nuclear-weapon-test-ban conditions. Although a certain amount of valuable information on this issue was provided, a detailed study by the CCD appeared impossible, since negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on how to provide for PNEs under the so-called threshold test ban treaty were still proceeding.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference considered in detail the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3] The Review Conference reaffirmed that PNE services should be provided for non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was very important, in our view, that the Conference concluded that any potential benefits of PNEs could be made available to non-nuclear weapon States not party to the Treaty. The Conference also considered that the International Atomic Energy Agency was the appropriate international body through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. It therefore urged the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of, the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also urged the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which governmental discussion could take place on the entire subject of peaceful nuclear explosions.[4]

Besides its continuing technical work, the IAEA set up an *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group for PNE-related programmes.[5] The Advisory Group's task is to examine procedural aspects, relating to possible requests for PNE-related services—economic, legal, health and safety aspects of PNEs. The task of the Group is also to advise the IAEA Board of Governors on the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international PNE service. In this connexion, it is to advise on the structure and content of agreements necessary under article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In its first meeting, the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group organized several working groups on different subjects. The Advisory Group is expected to report to the Board of Governors of the IAEA at the end of 1976 or the beginning of 1977.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] See *ante*, pp. 152–153.
[5] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.

Thus, this account of many developments during the past year shows that considerable progress was made on the PNE problem. Of course, nobody thought last year that we would finish all our work before this session of the General Assembly convened, but in any case we seem to be further along the road towards a better understanding of the problems involved.

In the light of the work that has been done and still to be done, it gives me great pleasure to introduce, on behalf of the sponsors, a draft resolution as a follow-up to last year's resolution 3261 D (XXIX). This draft resolution is before the Committee in document A/C.1/L.721,[6] and it is co-sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and my own country, and I am very pleased to announce that Ecuador has joined the group of sponsors.

I hope that the draft resolution is fully self-explanatory. Nevertheless I should like to draw attention to the third paragraph of the preamble, which is somewhat enlarged compared with last year's resolution, by taking into account the discussions in the CCD on arms control implications of PNEs. These discussions led to the widely held conclusion that it is not possible to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes without at the same time acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

I also draw attention to the fifth preambular paragraph, which again points out the danger that a spread of nuclear technology and materials may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The sixth, seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs are concerned with important conclusions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in this field of peaceful nuclear explosions.

In particular, I should like to stress again the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that any benefits of PNEs could be made available to non-parties to the Treaty. In operative paragraph 3, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is asked to continue its considerations of the arms control implications of PNEs. In particular, the CCD would have to look at the problem that PNEs could be misused for weapons tests under test-ban conditions.

Operative paragraph 4 stresses the need that PNEs will not contribute to weapons testing by existing nuclear weapons States and to proliferation by other States. In its operative paragraph 5, the draft resolution endorses the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in particular those of the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on PNEs, which I mentioned a moment ago.

In the view of the sponsors, the draft resolution would lead to further active consideration of various problems involved in the potential application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The sponsors believe that this draft resolution will help to clarify the issues involved

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 615–617.

so that the international community can come to sensible decisions on this, indeed, quite complicated subject. We still need some time to come to more definite conclusions as to what should be done with PNEs. The draft resolution is designed to assist us in making these decisions. So, on behalf of the co-sponsors, I warmly recommend the draft resolution to the positive consideration of the Committee and we hope that it can be adopted unanimously or at least by an overwhelming majority.

Before ending, I should also like to thank the representative of Liberia who, although he was listed to speak earlier, was kind enough to move down on the list. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I want to thank him most sincerely for that.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Mishra) to the First Committee of the General Assembly [Extract], November 14, 1975 [1]

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As stated above, an important first step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive ban on all testing of nuclear weapons. India has held a consistent position on this question. We consider that there are four main considerations which have to be kept in mind. In the first instance, the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty [2] should be fully observed and those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet adhered to that Treaty should do so without any further excuse or delay. Secondly, whatever the differences on the issue of verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapons tests, and notwithstanding any other considerations, all testing of nuclear weapons in all environments must be immediately suspended. Thirdly, a comprehensive test ban has two aspects: (a) all nuclear weapons tests in all environments should be prohibited and (b) all nuclear-weapon-States should be parties to such prohibition. Fourthly, negotiations should be undertaken for a separate treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests in the underground environment.

Recently, some suggestions for what has been termed "measures of restraint" have been put forward in regard to the question of a comprehensive test ban. It has been argued that since a complete suspension of nuclear weapon testing has not taken place so far, despite the repeated calls of the General Assembly, it would now be more pragmatic to ask for a partial limitation—say in size and numbers—of nuclear weapon tests being conducted in the underground environment. We are firmly of the view that the portion [position] taken by the international community over the years in favour of a complete suspension of all nuclear

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2088 (prov.), pp. 28–40.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

weapon tests in all environments is correct, as that is the only way in which suitable conditions can be created for achieving a comprehensive test ban. Suggestions for the so-called measures of restraint are only superficially attractive. They could create an illusion of progress. In fact, they would result in the legitimization of certain categories of nuclear weapon testing. A partial approach would be inadequate, unworkable and dangerous. There should be a truly comprehensive approach to the question of a comprehensive test ban.

India entered the nuclear field as early as 1948 with a firm and categorical declaration that it would use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. India has been consistently opposed to nuclear weapons, and has made every effort to bring about nuclear disarmament. India is also firmly opposed to any military use of nuclear explosions. It is a matter of record that over all these years India has strictly adhered to this nuclear policy in spite of its acknowledged capacity to produce nuclear weapons. At the same time it is also determined to make full use of nuclear technology for its economic progress and betterment. We have attached importance to peaceful nuclear explosions because of their potentially wide application in the exploitation of our natural resources. The various studies carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) make it clear that peaceful nuclear explosions have such a potential. A consensus has been emerging at various IAEA panel meetings on the various uses of peaceful nuclear explosions. The IAEA publications on these meetings have in fact divided the applications of peaceful nuclear explosions into three groups: first, established industrial applications; secondly, large-scale experiments under actual field conditions; and, thirdly, laboratory developmental work and theoretical studies.

The first group of applications of peaceful nuclear explosions has already been developed to the extent that they can be handed over for industrial uses. Several experiments in the USSR and the United States have fallen into this first group, and a large number of experiments reported at the IAEA panel meetings fall into the second group. It is of course recognized that the economic utility of a project is very much dependent upon particular national situations, including geographical, geological and other factors. A direct economic comparison with conventional alternatives cannot be the only criterion to justify the feasibility of such projects.

We consider that there cannot be a monopoly in regard to the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions or any other technology. There should be no ban on any country acquiring or developing a technology on the ground that it can also be used for evil purposes. It must be recognized that it is above all the will and intention of a nation which is of prime importance and which determines how the country would use any particular technology. We also consider that the principles of the sovereign equality of all nations and non-discrimination must be the basis of all international agreements.

There were many obstacles to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For instance, ideas concerning the design of nuclear reactors varied widely. There was a controversy about the siting of reactors, even though it was known that nuclear energy was safe and economic. Ill-founded criticisms had hampered the further growth of nuclear power. It is therefore essential to ensure that the development of peaceful nuclear explosions should not similarly be hindered by imaginary difficulties. It has been emphasized by developing countries time and again in various forums that too much emphasis is being placed on regulatory aspects rather than on promotional and developmental aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee also the view has been propagated that it is not possible to differentiate between a nuclear weapon and a device intended for peaceful purposes. At the present state of the art this is unjustified, and it is difficult to understand why peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons should be bracketed together. Nuclear weapons are extremely sophisticated destructive devices requiring a very advanced technology, and they are very much dependent on the associated delivery system. They also require a great deal of miniaturization. These requirements differentiate them completely from peaceful-nuclear-explosion devices. The planning of a peaceful-nuclear-explosion programme does not automatically imply the development of a nuclear weapon.

At IAEA meetings it has been pointed out that peaceful nuclear explosions for particular applications require specific development. It would appear that the design of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes requires constant improvement in parallel with studies on individual projects. For example, the diamond explosive developed by the United States was specifically designed for hydrocarbon applications. Another example is the stimulation of gas or oil deposits, where fission devices are preferred over fusion devices in order to reduce tritium hazards.

India considers that the question of the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions is only a collateral issue and should not be allowed to deflect attention from the main and priority question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. It was for that reason that India voted against General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX).[3] In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it became clear that our fears were justified. Far too much time was given to the alleged arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions—more than to the vital question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

India's approach to the general question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a comprehensive test ban is based on the following two main considerations.

First, there should be a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon

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[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 803-806.

tests. As the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 already prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment will accomplish the objectives of a comprehensive ban on all weapon tests in all environments. The first priority should therefore be given to obtaining universal adherence to a régime of prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments.

Secondly, only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such an agreement will be subject to international negotiations where detailed provisions will be worked out in the context of safeguards on nuclear activities of all States. Any system of international safeguards that may be devised should be based on objective, functional and non-discriminatory criteria. It should be universal in its application.

India cannot possibly agree to any international regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions unless the nuclear-weapon Powers first agree to stop their nuclear-weapon tests and then agree to submit themselves to the same system of international regulation of their nuclear activities, including peaceful nuclear explosions, as would be applicable to the non-nuclear-weapon Powers in the context of a general framework of universal safeguards.

Early this year the IAEA set up an *ad hoc* advisory group on peaceful nuclear explosions.[4] We consider this to be a useful step. My delegation would like to emphasize, however, that the IAEA's responsibility to provide peaceful-nuclear-explosion services arises basically from the same statutory obligations which authorize it to provide any other services. It is therefore but logical and right that the Agency should provide peaceful-nuclear-explosion services in the same non-discriminatory manner in which it makes available other services to Member States who seek such assistance.

On 6 November 1975 I had the opportunity to speak briefly in opposition to a somewhat new trend in our debate in this Committee. Some delegations have spoken here about the need for the exporters of nuclear raw material and equipment to get together and to devise common requirements for exports. The idea is that unless a State adheres to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [5] or accepts safeguards on all its nuclear facilities it will not be permitted to import nuclear raw material and equipment. There is also a tendency to involve the IAEA in such common requirements. This would be in clear violation of the statutes of the Agency on the basis of which it carries out safeguard activities or, indeed, performs any of its major functions, including the provision of technical assistance. Any arbitrary attempt to enforce on the entire

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[4] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

membership of the United Nations or the IAEA considerations which are not universally relevant and obligations which have not been universally accepted would only lead to a sense of discrimination which is not in the long-term interest of the United Nations or the IAEA or conducive to the fullest participation of all Member States. Efforts to make States conform to principles and criteria relevant only in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be fraught with consequences which need to be carefully considered.

In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX),[6] the CCD has submitted a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, prepared by an *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts.[7] India participated effectively in the discussions on the subject matter and welcomes the report. India has a positive approach to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those parts of the world where suitable conditions exist and where it is proposed that a zone be established at the initiative of and by agreement amongst the countries in that zone. However, as conditions for the establishment of such zones differ from continent to continent and from one region to another, it is not possible to devise a single formula or to lay down general principles which can cover all cases. India has, therefore, consistently maintained that any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be considered on its specific merits.

It is worthy of note that the approach of the Group of Experts is similar to that of India. The Group adopted the following principle unanimously:

> The initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary.

On the question of security of States included in a zone, the Group says:

> The premise upon which any nuclear-weapon-free zone must be based will be the conviction of States that their vital security interests would be enhanced and not jeopardized by participation . . . . The situation in areas where nuclear weapons are already present will be different, and will raise particular issues for the security of States. These issues would have to form a major consideration in any proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Several experts pointed out that there may be regions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones are impracticable or where their creation may not improve the security of the States of the area.[8]

With regard to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, India had pointed out that no consultations regarding its implications, feasibility and acceptability took place before the item was inscribed on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. India is of the firm view that such an arrangement can only be developed and matured from within the region concerned. For this purpose South Asia cannot be treated in isolation. It is a subregion and

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[6] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 808-809.
[7] *Ante*, pp. 417-419.
[8] Cf. *ibid., n.* 1.

an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific. It is necessary to take into account the security environment of that region as a whole. A genuine nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region can only follow the total absence of nuclear weapons.

The existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and the Pacific and the presence of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean complicate the security environment of that region and make the situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the subregion of South Asia.

We have noted with satisfaction the coming into force of the Convention banning bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons [9] this year. It is gratifying that nearly 115 States have signed the Convention and many, including India, have ratified it. Now the attention of the First Committee and the CCD must be turned with vigour to the question of achieving a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The CCD continued to discuss the question this year but without any substantial results. We are still of the opinion that a comprehensive ban is desirable. However, we are prepared to listen with an open mind to the various ideas and suggestions in regard to a step-by-step approach. In this context we await the joint initiative promised by the Soviet Union and the United States,[10] and we hope that it will be forthcoming in the very near future. We have also noted with interest the latest papers submitted to the CCD by Japan, Finland, Sweden, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany in this respect.

The CCD devoted some time to the question of prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes. Identical drafts of a convention were submitted to the CCD by the Soviet Union and the United States.[11] We welcome the joint initiative and look forward to the discussions on the subject here and in the CCD next year. We also welcome the initiative of the Soviet Union for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new systems and weapons of mass destruction.[12] My delegation will lend its support to the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to make comments on those subjects which were not covered today.

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[10] *Ibid., 1974*, p. 236.
[11] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[12] *Ante*, pp. 479–482.

Letter From Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements to Senator McClellan: Safeguard ABM System, November 17, 1975 [1]

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C., November 17, 1975

Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I view the recent action by the House of Representatives in deleting funds for the operation of the ABM site in North Dakota as a significant weakening of our defensive posture now and in the future.

The action which would result from shutting down the ABM site would be a direct act of unilateral disarmament on the part of the US without appropriate reciprocal acts on the part of the USSR. Not only would such an act weaken our SAL bargaining position, but much of the value to be gained from our investment in an ABM system would be lost by our refusal to operate the system for even one year.

Additionally, were the Defense Department required to implement the total shutdown of the Grand Forks site, the unique capabilities of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) to augment and improve our ability to classify enemy missile attacks and characterize by scope, intensity, and intent would be irretrievably lost.

We have reached our present position in ABM technology, and as a result, our currently negotiated SAL agreements, by an active and vigorous R&D program and the procurement of our one ABM site. The Department of Defense has requested funds for only one year of full operation of the SAFEGUARD site in order to gain operational experience which cannot be accomplished in any other manner. In FY 77 and beyond the plan calls for the operation of PAR full time, the MSR to be held in a powered standby state, and retention of some interceptors collocated with the MSR.

It must be realized that immediately shutting down the site will not realize any savings of FY 76 funds. On the contrary, contractually binding commitments such as termination costs could require additional funds over those programed. Because certain termination actions are time consuming, some funds will be required during the transitional period even if the site is to be shut down.

An orderly reduction of the North Dakota site activities which permits use of the PAR in a vital role and provides a capability for restora-

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[1] *Congressional Record*, November 18, 1975, p. S20317.

tion of the site to full operational capability must be considered in the best interests of our national defense.

Sincerely,

W. P. CLEMENTS, JR.

Six-Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee: Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, November 17, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling that the United Nations Organization, as set forth in the Charter, is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members and that, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, international relations should be governed, among other fundamental principles, by those of prohibition of the threat or use of force and non-intervention,

Bearing in mind that nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to the elimination of the danger of a nuclear holocaust,

Reaffirming the principle defined in resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 which established the necessity that there should be an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,[2]

Reaffirming also the request made in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,[3]

Having examined the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects carried out by an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament pursuant to resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[4]

Having examined also the comments made by States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding that study,

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[1] A/C.1/L.724, Nov. 17, 1975 and Corr. 1, Nov. 18, 1975. The resolution was submitted by Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, and Zaire. It was introduced by Mexico on Nov. 25 (*post*, pp. 669-674). A revised version submitted by the original sponsors and Pakistan after amendments were proposed by Bolivia (*post*, p. 693) was adopted by the G.A. plenary as pt. B of resolution 3472 (XXX), *post*, pp. 783-785.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534.

[3] *Ibid., 1966*, pp. 748-749.

[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 808-809.

the text of which is reproduced in the special report with which the Conference transmitted the study to the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that, without prejudice to the results that may be obtained through any further examination of this matter, from the analysis of the contents of the special report it is already possible at this time to draw certain incontrovertible conclusions,

Noting that from among those conclusions it would seem advisable to stress the necessity that the General Assembly define the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone and the scope of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards such zones and towards the States included therein,

Convinced that in so doing it will strengthen the new efforts recently undertaken and the realizations already achieved for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Solemnly proclaims the following declaration:

I

Definition of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone

A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject is defined, and
(b) an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

II

Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein

1. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, nuclear-weapon States shall have the following obligations:

(a) to respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;
(b) to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;
(c) to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

2. The preceding obligations shall in each case be embodied in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such

as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, which shall be signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States.

III

The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.

Statement by the Polish Representative (Wyzner) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical Weapons, November 21, 1975 [1]

As you will recall, in my statement in the First Committee on 7 November I referred to prospects for early progress in the field of chemical disarmament. I also indicated that in view of its traditional interest in that problem, the Polish delegation was prepared to work with other delegations to prepare a draft resolution which would urge the continuation by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) of its efforts towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons, taking into account the proposals which have been submitted to that body.

As a result of extensive consultations with many delegations, and owing to the spirit of co-operation which they invariably demonstrated, I now have the privilege of introducing, on behalf of Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, India, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, Yugoslavia and Poland, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.725.[2]

I should like at the same time to correct a mistake in the list of sponsors, because Hungary was inadvertently omitted as one of the sponsors of the document. I should be very grateful, therefore, if the Secretariat would issue an appropriate corrigendum to our document.

In the course of the long consultations we sought to work out a text which would reconcile and reflect, to the greatest extent possible, the views and suggestions submitted by many delegations. We hope that this objective has been reached in the text, which is largely self-explanatory. In view of the fact that the General Assembly has been seized of this problem for a long time—as indicated by the previous resolutions referred to in the first preambular paragraph—I do not intend to tax the Committee's patience by going into a detailed explanation of the draft's provisions.

The second preambular paragraph addresses itself to the interdependence between political détente and progress in the field of disarm-

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2095 (prov.), pp. 3-7.
[2] Identical with resolution 3465 (XXX), *post*, pp. 767-769.

ament. By stressing that international détente is conducive to the implementation of further disarmament measures and of general and complete disarmament, this paragraph reflects opinions articulated not only in the general debate of the present session of the General Assembly, but also views generally expressed and recorded at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and at the Lima Conference of non-aligned countries, as well as in many high level bilateral contacts between various States.

The third preambular paragraph stresses the importance of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in that over-all quest for general and complete disarmament, whereas the fourth paragraph of the preamble refers to the Geneva Protocol of 1925,[3] recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to its principles and objectives and reaffirmed the need for their strict observance by all States.

The subsequent two paragraphs refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, expressing satisfaction at the entry into force of that important instrument which, apart from being in itself a major step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States, contains, in its article IX, a specific undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith towards that end.[4]

The seventh preambular paragraph stresses the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a contribution to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The next three paragraphs of the preambular part of the draft resolution refer to the CCD and its efforts with regard to chemical weapons. They note that drafts of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of "C" weapons and on their destruction, as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Committee, constituting valuable contributions to the negotiation of an appropriate document. Furthermore, they express understandable concern over the lack of progress in the Committee's efforts in that regard, a statement which clearly does not prejudice any such efforts in that regard as may be made outside the framework of the CCD.

The eleventh and last preambular paragraph is especially noteworthy, for it reflects the resolve of the General Assembly and of the international community at large to contribute to a successful conclusion of the negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete pro-

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

hibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction.

It will be easily noticed that the operative part of the draft resolution parallels in fact, or in large part at least, the wording of the General Assembly resolution on chemical weapons which was adopted at the twenty-ninth session.[5]

Thus, as last year, the first operative paragraph reaffirms the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States, whereas the second paragraph again urges all States to make every effort to facilitate the preparation of such an agreement at an early date. While suggestions were made by some delegations to adopt a somewhat stronger language in order to convey the growing urgency of advance in the area of chemical weapons, other delegations argued that the lapse of time does not essentially affect the formulation of the ultimate objective, or the intrinsic obligation of all States to strive to facilitate the attainment of the said objective. We accepted the latter view, believing that the language now included is essentially adequate and would not prejudice any future stand in that regard.

Also, the third operative paragraph, requesting the CCD to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority, taking into account the existing proposals, is basically similar to that of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year. While my delegation would have wished to dramatize the need for the CCD to give greater attention to the problem of chemical weapons than it has thus far, we recognized the validity of the argument that there are already items on the Committee's heavy agenda which, by virtue of earlier General Assembly resolutions, had been accorded the highest priority status. We believe, that the present wording leaves no doubt as to the degree of urgency of progress that must be made by the CCD in the field of chemical disarmament.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the operative part, like the two corresponding paragraphs of the preamble, refer to the Convention on the prohibition of "B" weapons and to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, inviting States that have not yet done so to accede to the respective instruments. In the view of many delegations, including my own, such an appeal by the General Assembly is entirely justified, indeed necessary, even though in the meanwhile the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons has entered into force and the Geneva Protocol has been ratified by additional countries. Needless to say, it was felt that the draft resolution would be grossly inadequate if it omitted the customary appeal for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The remaining two paragraphs of the draft resolution are of a procedural nature.

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[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 790–792.

At a time when the international community, guided by humanitarian considerations, is becoming increasingly concerned over the use of indiscriminate weapons causing unnecessary suffering, and when, out of a sheer instinct of self-preservation, it seeks to prevent and proscribe the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, there can be no excuse for failure to make relentless efforts to eliminate chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States. After all, these are indiscriminate weapons of mass annihilation which would have the most devastating effect, first of all, upon innocent and unprepared civilians. These are weapons, too, where technological progress can lead to a new and unpredictable breakthrough, posing an ever greater threat to man and his environment.

Therefore, I speak for the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.725 when I commend it for adoption by consensus of the First Committee. Such a unanimous endorsement would be the most fitting manifestation of the urgency and importance attached by the General Assembly to tangible progress in the field of chemical disarmament.

In conclusion, I wish to renew, to the co-sponsors and to other delegations concerned, our appreciation of the goodwill and the spirit of co-operation which they have extended to my delegation in preparing the draft resolution.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Chuang) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 21, 1975 [1]

With regard to the question of disarmament, including the item on a world disarmament conference and others, the Chinese delegation has already expounded its position fully in our speeches at the plenary meeting and in the First Committee of the current General Assembly session. Now we would like to add a few remarks to explain our principled position on other items concerning disarmament.

1. On the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government has long advocated the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. This proposition has won wide support as it reflects the common will and fundamental interests of the people throughout the world.

We have also proposed that, as a first step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it is imperative to grasp the key to the problem, that is, that the countries which possess

[1] A/C.1/PV.2095 (prov.), pp. 37-45.

nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has already committed itself on its own initiative not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. Many countries have repeatedly asked the super-Powers to do the same. If the super-Powers are not bent on pushing their policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat, it would not be difficult for them to undertake such an obligation forthwith. In our opinion, if all of us practically and effectively undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, then conditions will be created for proceeding further to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

To evade this correct approach and propose instead, as an isolated step, the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests can in no way prevent the super-Powers from continuing the development, manufacture, deployment, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. It can neither eliminate the nuclear monopoly and nuclear threat by the super-Powers nor prevent a nuclear war.

As for China, we develop nuclear weapons entirely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the nuclear monopoly and ultimately destroying the nuclear weapons. China is ready to stop its nuclear tests at any time. But that can take place only on, and absolutely not before, the day when the super-Powers and all other nuclear countries completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy their nuclear weapons.

2. On the question of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[2]


As a number of draft resolutions directly or indirectly refer to the non-proliferation Treaty, we would like to say a few words in this regard. We have always held that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is something concocted by the super-Powers in order to consolidate their nuclear monopoly. This is an extremely unequal and unjust Treaty. As pointed out by a certain representative, this Treaty is designed only to disarm the non-nuclear countries while maintaining the arms of the fully-equipped nuclear countries. This Treaty has conferred on the super-Powers the privilege of developing, manufacturing, stockpiling and using nuclear weapons, but has deprived the numerous non-nuclear countries of their right to oppose nuclear threat, prevent a nuclear war and strengthen their armed forces for self-defence. The super-Powers have even refused to undertake the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries. This Treaty not only asks others to recognize the hegemony of the nuclear super-Powers, but gives them the privilege of carrying on out [sic] nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail. What is more, it even attempts to force other countries to come under the super-Power


[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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nuclear umbrella. This is precisely the naked nuclear hegemonism of the super-Powers.

Therefore, we reaffirm our principled position against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

3. On the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In our last speech we have already stated the principled position of the Chinese delegation in support of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, the nuclear-free zone in South Asia and the Indian Ocean peace zone. On signing Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,[3] the Chinese Government solemnly declared that China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone; nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send its means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to cross the territory, territorial sea or airspace of Latin American countries.[4] The aforementioned obligations we have undertaken have already exceeded the requirements to be met by the nuclear countries upon the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In our view, under the present circumstances of the world there exists neither equality nor mutuality in the relationship between the nuclear super-Powers and the non-nuclear countries; what exists is the aggression and threat imposed by one side on the other. Therefore, in order to make the nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones true to their name and to free them really from the super-Power aggression and threat, it is necessary first of all to urge all the nuclear countries, the super-Powers in particular, to undertake the minimum obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the above zones, to withdraw all foreign armed forces, including nuclear armed forces, to dismantle all foreign military bases, including nuclear bases, therein, and to prohibit the passage of any means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons through the territory, territorial sea or airspace of the countries in these regions. Otherwise, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones will be utterly impossible, while the super-Power nuclear war threat will still exist.

4. On the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and incendiary weapons.

Basing themselves on the position of opposing wars of aggression, the Chinese Government and people have consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Back in 1952, the Chinese Government

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[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 542–543.

recognized and ratified the 1925 "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare".[5] However, the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and the draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons concocted by the super-Powers have avoided mentioning the prohibition of the use of these weapons, and thus they can only facilitate the use of these weapons of mass destruction by the super-Powers in the future. As is known to all, the civilian and military uses of chemical toxin and bacteriological (biological) agents are not distinguishable. Moreover, the super-Powers have long been engaged actively in the research and production of these weapons, and they have mastered the methods and formula of producing them. Even if these weapons cease to be produced temporarily or have been destroyed, they can be reproduced when necessary. Therefore, we hold that the key to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of these weapons still lies in the prohibition of their use. Furthermore, even the Chiang Kai-shek clique was allowed to sign the so-called "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".[6] It goes without saying that we are against it.

As always we are in favour of prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. Obviously, it is far from sufficient to call for the "restriction of their use" only. At the same time, we have already pointed out that it is inappropriate to make a vague mention of "the use of specific conventional weapons including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects". It is essential to draw a clear distinction between a just war and an unjust one, to support the victim of aggression and oppose the aggressors.

5. On the question of so-called general and complete disarmament.

China has always been in favour of disarmament. But in our opinion, one cannot say in vague terms that disarmament is of paramount importance. It would not do to put the blame for the arms race and impose the obligation for disarmament on all countries without distinguishing between the aggressor and the aggressed, between those who threaten and the threatened. The super-Powers are countries with the highest military expenditures in the world, and they are equipped with the greatest number and the newest types of nuclear and conventional arms. Engaged in a frantic arms race and in continued aggression, expansion, interference and subversion against other countries, they are the source of a new world war. If a disarmament is to be implemented, first and foremost it should be a disarmament by the super-Powers, and not a general disarmament by all countries. As for the third world and other small and medium-sized countries, they are

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[5] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

being subjected to aggression and threat, so they have the right as well as the need to build and strengthen their defence capabilities in order to resist and prevent foreign aggression and expansion. To demand a general disarmament by all countries without making any distinction between the aggressor and the aggressed, between those who threaten and the threatened, and between the oppressor and the oppressed, can only lead disarmament on to a wrong path. As for the so-called "complete disarmament", one super-Power has been shouting the loudest about it, yet it is most rampant in arms expansion and war preparations. To date, it has not reduced a single bullet or a single rifle, still less any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Is it not as clear as daylight for all to see the real motives of that super-Power, which has been so zealously advertising general and complete disarmament?

In their speeches during the general debate in this Committee, many representatives expressed indignation at the fact that disarmament has thus far remained empty talk. Their indignation is only natural and fully justified. Is there any lack of forums for alleged disarmament over the past decades? Nevertheless, they have so far failed to effect the cut of a single soldier or a single weapon by the super-Powers. Now the super-Powers are intensifying their contention for hegemony and quickening their pace towards a new world war. In these circumstances one must never be lulled and taken in by the demoralizing music of phoney disarmament. Let us cast away illusions, prepare for struggle and maintain heightened vigilance. One will be safe only when one is well prepared. Only thus can the people of all countries remain invincible at all times.

We shall determine our vote on the various draft resolutions concerning disarmament in this Committee in accordance with our well-known position of principle. The foregoing is our statement in explanation of our vote on the relevant draft resolutions.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: No Nuclear Weapons to Israel, November 21, 1975 [1]

My delegation wishes to reply to certain statements made in this Committee alleging that the United States is interested in providing nuclear arms to Israel. I wish to state categorically that the United States has not transferred and will not transfer nuclear weapons to any country in the Middle East or elsewhere, contrary to its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[2]

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2095 (prov.), p. 66.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Address by ACDA Director Iklé Before the Milwaukee Institute of World Affairs: Deterrence and Verification, November 24, 1975 [1]

Keeping peace in the world today is a fearful and complicated business, and I would like to tell you about some of the difficulties we face.

We seem surrounded by paradoxes: We buy expensive weapons that will serve their purpose only if they are never used. We make agreements to reduce certain arms at the very time that we are inventing new ones that might take their place. Our diplomats work long and hard over the fine details of some arms control treaty, yet the treaty covers only a fraction of the arms that fill the world.

No wonder we are tempted to simplify: Why get enmeshed in all the subtleties and seeming contradictions? Why not get rid of the negotiators and simply rely on our military forces to prevent war and defend our freedoms? Remember the old Latin saying, "If you seek peace, prepare for war"?

Or, maybe we should do the opposite. "Armaments lead to war"—that's another saying—so why don't we get rid of these horrible weapons of mass destruction and preserve peace by diplomacy?

In fact, diplomacy and military strength must, and always have had to work hand-in-hand. Benjamin Franklin's diplomacy in Paris was just as important as the American army when it came to saving the new American republic.

The nuclear age has not changed the nature of man or the wish for simple solutions; but it has changed the nature of war. And this makes the link between diplomacy and military power more critical than ever before. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that no country can defend itself against a major attack. And nuclear war would be so awful, so unpredictable, that it can't possibly be a way for nations to achieve their purposes. Our nuclear missiles and submarines exist not to win wars but to avert them—not to repel attack, but to deter it.

Our policy must fit the fact that today we can no longer protect ourselves by military strength alone. Arms policy has to seek out and build on the self-interest of adversaries, to make sure they will never use nuclear bombs and missiles. In short, nations must learn arms control.

Arms control is vital to make the balance of mutual deterrence less dangerous—and it is our only chance to move beyond this grim confrontation, this tense, brutal interlock that makes Americans and Russians hostages to each other.

Let me talk for a few minutes about some problems of deterrence—five of them, in fact.

First: Nuclear strategy is based entirely on theoretical hypotheses. We can never let our assumptions—our calculations—be tested. In-

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[1] Transcript.

deed, some recent studies suggest that the effects from large numbers of nuclear explosions are largely unknowable—what they would do worldwide to climate and to crops, let alone to people.

Second: Deterrence depends on having military forces that can survive an attack and strike back. The problem is that today's science and weapon technology have such momentum that they are constantly changing the survival conditions for deterrent forces. At one turn, new technology upsets the balance by creating some deadly new weapon that makes deterrent forces more vulnerable—the invention of multiple warheads for intercontinental missiles—MIRVs—for example. At another turn, technology may come up with a way to make deterrent forces more survivable; for example, the missile-carrying submarine that can hide in the oceans. Deterrence is at the mercy of technology.

A *third* problem of deterrence is in the concept of "retaliation" itself. If a nuclear attack should ever occur, what purpose would be served by destroying the cities of the nation which launched the attack? What would be accomplished, at that point, by killing and maiming millions of men, women and children who had no part in the decision to attack? Is such retaliation a rational response to a limited nuclear attack? For example, an attack against some of our military forces overseas? And if it doesn't seem rational, can we count on it to deter the enemy? Our government has come to recognize this fundamental problem and it has taken steps during the last few years to see that our forces have a broad range of choices for responding to nuclear attack. This gives us a more credible deterrent against all levels of aggression.

A *fourth* problem—and it is a terrifying one: Deterrence, even if successful, does not eliminate all risks of nuclear war. The threat of retaliation helps to ward off only a rational, calculated decision to attack. It can't prevent an unintended outbreak of nuclear war. Accidental war cannot be deterred!

As if these four problems of deterrence were not enough, a new one may be about to break. Nuclear technology is spreading around the world, and this can give many more nations the potential to make nuclear bombs. Nuclear technology has this dual nature: reactors that produce energy also yield the material required to make nuclear bombs. Ask yourself, what does this mean for the deterrence we depend on to prevent nuclear attack? The only way we now know to ward off nuclear attack is based on two ideas: first, that we have to be concerned with only one or two nuclear adversaries; and second, that the nuclear weapons in such countries will always be controlled by men who care that their country should survive. In a world of many more nuclear powers, these two essentials will no longer be true. How could we retaliate against an attack if we weren't sure where it came from? How could we deter and retaliate against a small group of fanatics or criminals?

And how are we to curb nuclear arms competition by international agreement? It's hard enough to negotiate agreements between two

countries because of their differences in national interests, in geography, and in military forces. Think how complications will multiply when we try to get agreements among many nuclear armed nations.

So you see, I told you we do have serious problems in depending on deterrence to preserve the peace. I wanted to give you a feeling for how complex the situation really is. So long as we rely on deterrence, our arms control efforts must take its shortcomings into account.

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Now let me turn to something else arms control must cope with. Arms control agreements can improve the chances for peace—but, and it is an important "but"—we must be sure the agreements are observed. We can't depend on trust alone when our country's security is at stake. So for most such agreements we insist on *verification*—on having ways to tell if all parties are living up to the terms.

In fact, verification has three purposes:

First, it provides evidence that violations may have occurred—a warning of possible cheating that might threaten our security.

Second, verification helps to deter violations, because it increases the risk of being found out and it complicates any schemes for cheating.

Finally, verification helps build confidence in arms control, by showing the parties are really living up to it. So it encourages trust and helps the climate for further progress.

But like deterrence, verification is no simple matter either. It has technical and political complications.

For one thing, verification must often involve secrecy and advanced intelligence techniques. The deterrent value of verification may be based on the fact that a possible violator does not know precisely how he is being checked.

Furthermore, verification is not a simple question of black and white, as many suppose. It often depends on delicate judgments based on a great deal of different kinds of information. How well a certain agreement can be verified may depend on the kind of restrictions and kind of weapons involved. For example, a total ban is generally easier to verify than a limit on the number of weapons allowed. If mobile missiles were banned, seeing even a single one would be enough to show the ban was violated. But it would be much harder to determine if a limit on numbers were violated; one would have to find and count all of them—or at least up to the limit and just beyond.

Obviously, large stationary objects, like ballistic missile silos, are easier to keep track of than small and mobile objects—like soldiers or bombs. That's why agreements to limit strategic weapons have focussed on the launchers that deliver them—the silos, the submarines, the heavy bombers.

Agreements that restrict weapons quality or technical characteristics, are harder to verify than limits on quantity. The number of strate-

gic missiles, for example, is easier to verify than the type of warhead those missiles have.

Insisting on good verification doesn't necessarily mean we are questioning the good faith of those involved. Evidence is often ambiguous. Questions of whether a party is complying can arise from actions that are entirely innocent. And no matter how much care goes into drafting an agreement, different interpretations can arise. Nonetheless, history does not lack examples of treaties deliberately violated.

If ambiguities are promptly identified and questions of violation can be settled, arms control agreements will continue to be effective. Otherwise they are likely to degenerate into empty ceremony.

Difficulties of verification have become one of the main obstacles to progress in arms control. We could rapidly agree to more arms limitations if we only knew how to make them verifiable. Take the case of chemical weapons, for example. Virtually every country seems to want them banned, but no agreement has been made because we don't know how to verify such a ban.

Verification also limits the kinds of agreements we can have on strategic arms. You may have read about the cruise missile—a missile like a small pilotless aircraft. These cruise missiles are particularly hard to verify for a SALT agreement.

The news stories these days are rather pessimistic about the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT; and the negotiations to reduce the forces in Central Europe (the MBFR) have been moving very slowly.

Despite these frustrations and delays, formal, negotiated agreements are worth striving for. They help countries take coordinated steps they would not take on their own. They help avoid misunderstandings about what each side can expect from the other.

But we and other nuclear powers should not confine arms control efforts to formal agreements. There is much we can do in the management of our *own* forces to reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe.

First, the designers of our strategic armaments have to do a better job. Today, our deterrent forces depend far too much on arms that have to be used quickly lest they be destroyed—"use them or lose them," as some military men have described the situation. But this dilemma of "use them or lose them" is just what could push the world, in time of an acute crisis, over the precipice. We now depend on alert missile forces, instantly ready, day and night, year after year, controlled by fragile and far-flung command links. But this structure is so complex that nobody can check out all the places where human or technical error might cause disaster. We must not let the fate of our nation, the fate of the world, depend for the indefinite future on such a dangerous contraption. With all our brains and resources, we should be able to devise deterrent forces that can ride out an attack, and so avoid any need for hair-trigger response.

There is a second front where we can move ahead without waiting

for agreements: pay more attention to the human implications of nuclear arms. The horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was once vivid for the world, but it has long since faded from our minds. Too many people have lost the sense of proportion as to what is needed—and what is morally justified—to deter nuclear aggression. To have effective deterrence we need not guarantee to kill millions of innocent people—people who could never influence the decision we wish to deter. Rather, for fundamental morality, we should not rig our forces in such a way as to cause mass killing—totally unnecessary killing—in any nuclear war. If the war had been caused by accident, what would be the sense of such "retaliation"? We should never lock our own forces into a posture that would make us the first to use nuclear weapons in a cruel and wanton way. We must not be the first to use nuclear weapons against cities.

Fortunately, the evolution in United States nuclear policy, initiated under President Nixon and continued since, is moving us in the right direction. Those interested in arms control should give this evolution their whole-hearted support.

There is a third front: the battle to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading throughout the world. We are taking several actions here.

As Secretary Kissinger announced in the United Nations we are trying to get other countries to join together in setting up multinational centers for managing and storing their nuclear reactor fuel. Such centers can provide cheaper fuel through economy of size. But more important, they can give greater safety against the chance that peaceful nuclear fuel might be diverted to make weapons.[2]

We are seeking new ways to manage the growing traffic in nuclear fuels between nations, so they cannot be hijacked or otherwise stolen. And we are also seeking new ways to protect the increasing accumulating stockpiles of these dangerous fuels.

We have to explore better intelligence techniques to cope with nuclear proliferation. Techniques to tell where a nuclear explosion comes from, might be important.

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Human intellect created the atom bomb, but unfortunately, it has not yet found a safe way to live with it. Yet, we have been learning. Today we have a far deeper understanding of deterrence and arms control than, say, twenty years ago—or even ten. Our ambition should not be stunted by temporary frustrations and setbacks. Our goals must remain ambitious.

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[2] *Ante*, p. 476.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*, November 24, 1975 [1]

The purpose of my statement today, as you have just indicated, Mr. Chairman, is formally to introduce in the First Committee the draft resolutions which appear in documents A/C.1/L.722 [2] and A/C.1/L.723.[3] We have thought it appropriate to present them simultaneously, since both draft resolutions are sponsored by the same 21 Latin American delegations [4] listed in those documents and both are related to the same international instrument, namely, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.[5]

In the first place, I should like to refer to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.722, since it deals with Additional Protocol II of the Treaty,[6] in respect of which the General Assembly has already adopted no less than seven resolutions containing appeals to nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify it. Besides recalling those resolutions, the draft resolution reiterates the firm conviction of the General Assembly that the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is needed to enhance the effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and that this co-operation should also take the form of commitments entered into in a formal, legally binding, international instrument such as a treaty, convention or protocol. In the third and last preambular paragraph, it recalls with particular satisfaction that the United Kingdom, the United States, France and China—in chronological order—have already become parties to Additional Protocol II.

The primary purpose of the operative part of the draft resolution—in addition to inscribing the item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly—is to urge the Soviet Union once again to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. It is fitting to emphasize that for more than a year the Soviet Union has been in a position of total isolation on this matter. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution fail to understand how a nuclear weapon State can refuse to heed the repeated appeals of the General Assembly, for the simple reason that, as we have repeatedly recalled, among the five "nuclear Powers", it is precisely the Soviet Union which has most frequently advocated—and sometimes by spokesmen in the highest positions—its unreserved support for the establishment of nuclear-free weapon zones.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2096 (prov.), pp. 3–11.
[2] Identical with resolution 3467 (XXX), *post*, pp. 773–774.
[3] Identical with resolution 3473 (XXX), *post*, pp. 784–785.
[4] Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–82.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.723—the second draft resolution which I have the honour to introduce to the Committee this morning—deals with Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, accession to which is open to States having *de jure* or *de facto* international responsibility over given territories within the scope of the Treaty but which are not sovereign political entities.[7] The two resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted—resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 [8] and resolution 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974[9]—are recalled in the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. The second preambular paragraph refers to the fact that through Additional Protocol I the above-mentioned territories can receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty. Finally, it is also recalled with satisfaction in the preamble that two States to which Additional Protocol I is open for signature, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have become parties to it.

As is known, the General Assembly in resolution 3362 (XXIX) of last year appealed to the other two States which under the Treaty could become parties to Additional Protocol I, that is to say, the United States and France, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to them and to inform the General Assembly of any measures adopted by those States. Unfortunately, as reported by the Secretary-General in document A/10266 of 6 October 1975, "to date no reply has been received" from these States.

The delegations which are co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.723 deplore this attitude of indifference to General Assembly decisions, since they are convinced, as was stated last year, that the populations of the territories concerned are entitled to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty, which consist mainly in removing the danger of nuclear attacks and avoiding the squandering of resources in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the draft resolution includes a renewed appeal to the United States and France to sign and ratify Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as soon as possible, and once again we request the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly at its thirty-second session of any measure adopted by those two States.

The 21 delegations co-sponsors of the two draft resolutions, the introduction of which I am about to conclude, hope that the three States to which the draft resolutions refer will heed the appeal which we are sure the General Assembly will address to them by adopting these draft resolutions with the same impressive number of votes as on past occasions. Were they to do so, they would make a valuable contribution to strengthening the only densely populated nuclear-free zone in existence, whose encouraging example has no doubt contributed to our

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[8] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 620–621.
[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 809–811.

having on the agenda of the General Assembly today items relating to the establishment of five other similar zones.

To conclude this statement on a note which we believe gives grounds for optimism, I should like to report to the Committee that in the course of this year the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America entered into force for two more States of the region: Grenada signed it on 29 April and ratified it, with a waiver provided for in article 28, on 20 June; while Trinidad and Tobago fulfilled the ratification requirement, the only one remaining, on 27 June. Therefore, today we now have 20 Latin American States which are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the two draft resolutions that I have just introduced refer to the two Protocols of that Treaty.

Statement by the Romanian Representative (Ene) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, November 24, 1975 [1]

The Romanian delegation has had occasion to set forth its fundamental views on the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security".[2]

My statement today will be devoted to an introduction of the draft resolution which I announced at that time.

As has been demonstrated clearly by our general debate, the whole of mankind is profoundly concerned at the direction and scope of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, its effects on world peace and security and on the economic and social development of all countries.

Military expenditures are a heavy burden on all the peoples of the world; they impede co-operation among States, are an obstacle to efforts to end under-development and to plug economic gaps, and prevent the solution of other problems so vital for the future of mankind.

In the circumstances the examination by the United Nations of the many consequences of the arms race may, in short, provide the underlying reason for the efforts undertaken so far by our Organization to take authentic and determined action to bring about disarmament. The conclusions which may be drawn from this do provide important points of departure for disarmament negotiations. They carry great conviction and are likely to mobilize the necessary political will in this field.

The first report of the Secretary-General, issued in 1971 on the consequences of the arms race, highlighted the alarming momentum of this race and also the urgent need for broad and responsible action to halt it.[3]

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2096 (prov.), pp. 22–28.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 626–636.

[3] *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (A/8469/Rev.1).

Since that report came out, the situation with regard to the arms race has continued to deteriorate even more rapidly; the growth of military expenditure in the last five years has reached proportions unprecedented in peacetime; and the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has become markedly more technological in nature and weapons are becoming ever more sophisticated, while at the same time disarmament negotiations are at a standstill.

All these factors and the important developments which have occurred in the world since the last report of the Secretary-General on the subject require—and the general debate has amply confirmed the need for this—that a new examination of the complex consequences of the arms race should be undertaken in order to shed light on their particular features at the present stage.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.727 [4] which the Romanian delegation has the honour of introducing, together with the delegations of Argentina, Colombia, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, Venezuela and Yugoslavia,[5] has as its specific aim the updating of the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and military expenditure.

The principal reasons which underlay the approach of the Romanian delegation throughout the negotiations on the draft resolution were: first of all, the important changes in the phenomenon of the arms race since the first report of the Secretary-General; the very serious consequences of this race for the political, economic and social life of the world, consequences which make this arms race incompatible with the efforts at present under way in the international community to bring about a new international economic order in the world.

Secondly, the need for systematically and periodically informing Governments and world public opinion on the situation with regard to [the] armaments field and to disarmament negotiations. The mobilization of all factors liable to bring about effective measures to stop the arms race and bring about disarmament, require, among other things, continuous efforts on the part of all to provide information regarding the prevailing situation in this field.

Thirdly, we have been guided by the feeling, which is widely shared, that the direction taken by the arms race has increased the urgent need for measures to halt and reduce the arms race, particularly by the reduction of military budgets, beginning with the military expenditures of the major military Powers.

As emerges clearly from the preamble of the draft resolution, we believe that these considerations should govern the additional task which we are asking of the Secretary-General at this session, in bringing up to date his report on the economic and social conditions of the arms race and military expenditures, to study them in greater detail,

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[4] Identical with resolution 3462 (XXX), *post*, pp. 762–763.

[5] Subsequently, Grenada and the Philippines also became sponsors.

and to derive from them relevant conclusions capable of influencing future negotiations in the field of disarmament. With the benefit of the work already done in the first report, which was the subject of unanimous appreciation in the General Assembly, we believe that the new study should take as its point of departure, the concerns reflected in the report of 1971, particularly the qualitative aspects of the arms race; the arms race in terms of resources; the dynamics of military research and development; and the national and international consequences of the arms race. At the same time, bringing the report up to date should obviously not be a mere mechanical operation.

Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.727) requests that any new developments since the first report was issued should be taken into account, in order to make clear the effects of the arms race in the years 1975–1976.

With regard to the procedure, the draft resolution is based on the view that the bringing up to date of the report is a continuation of the study on the consequences of the arms race that was undertaken five years ago. The draft resolution accordingly reiterates, without any change, the procedure used in producing the report of the Secretary-General in 1971. It thus respects the right of the author of the report, the first edition of which was prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, to bring his work up to date on the same conditions.

The operative part of the draft resolution provides that the action concerned will cover a period of two years, the report being requested for the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the procedure employed in 1971, the Secretary-General will no doubt again invite Member States to communicate their views and comments on the subjects that will be dealt with in the report. The group of expert consultants to be appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with Governments will assist the Secretary-General to collate the information thus obtained, in the form of an up-to-date report, and to formulate the necessary conclusions.

In our view, in order to preserve the continuity of the work, it will also be necessary for the group of expert consultants to consist, as far as possible, of the same persons who took part in the preparation of the initial report.

We are convinced that the Secretary-General, on the basis of the great interest he has always shown in disarmament problems, and also the experience gained in the preparation of the first report, will find the most appropriate means of co-ordinating effectively all the factors which are required for the success of the work.

There is no doubt that the Secretary-General should have the co-operation and assistance of Governments, governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations in order to carry out this work in the most effective way.

The draft resolution which I have the honour of introducing today is the result of broad consultations with a large number of delegations. The text which was produced takes into account, in so far as possible, the various views expressed. And since what we are calling for is a continuation of something begun five years ago, the text also follows very closely the formulations previously accepted by the General Assembly.

The Romanian delegation would like to thank all those delegations which participated in a constructive spirit in these consultations, particularly delegations which share our views and have been good enough to become co-sponsors.

We are most sincerely convinced that the adoption of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.727, and the preparation of the report, will be an important contribution by the United Nations to the task of informing all Governments, and world public opinion, about the serious consequences of the arms race for peace and security in the world, and for the economic and social development of all peoples, and will, we hope, give a new impetus to disarmament negotiations.

We hope that in view of its objectives, the draft resolution will meet with the general approval of the Assembly, and will be adopted by consensus.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extracts], November 25, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the arms talks with the Soviet Union are stagnated.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. What is causing the stalemate, and what are the chances for breaking it? What will it take to break it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the stalemate has been caused basically by the issue of whether to count the so-called Backfire bomber and how to take into account the so-called cruise missiles in relation to the overall totals that had been agreed to at Vladivostok. These are complicated technical issues, and the status of the negotiations is such that if that deadlock is broken, it can be concluded reasonably rapidly after that in working out the details.

The prospects are hard to foretell at this moment. It is our position—we are prepared to review our position if the Soviet Union is prepared

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, December 15, 1975, pp. 859–860.

to review its position. We cannot make new proposals simply because the Soviet Union rejects our old proposals without offering any alternatives. If the Soviet Union is prepared to review its attitude, then we can see what can be modified in ours so that a mutually acceptable compromise can emerge.

At this point I cannot give you a judgment of the degree to which this is possible, because there have not been any detailed talks since my last press conference.

Q. Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you consider it a possibility that you might be meeting with one or another of the Soviet leaders before the end of the year on that subject?

Secretary Kissinger: That possibility exists, but it is not yet absolutely firm.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, Aviation Week and Space Technology has accused you and the President of a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception at the SALT talks. Do you have any response to that editorial?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a disgrace when the President and the Secretary of State can be accused of deliberately deceiving the American public with respect to alleged violations of our major adversary.

Serious people are bound to differ when you have complicated weapons systems on both sides of great technological complexity. When there is a report of violation, it is investigated. That takes some time. Then representations are made. That may take some time.

But there has been no violation that has been reported that has not been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union and has not been energetically pursued—or, I should rather say, no allegation of a violation—and I think this is an unworthy editorial.

Q. Therefore, to follow up, they say the Soviet Union is building an irreversible Soviet military advantage. You say that is totally wrong?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is building up its strategic forces—but not on the basis of violations of the agreement, but on the basis of investment in its strategic forces.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union can build an irreversible advantage in strategic forces against the United States if we are on our toes. They will certainly not do it on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement. Whether they do it by being willing to spend more than the United States is another matter. But on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement, it is not correct.

. . . . . .

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, November 25, 1975 [1]

Pursuant to the decision taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[2] the Assembly has received a special report by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) transmitting the comprehensive study, carried out by an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts, of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, as well as the comments made by members of the CCD on the study. That special report is contained in document A/10027/Add.1.[3]

Several conclusions can be drawn from a careful examination of that study and the comments on it. Among those conclusions we must emphasize the need for the General Assembly to adopt an internationally recognized definition of the concept of "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of such zones and the States making them up.

That would be one of the most effective procedures to enhance—as the General Assembly stated in the resolution to which I have already referred—the efforts recently undertaken and the results already achieved with regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

With respect to the first of the two definitions to which I have referred—that is, the concept of "nuclear-weapon-free zone"—I would say the following. The urgency of reaching such a definition is obvious when one reads chapter III of the study carried out by the experts, the chapter dealing specifically with this aspect of the subject. Throughout the chapter the reader is aware of the attempts—more or less disguised—by some Governments to discourage or restrict the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Thus, reference is made to the indispensable requirement that "suitable conditions exist for the creation of such zones", conditions which are subsequently described as "feasible". We are told that:

> Several experts pointed out that there may be regions in which nuclear-weapon-zones are impracticable or where their creation may not improve the security of the States of the area.

It is stated that

> it was argued by some experts that the reduction of tension must precede the creation of a truly effective nuclear-weapon-free zone.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2097 (prov.), pp. 3–16.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.

We are informed of the belief of other members of the *ad hoc* group that

> nuclear-weapon-free zones may not be appropriate in all areas.[4]

We really cannot hide our astonishment at these reservations reflected in the study that has been transmitted to us. We fail to understand why our world, which in 1944 was throughout its immense surface a gigantic nuclear-weapon-free zone, must be today—in the middle of what has been called the Disarmament Decade—divided between the territories of nuclear-weapon States and the territories of States that do not possess these terrible instruments of mass destruction, nor why in the regions occupied by the latter States we should differentiate between those which meet and those which do not meet the "suitable" or "feasible" conditions making it "appropriate" to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones there.

And we must also ask: Who is to judge that "suitability" or "feasibility" or "appropriateness"?

Clearly, there are States for where the clock has been stopped all these years. When I read the statements in chapter III which I have just quoted, I am reminded of what I said in this very conference room, during the 1333rd meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 11 November 1963, when I introduced to the Committee the Latin American draft resolution that became resolution 1911 (XVIII), entitled "Denuclearization of Latin America".[5] Referring to the numerous statements which had alluded to the Latin American initiative, I said:

> I must confess that I was somewhat surprised that in some of those statements, after recognizing the fact that the establishment of a denuclearized zone was something primarily within the competence of the countries composing the zone, some . . . representatives, referring to this matter, thereupon went on to enumerate a more or less long list of conditions, many of them impossible of fulfilment, which they believe to be indispensable for such a denuclearized zone to be established.
>
> Now, since the application of this procedure on a general and indiscriminate basis would in practice nullify the will expressed by States composing the zone directly concerned, and therefore would be in direct contradiction with the recognition of the fact that that will must be considered as the decisive element and since, on the other hand, such an attitude would seem to set aside the fact that the United Nations, in Chapter I of its Charter, expressly grants the 'sovereign equality of all its Members', I am inclined to believe that the intention of the speakers to whom I have alluded . . . was primarily one of enumerating the conditions which they consider indispensable for an eventual or possible denuclearization of the geographical zones in which their own countries are situated.[6]

That is what I said in this Committee in 1963.

That view, which I expressed more than a decade ago, continues to be fully applicable to the restrictive assessments which abound in the study of the *Ad Hoc* Group. Furthermore, if the contents of the report are examined carefully, the origin of the many contradictory state-

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[4] A/10027/Add.1, annex I, pp. 38–40.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 628–629.
[6] A/C.1/PV.1333, pp. 47–48.

ments can easily be determined, despite the cryptic style in which they are drafted.

Clearly, some of these statements reflect the position of some States —very few, fortunately, among the impressive total membership of the United Nations—which seem not to have grasped the philosophy of the San Francisco Charter. One might even say that they are trying to continue to live in the pre-war world. This explains the tendency towards hegemony, the systems of alliances and military blocs, spheres of influence and the many nuclear bases; in short, it explains that "balance of power" of modern times which is quite properly called "the balance of terror".

The other group of statements in the report are those made by the legions of young developing States which are usually referred to by the generic term of "the third world". They are the States whose peoples believe in and want to believe in the postulates, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, which stand for and advocate as the supreme rule of conduct the sovereign equality of States and mutual respect, self-determination and non-intervention.

Between these two concepts which confront each other on every page, and at times even in every paragraph of the study prepared by the experts, the United Nations cannot be neutral; that would be a betrayal of its constitutive Charter.

The second definition which we consider it most desirable for the General Assembly to proclaim is the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and in respect of the States in those zones. These obligations would obviously not be created by the Assembly but only defined by it, since the obligations derive from various sources, among which it is appropriate to single out the following two which could be considered to be the principal ones.

First, the commitment undertaken by virtue of the Charter of the United Nations, in Chapter I of which we have as one of the fundamental principles to refrain from "the threat or use of force", a commitment which obviously and in the first place must include the obligation to refrain from the use or threat to use nuclear weapons, since these represent the most destructive form of the use of force which the genius of man has discovered.

Secondly, the fact that in the case of any nuclear-free zone—the creation of which obviously means a valuable contribution towards nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of peace—there must exist "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities . . . of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers" as was affirmed by the General Assembly in the context of the negotiations which led to the non-proliferation Treaty in resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965.[7] If the

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532-534. For text of the treaty, see *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461-465.

non-nuclear-weapon States, to make possible the existence of the zones, accept a number of specific obligations, then it is only to be expected that nuclear-weapon States, in turn, accept certain commitments in favour of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

On the basis of considerations such as the ones I have mentioned, the delegations of Argentina, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Zaire and my own, have sponsored the draft resolution which appears in document A/C.1/L.724, which I now have the honour formally to introduce to the Committee on behalf of the sponsors.[8]

By way of introduction, I should like to add only a few remarks to the comments I have already made, which in general represent a further explanation of what is stated in the preamble of the draft resolution, to make clear the content of the two definitions proposed.

With reference to the first, it is fitting to indicate that of the five fundamental elements four are among the relatively few items on which a consensus was achieved in the *Ad Hoc* Group, all of whose members agreed that: first, the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone must come from one or several of the States which are to make up that zone; secondly, the constitutive element should be a treaty or convention freely entered into, since participation in the zone cannot be imposed on any State; thirdly, the statute of the zone to be defined by the instrument must be one of total absence of nuclear weapons; and, fourthly, that the instrument should also include an international system of verification and control to ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations.

As regards the fifth and last basic element of the definition—namely, recognition of the zone as a "nuclear-weapon-free zone" by the General Assembly—while it was one of many on which unanimous agreement was not reached by the experts, it is worth while to point out that most of the experts did agree on the application of a criterion to this effect and, further, there are unquestionably sufficient valid reasons to justify that recognition, among which are the following: the fact that "circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case", as was recognized by the *Ad Hoc* Group in the very brief conclusion which appears at the end of the study.[9]

Consequently, as a complement of two of the universal requirements—a régime of total absence of nuclear weapons and an effective system of verification and control—which include the definition we have mentioned, provision will have to be made for a statement by an internationally recognized body, such as the General Assembly, to tell us, also in each case, whether the "pragmatic and flexible approach" mentioned by the experts has been judiciously applied and whether the

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[8] *Ante*, pp. 647-649.
[9] A/10027/Add.1, p. 69.

result of their application has been the creation of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone".

This is a most delicate task and cannot be left to the arbitrary judgement of the nuclear Powers. We are therefore convinced that recognition by the United Nations, through a statement by its fully representative organ, namely, the General Assembly, to the effect that a zone meets all the requirements to be considered a "nuclear-weapon-free zone", will constitute the best defence of the legitimate interests of the peoples and States of the third world. In fact, with the authorized statement of the organ which is considered to be the spokesman of the conscience of mankind, capricious or self-seeking objections which may come in certain cases from members of the large military blocs, and particularly from some of the nuclear super-Powers which sponsor them, will be refuted.

With regard to the text under reference, it remains only for me to explain that the definition contained in it is the one that will be applied as a general rule, which of necessity means that the General Assembly can proceed to recognize a nuclear-weapon-free zone without strictly adhering to the procedures specified in the definition should the General Assembly consider that special circumstances make it advisable to make an exception to the general rule.

With regard to the second definition, the three obligations specified therein as the principal ones for the nuclear-weapon States are the same as those which were incorporated in 1967 in the first three articles of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[10] and which also appears in resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.[11] As everybody knows the Protocol already has the signatures and ratifications of four of the five nuclear Powers to which it was originally open. The unalterable and constant practice of the Assembly which was started in its resolution 2286 (XXII) [12] and continued in six other resolutions, the latest of them resolution 3258 (XXIX),[13] all of which were adopted without a single negative vote and the majority of them with more than 100 votes in favour, has been unreserved support for acceptance of these obligations by the nuclear-weapon States.

What is provided for in paragraph 2 of the definition to the effect that the obligations of nuclear States must be embodied in each case

> . . . in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, which shall be signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States

[10] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[11] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 689–691.
[12] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 620–621.
[13] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 793–795.

also reflects the concept which the General Assembly has maintained year after year since 1968 when it adopted resolution 2456 B (XXIII).[14]

Finally, I should like to make clear that the provision in section III of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724 is intended to dispel any doubt, as regards both the non-retroactive character of the two definitions which we hope the General Assembly will approve, and the fact that these definitions cannot be interpreted as a limitation of the power vested in the General Assembly. This is why we declare that:

> The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.[15]

I would like in conclusion to reply in advance to any delaying tactics that some delegation might resort to, on the grounds that the subject in question requires additional study by Governments, by pointing out that the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724 are firmly convinced, as stated in the seventh preambular paragraph, that without prejudice to the results that may be obtained through any further examination of this matter, from the analysis of the contents of the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it is already possible at this time to draw certain incontrovertible conclusions: these include, in the first place, the need for the General Assembly to adopt without delay the two definitions we have proposed.

We are likewise convinced that in so doing the General Assembly will promote and facilitate the banning from ever broader areas of those terrible instruments of mass destruction, nuclear weapons which represent, as we must never for a moment forget, the most terrible threat to the survival of mankind since the beginning of history.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Use of Conventional Weapons, November 25, 1975 [1]

In my statement here on 19 November, I addressed myself to matters relating *inter alia* to item 35, "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use". In briefly doing so again today, I have the honour of introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.728, which is sponsored by the delegations of Austria, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,

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[14] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 799.
[15] *Ante*, pp. 647–649.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2097 (prov.), pp. 17–20.

Nigeria, Norway, Tunisia, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, besides my own delegation.[2]

As is well known, this item involves matters relating to the prohibition or restrictions of use not only of napalm and other incendiaries, but also of various specific conventional weapons, for humanitarian reasons. The fourth preambular paragraph of the draft specifically recalls this fact. It is quite obvious that the present name of the item does not adequately cover what we actually are discussing. The wish of the sponsors to remedy this by having a more appropriate title is reflected in the final operative paragraph. There, it is proposed that as of the next session of the General Assembly the item be entitled: "Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons". By thus renaming the item as from the next session of the Assembly, the full scope would be covered. At the same time a link to the past title is retained through the reference to "incendiary weapons" being one of the categories of conventional weapons concerned. Some might have preferred to keep the word "napalm" as such a link. However, it is in the expectation that it will help to bring increased support for the draft resolution that the sponsors have settled instead for the word "incendiary".

As in previous years, the draft resolution basically limits itself to procedural aspects. Thus, in operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly would invite the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to continue its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons. The Conference would also be invited to continue its search for agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons, for humanitarian reasons. In this context I wish to recall that the Conference will be attended by plenipotentiary representatives of States. Obviously they will be free to bring forward any consideration which they deem relevant to the effort. Although the Conference basically is in the humanitarian domain, they would also, of course, be able to raise any relevant security considerations.

I would also wish to reiterate what I already said in my statement last week; that is, that the results of the Conference should be based on broad agreement in order to be realistic. This point is explicitly covered in the first and fifth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution.

The sixth preambular paragraph recalls the important fact that the next session of the Diplomatic Conference will be preceded by a second conference of government experts. The object of this effort by experts is to focus on such specific conventional weapons as have been or might become the subject of proposed bans or restrictions of use, and in this context to study the possibility, the contents and form of such proposals, bans or restrictions.

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[2] Identical with resolution 3464 (XXX), *post*, pp. 766–767.

Mexican Amendments to the Thirteen-Nation Draft Resolution on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, November 25, 1975 [1]

1. Add, after the first preambular paragraph, the following:

Convinced of the urgent necessity that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, take effective measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race, .

2. Delete the last part of the third preambular paragraph so that it reads as follows:

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proved possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, .

3. Delete the fifth preambular paragraph.

4. Redraft the sixth preambular paragraph to read:

Noting that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have the right to obtain the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, pursuant to a special international agreement through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, as contemplated in article V of the Treaty, .[2]

5. Delete the words "any benefits which may accrue from the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" from the seventh preambular paragraph and replace them with the words "the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes".

6. Add the following paragraph after the seventh preambular paragraph:

Recalling once again the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee, held on 31 May 1968, by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America concerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which relate to the conclusion of a special international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[3]

7. Add, in the last preambular paragraph, the word "special" between the words "need for the" and "international agreement".

8. Insert the following as new operative paragraph 1:

1. *Appeals once again* to all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; .

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[1] A/C.1/L.729, Nov. 25, 1975. The thirteen-nation draft resolution appears *ante*, pp. 615–617. The amendments were introduced on Nov. 28 and withdrawn on Dec. 3 after the sponsors, together with Austria and Ecuador, submitted a revised draft resolution which reflected the main points of the proposed amendments. On Dec. 4, the Netherlands, on behalf of the sponsors of the revised draft resolution, amended orally operative paragraph 8 by adding the words, "in its consideration of an elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty," after the word "review." As revised and amended, the draft was adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 12 as pt. A of resolution 3479 (XXX), *post*, pp. 803–806.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 412–413, 417–418.

9. Delete from subparagraph (b) of the existing operative paragraph 1 the word "both" and the words "and the establishment" and replace them with the words "which includes information regarding the establishment".
10. Redraft subparagraph (c) of the existing operative paragraph 1 so that it reads as follows:

(c) The section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of a comprehensive test ban; .

11. Change the order of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the existing operative paragraph 1 so that subparagraph (a) becomes (c), (b) becomes (a) and (c) becomes (b).
12. Delete the text of the existing operative paragraph 2 and replace it with the following:

Deplores, in this connexion, that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have ignored the invitation addressed to them in resolution 3261 D (XXIX) to provide the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with information concerning such steps as they have taken since the entry into force of the treaty, or intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V of the Treaty; .[4]

13. Insert the following new operative paragraph after the above:

Invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to submit such information, through the Secretary-General, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session; .

14. Delete from the existing operative paragraph 5 the words "to give consideration to the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and to the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,".
15. Renumber all the operative paragraphs accordingly.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Reduction of Military Budgets, November 26, 1975 [1]

One of the items most frequently referred to in the general debate of this Committee on the disarmament items—a debate which, as we know, concluded last Friday and during which we heard approximately 100 statements—was the item on the urgent need to halt the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, and to reduce world military expenditures. My delegation hopes to have an opportunity to deal with

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[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 803–806.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2098 (prov.), pp. 6–16.

the question of the nuclear arms race at one of our forthcoming meetings devoted to the presentation of draft resolutions and to an exchange of views on them. The purpose of my statement today is to introduce to the First Committee, on behalf of the delegations of Sweden and Mexico, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.726 on agenda item 34, entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX)",[2] dealing with the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures.[3]

In addition to recalling last year's resolution, the draft resolution notes with appreciation that the 1974 report of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets [4] has been issued as a United Nations publication and given wide distribution by the Secretary-General.[5]

Similarly, reference is made to the report of the Secretary-General, containing the views and suggestions of States regarding the matters covered in the report of the Group of Consultant Experts mentioned above.[6] Thereafter, the following facts are emphasized in the draft resolution: first, that, considering the report of the Group of Consultant Experts, as well as the views and suggestions reflected in the report of the Secretary-General, it would seem advisable to continue studying the main questions related to this matter; secondly, the urgent need for States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures to reduce their military budgets; thirdly, that part of the funds thus saved should be used to provide assistance for social and economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

In the penultimate preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, we reiterate the concern of the General Assembly at the fact that year after year world military expenditure continues to rise. As the Secretary-General pointed out in the introduction of his report on the work of the Organization, world military expenditures today amount to close to $300,000 million per year and this figure represents an increase of 300 per cent over what the world spent in the initial years of the cold war.[7]

In the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution on which I am commenting, the conviction is expressed that, as indicated in the report of the Group of Consultant Experts, international security

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[2] For text of resolution 3254 (XXIX), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 784–786.

[3] An amended version of this draft resolution was adopted by the G.A. as resolution 3463 (XXX), see *post*, pp. 764–766.

[4] A/9770. *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 523–546.

[5] *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (A/9770/Rev.1), (Sales No. E.75.I.10).

[6] A/10165 and Add.1, Aug. 1, 1975.

[7] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1A* (A/1001/Add.1), p. 4.

could be maintained with far lower general levels of world military expenditures than at present.

It clearly follows from what I have just said that the aim of the draft resolution is to combine immediate action with an in-depth study. Hence, the first two operative paragraphs appeal to all States, in particular the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, to strive to reach agreed reductions of their military budgets and urge the United States of America and the Soviet Union—the two States with the highest levels of military expenditure in the world—pending such agreement to carry out reductions of their military budgets.

The latter is neither new nor unprecedented, since, as is known, those two States, in 1963 and 1964, carried out reciprocal unilateral reductions under what was called a "policy of mutual example".[8] There is no doubt that a repetition of that policy would not only contribute to lessening the pace of the arms race but would also have positive results as regards the success of the negotiations with the other permanent members of the Security Council and the other States referred to in operative paragraph 1. This opinion is not only shared by the vast majority of Member States of our Organization but has been expressed unequivocally by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom, in whose reply to the enquiry contained in resolution 3254 (XXIX) we read the following:

> Economies of scale in research, development and production enjoyed by the two super-Powers mean that a crude percentage cut in the military expenditure of the permanent members of the Security Council would have a disproportionately severe effect on the other three permanent members.[9]

Operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 are intended to achieve the second of the two aforementioned objectives, namely, an in-depth study of the subject. Accordingly, the Secretary-General is requested, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him, after consultations with Member States, to prepare a report containing an in-depth analysis and examination, in concrete terms, of a series of matters, with conclusions and recommendations. In particular, the report should emphasize the following matters:

> (a) The definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures, as well as the classifications and structuring of expenditures within the military budgets, with the over-all aim of achieving generally acceptable and universally applicable delimitations and definitions and a standardized accounting system, so as to permit effective comparisons of the military budgets;
>
> (b) The valuation of resources in the military sector, considering different economic systems and different structures of production within the military sector, with the purpose of examining methods concerning the relationships between resources and military output;
>
> (c) The deflation for price change in military production in different countries, with the aim of examining methods of measuring real expenditure trends over time, taking into account differences between countries in the rate of price change;

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 652, 653; *ibid., 1964*, pp. 4, 7, 14.
[9] A/10165, p. 33.

(d) The international value comparison and exchange rates relevant to military production, with the purpose of examining methods for accurate currency comparison of military expenditures; .[10]

Since the requested report would be a most useful supplement to the one prepared in 1974, the Secretary-General might perhaps consider the possibility and the desirability of requesting, for the discharge of that task, the co-operation of those consultant experts who may be available among those who assisted him in the past.

The draft resolution urges all Governments to extend their full co-operation in providing all assistance that may be required for the efficient preparation of that report, which, as is stated in operative paragraph 6, is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

Finally, the draft resolution contains a paragraph intended to inscribe on the provisional agenda of that session an item entitled, "Reduction of military budgets: implementation of resolution . . . (XXX)" —the number to be filled in.

It seems fitting, to illustrate the existing disparity between world military expenditures and the expenditures intended to improve the living conditions of the world population, to cite a few figures which are so eloquent as to need no comment.

The world spends approximately six to seven times more on military research and development than on medical research.

The average investment required for each soldier is approximately $10,000 per year, while public expenditures on education barely amount to some $200 per year for each school-age child.

In a world where more than 500 million human beings suffer from severe malnutrition, where 1,500 million have no access to effective medical care, where almost 1,000 million adults are illiterate, where there are less than 70 teachers and seven doctors for every 10,000 inhabitants, some $300,000 million are spent every year, as I have already had occasion to point out, for war purposes. And all this military expenditure, what is spent by the permanent members of the Security Council and their allies represents about 80 per cent.

The representative of Sweden whose delegation joined mine in sponsoring the draft resolution which I have just introduced, reminded us here in her statement last Wednesday of what the Prime Minister of her country said when addressing the General Assembly on 11 November.[11] I would like in conclusion to make a similar reference to what the President of Mexico said on 7 October, also at a plenary meeting of the Assembly:

> The arms race, with the incredible sums devoted to the manufacture and sale of weapons, is at one and the same time an unjustifiable squandering of resources and at the same time proof of the moral crisis afflicting those countries which base their prog-

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[10] See *post*, p. 765.

[11] For the Swedish representative's statement, see A/C.1/PV.2091, pp. 12-20. The Prime Minister's statement is printed *ante*, pp. 601-604.

ress on the industry of war and build the progress of key sectors of their economy on such an industry.

More than anything else, disarmament is a true attempt at liberation: liberation of energy, liberation of resources, liberation of assets, of men of science and of workers. All these elements should then be diverted to a fruitful programme of action, of study and work that will hasten social transformation . . . . If the enormous sums today being spent on armaments were channelled to the over-all development of the world, much would be done then to eliminate the conflicts which today darken the present and future of mankind.[12]

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Role of the United Nations in Disarmament, November 26, 1975 [1]

I have asked for the floor this afternoon in order to introduce under agenda item 41, "General and complete disarmament", a draft resolution on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.[2] The draft resolution is sponsored by the delegations of New Zealand, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Venezuela as well as my own delegation. I am happy to announce that the Philippines has also decided to join us as a sponsor.

The preambular paragraphs should be fully self-explanatory. They give the well-known reasons behind the urgent need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in our common search for disarmament, as outlined by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report. We have noted that a large number of delegations have given these ideas their full support during our general debate. I therefore do not believe it necessary to go into a detailed explanation of the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution.

I wish to draw particular attention to certain provisions in the operative part of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 2 concerns the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee of the General Assembly open to the participation of all Member States. We consider that the question of disarmament is of direct concern to the whole world community. All States should therefore have an equal right to contribute to efforts to strengthen the role of the United Nations in disarmament and, with that purpose, to participate in the proposed review.

During our informal consultations it has been suggested that the United Nations Disarmament Commission might be the body to carry out the review. There are two main reasons why we have come to the conclusion that it would be more appropriate in this case to work through an *ad hoc* committee specially set up for this purpose. One is that the review—as I have said repeatedly—should not deal with the substance of disarmament, which has been and still is the main task for

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[12] A/PV.2377, pp. 17–18.

[1] A/C.1/PV.2098 (prov.), pp. 22–26.

[2] A/C.1/L.732. A revised version of this draft resolution was adopted by the G.A. as resolution 3484B (XXX), *post*, 807–809.

the Disarmament Commission. The other consideration lies in the strictly temporary character of the work envisaged for the review, something which might be less clear if the task were to be entrusted to a permanent body like the Disarmament Commission.

In operative paragraph 3 delegations will find outlined the three main areas on which the review should, *inter alia*, focus its attention. The first area covers new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The goal should be to let the United Nations exercise its full role in all universal disarmament efforts. This will in no way interfere with the process of negotiations on disarmament which are pursued in existing or future multilateral negotiating fora, as, for example, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). On the contrary, a strengthening of United Nations activities in this field could give them new and improved inputs and thereby contribute to their effectiveness.

The second area concerns the role of the United Nations in the field of information. Much has already been said in this Committee on the inadequacy of the United Nations performance in this respect, and on the consequent need to expand information activities in the field of disarmament to correspond and better accord with the efforts which the United Nations already deploys in other important fields. The Member States and world public opinion could reasonably expect complete and objective information on disarmament from the world Organization. Through this, they will be able better to appraise the situation and the progress achieved.

In the third area the Review Committee should consider what can be done by the Secretariat to assist Governments on their request to follow up existing disarmament agreements. As I have already mentioned in my statement on 14 November it is essential to ensure that at any given time efforts in disarmament respond to changing realities both in the political and in the technological fields.

I would furthermore like to draw attention to operative paragraph 1. We believe that all Governments should have the opportunity to give the Secretary-General their views and suggestions relating to the review, so as to provide the Review Committee with useful material for its work.

In this connexion I would like to outline some very preliminary ideas on the organization of the work of the Review Committee, in response to questions to us from various delegations. Now this is, of course, a matter to be decided upon by the Review Committee itself. My very early views are, however, that it might be appropriate to have a first and short organizational session of the *ad hoc* committee already in January next year. At this session the Review Committee would set up its bureau and decide on such things as the schedule of work. It would also be possible then to consider questions which might be put to Member States by the Secretary-General in accordance with operative para-

graph 1, to solicit their views and suggestions on how best to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The first real working session would preferably be held in May or early June, a session which might be of two-weeks duration, when replies received from Governments would be available. A third and final session could then be held at the beginning of September next year, to allow the review committee to complete its work and finalize its report in time for the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. From this it should be perfectly clear that the mandate of the review committee would be of limited duration. We have every reason to believe that it will prove possible for the committee to fulfill its mandate by next September, as indicated in operative paragraph 5.

One obvious way of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament would, of course, be to increase the capacity of the Disarmament Division of the United Nations Secretariat. We would strongly favour decisive steps in that direction. In my statement of 14 November I emphasized this by making a comparison between the financial implications of such steps and the exorbitant levels of military spending, particularly by the super-Powers. In other words, the cost could hardly be raised as a credible obstacle to proceeding with the strengthening of the Disarmament Division. The services of the *ad hoc* review committee and any other assistance requested by the Secretary-General for the comprehensive review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament are likely to place an additional strain on the capacity of the Disarmament Division which, by the way, seems already to be stretched very far. Some strengthening of the Secretariat would therefore seem appropriate following the adoption of this draft resolution. In our view it would then be for the *ad hoc* committee carrying out the review process to identify further needs for increased capacity in the Secretariat. This is in conformity with what I have stated several times—that in the current process of launching the review we should not in any respect prejudge its outcome.

The draft resolution is designed to give the United Nations a strengthened and renewed role in the field of disarmament. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I warmly recommend the draft resolution to the positive consideration of the First Committee. We hope it may be adopted unanimously.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, November 26, 1975 [1]

Yesterday, at our 2097th meeting, the representative of Mexico, on behalf of the Mexican and several other delegations, introduced a draft

[1] A/C.1/PV.2098 (prov.), pp. 27–32.

resolution (A/C.1/L.724) under agenda item 44,[2] concerning the comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones conducted this year by a group of experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. With all due deference to our esteemed Mexican colleague, my Government thought it would be appropriate to express its strong opposition to the draft resolution at the earliest practicable moment. By adopting the draft resolution, the General Assembly would "solemnly proclaim" a declaration setting forth a definition of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept, together with a definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States towards such zones and the States included in them. My delegation considers the draft resolution unacceptable in several respects, and will vote against it. I should like to set out the principal reasons for that position.

One of the valuable contributions of the comprehensive study in document A/10027/Add.1 [3] is that it clearly demonstrates that basic issues involved in the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept and in the question of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones are both highly complex and subject to widely divergent views. A "definition" of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept that ignores those basic issues or glosses over them with generalities, as we believe the definition in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724 does, would hardly serve the interests of States wishing to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in their regions. Indeed, by giving the false impression that key questions have already been answered, such a definition could mislead proponents of nuclear-weapon-free zone proposals.

Let us take just one example. The comprehensive study shows that many experts consider that a basic attribute of any nuclear-weapon-free zone should be the effective prohibition of the development by States within the zone of any nuclear explosive capability, for any purpose whatsoever. My Government strongly shares that view and would consider such a prohibition essential to the effectiveness of a zone. The proposed definition before us, however, does not even refer to this important question, nor does it acknowledge other important issues, such as the geographical scope of zones and the treatment of the question of transit. I have to question the utility of proclaiming such a definition, while ignoring complex underlying considerations.

My Government has made it clear that it will not commit itself to any particular set of undertakings towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in advance of negotiation of specific arrangements for the zone. We have stated on more than one occasion that the United States would take into account the extent to which a particular zone arrangement meets several important conditions that we consider essential to its effectiveness, before determining the undertaking that we would be prepared to

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[2] *Ante*, pp. 647-649. An amended version of the draft resolution was adopted by the G.A. as resolution 3472 B (XXX), (*post*, pp. 782-784).

[3] *Ante*, pp. 417-419.

make. Thus we cannot accept the abstract assertion that the obligations stipulated in the proposed definition are an essential component of any nuclear-weapon-free zone.

My delegation questions the proposed definitions in and of themselves, as well as the utility of seeking universally valid definitions of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept. Moreover, our strongest objections concern the implications of the draft resolution for the role, competence and authority of the General Assembly.

The proposed definition of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept asserts that a basic requirement for a zone is its recognition as such by the General Assembly. That assertion has very serious implications. It states, in effect, that an agreement negotiated among a group of States does not become valid and cannot enter into force without the approval of this body. The draft resolution goes even further in saying:

> In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, nuclear-weapon States shall have the following obligations . . .[4]

That says that the General Assembly has the power to impose upon States binding commitments—commitments, indeed, that might fundamentally affect their security interests.

But the General Assembly does not have the authority to impose such obligations either on parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement or on outside States. The assumption of such obligations is necessarily a voluntary act of sovereignty, based on mutual agreement freely entered into among the States concerned.

The General Assembly can make an important contribution to the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, both by providing a forum for consultations and by adopting resolutions that encourage States to work towards specific arrangements. However, there is absolutely no justification in the United Nations Charter or international law for arguing that "endorsement" or "recognition" by the General Assembly can be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for entry into force of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or for the assumption of obligations towards the zone by States not located in the region.

It seems to us particularly unfortunate that this resolution should be presented before Member States have been given the opportunity to present their views on the issues raised in the comprehensive study.

My delegation has already indicated its support for a resolution inviting States to submit their views, and we are aware that a resolution along these lines is being prepared. We believe that the adoption of such a resolution would be a constructive action on this subject for the Assembly at this session.

On the other hand, adoption of the resolution presented by the representative of Mexico would be of little service to those considering the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone who must eventually come to grips with some of the controversial issues that are ignored by the

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[4] A/C.1/L.724, para. 1; cf. *post*, p. 784.

proposed definitions, and it would represent a serious distortion of the role of this forum. It is with these considerations in mind that the United States will oppose the adoption of this resolution.

We believe that this is an extremely important matter. We recognize the sincere desire of the sponsors to promote nuclear-weapon-free zones, but we must urge each member of this Committee to examine this resolution with great care to ascertain what implications it may have for its own vital national interests.

Statement by the Sri Lanka Representative (Amerasinghe) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [Extract], November 26, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

By way of preface, I should like to refer to the historical background of this proposal. It had a fairly long period of gestation—seven years. In its original form, as suggested at the Cairo Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in October 1964, it was concerned with only one aspect of the problem, that is the treatment of the Indian Ocean area as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.[2] It then developed—at the Lusaka Non-Aligned Summit held in September 1970—into the idea of a peace zone which would be one not only free of nuclear weapons but also one from which great Power rivalries and competition would be excluded.

Presenting the proposal formally to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session on 12 October 1971, my Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, in describing the concept, stated as follows:

> The concept of a zone of peace is inherent in the concept of non-alignment, which requires that the land territories, air space and territorial waters of non-aligned States must be closed to great-Power conflicts and rivalries.

She went on to state as follows:

> The proposal should not be regarded merely as part of a scheme of collective security confined to the Indian Ocean. On the contrary, it is intended as a direct and tangible contribution to the Disarmament Decade and to the strengthening of conditions for world peace.[3]

This is why we have consciously avoided getting this Indian Ocean peace zone mixed up with disarmament. It is not a disarmament item, as I said, though it makes a positive contribution in that direction, but more directed to establishing conditions of peace and security which would obviate the need for military alliances or for the acquisition of armaments by countries of the area or of the military presence of any great Powers in the area.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2098 (prov.), pp. 32-46.
[2] Cf. *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 443-446.
[3] A/PV.1962, p. 3.

At its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) [4] by a vote of 61 in favour with none against, but with massive abstentions, amounting to 55. Abstentions have been described as an act of irresponsibility. I would not go so far. I would merely state that abstentions are often due to a lack of proper understanding, and I am sure that was the case in this instance.

The declaration, adopted on that occasion, solemnly declared:

> . . . that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace;

In its second operative paragraph, it called upon the great Powers:

> . . . to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

and here come the main elements of the declaration:

> (a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;
>
> (b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;[5]

The reason for the introduction of this proposal was that there were ominous signs of military rivalry in the Indian Ocean area between the two super-Powers, growing in intensity and thereby creating tensions within the area.

One super-Power is often criticized today for—to use the jargon that is used today—escalating its naval presence in the area. But it is forgotten that that escalation was its answer to the provocation offered by the presence in formidable shape of the other bloc which was a rival bloc. Any military presence of this nature must provoke a response from a bloc that feels threatened by the growth of that military presence.

It was to stop this that the proposal brought before the General Assembly and a declaration was presented to the General Assembly and adopted. It was not the intention of those who introduced this proposal that one Power should continue to remain in that area and exercise dominance over it or use it as its private lake. We wish to make it clear that we do not want either of the super-Powers in that area; in fact, we do not want any great Powers there. By the same token, we do not intend that we should drive out Satan by Beelzebub and allow some other Powers within the group of littoral and hinterland States to take the place of the super-Powers whom we have succeeded in getting rid of, if we do succeed in doing so. That is one misconception that I think it is necessary to allay and to dispel before we proceed to a proper examination of this question.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 901-903.
[5] *Ibid.*

At the twenty-seventh session, resolution 2992 (XXVII) was adopted by a vote of 95 in favour, with none against and 33 abstentions. That resolution established the *Ad Hoc* Committee for the purpose of studying:

> the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of [the] resolution . . . having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States . . . and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Those who find it difficult to understand the purpose of this resolution and of peace zones should pay some attention to the last few words that I read out:

> having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter . . .[6]

The next stage was reached in resolution 3080 (XXVIII), adopted at the twenty-eighth session by 95 votes in favour, none against and 35 abstentions. It again urged "all States, especially the major Powers, to extend their co-operation to the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions", extended the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and, finally, requested the Secretary-General

> to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects . . . with special reference to their naval deployment, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.[7]

This information regarding the military presence of the Powers was not intended to embarrass anyone, but was required to enable the Committee to have a clear idea of the extent and scale of the foreign military presence in the area and its implications. It must know the dimensions of the problem in order to deal with it.

Last year, resolution 3259 A (XXIX) was adopted by 103 votes in favour, with none against and 26 abstentions.[8] The resolution, while taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and of the factual statement of the Secretary-General, whose history I need not refer to here, endorsed the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee regarding its future work, which were that it should continue its efforts in terms of its mandate, proceed with its consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council other than one permanent member—China—which had co-operated with the Committee from its very inception. Its purpose was described in the following terms: "With a view to ascertaining their precise policy and position regarding the implementation of the Declaration". That was the only purpose of the consultations which were intended to be held with the permanent members of the Security Council.

The Committee was also asked to give priority attention during 1975

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[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 861-862.
[7] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 854-855.
[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 795-796.

to definitions such as the limits of the Indian Ocean for the purpose of the implementation of the Declaration, and other concepts such as foreign military bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities and so forth, not to mention the definition of "littoral and hinterland States". It was also asked to consider convening as early as possible a conference of littoral and hinterland States, and requested littoral and hinterland States to enter into consultations regarding a conference on the Indian Ocean. Finally, it invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate in a practical manner with the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The history of the proposal indicates the evolution of a new law, a law of diminishing returns and ever increasing support, paradoxical though it may seem.

During 1975, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held seven meetings and we also held informal consultations among the littoral and hinterland States. The littoral and hinterland States were, for the purposes of these consultations, asked to give their views on six points regarding the convening of the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean, namely: the purposes of the conference; the date and duration; its venue; the provisional agenda; the question of participation, whether it was to be limited to littoral and hinterland States only or to include the great Powers and major maritime users as well; and, finally, the level of participation.

Through 1974 attempts were made by me in my capacity as Chairman to obtain the co-operation of the great Powers through oral communications. Perhaps what would have been more appropriate would have been oral respiration. Finally, having failed over a period of one year to engage their interest or attention, the co-operation of the great Powers and major maritime users was sought by a letter dated 10 June 1975 which was addressed to them by me in my capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, seeking their views in regard to the implementation of the Declaration so far as their security and other interests were concerned, and the best means of advancing towards the objectives of the Declaration with modifications that may be necessary to reconcile differing views and interests. I could not conceive of a more innocuous form of presenting our position to them and seeking their co-operation.

It might be surprising to some, but not to all, to learn that the four great Powers did not even deign to send a reply in writing; they thought an oral reply was sufficient in response to a written communication. The rules of etiquette seem to be different in different places. However, finally, under some pressure, a couple of them did choose to risk putting down their objections in writing, or their reasons for not being able to co-operate with us. One great Power, I regret to say, has not favoured us either with an oral reply or a written reply, but with comments made at cocktail parties, to which I do not pay much attention. This response has been most disappointing, coming as it has from the "holy trinity"—the United States, the United Kingdom and France—which in this instance added a fourth to its number, the Soviet Union. The attitude of the Soviet Union and its desire to join the "holy trinity" is under-

standable, of course. But what we cannot understand is the glacial indifference shown by these four Powers to countries whose support they earnestly seek for every type of resolution that they bring forward, however remote it may be from the goal of disarmament. Perhaps they will learn to regard others with the same forbearance and respect that they expect from those others.

As regards the major maritime users, one, namely Japan, has from the very start co-operated with the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The others belonging to the formidable minority, the European club, have not chosen to reply because they fear that in some way or other this will interfere with the freedom of the high seas. Apparently they have not read the declaration carefully. Had they done so, they would have noted that we have no intention of interfering with the peaceful uses of the ocean. As for other uses which they consider as falling within the concept of the freedom of the high seas, we have differed from them because what they want is not freedom but licence.

Some great Powers regard the Indian Ocean peace zone concept as a disarmament measure—I referred to that earlier—and therefore as falling within the framework of general and complete disarmament. If we want to give it a decent burial, certainly we will entrust it to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. But we want to keep it alive. They also, as I said earlier, seem to view the Indian Ocean peace zone as a threat to the traditional concept of freedom of the high seas. I have replied to that point already. As I have already said, we regard the Indian Ocean peace zone concept not as a disarmament measure, in the negative sense, but as a positive contribution to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security, and as one step towards the larger concept of universal collective security without major alliances.

I am sure that no member of the group of littoral and hinterland States wishes to be present at the obsequies that have been proposed to us, by their conduct, by the great Powers.

I should like to assure this Committee that what we are seeking is not the conversion of the Indian Ocean into a private lake with special rights or privileges for the littoral and hinterland States, but rather the assumption by all States, littoral and non-littoral, through international agreement, of certain restraints in the interests of both regional and global security. Such internationally agreed restraints cannot be determined unless there is active consultation between the States of the region and those outside it. Hence the need for an understanding of the interests and problems of all States, particularly the great Powers and the major maritime users. It is unreasonable for the great Powers and the major maritime users to ask the littoral and hinterland States to agree among themselves in the first instance on what they want before they can expect co-operation of the great Powers with the littoral and hinterland States. What we want may differ widely from what they will be prepared to agree to. We need not go through the painful

process of agreeing among ourselves only to discover that they reject entirely what we offer them. It is a much simpler operation if they came in from the very start, that is, if they believe in the Charter principle of co-operation, and gave us the benefit of their advice and explained to us exactly how far they thought we should attempt to go.

The consultations among the littoral and hinterland States have succeeded in disclosing a certain amount of general agreement. Of course, there is a consensus that the conference should be held; but we have not yet succeeded in agreeing on other points, such as the venue, the purpose of the conference, the duration and the date. It is for this reason that we have proposed that our mandate should be extended and that we should be given further time to prepare for the conference. There is complete agreement that the conference should not be held without full, proper and adequate preparation, and this process will have to be gone through in the next year if the draft resolution which appears in paragraph 31 of the report, document A/10029, is adopted.[9]

There are other important questions, such as the definition of certain terms, on which we are still holding consultations, questions, as I mentioned earlier, such as what would constitute a military base. At a recent meeting at which I happened to be present—and it is no secret—the Lima Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned movement, an attempt was made to refine the term "military bases" into "imperialistic military bases".

I must say quite clearly that, although we were a party to the Declaration issued by the Lima Conference,[10] we did not agree that there was any such thing as an "imperialist military base". In our opinion, any military base that is not operated by a country with its own resources and on its own territory is imperialistic. As I say, any other base but those established in a country with its own resources, operated under its own authority and in its own territory is an imperialist base. We felt that to try to distinguish between foreign bases by putting them into two categories—imperialistic and non-imperialistic—was far too tendentious for us to accept.

However, that problem has been avoided by speaking of "foreign and imperialistic military bases". That does not make the position any better.

That is all I wished to say in commending the draft resolution to the Committee. However, I must make a final appeal to the four great Powers—or the four musketeers—and the other major maritime users, except for China and Japan, kindly to think again about their duty to this Organization and towards the establishment of international peace and security. Their duty is clear and it is to encourage instead of to discourage all measures that are taken in all honesty and good faith to promote international peace and security.

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[9] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 29* (A/10029), pp. 9-10.

[10] *Ante*, pp. 435-438.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitations [Extracts], November 28, 1975 [1]

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that, some of us at the President's news conference the other night sensed a certain hardening of the U.S. position toward the Soviet Union from his reaction to the question on Angola and also his reaction on a possible Ford-Brezhnev meeting, saying there will be no meeting until progress is made. Is the United States more unhappy now with the Soviet Union because of the Angola situation, and has there been a hardening of the U.S. attitude toward Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: I have never liked characterizing foreign policy in terms of soft or hard. The United States objects to what the Soviet Union is doing in Angola. The United States believes that the policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union is essential for our two countries and for the peace of the world. We have seen no viable alternative that anybody has put up to the policy of relaxation of tensions except rhetoric. We will therefore pursue it.

We believe that the limitation of strategic arms is essential. We are prepared to modify our position if the Soviet Union is prepared to modify its own, and we will make a serious effort to bring about a limitation of strategic arms.

The relationship between us and the Soviet Union must clearly be based on reciprocity. It cannot be done by one country alone. When we take the effort seriously, we will resist unilateral efforts and unilateral measures by the Soviets, and we will not make the unilateral concessions in SALT. But the basis for a relaxation of tensions exists, and we will pursue it with great seriousness of purpose.

. . . . . .

Q. Is each side seemingly ready to change its proposal on SALT, and are you going to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: We are discussing the possibility of a trip to Moscow; and, if I go, you can assume that it is on the basis that both sides will modify their position. It does not mean that the modified position necessarily will lead to an agreement, but at least we will not be talking on either side on the basis of the old proposals.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the chances of your going to Moscow to discuss SALT in the near future?

Secretary Kissinger: The possibility exists.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 22, 1975, pp. 897–898.

Bolivian Amendments to the Six-Nation Draft Resolution on the Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, November 28, 1975 [1]

Reword the penultimate preambular paragraph to read:

Noting that from among those conclusions it would seem advisable to stress the necessity that the General Assembly clarify the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone and the attitude of the nuclear-weapon States towards such zones and towards the States included therein,

Reword the operative paragraph to read:

Solemnly makes the following declaration:

The three sections of the operative part shall be worded as follows:

I

Concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone

A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall be deemed to be any zone which any group of States has established by virtue of a treaty or agreement providing for:

(a) the total absence of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the zone;
(b) the establishment of an international system of verification and control of the foregoing; and
(c) the boundaries or general circumference of the zone.

II

Attitude of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein

1. The General Assembly, in cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been recognized as such by it, urges nuclear-weapon States:

(a) To respect in all its parts the treaty or agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
(b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories in the nuclear-weapon-free zone of acts which violate the international commitment; and
(c) To refrain from using nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone or threatening them with their use.

2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall become legally binding upon nuclear-weapon States from the time when they accede to and sign the relevant treaty or agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
3. This is without prejudice to the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones or to the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.

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[1] A/C.1/L.740, Nov. 28, 1975 and Corr.1, Dec. 1, 1975. See *ante*, pp. 647-649, for the six-nation resolution. Bolivia withdrew its amendments on Dec. 4, after the original sponsors and Pakistan submitted a revised version of the resolution (A/C.1/PV.2105, pp. 16-31, 38-41). The revised resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as pt. B of resolution 3472, *post*, pp. 782-784.

Statement by the Finnish Representative (Rajakoski) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, November 28, 1975 [1]

On 3 November my delegation indicated its intention to present a draft resolution on the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. After consultations with the delegations countries whose experts participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts and a number of other delegations, we are now in a position to introduce a draft resolution on the matter in document A/C.1/L.734.[2]

My delegation had wished that all the 21 countries which participated in the *Ad Hoc* Group would sponsor this draft resolution. While the overwhelming majority of them were prepared to sponsor it, some special considerations made it impossible for all of them to do so. In these circumstances we, and most of the prospective sponsors, felt that this draft resolution should be presented by Finland alone. We are nevertheless confident that it will be adopted by consensus, as was the case with resolution 3261 F (XXIX) last year.[3]

This draft resolution which I now have the honour to submit for consideration by the First Committee is above all of a procedural nature. In the view of the Finnish delegation, it therefore does not prejudge, nor does it preclude, any consideration of substantive issues arising from the study.

I am not going to deal with the study itself in any detail since the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group did so earlier when he presented his report to us.[4] Let me only comment very briefly on certain points in the draft resolution.

As to the preamble, the first three paragraphs follow a conventional pattern. As to the fourth paragraph, one of the very purposes of the study was to enhance further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones as provided for in last year's resolution 3261 F (XXIX). By throwing light on various relevant aspects, we think the study will indeed enhance further efforts and thus serve usefully those purposes which were set forth in resolution 3261 F (XXIX). It recognizes that the establishment of such zones can contribute to the security of the members of such zones, to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goal of general and complete disarmament. The fifth preambular paragraph reflects the over-all positive conclusion of the *Ad Hoc* Group as to the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the field of disarmament.

The sixth paragraph of the preamble expresses the wish that the study will be of assistance to States interested in the establishment of such zones. This follows from the general character of the study. As the

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2099 (prov.), pp. 48–51.
[2] A revised version was adopted as pt. A of resolution 3472 (XXX), (*post*, pp. 780–782).
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 548–551.

Finnish delegation said on 3 November, the aim was not an academic exercise but a practical study to be of assistance to those who are interested in nuclear-weapon-free zones, by analysing both the opportunities and the problems involved.

Now, with regard to the operative part I think it is only appropriate to begin by expressing gratitude for the effective and highly qualified work done by the *Ad Hoc* Group. The task of the Group was greatly facilitated by the valuable support of the Secretary-General and his staff. Similarly, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international organizations associated with the study are to be commended for their assistance in the preparation of the study.

In order to give an appropriate follow-up to the study, the draft resolution commends the special report to the attention of all Governments, IAEA and other relevant organizations, and requests the Secretary-General to give the widest possible publicity to it. As a further step, we have felt it proper to invite all Governments and relevant international organizations to give their views, observations and suggestions on the special report so as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report based on this material. That is the main objective of our draft resolution. That report is meant to serve as a basis for further deliberations during the thirty-first session of the General Assembly under the proposed item entitled "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects".

The idea of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones has aroused steadily growing interest over the years. It has become one of the possible instruments of States in their efforts to enhance security in their respective regions and to contribute to a lessening of the danger of nuclear proliferation worldwide. By increasing knowledge of the various aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones we can best promote efforts towards that goal.

With those considerations in mind, I have the honour to recommend, on behalf of the Finnish delegation, this draft resolution for adoption by consensus in this Committee.

Statement by the French Representative (Mistral) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, November 28, 1975 [1]

My country did not wish to oppose the consensus that we have just had on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.725 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,[2] even though it contains an explicit reference to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. But I

[1] A/C.1/PV.2099 (prov.), p. 61.
[2] Identical with resolution 3465 (XXX) of Dec. 11, 1975 (*post*, pp. 767-769).

must point out, in this connexion, that our participation in the consensus in no way implies a change in France's position with respect to that body; on the contrary, our position remains unchanged. The reservation which I make now will apply in all cases where a similar situation arises.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Chou) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, November 28, 1975 [1]

Since the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, at its twenty-sixth session, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean have held consultations, and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean has worked tirelessly. We highly appraise the positive efforts they have made for the implementation of the Declaration.

Nevertheless, despite the progress that has thus far been made, the task will still be onerous and the road long in attaining the goal for the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone. It should be pointed out in particular that the Declaration calls upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to

> halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean

and

> eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.[2]

Four years have now elapsed. Yet foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean region has increased rather than decreased in any way, and the situation in the Indian Ocean region has become even more turbulent and unstable. Evidently, this is the result of the intensified rivalry in the Indian Ocean between the super-Powers. Not only have they always refused to enter into consultations and co-operation with the countries concerned of the Indian Ocean peace zone and the *Ad Hoc* Committee, but they have done their utmost to find all kinds of excuses against the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone. In pursuance of their policy of aggression and expansion, they are stepping up their rivalry for spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean. Not only have they refused to withdraw their military forces therefrom, but they have put on a greater show of force, thus aggravating the tension there.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), pp. 11-15.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 901-903.

The super-Power which styles itself "socialist" has long regarded the control over the oceans and seas as an important component and immediate target in its rivalry with the other super-Power for world hegemony. It has been engaged in frenzied expansion of its naval force, establishing ocean-going and missile fleets in a desperate attempt to gain command of the sea. It carries on frequent naval exercises, dashing around in all oceans and seas.

The remarks of its naval chieftain have revealed this super-Power's wild ambition for world domination. He has boasted that his navy is capable of extending its force not only to the oceans but to the land of the distant continents. He has clamoured to fly his naval flags over the seven oceans of the world.

In order to contend for hegemony in Asia and Africa and prepare for war, this super-Power attaches particular importance to its contention for the command of the Indian Ocean in an attempt to cut off, in any contingency, the sea lanes of Afro-Asia countries and to seize control of the "oil route" from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. To this end it has stationed a permanent fleet of unprecedented strength in the Indian Ocean. During the war of the South Asian sub-continent in 1971 and during the October war of the Middle East in 1973, it increased its naval strength in the Indian Ocean many fold. It goes without saying that this involved neither "friendly visits" nor "innocent passages".

It has also done its utmost to acquire some overt and covert bases along the coast of the Indian Ocean, as well as the so-called facilities which may serve its military operations when the need arises. Moreover, it has been sowing discord among the littoral States, carrying out intervention and subversive activities and even provoking military conflicts.

These glaring acts have become well known to everyone and can in no way be covered up.

The abovementioned acts of this super-Power which chants "detente", "peace", "disarmament", and "complementing political detente by military détente", have laid bare its social-imperialist nature of double-dealing and utter hypocrisy.

In order to overpower its rival, the other super-Power has not lagged behind and has been busy stepping up its naval deployment and the expansion of its military bases in the Indian Ocean.

The facts prove that it is exactly the rivalry and contention between the super-Powers for hegemony that have posed a serious menace to the peace and security of the Indian Ocean region, endangering the independence and sovereignty of the littoral States and jeopardizing the fundamental interests of the Asian and African States. This cannot but evoke strong condemnation and resolute opposition by the countries and peoples concerned in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region.

The Chinese Government and people have always deeply sympa-

thized with and firmly supported the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in their just struggles against imperialism, colonialism, expansionism and hegemonism, and we have actively supported the just proposal for the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone. We maintain that the desire of the Indian Ocean States for the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone must be respected and that in particular the super-Powers must not be allowed to run amuck and to engage in wilful obstruction and sabotage there.

We wish to stress that in order to achieve the Indian Ocean peace zone, the Indian Ocean States and other Afro-Asian countries must get united to oppose and root out, first and foremost, the military expansion and hegemonic activities of the super-Powers in that region, and to demand the withdrawal of all their military forces, including nuclear forces, therefrom and the dismantling of all overt and covert military bases, including nuclear bases. Meanwhile, other foreign armed forces and military bases in that region must be withdrawn and dismantled as well.

We would also like to point out in all sincerity that in order to achieve the Indian Ocean peace zone, the countries in that region, bearing in mind the over-all interests of the peace and security in the Indian Ocean region, should make active efforts to improve and strengthen their relations in accordance with the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

At present particular vigilance must be maintained against the super-Power attempt to sow discord among the Indian Ocean States and to create antagonism among them. The affairs of the Indian Ocean region should be managed by the States and peoples in that region themselves.

It is our hope that the countries in that region will strengthen their unity, persevere in struggle, do away with foreign intervention and obstruction, and oppose expansionism and hegemonism in any form. Meanwhile, it is our ardent hope that through consultations on an equal footing they will prepare and convene the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean so as to contribute to the promotion of the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone.

In conclusion, I wish to state that the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.[3]

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[3] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 29* (A/10029). The draft resolution is identical with resolution 3468 (XXX), (*post*, pp. 774-776).

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [Extract], November 28, 1975 [1]

On the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, the Soviet Union proceeds from a position of principle which is aimed at supporting proposals which realistically contribute to strengthen peace and security of States and are also likely to decrease international tensions. The USSR considers with respect the political initiatives of *the countries of Asia which have been dictated by their concern for* peace and, in particular, in relation to the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. It is important that such initiatives should realistically assist in the endeavour of turning Asia into a continent of peace and co-operation among peoples.

The position of the USSR in respect of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has been repeatedly stated before the General Assembly at various sessions; the Soviet Union is prepared to participate with all the interested countries on an equal footing in an endeavour to find a favourable solution to this problem, of course, with the proper adherence to the internationally recognized norms of international law. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to consider, on an equal footing and without any detriment to the security of any side, the whole question of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

In solving this problem there should not, however, be any artificial singling out of groups of countries which would enjoy special rights regarding the elaboration and the institution of the régime which would govern the Indian Ocean. In working out the provisions which would transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, there must be no prejudice to the principle of freedom of navigation. For the Soviet Union, proposals would be unacceptable which would be aimed at restricting freedom of navigation. We should like to point out that important communication lines of the Soviet Union go through the Indian Ocean; and in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1958 [2] on the open seas, freedom of navigation is of interest and of relevance to all sea-going craft.

We want to stress that the Soviet Union has not had in the past and has not at present any military bases in the region of the Indian Ocean. Soviet ships in this region have never threatened anyone—and will not do so. As we have already pointed out, important transportation lines from the European parts of the Soviet Union to the Soviet Far East go through the Indian Ocean; and in accordance with the norms of international law and recognized international practice, Soviet ships also undertake training cruises in the Indian Ocean.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), pp. 16-17.
[2] 13 UST 2312; 450 UNTS 82.

Since there are in the region of the Indian Ocean military bases of imperialist States, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, with the retention of military bases there by other States, would certainly place the Soviet Union on an unequal footing which would be detrimental to the interests of the USSR and of other countries of the socialist community. It would also prove detrimental to the interests of the countries of that region attempting to strengthen their national independence. That is why the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace would require in the first place the elimination of all foreign military bases in that region.

The Soviet Union takes the same position in its approach to the military base of the United States on the island of Diego Garcia.

Bearing in mind that the proposed draft resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace contains the objective of taking measures which would create a régime in the Indian Ocean without, however, properly taking into account the various positions which we have stressed, the delegation of the USSR would not be in a position to support the draft resolution in document A/10029, and will abstain when it is put to the vote.[3]

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Statement by the Canadian Representative (Rowe) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, November 28, 1975 [1]

Canada remains strongly sympathetic to the idea of creating demilitarized or denuclearized zones where these are feasible and would promote stability. We appreciate the efforts of certain States to initiate consultations on the possibility of establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and we hope that such consultations will be fruitful.

As we have observed in previous years, however, the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace implies obligations for States outside the zone, including the maritime users of the Indian Ocean. This concept has been defined only by resolution 2832 (XXVI), on which Canada abstained because we had reservations about the definition of the obligations that it implies.[2] Canada continues to have those reservations, and as a result my delegation abstained on the present draft resolution.

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[3] The draft resolution is identical with resolution 3468 (XXX), (*post*, pp. 774–776).

[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), pp. 22–25.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 901–903.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, November 28, 1975 [1]

May I be permitted to make a statement in explanation of vote on the draft resolution of the three co-sponsors (A/C.1/L.719) on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.[2]

The representative of the USSR, at this session of the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has stated that the Soviet Union supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various parts of the world, and the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that such zones could contribute towards preventing the spread of nuclear weaponry.

The representatives of the USSR have also pointed out that the boundaries of the nuclear-weapon-free zones should be determined in accordance with the recognized norms of international law, which include the right of free navigation through the open seas and the straits used for shipping. The Soviet Union has understanding for the motivation which prompted the co-sponsors of the draft resolution which is now before this Committee, introduced by Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. At the same time, we wanted to point out that the formulation which is contained in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which says that the General Assembly endorses the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, allows for the possibility of expanding this zone to the high seas, to the open seas, which could of course lead to attempts to restrict freedom of navigation in that region. Such a restriction would not be in accordance with the existing norms of international law, nor with freedom of navigation in the open seas, as is indeed provided by the Geneva Convention of 1958 on this subject.[3]

In addition, in the preambular part of the draft resolution before us there is a statement to the effect that notable progress has been achieved by the Latin American States towards the denuclearization of their region. But we note that in the agreement on the creation of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[4] there are several deficiencies and drawbacks which very much weaken the efficiency of that instrument and impede the establishment of a true nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

In view of the considerations I have just outlined, the delegation of the USSR will not be in a position to support the three-Power draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, and we shall abstain in the vote.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), pp. 27–31.
[2] Identical with resolution 3477 (XXX), *post*, pp. 791–793.
[3] 13 UST 2312; 450 UNTS 82.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, November 28, 1975 [5]

The United States abstained from voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.719 [6] because it is not prepared to endorse the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. As we made clear to New Zealand and others, we could have supported a draft resolution that welcomed their initiative and called on the States concerned to engage in consultations on the proposal without implying a commitment in advance to the establishment of such a zone. Among our concerns is the fact that Mr. Templeton of New Zealand indicated that the proponents of a South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone intend to seek its extension eventually to include areas of the high seas. The United States cannot endorse a proposal that contemplates restrictions on internationally recognized rights of navigation and overflight of maritime areas, including the rights of innocent passage through territorial seas.

The United States respects and shares the desires of the sponsors to find additional ways to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the security of their region. We therefore regret that the terms of the draft resolution and the implications of the proposal were such as to preclude United States support for it.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, November 28, 1975 [1]

The Soviet Union was and continues to be a consistent supporter of nuclear-free zones in the various regions of the world because we see in it one of the ways to limit the arms race effectively and to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and also to reduce international tensions. We proceed from the premise that any agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone must really ensure that the territory of the States involved should indeed become a zone totally free from nuclear weapons and it should exclude any loop-holes which could violate the nuclear-free status of a given zone.

The Soviet Union is guided by this position of principle in the approach it takes on the agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, which is the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[2] As our delegation repeatedly pointed out at the sessions of the General Assembly and also at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Treaty

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[5] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), p. 47.
[6] Identical with resolution 3477 (XXX), *post*, pp. 791–793.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), p. 56.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

of Tlatelolco has several short-comings which significantly weaken its effectiveness and which impede the transformation of Latin America into a zone which would really be free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty does not contain a prohibition of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes by member States. There is also no provision which would prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territories. Moreover—and this is in contradiction to the norms of international law—the zone of the operation of that Treaty is being expanded to vast expanses of the high seas which, as we all know, are indeed regulated by the international Convention which was concluded in Geneva in 1958.[3]

For the reasons which I have just outlined the Soviet delegation has not given its support to the draft resolution on the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which are contained in documents A/C.1/L.723[4] and A/C.1/L.722[5]—and when these drafts were put to the vote our delegation abstained.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, November 28, 1975 [1]

In light of the United States Government's long-standing position on Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[2] my delegation could not support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.723.[3] We do not believe that either the United States Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico could be included in the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone because the United States Virgin Islands are a part of United States territory and Puerto Rico has a special relationship with the United States.

On the other hand, we believe, first, that the Guantanamo base could be included if the Government of Cuba were to sign and ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and second, that the treaty would apply to the Canal Zone upon return of jurisdiction over the zone to Panama under the new treaty now being negotiated.

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[3] 13 UST 2312; 450 UNTS 82.
[4] Identical with resolution 3473 (XXX), *post*, pp. 784–785.
[5] Identical with resolution 3467 (XXX), *post*, pp. 773–774.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), p. 57.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 82.
[3] Identical with resolution 3473 (XXX), *post*, pp. 784–785.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, November 28, 1975 [1]

I should like to make some brief remarks on certain comments made at this meeting in respect of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.722 [2] and L.723.[3]

Regarding the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.722, relating to the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[4] the representative of the Soviet Union has today repeated three of the four reasons which he has adduced in the past in an endeavour to explain why his Government has not complied with the reiterated appeals of the General Assembly. The three reasons he mentioned today concerned peaceful nuclear explosions, transit, and the extension of the provisions of the Treaty to the high seas.

I shall not attempt to analyse and explain the many reasons why we find that those reasons are not valid excuses, but by way of bibliographical reference, so to speak, I shall, as I have done several times in the past, limit myself to referring those who are interested in the matter to the verbatim record of the meeting of this Committee held in the afternoon of 10 November 1972, which contains an exposition of the attitude on this matter of the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as I had the honour of explaining it at that time. For the time being, to complete this point, I should like to recall only the brief conclusion which I arrived at at that time when, among other things, I said,

> . . . the theory which seems to constitute the implicit premise of the Soviet position . . . could be stated as follows:
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> 'First, it is not the United Nations but the Soviet Union which has exclusive authority to decide whether or not a nuclear-free zone exists in any part of the world, even though the zone has been established by a multilateral treaty which contains the most complete international system of inspection and control and which, as in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has received the repeated praise of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the praise of the vast majority of the members of the international community.' [5]

I appeal to the members of the Committee to think over that conclusion, and I venture to hope that they will consider that we are right in considering that this attitude of the Soviet Union, based on that premise, is unacceptable.

The second question on which I should like to make some observations is the draft resolution relating to the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[6] In this connexion the representative of the United States, in explaining why his delegation

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2100 (prov.), pp. 71–77.
[2] Identical with resolution 3467 (XXX), *post*, pp. 773–704.
[3] Identical with resolution 3473 (XXX), *post*, pp. 784–785.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 83.
[5] A/C.1/PV.1889, p. 91.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 82.

had abstained on the draft resolution, which expressly invites the United States and France to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I, stated that the reason was that the Virgin Islands were part of the United States and that Puerto Rico had a special relationship with the United States. My delegation does not think this should be a barrier. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have, in respect of the Territories for which they are internationally responsible within the zone covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed and ratified Additional Protocol I, and if they could do so I fail to see why the United States cannot.

First of all, in connexion with the Virgin Islands being legally part of the United States, we would have to say—and I venture to hope that Mr. Martin would agree with me—that they are not on the same footing as the first 13 States of the Union which signed the Declaration of Independence, the bicentenary of which is to be celebrated next year. The Virgin Islands are certainly not Massachusetts, nor are they Virginia or New York.

In the second place, with respect to the special relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, neither do we think that should be a barrier. At most, if the Government of the United States believes that it cannot by itself take a decision which would in every way be beneficial, as the representative of Guinea said today, for the peoples and territories involved, it could ask the people of Puerto Rico, through one of those referendums which are frequently held in Switzerland, that country which is an example of democracy, whether they would agree to the United States' signing and ratifying Additional Protocol I.

For further clarification I should like to add—and this applies both to the United States and to France, since France, too, has raised a similar objection in regard to the Territories of Guadaloupe, Martinique and French Guyana—that there is nothing in either international law or international practice to prevent a State from deciding, in exercise of its sovereign freedom, not only to denuclearize militarily, but even to demilitarize completely, a Territory that is under its jurisdiction.

Allow me to recall, for example, the case of Antarctica, in which I believe France, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom exercise sovereignty over various parts, and yet the entire territory of Antarctica is, as we all know, by virtue of the Antarctic Treaty, not only militarily denuclearized but completely demilitarized.[7]

Of course we may be told that these are uninhabited territories, but I do not believe that from a legal point of view this should make much difference, nor would it be impossible to find several examples of inhabited territories. I shall mention a few.

In the Scandinavian region we have the instance of the Aaland Islands which have a demilitarized status that is recognized by interna-

[7] For the Antarctic Treaty, see *ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

tional law and respected by all those Governments which, throughout the last century, have successively occupied them.

The Mediterranean region provides us with a similar case, that of some islands in the Aegean. And France offers us a third example: Huningue. This Alsatian town is located on the banks of the Rhine. In 1815, when the final peace treaty was signed between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, on the one hand, and France, on the other, it was decreed *inter alia* that there would be a "permanent demilitarization" of that town, so as to give Switzerland, and in particular the city of Basle, a further proof of good will.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, France yielded Alsace to the new German empire, which respected the demilitarized status of the town of Hüningen. Under the Versailles Treaty, Huningue reverted to French territory, but that treaty does not mention the status of demilitarization of the town.

In 1927, however, in endeavouring to draw up the Maginot Line in the corner between Germany and Switzerland, French authorities realized that there was this omission and decided to respect the demilitarized status. Therefore, the extreme southern section of the Maginot Line was drawn at a distance of three leagues from Basle.

We hope that these historical examples, which I do not doubt could be added to by careful research, will help to convince the representatives of the United States and of France that there is no insurmountable obstacle at all to compliance with this draft resolution which the First Committee will recommend to the plenary.

We would not wish that those countries should act in haste. Therefore, at this time the sponsors, as without doubt all representatives have realized, are not requesting the inclusion of this item, namely, implementation of the resolution to be adopted on this question, on the agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, but we are requesting it for the thirty-second session. Thus those States will have two years, during which time we hope their thinking will lead them to a positive conclusion.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976 [Extract], November 29, 1975 [1]

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PART 2—ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 141. Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act

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[1] Public Law 94-141, 94th Cong.; 89 Stat. 756. See *ante*, p. 64, *n.* 2 for the Administration bill; *ante*, pp. 239-243 for the House bill; and *ante*, pp. 455-458 for the Senate bill.

(22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) [2] is amended by inserting in the second sentence thereof immediately after "$10,100,000," the following: "and for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 the sum of $23,440,000 (and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs),".

Study Regarding Impact of Certain Arms Control Measures Upon Military Expenditures

SEC. 142. Of the amount appropriated under the amendment made by section 141 of this Act, not to exceed $1,000,000 shall be used by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to conduct a study of the impact upon military expenditures of arms control measures mutually agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate—

(1) from time to time, reports with respect to such study, and

(2) not later than December 31, 1976, a final report setting forth the findings and conclusions of such study.

Research Regarding Development of Nuclear Safeguard Techniques

SEC. 143. In addition to amounts otherwise available under the amendment made by section 141 of this Act, $440,000 may be used for the purpose of conducting research, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, with respect to the development of nuclear safeguard techniques.

Purposes of Arms Control and Disarmament Act

SEC. 144. Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2551) is amended by striking out "It must be able" in the second sentence of the third paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "It shall have the authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State,".

National Security Council

SEC. 145. Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended by inserting ", the National Security Council," immediately after "Secretary of State" in the first sentence.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482-495; *ibid., 1963*, pp. 622-623; *ibid., 1965*, p. 206; *ibid., 1968*, p. 396; *ibid., 1970*, p. 213; *ibid., 1972*, p. 465; *ibid., 1974*, p. 281.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

SEC. 146. Title III of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571-2575) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"ARMS CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

"SEC. 36. (a) in order to assist the Director in the performance of his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal for—

"(1) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facilities or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the delivery of nuclear weapons,

"(2) any program of research, development, testing, engineering, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities, having—

"(A) an estimated total program cost in excess of $250,000,000, or

"(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of $50,000,000, or

"(3) any other program involving weapons systems or technology which such Government agency or the Director believes may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall, on a continuing basis, provide the Director with full and timely access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.

"(b)(1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations, and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such assessment and analysis, to the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing such program.

"(2) Any request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations for—

"(A) any program described in subsection (a) (1) or (2), or

"(B) any program described in subsection (a) (3) and found by the National Security Council, on the basis of the advice and recommendations received from the Director, to have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament policy or negotiations,

shall include a complete statement analyzing the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.

"(3) Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the House of Representatives; the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of State, advise such committee on the arms control and disarmament implications of any program with respect to which a statement has been submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph (2).

"(c) No court shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of any requirement of this section or to review the adequacy of the performance of any such requirement on the part of any Government agency (including the Agency and the Director).".

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS

SEC. 147. (a) (1) The second sentence of section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(a)) is amended by striking out "The Director" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), the Director".

(2) The fifth sentence of section 45(a) of such Act is amended by striking out "No person" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d), no person".

(3) Section 45 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The investigations and determination required under subsection (a) may be waived by the Director in the case of any consultant who will not be permitted to have access to classified information if the Director determines and certifies in writing that such waiver is in the best interests of the United States.".

(b) Section 45(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding the foregoing and the provisions of subsection (a), the Director may also grant access to classified information to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of a security clearance granted by the Department of Defense, or any agency thereof, to the individual concerned; except that any access to Restricted Data shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c).".

PUBLIC INFORMATION

SEC. 148. Section 49(d) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(d)) is repealed.

REPORT TO CONGRESS; POSTURE STATEMENT

SEC. 149. Section 50 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2590) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Such report shall include a complete and analytical statement of arms control and disarmament goals, negotiations, and activities and an appraisal of the status and prospects of arms control negotiations and of arms control measures in effect.".

CONSULTATION REGARDING ARMS TRANSFERS

SEC. 150. (a) Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"(f) Decisions on issuing licenses for the export of articles on the United States munitions list shall be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will contribute to an arms race, or increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral control arrangements.".

(b) Section 42(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2791 (a)), is amended by striking out "(3)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(3) in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director's opinion as to".

(c) Section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321 (d)) is amended by striking out the words "take into account" and inserting in lieu thereof "be made in coordination with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account his opinion as to".

. . . . . .

Revised Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, December 1, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the cessation everywhere and by all

[1] A/C.1/L.707/Rev. 1, Dec. 1, 1975. The original draft resolution, with the text of a treaty annexed to it, was submitted Sept. 23, *ante*, pp. 486–490. The revised version printed here was sponsored also by Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, GDR, Hungary, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, and the Ukrainian SSR. A further revised version, also with a treaty text, was submitted by the same sponsors on Dec. 3 and adopted by the First Committee on Dec. 5. It was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3478 (XXX), *post*, pp. 793–795.

of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

Expressing its deep concern over the fact that an international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests of all kinds has not yet been reached,

Convinced that the cessation of such tests would contribute to the reduction of the nuclear arms race as well as to the further relaxation of international tension,

Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] in such a way as to exclude any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Further convinced of the need again to exert every effort for the early cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

1. *Takes note* of the draft "Treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (annexed hereto)[3];

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of the results of the negotiations at its thirty-first session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

Statement by the Australian Representative (Kevin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, December 1, 1975 [1]

Nuclear weapons testing fuels the nuclear arms race and is its most visible and dramatic manifestation. It has therefore been a major

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Post*, pp. 795–798.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2101 (prov.), pp. 12–18.

concern of world public opinion and of the Assembly for nearly 20 years. Twelve years ago in 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom agreed—under the partial test ban Treaty—to ban all nuclear-weapon tests except those under ground. In becoming parties to that Treaty, those Powers also committed themselves to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.[2]

Since then, progress has been painfully slow and, indeed, at times has seemed to be non-existent. Nevertheless, there have been positive developments.

After a period of several years during which the two nuclear-weapon States not parties to the partial test ban Treaty conducted a series of tests in the atmosphere, this year for the first time there were no atmospheric nuclear-weapon tests anywhere in the world. Moreover, one of those two States has indicated that in [the] future its nuclear weapons testing programme will be conducted underground.

Another step in the right direction is the threshold test ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in 1974 and due to come into force in 1976, which will ban nuclear weapon tests above 150 kilotons.[3] Verification will be by national technical means. However, peaceful nuclear explosions above the 150 kiloton limit are not covered by the Treaty but will be the subject of a further agreement which as yet does not exist.

That is the extent of progress over the past 12 years: 12 years during which the Assembly has repeatedly pressed the major Powers, and the CCD over which they preside, to complete the task which they undertook under the partial test ban Treaty of achieving a comprehensive test ban (CTB). The Assembly has also in this period regularly called upon the two nuclear-weapon States outside the partial test ban Treaty to adhere to that Treaty.

Throughout those 12 years, one major Power has consistently taken the position that it cannot accept a CTB—or even an interim suspension of testing—unless it is satisfied that the verification procedures are adequate to detect any violation. For this purpose it has insisted upon the need for on-site inspection. The other major Power has consistently rejected the need for on-site inspection and has claimed instead that national technical means of verification are sufficient.

As the detection threshold has steadily come down over the years due to the advances in seismic monitoring technology—a field in which Canada, Japan and Sweden have made a notable contribution—the technical difficulties on this issue have apparently somewhat lessened.

But new and important problems have come into focus more recently which threaten to negate the value of the great efforts made over the past 12 years, particularly in the CCD, to find a solution to the verification problem. Indeed, there is now a real danger that we could be mov-

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225-227.

ing towards a situation of impasse on the CTB issue. This must seriously concern all countries that are anxious to see an early end to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments.

One major Power has lately begun to draw attention to the point that an effective CTB treaty would need to contain adequate provisions for the monitoring of any peaceful nuclear explosions by its signatories, in order to ensure that these could not be used to circumvent the intentions of the treaty. The other major Power, for its part, has come out increasingly strongly with the proposition that a CTB could not enter into force until and unless all nuclear-weapon States adhered to it. Against this, the two nuclear-weapon States outside the partial test ban Treaty claim the right to continue their nuclear-weapon testing, at least until the two major Powers begin to significantly reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in their possession.

This is a situation that threatens total deadlock: a situation in which each of the parties concerned, having arrived at its own definition of the necessary preconditions for a CTB, would then be able to blame failure to achieve a CTB on the fact that other parties concerned had not met its preconditions. Unlike verification, which is more of a technical problem, this is clearly a political issue. As such, it is an issue upon which it is entirely appropriate that this Assembly should express its views.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.738 [4] believe that it is important that the Assembly should speak with a strong and united voice on the issue of nuclear-weapon testing. The co-sponsorship group is broadly representative of non-nuclear-weapon States from all regions of the world. It includes developed and developing countries; it includes aligned and non-aligned countries.

It could not be expected that the precise viewpoints of all the co-sponsors on more technical aspects of the CTB issue—which is a complex one—would be identical. The expression of the co-sponsors' various positions on the CTB issue is a matter of public record, from their past statements in this Committee, in the CCD, and at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, where the CTB issue was discussed in some depth under the review of article VI of the Treaty.[5]

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 has been framed to accommodate the range of these views in order to give a single and united expression to the strongly held position of principle that there is an urgent need for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and for the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban—which is, of course, the title of the agenda item under which the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 has been presented. By giving a firm expression of world public opinion on this issue, the co-sponsors hope that we will spur on the major Powers to intensify their efforts to reach agreement on an effective comprehensive test ban.

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[4] See resolution 3466 (XXX), *post*, pp. 769–773.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 largely speaks for itself, and I can be quite brief in commenting on its contents. The draft resolution is based on last year's resolution 3257 (XXIX), which had a similar group of co-sponsors. Resolution 3257 (XXIX) received 95 affirmative votes in the plenary, and the co-sponsors hope that we will do even better this year.[6]

The draft resolution begins by expressing deep concern that underground nuclear-weapon testing continues, while it welcomes the fact that there have been no atmospheric tests since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It recalls previous resolutions, most recently resolution 3257 (XXIX), and it recalls the stated aims of the parties to the partial test ban Treaty to seek to achieve a discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

The fourth preambular paragraph is a rather long paragraph which records in summary form the results of the discussions on a comprehensive test ban that took place at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

Subparagraph (a) reproduces the consensus language of the final declaration of the Conference, which expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race; expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would take the lead in reaching an early solution to the technical and political difficulties on this issue; and appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.[7]

Subparagraph (b) records the fact that a considerable number of States which attended the Conference—no less than 20, in fact—submitted a draft resolution and a draft additional protocol concerning nuclear-weapon tests, whereby the nuclear-weapon States depositaries to the Treaty would agree on a moratorium which could in due course become a comprehensive test ban embracing all nuclear-weapon States. This draft protocol was included in the Conference's final documentation as document NPT/CONF/L.2/Rev.1.[8]

Subparagraph (c) reproduces the statement contained in the Review Conference's final declaration that the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should, as soon as possible, enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear-weapon tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity at that time to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.[9]

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[6] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 792–793.
[7] *Ante*, p. 154.
[8] A/10027-DC/238, annex B, CCD/464.
[9] *Ante*, p. 154.

The fifth preambular paragraph notes the section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of a comprehensive test ban agreement.[10]

The sixth preambular paragraph reaffirms the Assembly's conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing would be in the supreme interest of mankind, both as a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and to relieve the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations.

I turn now to the operative paragraphs. Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are self-explanatory. The Assembly would condemn all nuclear-weapon tests in whatever environment they may be conducted, it would deplore the continued lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement, and it would emphasize the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.

Operative paragraphs 4 and 5 introduce a new element. These paragraphs take up the question of the desirability of an interim suspension of testing, agreed between all or some of the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement. The intention of these paragraphs is to provide a statement of what the positions indicated in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the fourth preambular paragraph have in common. To this end, operative paragraph 4 calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear-weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement. Operative paragraph 5 emphasizes the particular responsibility in this regard of the nuclear-weapon States which are parties to international agreements in which they have declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

The co-sponsors believe that the approach underlying these two operative paragraphs would be consistent with the views of a large majority of delegations as expressed in this Committee and elsewhere.

Operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 are much along the lines of last year's resolution 3257 (XXIX). Operative paragraph 6 calls upon all States not yet parties to the partial test ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith. Operative paragraph 7 urges the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report its progress to the next session of the General Assembly. Operative paragraph 8 inscribes the item on the agenda of the next session of the Assembly.

Finally, I would like to inform the Committee that a separate vote has been requested on preambular paragraph 4 and on operative paragraph 5, and this has been accepted by the co-sponsors.

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[10] *Ante*, pp. 419-435.

Statement by the Iranian Representative (Hoveyda) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, December 1, 1975 [1]

By a nearly unanimous vote, the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly adopted resolution 3263 (XXIX), dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.[2] As co-sponsor with Egypt of that resolution, my country is gratified to see that interest in the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones has revived in recent years. The growing interest in the regional approach for containing the spread of nuclear weapons is in a way a reflection of the disillusionment felt at the lack of progress on a global scale. Hence, in a more positive sense it is a concrete response by the States concerned for devising alternative ways of enhancing their own security within certain defined regions of the globe. Moreover, the disturbing outlook with respect to the depletion of traditional sources of energy has accelerated the diffusion of nuclear technology and thus increased the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Those factors have combined to lead to an upsurge of interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones as an approach to curbing the further spread of weapons. Thus, at this Assembly session we have as many as eight agenda items dealing with non-nuclear-weapon zones. Moreover, the Assembly has been entrusted with the task of examining the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX),[3] which in our view is bound to stimulate further interest and encourage constructive efforts with respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The concerns underlying our proposal have already been explained at length in this Committee and elsewhere. One essential element in it, however bears constant re-emphasis. In the political climate of our region, the introduction of nuclear weapons not only cannot be discounted but also would represent the most dangerous aspect of nuclear-weapon proliferation. It would seriously complicate the prospects for peace and security in the region. All of us here know the full import of the brutal facts that confront us in that part of the world. Indeed, it is ominously easy to predict the turn of events that could follow the introduction of nuclear weapons into the area.

It is no mere coincidence that in the comprehensive study on the question the opinion has been expressed by many experts that:

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2101 (prov.), pp. 31–36.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 811–813.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 808–809.

> . . . in regions where the most acute tensions exist, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, though particularly difficult, would be particularly desirable.[4]

It is precisely that logic that is the basis of our advocacy of such a zone in our part of the world.

Thus, on the initiative of Iran and Egypt, resolution 3263 (XXIX), on the subject, was introduced in the General Assembly last year. As I have said, the resolution received nearly unanimous support, including the support of all the nuclear Powers. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General has ascertained the views of the States in the region with respect to the implementation of the resolution. One may take heart from the positive tenor of the bulk of the replies received. From the answers it is obviously manifest that the idea of the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East enjoys a wide measure of support in the region.

However, that does not minimize the complexities involved in the implementation of the proposal. In our view, mere expression of support for the idea, though welcome, is not in itself sufficient to override the existing obstacles; nor could the advocacy of conventional means for the realization of the idea stand the test of credibility in the face of the particular climate in the region. That view is amply supported by the experts studying the question when, in their conclusions, they express deceiving unanimous opinion:

> The study does not attempt to establish any precise rules, as it is the considered view of the experts that circumstances in different regions vary so widely that a pragmatic and flexible approach would need to be adopted in each case.[5]

It is in the sincere hope of offering such pragmatic means that the delegations of Iran and Egypt have endeavoured to produce a draft resolution as a follow-up to last year's resolution on the subject. It is my privilege now to introduce the text of the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors.[6]

The preambular paragraphs essentially trace the background to the present draft resolution, as well as the relevant developments since the adoption of last year's resolution, and therefore do not require elaborate explanation. I should, however, like to draw particular attention to the third preambular paragraph, which acknowledges the extensive support the proposal has received within the region, to which I referred a short time ago. The approach adopted in the operative part of the draft resolution is based on a realistic assessment of the present situation. It entails two distinct though complementary courses of action by the Governments which would form the core of the denuclearized zone in the region.

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[4] *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament* (A/10027/Add.1), [U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7], p. 30, par. 86; *ante*, p. 324.

[5] *Ante*, p. 349.

[6] See resolution 3474 (XXX), *post*, pp. 786–788, and *ibid.*, *n.* 1.

In a more general way, it would be essential to promote conditions which would be conducive to the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the exertion of efforts towards the creation of such a congenial environment is the course of action advocated in the first two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. Through actions which could be interpreted unequivocally as gestures of good faith, feelings of trust and confidence among the States of the region would be bound to be generated. In the opinion of the sponsors, adhesion to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the States directly concerned could produce such a beneficial effect, and thus that is urged in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

Operative paragraph 3 addresses itself to the very heart of the matter. It recommends that the States with which the Secretary-General has consulted pursuant to resolution 3263 (XXIX) should proclaim immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territory or the territory under their control by any third party. It further recommends that these States refrain from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, transit, testing or use of such weapons, or that would be in any other way detrimental to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, under an effective system of safeguards. By thus spelling out in precise terms the urgent and substantive measures to be undertaken by the States of the region, this paragraph tries to prevent pre-emptive action that would defeat the purpose of the zone at an embryonic stage.

Operative paragraph 4 recommends that the nuclear States should extend their full co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote the objective of establishing the zone, and that they should refrain from any action that might be contrary to the purpose of the present resolution or to the objectives embodied in it. At this stage, we do not ask them to undertake *a priori* obligations with respect to the security of the zone. What is required of them, rather, is the avoidance of any action that would render the eventual realization of the zone even more intractable.

Finally, it only remains for me to say that, in trying to produce a suitable formula, the co-sponsors have been guided by one supreme and overriding aim, that of sparing our region from the ravages of a nuclear holocaust. And in that spirit, we have laboured to eschew, in terms of form as well as content, anything that might give legitimate cause for dissension on the part of anyone. We think we have succeeded in that endeavour. It is now our hope that all sides concerned, as well as each and every Member of the Organization, will concur in this opinion and adopt the resolution unanimously.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, December 2, 1975 [1]

The Soviet delegation wishes to make the following statement on the draft resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons (A/C.1-/L.711) [2] and on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (A/C.1/L.707).[3]

In the course of the general debate during plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the course of the work of the First Committee itself, a great deal of attention has been devoted to both these questions, which were introduced at this session on the initiative of the Soviet Union. This is understandable; after all, what we are dealing with are proposals of great significance and relevance, since they are designed to ensure that measures are taken in the field of limiting the arms race and disarmament.

In this statement there is no need for me to argue these Soviet Union proposals or to explain them. That has already been done by the Soviet delegation at the 2072nd [4] and 2075th [5] meetings of the First Committee. The Soviet delegation has also held numerous meetings and talks with individual delegations and regional groups.

In the course of these contacts the Soviet delegation attempted to answer the questions put by a number of delegations while they were studying the Soviet proposals, and we should like to stress once again that the implementation of the proposals on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons, and on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would promote the further development of the favourable processes occurring in the world today, would help to make these processes irreversible and would help to supplement political détente by military détente.

During the consideration of the Soviet proposals at this session many delegations not only supported them but became co-sponsors of the draft resolutions on these subjects (A/C.1/L.707 and A/C.1/L.711). We should like to take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude to the delegations of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia,

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2102 (prov.), pp. 7-16.
[2] *Ante*, p. 495.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 486-490.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 510-521.
[5] *Ante*, pp. 563-568.

Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia for their co-operation and co-sponsorship.

At the same time, we should like to express our gratitude to all those delegations which supported the Soviet proposals and commented on them in such a constructive spirit, informing us of their wishes and their observations.

The sponsors of these draft resolutions have found it possible to take into account the wishes expressed by a number of delegations, and certain additions and clarifications have therefore been made to the texts. The revised draft resolutions are contained in documents A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 [6] and A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1.[7]

In the discussion of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons, a number of delegations pointed out the difficulty of defining the object of the prohibition, since what we are talking about here is a novel and complex problem in the realm of international relations: prohibiting potential or possible types of weapons and weapons systems which do not actually exist at present but may in the future. Therefore, it was pointed out that it would be a good idea to obtain an expert study on this subject by means, *inter alia*, of setting up a special group of experts. The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1 share the view of those delegations which believe that, in order to reduce the question to tangible terms—that is, the question of what is to be the object of the prohibition—the participation of highly qualified scientific and technological experts was required.

Therefore, an addition was made to the text of the draft resolution in order to accommodate the wishes of delegations which supported our proposal in principle but drew attention to the need for an expert study of the question.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution has had added to it the words "with the assistance of qualified governmental experts". Accordingly, paragraph 3 in the new form would read as follows:

> *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to work out the text of such an Agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

It is precisely the Committee on Disarmament which has such positive experience in holding expert talks on matters of disarmament and the production of important international agreements, that is the most appropriate body for holding talks on the question of concluding a treaty prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

With regard to the proposal for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, many delegations supported the new approach

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 710-711.
[7] See *post*, p. 798, *n.* 1.

to a consideration of this problem, that is, direct practical talks among all five nuclear Powers. The Disarmament Committee, which for many years has had on its agenda the question of complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests, in spite of considerable efforts has not been able to make any progress towards a decision. As we are aware, not all nuclear Powers have been taking part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. And this fact, of course, considerably limits the possibility of producing and agreeing upon an appropriate prohibition within the framework of this Committee.

The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 are convinced that the new approach contained in the draft resolution, if it were accepted, would help to overcome the inertia in the question of solving the problem of a complete and general prohibition of tests.

In the course of the discussion, some delegations pointed out that in deciding on the question of the complete and general prohibition of tests, it was necessary to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be accessible to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear. At the same time, a number of delegations expressed misgivings with regard to the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for producing and creating nuclear weapons or improving existing arsenals of such weapons, that is, being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such weapons.

Furthermore, a number of delegations expressed the view that the non-nuclear States should also take part in the talks of the five nuclear Powers on the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution are sympathetic to these ideas and wishes.

We have, therefore, found it possible to put in certain additions in the text in order to accommodate the delegations concerned and to meet their points and wishes. Accordingly, we have included in the preambular part of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 a new paragraph 4, worded as follows:

> Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in such a way as to exclude any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, after the words "complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", we would add the words

> . . . to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations . . .

The co-sponsors express the hope that the additions and clarifications made in the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.707/

Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1 will satisfy States which have expressed the points of view and wishes in question.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that both draft resolutions will receive wide support in the vote, both in the First Committee and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. In this way new steps will be taken towards limiting the arms race and towards disarmament in keeping with the interests of the peoples of all countries and the whole of peace-loving mankind.

In its amended form, then, paragraph 2 would read as follows:

> *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of the results of the negotiations at its thirty-first session;

Of course, the question of inviting non-nuclear States to participate in talks, and their appointment by the President of the General Assembly, will be decided in the light of agreement among the five nuclear States as to the opening of talks among themselves.

Statement by the Finnish Representative (Pastinen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Environmental Warfare, December 2, 1975 [1]

In its statement on 13 November the Finnish delegation made brief comments on the question of environmental warfare, welcoming the two identical draft conventions submitted on 21 August by the Soviet Union and the United States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).[2] Today, the Finnish delegation has the honour to introduce for the consideration of this Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739 which is sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and my own delegation.[3]

From the statements made in this Committee on the subject of environmental warfare, some salient features clearly emerge. The dominant one is the almost unanimous recognition of the importance of early preventive measures in this field, that is, that measures should be taken before the potential threat of these new techniques of warfare gets out of control. If—as has been stated—such means of warfare are introduced into the arms race, their prohibition will become more complicated. The significance of a convention on the prohibition of military

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2102 (prov.), pp. 16–20.
[2] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.
[3] See resolution 3475 (XXX), *post*, pp. 788–789.

or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques has thus been generally recognized. Such a convention would eliminate from the arsenals of States a whole category of potential means of warfare of a particularly dangerous and destructive kind. The convention would thus become an integral part of the continuous effort of the international community to restrict the dangers inherent in the very existence of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the introduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of the text of the draft convention, as a basis for negotiation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has been welcomed.

The sense of satisfaction expressed by most is but a reflection of resolution 3264 (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly last year by an overwhelming majority.[4] The general tenor of the comments made here on this subject gives us cause to believe that the present draft resolution will be approved by consensus.

The text of the draft resolution is couched in clear and straightforward language, and I can therefore dispense with any elaborate explanations.

The first preambular paragraph recalls resolution 3264 (XXIX), in which the General Assembly requested the CCD "to proceed"—and I want to emphasize this—"as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text" of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military and other hostile purposes.

The second preambular paragraph expresses the same conviction that was included in resolution 3264 (XXIX), namely, that the conclusion of such a convention would serve to spare mankind from the potential dangers of the use of environmental techniques for military and other hostile purposes, and that it would thereby also contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war.

On the other hand, the possibility of using some environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes will not be prohibited. To the contrary, in its third preambular paragraph, the draft resolution expresses the conviction that the development and use of such techniques could contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment. This, evidently, is for the benefit of both present and future generations as the draft itself indicates.

The fourth preambular paragraph again refers to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That report is contained in document A/10027 and the relevant parts of that document are its paragraphs 40 to 45 as well as a number of working papers and the two draft texts of the convention, all of which are included as annexes to the CCD report.[5]

The fifth preambular paragraph reflects the sense of satisfaction expressed in the Committee over the submission of identical draft conventions by the Soviet Union and the United States. It further notes

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.

[5] See *ante*, pp. 419–435 for the report minus the documentary annexes.

with satisfaction the suggestions and preliminary observations offered by other delegations regarding those drafts.

I now come to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739. Operative paragraph 1 requests the CCD to continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and to submit a special report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-first session.

In referring to "early agreement" the draft also suggests that this might be reached during the Committee's 1976 session. On my own behalf, I would venture to say that the efficient manner in which this item has been taken forward so far, gives us reason to hope that this will indeed be possible. The paragraph also requests the CCD to bear in mind both the existing proposals and suggestions and relevant discussion by the General Assembly while working out the convention. Many delegations during our general debate have put forward their views on the question of environmental warfare. Some have done so in broad and general terms, others in a more precise and detailed way. We believe that all these statements, constructive and positive as they are, can be of valuable help to the CCD in its negotiations. That is why operative paragraph 2 requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the CCD all documents related to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly.

Finally, operative paragraph 3 envisages the inclusion of this item on the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session. If the wishes expressed in operative paragraph 1 on the early agreement were to be fulfilled, as we hope they will, the next General Assembly would have the agreed final text of the convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques for its consideration.

It is with these hopes and expectations that I have the honour, on behalf of the co-sponsors, to commend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739 to the attention of this Committee for approval and adoption.

Statement by the Nigerian Representative (Clark) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, December 3, 1975 [1]

Please permit me to announce at the outset that Comoro, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia should be added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.742 of 1 December 1975 that I am

[1] A/C.1/PV.2103 (prov.), pp. 12–20.

about to introduce.[2] I sincerely regret that because of the hectic nature of the activities of the current session it has not been possible to establish closer liaison with the delegations of very close and friendly sister countries and others, in order to include them in the list of sponsors which appears on the document I have just referred to.

There is a popular and, indeed, most disquieting misconception that it is a privilege for a State to belong to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The corollary is that certain States, probably the nuclear-weapon States, have the inherent right to confer that privilege on States that wish to establish or belong to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If this assumption were correct, it would be a very dangerous development in international relations, not only for its implications for the fundamental belief in the equal rights of nations, large and small, under the Charter of the United Nations, but also for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both with immeasurably deleterious effects on international peace and security.

Anyone with a serious approach to this matter would see that there is a tremendous difference in the consideration of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in parts of the world where nuclear weapons have not been introduced and the basic question of nuclear disarmament which involves, on the one hand, the continuing production, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, the desirable objective of freezing their present levels previous to their total elimination under effective international controls. In the former case, that is, the case of nuclear-weapon-free zones, agreement on the scope and characteristics of the zone is the primary responsibility of the contracting parties. The contracting parties, acting within international law, must not assume obligations which contradict the free and legal exercise of their sovereign will. While it is desirable for them to consult with outside States so as to ensure that the international community as a whole, particularly the nuclear-weapon Powers, accept and respect the status of their zone in all aspects, it is absolutely necessary for them to resist any imposition of prior conditions from outside. If they and the other members of the international community fully appreciate the awesome danger of nuclear weapons, they must conceive the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones not in terms of ability and capacity to produce them at a material time. Rather, the objectives of such zones must be to strengthen international peace and security in the regions where they exist and in the world at large; to arrest the costly arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race; to work with a plan and purpose for complete and general disarmament under effective international control; to give priority to economic and social development through diversion of resources from armaments to peaceful purposes; to use nuclear science and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes;

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[2] Identical with resolution 3471 (XXX), *post*, pp. 778–779.

and to apply the principles of the United Nations Charter and the *Declaration on friendly relations among nations based on respect for* the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Let no one deceive himself that nations, like people, are not capable of rearranging their priorities so as to sacrifice and acquire weapons reportedly beyond their present reach, if they feel threatened with untoward humiliation or total annihilation. The African States, therefore, do not approach the question of the denuclearization of their continent negatively or from a defeatist stance. A continent of 46 virile States, with more than half of the known deposits of uranium, is not without bargaining chips.

Being mainly non-aligned countries, the African States attach the highest importance to international security, peace and justice. The Cairo Declaration of our Heads of State and Government regarding the denuclearization of Africa was not directed against any military alliance or Power.[3] Neither will its translation into a formal instrument be directed against anyone.

Pariahs of the international community, like South Africa, may have their nuclear designs. It is common knowledge that South Africa is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[4] Though a permanent member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, South Africa has refused to place its uranium-processing facilities and nuclear activities under appropriate IAEA safeguards.

It is also common knowledge that, contrary to United Nations injunctions and appeals, several Western Powers, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, are investing vast material and human resources in South Africa; that they are, by licensing, technical and financial agreements, building up South Africa's war machine in order to institutionalize terror and bestiality in that unfortunate country with a view also to intimidating independent Africa; and that they are actively assisting in building one of the largest uranium-enrichment plants in the world in South Africa. If by all the facts the uranium-enrichment project in South Africa is absolutely unjustified on economic grounds, one may ask what is the reason, other than military, for funding and constructing the plant? It is hard not to be cynical, if one may paraphrase Juvenal, when eunuchs claim to father children.

We have heard denials, such as that which our friend from the Federal Republic of Germany made in the Special Political Committee and in this Committee. For the moment, we shall say no more on this matter. We shall leave it to the conscience of all who love human rights and human decency, who love peace and do not easily forget the lessons of history.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 294-295.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461-465.

The resolution I have the privilege to present on behalf of the thirty-four African States in document A/C.1/L.742 should not present any difficulties for anyone who voted for resolution 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974.[5] There are no basic differences. The object is one and the same. As I said on 20 November last year, when I had the honour of introducing that resolution:

> The purpose is simple and non-controversial: it is to reaffirm our conviction of the vital necessity of saving the world from the scourge of a nuclear war; it is to register our opposition to the harmful biological and other consequences of radio-active fall-out; it is to express our concern about the present rate of nuclear armaments and the possible spread of nuclear weapons; and it is to enable us to focus undivided attention on the task of harnessing the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples.[6]

May I repeat what I also said last year, that we are not here to make a new declaration or to proclaim a new doctrine, nor are we seeking to impose on other States any new obligations which they have not hitherto freely assumed under General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 1965.[7] All we ask is recognition of the fact that Africa is master of its own destiny. Those who live in a nostalgic euphoria of the past cannot contrive to claim for themselves, at the expense of Africa, what they deny to others. International law is of universal application: it does not serve the interests of great Powers alone.

The first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is cribbed from the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report for this year: in fact it is a direct quotation from page 9 of document A/10001/Add.1.[8] Now one may ask, why do nuclear-weapon-free zones provide the best and easiest means whereby non-nuclear-weapon States can ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories, when they have the choice of acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? The answer is simple: look at the history of disarmament negotiations in the United Nations.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not, for reasons well known to all of us, appeal to everyone. Several African States are not parties to it. In any case, that Treaty does not mean the total absence of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to it. It means only that non-nuclear-weapon States parties will not acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. In other words, proliferation in the sense of that Treaty has more to do with ownership than with the general deployment of nuclear weapons. But all African States subscribe to the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, which postulates the total absence of nuclear weapons from Africa. Furthermore, if nuclear weapons are not introduced into our continent, Africa will not be embroiled directly in the tiresome and

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[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 807-808.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 689-694.
[7] *Ibid., 1965*, pp. 624-626.
[8] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1 A* (A/10001/Add.1), p. 4.

tedious arguments on nuclear disarmament. Thanks to our own efforts and imagination, there are no foreign military bases or extra-territorial zones in Africa. We are all non-aligned and we are not subject to foreign security entanglements. A nuclear-weapon-free zone spontaneously established on our own initiative and by our own efforts will therefore be easier to achieve than an attempt to reconcile all and sundry to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other treaties of similar arms-control dimensions with inherent contradictions.

The second preambular paragraph is self-evident. Let me hasten to clarify that the clause "régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" is being used advisedly. The idea contained therein is not synonymous with the statute of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many non-adherents to that Treaty strongly believe in the objectives of nuclear-free-zones; hence the paragraph has been constructed to satisfy both parties and non-parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The remaining four preambular paragraphs have been taken from previous resolutions, dating back to 1965. They need no further elaboration, except to underline the fact that the definition of the continent of Africa in the fourth preambular paragraph is taken verbatim from the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Naturally, the islands referred to therein include such island States as Mauritius, which became independent after the Charter had come into force.

It is probably a feat of artistic achievement that the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution require more explanation than the operative paragraphs. I may add, however, that operative paragraph 1 is new. Like the fabled emperor in his new clothes, the kernel of the paragraph is bare and honest. It requires no special effort to see its essence and significance. It is a part of the standard folklore of the United Nations.

Lest there be some doubting Thomases, I should like to conclude by saying that operative paragraph 4 is one and the same as paragraph 3 of resolution 3261 E (XXIX) which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. The only correct construction to put upon the paragraph is one conceived in the light of international law that governs the sovereign rights of States, the high seas and the rights of innocent passage. We do not use the word "transporting" in a restrictive manner. We believe that nuclear-weapon States owe us a legal and a moral obligation not to transport nuclear weapons into or in transit across Africa. If for some unforeseen reasons that has to be done, such an exercise cannot be undertaken without permission as required by international law. Our fear, our concern, genuine and legitimate, is that nuclear weapons in transit across Africa, might be dropped, or even fall accidentally, on our continent, resulting in incalculable havoc and calamity. Nuclear-weapon States must not do or be seen to do anything that will jeopardize States in nuclear-weapon-free zones that have voluntarily, and in the interests of mankind, renounced the nuclear option.

Statement by the Israeli Representative (Erell) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, December 3, 1975 [1]

The Israel delegation wishes to state its position, at this stage in the work of our Committee, with respect to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.741.[2]

My Government has studied with attention the Iranian-Egyptian proposal now before the Committee concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Government of Israel has already stated in the past its support in principle for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

As it stated in its letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

> . . . the Government of Israel cannot disregard the fact that Governments of Arab countries bordering on Israel and beyond unstintingly evoke the threat of force and attempt actively and increasingly to ostracize Israel from the international community.[3]

This attitude is clearly incompatible with the professed aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

As regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[4] the Government of Israel has voted in favour of it, has stated that it supports its principle, and is continuing its examination of the Treaty's implications, against the legal and factual background depicted in the foregoing remarks.

With reference to operative paragraph 3 of the proposed resolution, the Government of Israel has solemnly stated that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and it reiterates its desire to consult and confer with the Governments of all the countries concerned in order to agree on the prerequisites from which the commitments sought by the operative paragraphs of the proposed resolution may emerge as a genuine, and not as a spurious, contribution to peace.

As my Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in his statement to the General Assembly on 30 September concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East:

> Israel . . . will be ready to enter into negotiations with all States concerned in order to attain that objective. By negotiations we mean a process of intergovernmental consultation similar to that which preceded the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other international instruments of like character.

A process of this kind is envisaged also for the South Asia and South Pacific agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2103 (prov.), pp. 21–22.
[2] See resolution 3474 (XXX), *post*, pp. 786–788.
[3] S/11778/Add. 3, p. 2.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

My Minister added the comment that:

> We do not think that so grave a matter can be settled by correspondence through the Secretary-General.[5]

The Arab States have so far shown no readiness to take part in such a consultation, and this is surely both significant and disquieting.

It is no doubt for this reason that the draft before us does not call for such a consultation. This deliberate anomaly weakens the text irredeemably, and in fact subverts its proclaimed purpose. Accordingly, we cannot support the present draft, and will abstain from voting on it.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, December 4, 1975 [6]

My delegation has accepted the wish of the sponsors of the two draft resolutions concerning a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, namely that both resolutions be adopted without vote.[7] Had there been a vote, however, my delegation would have abstained. In our view, this year's resolutions embody quite different approaches to the stated objective, just as they did last year. Progress towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia requires consultations and careful preparation by the States in the region, so that the necessary agreements on the goals and conditions of the zone can be reached. We welcome the discussions that have taken place between the interested States in this connexion.

I should also like to add that an important consideration in determining the attitude of the United States towards any particular zone arrangement is based on whether it effectively prohibits the indigenous development of any nuclear explosive capability for whatsoever purpose.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon Testing, December 4, 1975 [1]

In connexion with the vote on the draft resolution on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, including underground testing, everywhere and by everyone.

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[5] *Ante*, p. 496.
[6] A/C.1/PV.2105 (prov.), p. 61.
[7] I.e., draft resolutions adopted as resolutions 3476 A and 3476 B (XXX), *post*, pp. 790–791.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2106 (prov.), pp. 33–36.

That position of the Soviet Union has been expressed particularly in the proposal submitted to the present session of the General Assembly on conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. That proposal has received considerable support at this session. It provides for direct talks among States possessing nuclear weapons in order to produce a relevant international draft agreement. The idea is that the complete and general prohibition of tests can be brought about only with the participation of all the nuclear Powers.

However, in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 we find a provision which is not based on a principle acceptable to the USSR.[2] We believe that the moratorium on nuclear testing proposed in the draft resolution will not facilitate progress towards the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. If this measure is put into effect by only a few nuclear Powers, it will lead only to the creation of one-sided advantages for certain States, to the detriment of others.

The Soviet Union cannot agree either with the attempt to place responsibility for the absence of progress in this area on, among others, the USSR, which has constantly bent every effort to solve the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and which has put forward a new initiative designed to attain that objective.

In the light of what I have said, the Soviet delegation will not support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738, and will abstain from voting on it.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Comprehensive Test Ban, December 4, 1975 [1]

No matter how worthy the objective of a comprehensive test ban, or how desirable it may be to achieve it at the earliest possible date, members of the General Assembly would be deluding themselves to believe that significant progress can be made without recognizing and coming to grips with the problems that must be solved if that objective is to be realized.

While the United States remains firmly committed to the objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban, my delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738 because, in our view, that draft resolution ignores or minimizes those problems.[2]

My Government believes that it is illusory to expect States to enter into an agreement affecting their basic security interests in the absence of sufficient confidence that the terms of the agreement will be fully

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[2] See resolution 3466 (XXX), and *n.* 1, *post*, pp. 769-773.

[1] A/C.1/PV.2106 (prov.), pp. 48-51.

[2] See resolution 3466 (XXX), and *n.* 1, *post*, pp. 769-773.

respected. In the case of an agreement to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests, this means that a verification system must be devised capable of performing two essential functions. Firstly, it must provide adequate assurance that clandestine weapon tests are not going undetected and unidentified. This requires the ability to determine whether ambiguous seismic signals—even relatively small signals—are caused by an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. Various approaches to this verification problem have been advanced, but so far there is no agreement. Secondly, a verification system must assure participants that weapons-related information is not being obtained from nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes. At a minimum, such a system would have to provide confidence that peaceful nuclear explosions do not involve the testing of a new-weapons concept, the use of a stockpiled weapon to verify its performance or the carrying out of nuclear-weapons effect studies.

No solution to this complex problem has yet been found. Indeed, the international community has hardly begun to examine the critical question of whether, under a comprehensive test ban, an adequately verifiable accommodation for peaceful nuclear explosions is possible.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.738, while referring to the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban, seems to recognize that such an agreement must contain provisions on verification to assure its effectiveness. My delegation cannot, however, agree with the measure recommended in operative paragraph 4 as an interim step towards an effective comprehensive test ban.

While an earlier version of this paragraph called for an agreement containing appropriate provisions to ensure the effectiveness, the present paragraph simply calls for an agreed suspension. Thus, the sponsors apparently discarded the idea that the testing prohibition should be adequately verified.

My Government cannot accept the notion that any nuclear-testing restraint should lack effective verification provisions, both with respect to nuclear-weapons tests and to peaceful nuclear explosions if they are to be permitted.

My Government strongly objects to operative paragraph 2. It is clear from that paragraph that the sponsors have chosen simply to ignore the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty. The United States believes that this Treaty will have a significant moderating effect on the competition in nuclear arms between the two parties to the agreement. We also believe that the detailed and innovative verification procedures contained in the agreement should provide a sound technical basis for achieving further restraint in nuclear testing. Operative paragraph 2 also ignores the CCD's work on the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions under test-ban conditions.

As can be seen in the section on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions in the Committee's annual report, considerable light was shed this past year on a subject that had previously

received little international attention. Legitimate and sincere differences of opinion can exist concerning the adequacy of progress towards a comprehensive test ban. But to deny, as this paragraph does, that progress has been made, is not only a distortion of the historical record but could also work against the comprehensive test ban objective if opportunities are missed to build upon the progress that has already been achieved.

Finally, my delegation takes exception to the tone of operative paragraph 1. It seems inconsistent to us that many of the States that voted for the blanket condemnation contained in that paragraph, and some of the sponsors of the draft resolution, have publicly recognized that genuine problems must be solved before a comprehensive test ban can be achieved.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, December 4, 1975 [3]

The United States supports the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East under conditions which we have enumerated in the past for assuring the effectiveness of such a zone. We are prepared to lend our co-operation to efforts to achieve this objective.

For that reason, although we question the approach of asking States to undertake commitments in advance of the negotiations of a zone arrangement, my delegation voted in favor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.741.[4]

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade, December 5, 1975 [1]

Had this draft resolution been put to the vote, the United States would have voted in favour, despite some reservations concerning its elements and language. In particular, we question the value of asserting an essential link between disarmament and development, as the draft resolution's operative paragraph 4 appears to do.[2]

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[3] A/C.1/PV.2106 (prov.), pp. 76–77.
[4] See resolution 3474 (XXX), *post*, pp. 786–788.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), pp. 13–15.
[2] See resolution 3470 (XXX), *post*, pp. 776–778.

While both of these objectives are important, progress in achieving disarmament depends upon the solution of problems that in many respects are fundamentally different from those of development. In our view, disarmament and development should be pursued on their own merits, without being made mutually dependent.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, December 5, 1975 [3]

Earlier in our debate my delegation commented in some detail on certain aspects of the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests which was introduced by the Soviet Union. At that time we pointed out that the United States recognizes that a complete halt of all nuclear-weapons testing by all countries must certainly be our ultimate objective on the test-ban issue.[4] However, this draft resolution proposes that this objective be pursued by calling on all the nuclear-weapon States and a substantial number of non-nuclear-weapon States to commence negotiations by 31 March 1976 on a complete and general test-ban agreement.

It is clear that it is not realistic to expect all nuclear-weapon States to agree to join comprehensive test-ban negotiations in the near future. Under these circumstances, we frankly believe that the only sound course of action is to continue consideration of the test-ban issue in existing negotiating forums, particularly the CCD.

Accordingly, my delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.2.[5]

Statement by the Italian Representative (Di Bernardo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 5, 1975 [1]

On behalf of the States members of the European Community, I wish to explain the reasons which will lead us to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1.[2]

The States members of the European Community have considered with interest and with a positive attitude the proposal concerning the

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[3] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), p. 21.
[4] *Ante*, p. 526.
[5] Identical with resolution 3478 (XXX), *post*, pp. 793–798.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), p. 41.
[2] Identical with resolution 3479 (XXX), *post*, pp. 798–803.

prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. We share in principle the objectives which underlie this proposal.

The prevention of the development of still more destructive weapons must strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of all of us. However, it is not clear to us that a draft agreement without any specific prohibition would be a useful means of achieving this objective. In these conditions it is difficult to evaluate all the implications of such an initiative. We would have rather seen as a matter of priority a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of weapons of mass destruction before starting a negotiating process which is hardly conceivable without having an idea as to precisely what we are going to negotiate.

We therefore consider it necessary for the representatives of interested Governments, as a first step, to consider together the best practical approach to study further particular scientific development capable of military application. The States members of the European Community, therefore, while sympathizing in principle with this new initiative, believe that the best way forward will be to examine ways in which restraints might be devised which would avert the threat of more terrible and indiscriminate new weapons and in this connexion to consider the methodology of forecasting possible developments.

We look forward to a profitable discussion along these lines. Our abstention on this draft resolution in no way indicates a lack of interest or concern but simply the desire to get this new subject launched on the right lines.

Statement by the French Representative (Scalabre) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 5, 1975 [1]

I should like to add a few remarks to what the representative of Italy has just said on behalf of the European Economic Community.[2] It is to be understood of course, that we associate ourselves fully with the statement just made by the representative of Italy on behalf of the Community.

My delegation will unfortunately have to abstain on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1,[3] because in our view we should consider very carefully the idea of prohibiting new types of weapons before they reach a stage of development, where their elimination would create almost insurmountable obstacles.

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), pp. 41–45.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Identical with resolution 3479 (XXX), *post*, pp. 798–803.

That was the point made by the President of the Republic of France when, in a recent interview on 12 November 1975, he said:

> The world can derive no benefit from developing new weapons ruinous to its economies and certainly lethal to its existence.[4]

The interest we take in this new approach towards an important element of disarmament leads us to hope that prompt replies will be given to a series of questions which are at the core of the draft resolution. We had hoped, I must say, that the sponsors of this draft resolution, who are best qualified to tell us exactly what they have in mind, would have given us some more details.

We are not asking them to describe new weapons or types of weapons which have not yet been invented and therefore cannot be defined before some distant date in the future. Nevertheless, the fundamental concepts on which the preparation of the agreement is to [be] based should have been specified in greater detail.

What do we mean by weapons of mass destruction? What is a new type of weapon? What is a new system of weapons? Are we to understand that a new weapon is one requiring scientific and technological applications as yet not achieved in the field of armaments? If so, that would be a limited concept. Should one, on the contrary, consider that further substantial improvement of an existing weapons system may make it a new weapon subject to any ban on manufacture which might be decided upon? Finally, will the provisions of the new agreement apply to nuclear weapons and to chemical and bacteriological weapons which, by general consensus, are considered to be types of weapons of mass destruction?

In respect of these points and some others, we would have wished to receive some information. But, as I said earlier, we shall unfortunately have to abstain in respect of certain provisions of the draft resolution which seem to us to be unacceptable: First of all, operative paragraph 2, which takes note of a draft agreement which was annexed to the draft resolution. That document is based on certain conceptions, particularly in respect of control and verification, to which we cannot subscribe.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution refers the study to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We need not remind the General Assembly of our position, for it knows full well our reservations in respect of that body. It is therefore essentially for procedural and not for substantive reasons that we shall have to abstain.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of the Government of France to follow with interest and care the work which will be carried out in this field. We will assess the results obtained on the basis of merit. We sincerely hope that these results may be positive and lead to the actual prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of

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[4] For the interview, see *Le Figaro*, Nov. 12, 1975, pp. 2–4. A variant translation of the statement can be found in FBIS, vol. VII, Nov. 18, 1975, p. K9.

weapons. Everybody would stand to gain, no one would lose—that would indeed be an encouraging factor for concluding an agreement on this subject.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 5, 1975 [5]

The United States shares with the co-sponsors the concern expressed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1 over the dangers posed by the possible development of new weapons of mass destruction.[6] We accordingly informed the sponsors of the draft resolution of our willingness to consider any practical steps towards the prevention of such dangers.

We indicated that the United States could support a resolution calling for examination of this issue by the CCD. We believe, however, that before making a commitment to seek restraints on new weapons of mass destruction, it is essential to obtain a clear understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, we could not associate ourselves at this time with the assertion contained in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution that it is necessary to conclude an international treaty on new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Nor could we agree with a request, as contained in operative paragraph 3, that the CCD proceed as soon as possible to work out the text of such an agreement.

These features of the draft resolution compel us to abstain in the vote.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Stashevsky) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Reduction of Military Budgets, December 5, 1975 [1]

In connexion with the forthcoming vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.726 and Corr.1, on military budgets,[2] the Soviet delegation would like to state the following.

At the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union put forward a proposal on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. That proposal was widely supported in the United Nations.

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[5] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), p. 45.
[6] Identical with resolution 3479 (XXX), *post*, pp. 798–803.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), pp. 52–56.
[2] Identical with resolution 3463 (XXX), *post*, pp. 764–766.

Its specific provisions laid the basis for General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII).[3] However, the practical implementation of that proposal has been delayed, a situation for which certain permanent members of the Security Council must bear responsibility, since so far they have not shown any readiness to implement that measure in practical terms.

In our opinion the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.726 will not promote the solution of the problem of the reduction of military budgets. It would only replace the reduction of military budgets by theoretical research into questions connected with those budgets.

We are convinced that technical research cannot replace the actual reduction of military budgets of permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States. The efforts of United Nations Member States, in our view, should be directed not towards theoretical research in the area of military expenditures of States, but rather at the speediest practical implementation of the aforementioned resolution of the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the reduction of military budgets.

Moreover, the draft resolution before us appeals to only two States to reduce their budgets unilaterally. This course will not lead to a solution of the important question of the reduction of military expenditures of States. Reduction of military budgets should be carried out by all permanent members of the Security Council as well as by the most militarily significant States bearing a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Soviet Union is ready to adopt the relevant practical measures for the reduction of military budgets along with all the other permanent members of the Security Council.

For the above reasons, the delegation of the Soviet Union will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.726 and Corr.1.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Reduction of Military Budgets, December 5, 1975 [1]

We truly regret that certain unacceptable elements in the draft resolution made it necessary for us to abstain.[2] Among such elements, we could not agree to operative paragraph 2 which singles out two States and urges them to reduce their military expenditures in advance of achievement of effective agreements. We do not understand how any State can be expected to reduce its defence expenditures without some assurance that doing so would not jeopardize its security.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 876-877.

[1] A/C.1/PV.2107 (prov.), pp. 61-62.

[2] I.e., draft resolution A/C.1/L.726 and Corr.1, identical with resolution 3463 (XXX), *post*, pp. 764-766.

Under present conditions, as later operative paragraphs in the draft resolution clearly recognize, it is not even feasible for one State to compare its own defence expenditures with those of other States. To provide a basis for such comparisons is indeed an aim of this draft resolution. Operative paragraph 2 is clearly inconsistent with that aim. However, I now want to emphasize that our abstention does not in any way reflect disagreement with the central purpose of the draft resolution as set out in the last five operative paragraphs.

Quite the contrary, we consider the request for an in-depth analysis and examination in concrete terms of the issues involved in the definition and comparative measurement of military expenditures to be a constructive and a valuable action by the General Assembly. It represents, in our view, an essential step forward toward creating conditions in which agreed limitations on military expenditures can become a serious possibility.

As I noted in my statement before this Committee on 30 October,[3] the United States proposed last summer at the CCD that such a study be undertaken by a small group of highly qualified governmental experts. Indeed, the specific topics suggested in the United States working paper as a basis for further study are very similar to those set out in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.[4]

Although we suggested that the CCD would be the appropriate body to organize this study, we can agree to the draft resolution's request that the Secretary-General assume responsibility for its organization. The United States is prepared to co-operate fully in the preparation of the report called for in the draft resolution. We sincerely hope that the other States which are principally concerned will be able to do the same.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, December 5, 1975 [1]

The Soviet delegation would like to explain its views on the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.724/Rev.1.[2]

The Soviet Union is in favour of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. Our view is that any agreement on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone must genuinely ensure the transformation of that territory—the territory of the interested States—into a zone entirely free from nuclear weapons and must exclude any loop-holes permitting violations of its nuclear-free status. The Soviet Union would be ready to assume the obligation to respect

[3] *Ante*, pp. 523-524.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 279-284.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 12-15.
[2] Identical with pt. B of resolution 3472 (XXX), *post*, pp. 782-784.

the nuclear-free status of a given zone on condition that it would be genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and other nuclear States should also assume similar obligations.

It follows from this position that the Soviet Union cannot automatically assume obligations with regard to any zone which has been declared to be free from nuclear weapons. However, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724/Rev.1 is not designed to create zones entirely free from nuclear weapons; in particular, it does not provide for the renunciation by a non-nuclear State, participant in a zone, of the possession of nuclear explosive devices, it does not prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through the territory of the zone, and in essence it permits the extension of such a zone to the high seas.

Statement by the Italian Representative (Di Bernardo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, December 5, 1975 [1]

The nine States of the European Community, of which Italy occupies the presidency during the current period, wish to submit collectively certain observations to the Committee regarding the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724/Rev.1, which will shortly be put to the vote.[2]

We recognize that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, wherever suitable conditions exist, could make a positive contribution to the achievement of the objectives of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and, accordingly, has a potential significance that could extend beyond the area covered by those zones. We support the unanimous conclusion of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones (A/10027/Add.1) that, although the primary purpose of a zone is to enhance national and regional security, such zones should also be seen as part of the process of averting nuclear-weapon proliferation, of arresting the arms race and of diminishing the danger of a nuclear war.

We have therefore voted for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.734/Rev.1, which was introduced by Finland and invites all Governments to transmit their views and suggestions on the report.[3]

It is our view that two essential elements for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones are that the initiative for their creation must come from the States within the region concerned and that the zonal arrangements must be in accordance with international law and usage.

As far as the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724/Rev.1, which was introduced by Mexico, is concerned we fully accept that the Gen-

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 17–18.
[2] Identical with pt. B of resolution 3472 (XXX), *post*, pp. 782–784.
[3] Identical with resolution 3472 A (XXX), *post*, pp. 780–782.

eral Assembly can make an important contribution in this field by giving moral support and encouragement to the State or States considering the establishment of such zones, by producing useful material such as the comprehensive report, and by adopting resolutions supporting such initiatives.

However, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations very clearly provides that resolutions of the General Assembly are recommendatory by nature. We believe, moreover, that it is both wrong and dangerous for this Assembly to attempt by majority vote to impose on States, against their will, obligations which should be undertaken only by international treaty in the free exercise of their sovereignty.

The nine States of the European Community will therefore vote against this draft resolution. Our vote is based on what we regard as a matter of principle which goes beyond the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones, important though that is.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, December 5, 1975 [1]

The Soviet delegation would like to explain its views before the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721/Rev.1.[2] The Soviet delegation intended to vote in favour of the initial draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721,[3] which was constructive in character and as a whole, correctly in our view, focused the efforts of States on solving a whole complex of complicated questions and problems connected with the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

However, the inclusion in the initial draft resolution of the amendments of Mexico and other countries in document A/C.1/L.729 [4] has made the initial draft resolution considerably less acceptable. It has included formulations which give a one-sided interpretation of important provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [5] relating to peaceful nuclear explosions and the position of the USSR on this question as a State party to that Treaty.

Those amendments to the initial draft resolution represent incorrectly the actual state of affairs with regard to the implementation of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the work done towards achieving its purpose.

The USSR delegation informed the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which took place in May of this year in Geneva, in the general debate and also in

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 36–37.
[2] See pt. A of resolution 3484 (XXX), *post*, pp. 803–806.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 615–617.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 676–677.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Committee II of that Conference, of the steps taken and being taken towards the implementation of article V of that Treaty relating to peaceful nuclear explosions. The USSR is taking an active part in the Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions set up within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the task of considering a broad range of questions. The establishment of this multilateral organ is a step forward in the efforts of States to bring about the practical implementation of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[6]

The preparatory work with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions is going on, too, on a bilateral basis between the USSR and the United States of America. Technical and theoretical aspects of the use of peaceful nuclear explosions were discussed in the course of Soviet-American technological talks in 1969 and 1971. At the present time, too, Soviet-American talks are taking place with regard to questions connected with the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These talks are a result of the USSR-United States Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests signed on 3 July 1974.[7]

Article III of that Treaty provides that underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be governed by an agreement with regard to which the parties will hold talks which will be completed, and the agreement signed, at the earliest possible moment. Those talks are directly related to article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

For the reasons I have explained, the USSR delegation will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721/Rev.1.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, December 5, 1975 [1]

I hope that the Committee will bear with me. In view of the great importance of this subject to my country, I shall have to make a rather extended explanation of vote.

My delegation will abstain from voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.721/Rev.1,[2] primarily because we believe that operative paragraphs 5 and 6 are unnecessary and could convey a misleading impression about the process of working out the special agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

International activity is well under way on the legal and procedural framework required to implement an international peaceful nuclear

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[6] Probably *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group, see *ante*, pp. 188–190.
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.
[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 51–55.
[2] See pt. A of resolution 3484 (XXX), *post*, pp. 803–806.

explosions service. This effort was given significant impetus in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference recommended that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expedite work on identifying, examining and commencing the consideration of the important legal issues involved in the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V. The United States delegation to the Review Conference supported that recommendation.

The United States supported also a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that established an *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes [3] and called on that Group to advise the Board within the Agency's sphere of competence on the structure and content of agreements necessary under article V. My Government is working with other members of the Group in an effort to fulfil that mandate expeditiously.

In light of the clear indication that work on the article V agreement or agreements is proceeding apace, we question whether any constructive purpose is served by noting that—as of May 1975 presumably—no consultations on the subject had taken place.

A potentially more serious problem is involved in operative paragraph 6, which invites the United States and the Soviet Union to provide information on the article V question to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. We see absolutely no reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to report on the matter, since we fully expect that any activity on the special agreement or agreements in the coming year will appropriately take place in the IAEA context and will be reported in the IAEA's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. The invitation to the United States and the Soviet Union to inform the General Assembly therefore seems unwarranted, and it could give the impression that activity on the article V issue in IAEA was insufficient and that additional efforts should be made outside the Agency. To the extent that such an impression gained currency, the effect could be to undermine the work currently in progress in IAEA. We regard IAEA, particularly the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, as the appropriate focus of current international efforts on the question of the special agreement or agreements on peaceful nuclear explosions.

My delegation regrets the decision of the sponsors of this draft resolution to insert the words "at present" in the revised text of the fourth paragraph of the preamble. At the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) last summer my delegation pointed out that, because of their common inherent technical characteristics, all nuclear explosive devices, regardless of their particular design features or intended application, could be employed in some fashion as a nuclear weapon. We stated that it has not been possible, and we see no basis for believing that it could be possible, to develop a strictly

[3] See *ante*, pp. 188–190.

peaceful nuclear explosive device—that is, one not capable of military application.

In the section of the CCD's annual report on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, it can be seen that there was a wide measure of agreement on those points, and also on the conclusion that it is not possible for a State previously not possessing a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a peaceful nuclear explosion programme without in the process achieving a nuclear weapons capability.

Despite those features of the draft resolution, my delegation believes that it contains several very constructive elements. I refer particularly to operative paragraph 8, which calls on the CCD to keep the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions under review; and also to operative paragraph 9, which stresses the need to ensure that any application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the nuclear weapons programme of existing nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of a nuclear explosive capability by other States.

My delegation was prepared to support the draft resolution in the form in which it was originally introduced by Ambassador Kaufmann, the representative of the Netherlands.[4] We recognize and appreciate the difficult problems faced by the co-sponsors in developing a draft resolution acceptable to a broad spectrum of views, and we sincerely regret that the resulting amendments will compel us to abstain from the voting.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, December 5, 1975 [1]

My delegation welcomes the interest shown by the world community in the SALT talks, and the United States reaffirms its desire to achieve, at the earliest possible date, a SALT II agreement limiting quantitative and qualitative aspects of competition in strategic arms. Substantial agreement has been reached on many elements of a new accord, and we are working seriously to resolve the remaining issues.

In voting against this resolution,[2] my delegation wishes to register its strong objections in particular to the statements in operative paragraphs 1 and 2. In our view, these statements seriously misrepresent the facts. The November 1974 Vladivostok accord between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev established a major breakthrough in the effort to limit nuclear arms.[3] We are actively working

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[4] *Ante*, pp. 615–617.

[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 71–22.

[2] I.e., draft resolution A/C.1/L.744, which is substantially the same as resolution 3484C, *post*, pp. 809–810.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

with the Soviet Union to achieve a SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok understandings. Such an agreement would impose equal aggregate totals and qualitative limitations on the strategic delivery vehicles of the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby leading to a more stable balance between them. It would also provide both sides with a firm basis for further negotiations.

As the United States representative stated at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 1975, we look forward as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement outlined at Vladivostok, to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, December 5, 1975 [1]

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the great interest displayed by the delegations of many States in the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitations, and shares their natural desire to see these talks successfully concluded.

The conclusion in 1972 and 1974 between the USSR and the United States of agreements on the limiting of strategic arms is undoubtedly of great significance as a measure designed to ease the threat of nuclear war and designed to put a brake on the arms race.[2]

As a result of the American-Soviet summit meeting in November 1974 near Vladivostok, a joint statement was issued on the question of the limitation of strategic offensive armaments, which stressed the intention of the USSR and the United States to conclude a long-term agreement on this subject. The Vladivostok agreement was very highly appreciated throughout the world and is of great significance for the solving of the fundamental problems of disarmament. For the first time in the practical realm the task was undertaken of ensuring, on a long-term basis, up to 1985, the limitation of strategic offensive weapons not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, with the additional aim of the further reduction of such weapons.[3]

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the Soviet-American talks going on in Geneva on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement, with the idea of working out a long-term agreement between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The conclusion of such a treaty would be a new important step towards the creation of guarantees against the outbreak of nuclear conflict and

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[1] A/C.1/PV.2108 (prov.), pp. 73–75.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–205; *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 746–750.

nuclear war, in general, and towards the strengthening of international peace and security.

The draft resolution we are now considering in document A/C.1/L.744 [4] gives a distorted picture, however, of the results of the talks between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments, and misrepresents the actual state of affairs with regard to these talks. Furthermore, the content of the fundamental provisions of this resolution is such that it represents an unjustified attempt to intervene in the course of these talks. For the reasons I have enumerated, the delegation of the USSR will vote against the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.744, and we wish to make this announcement of our intention.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger: Compliance With the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, December 9, 1975 [1]

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, before I go to your questions I thought it would be helpful to review some of the SALT issues that have been raised.[2] I will not get into a debate with aspirants to political office, either statewide or national. Therefore I will not deal with specific testimony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to present the truth. What I would like to do is to deal with categories of assertions that have been made and then to explain the real state of affairs with respect to them.

The assertions have been made that there have been massive Soviet violations, that the Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations, that the Administration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically, and that senior officials, especially the President, have not been kept informed about the facts with respect to these violations.

I would like to discuss with you the procedures that the government is following with respect to SALT compliance and illustrate them with one or two examples.

First of all it is important to keep in mind that with respect to SALT or with respect to the strategic forces on both sides, we are dealing with military establishments of great technical complexity that are constantly engaged in military activities. These military establishments, moreover, on both sides are in the process of constant change so that there is great fluidity in what one observes. We are not dealing with a static situation; we are dealing with a fluid situation. Therefore, too,

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[4] Substantially the same as resolution 3484C, *post*, pp. 809–810.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, January 5, 1976, pp. 1–12.

[2] For the SALT agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–205.

the information that is obtained has to go through various stages of analysis.

The first information about any event is usually extraordinarily illusive and ambiguous, and one part of the process of the government is to refine the information until we reach a point at which senior officials can make a reasonable decision. I believe it is a good working hypothesis to assume that government is not run by conspiracy but by serious people trying to come to serious conclusions about difficult topics, especially when the charge of a violation of a formal agreement is not a minor matter to be introduced into the diplomatic discourse.

Now, first of all, what is meant by a violation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the current debate.

A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to preclude.

Second, a violation can be an action inconsistent with the sense or the spirit of the agreement and tending to undermine its viability even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situations where a technical violation cannot be established but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.

Third, there can be unintended violations occurring, for example, through negligence of higher officials responsible for insuring compliance by their subordinate organizations.

Fourth, there can be actions not banned by an agreement but which complicate verification of the agreement.

Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities resulting from differing interpretations of the provisions of the agreements.

Sixth, there can be activities that are assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate information or misinterpretation of information which suggests a violation where in fact none exists.

I want to repeat that many compliance issues will arise initially as ambiguous activities which could apply to any of these categories. Our policy is to seek clarification of ambiguous situations as soon as there is a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in order to preclude development of a more serious situation.

Now to go to the procedures for handling allegations of violations. Any one of these categories would be initially reported in intelligence channels, either from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense. The Department of State and the White House have no independent means of acquiring any of this information.

There is no instance in which a reported violation was not immediately—an alleged violation—was not immediately reported to the President. And we have searched all the files of all the incidents.

I will in a minute discuss the handling of intelligence, and I would like to talk now about the procedures that are followed.

In order to deal with the problem of compliance, there are four insti-

tutions. There is a special intelligence committee, which was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. This committee makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance. This committee—I'm looking now for how many meetings it has held—well, it has met quarterly since July '73, so you can figure it out for yourselves, and all of its reports have gone directly to the President as well as to every senior member of the Administration that is dealing with the problem of strategic arms.

In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the NSC. There is the Verification Panel's Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.

The Verification Panel Working Group of the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times since the middle of 1973. The Verification Panel has met four times on SALT matters—has met four times on compliance issues exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it has met 40 times on SALT matters since 1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing that includes all compliance issues. So that, in addition to the four formal meetings, there were 40 meetings of the Verification Panel where whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the attention of the Verification Panel.

The President has been briefed on compliance matters 10 times since the middle of 1973, six times in the Administration of President Ford. There has been one NSC meeting solely devoted to compliance issues, and parts of others.

The procedure is that the working group will attempt to determine what is going on and will devise either options or recommendations for consideration by the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel then reviews it and makes a recommendation or defines options.

In all the meetings that I have described of the Verification Panel there was never a split decision. The allegation that individuals or departments have held up consideration of compliance issues, have obscured consideration of compliance issues, have refused to deal with compliance issues, is a total falsehood. All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance have been unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed to by the Department of Defense, by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by the Central Intelligence Agency, and by the State Department.

There is no doubt that there may have been differences of opinion in the working group as these papers were being considered. I am not familiar with these disagreements, because unless they are passed on to the Verification Panel there would be no particular reason for me to deal with them.

Let me now turn to the handling of intelligence. First of all, I think it is important to understand how the flow of information to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from the President of the United States.

The flow of information to the President is handled in the following way.

The President receives daily, unabbreviated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelligence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk together with separate notes from various departments every morning and waiting for him when he comes to his office.

In the period of the Presidency of President Ford he has had, until recently, the practice of reading those two intelligence summaries in the presence not of a member of the National Security Council staff, but in the presence of a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore any intelligence item that would deal with compliance would come to his immediate attention. And in compiling a list of the various compliance issues, it is apparent that the President's daily bulletin would reflect the information of the Central Intelligence Agency, as you would expect, within no more than two weeks of its first appearance on a technical level.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cabinet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually in those cases with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore, any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity, to address the President directly. Never has the Assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these individuals or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any Chief of Staff of any of the services, by any head of any department, raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent testimony. There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the information. There has been no reclama of any of the decisions of the Verification Panel, except in one case where one department that had first recommended one course of action—that course of action being not to protest a seeming issue of noncompliance because it wanted to protect its sources of intelligence—later changed its mind and recommended that the issue be raised in the Standing Consultative Commission.

When that Department changed its mind, the President agreed with that new position, and the decision of the Verification Panel was changed.


The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the decisions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous and because no member of the Panel has ever appealed to the President with a contrary view.

With respect to the handling of intelligence, all intelligence concern-

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


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ing alleged noncompliance was immediately distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel and by them to those of their senior members that were concerned with SALT.

For the period that a preliminary investigation was going on, the intelligence was not distributed in the technical publications that were addressed to those whose primary responsibility was not concerned with SALT at a level below the Cabinet level. The longest time this ever took place was a period of two months, and usually the so-called hold has been for a period of about a week or two to permit the refinement of intelligence.

There has been no case in which the intelligence was not distributed in the quarterly intelligence publication that was concerned with the question of SALT monitoring. And in no case was intelligence kept from members of the Verification Panel.

Even during the period that this refinement was going on, the United States did not feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic action. For example, in one instance, which I will get into in a minute in greater detail, in one instance there were reports of unidentified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 [1973] at a time when Brezhnev was in the United States. It seemed improbable that the Soviet Union would violate the agreement by blatantly building additional missile silos, and therefore a further study of the subject was ordered.

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising the issue of that construction, even before we had begun our detailed examination of the issue. In that case the distribution of that information was kept out of those journals that went to individuals not concerned with SALT matters until August 8, when it was generally distributed. In that interval two American notes had been sent to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising that issue.

Now, as I have pointed out, the issue of compliance is an extremely complicated one, and in rummaging through the files of various departments it is not difficult to find memoranda written by subordinates who have no idea of what is going on in the overall picture, who will write down their own perceptions of what they think is happening—usually in the modern form of memoranda of conversation to themselves that nobody ever sees, on which no one can ever comment, and which appear three years later in a context that no one can ever discover.

But let us take the case of these missile silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 in a number of Soviet missile fields, the beginning of some construction that clearly looked like additional silos. If these had been converted into missile silos, there was no question that they would have represented a clear violation of the agreement.

The construction of a silo generally takes two years to complete. And it is important for you to keep in mind in any event that almost any of

these noncompliance events extend over a time span that, to be significant, is months and usually years, so that those of us who are engaged in policymaking, and not rhetoric, must have an opportunity to study the problem before we draw any final conclusions, and we do have this opportunity.

Now, when we approached the Soviet Union within six days of receiving that information in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos.

This, incidentally, was also the judgment of our intelligence community. Our intelligence community believed that almost certainly these were command and control silos. The question being raised was whether, at some later time, they could be converted into missile silos.

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet Union in reply raised certain questions about certain ambiguities in American practices which we were not excessively anxious to have publicized and which accounted for the fact that these exchanges were conducted in a rather less dramatic manner than some people might have thought appropriate.

There were six exchanges in this channel of increasing specificity, in which we began to advance criteria which could be met in order to assure us that these silos were in fact intended for command and control. This extended over a period of a year. At that point in 1974, we moved the discussion from the Presidential channel to the Standing Consultative Commission and made formal representations building on the previous exchanges.

We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous *opinion of all agencies, that we are dealing with command and control* silos. We have been given criteria which seem to us for the time being adequate; and there is no agency that today disputes that this issue is for the time being quiescent, though we will be vigilant in making certain that any unusual construction activity at these silos would raise profound questions.

For a variety of reasons, including the fact that the information about alleged noncompliance inevitably involves sensitive intelligence, I cannot go through all of the allegations that have been made; though I would perhaps mention one other, which is the most serious one and which comes closest to the borderline of a possible violation, which has to do with the testing of certain antiaircraft radars in what might be considered an ABM mode.

The issue is complicated by the fact that, at American insistence, the ABM treaty includes a provision that antiaircraft radar could be used—could be tested—in a manner in space for range-instrumentation purposes. I might point out that this was our idea, and if we had not included that, that issue of the SA-5 radar could have been more rapidly resolved.

We received information that some testing was going on with respect

to the SA-5 radar in 1973. At that time it was routinely distributed, and nobody paid any attention to it because it was not put into connection with a possible ABM testing program. Between April and June 1974 some more tests took place which at least raised the problem that the radar might be tracking incoming missiles. That clearly is not permitted by the treaty, though it raises an ambiguity with respect to whether this is done for range-instrumentation purposes.

In any event, several meetings of the working group and the Verification Panel took place. The first decision in December 1974 was, on the recommendation of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, that this issue not be raised because we did not wish to reveal the source of our intelligence.

In January 1975 the Defense Department reversed itself and recommended that the issue be raised. As a result, the issue was raised in February 1975. Since then, within a 17-day period after we had raised the issue, this activity has stopped—has not since been resumed. It was at the borderline of violation, but it has now stopped.

There are other issues, some having to do with unilateral American statements which the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. official could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept noncompliance with an agreement that had any conceivable impact on the strategic equation.

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate of the allegation in which some violations are invented, and in which the lack of vigilance of the Administration is asserted, may tempt the very noncompliance which it claims to seek to avoid, because it may create the impression that the U.S. Government would make a serious agreement on a matter affecting the survival of the United States and that its senior officials would then collude in a violation of this agreement.

Let no foreign government believe that this is conceivable. And I think the time has come that we deal with each other more seriously.

I want to make just one other point before I go to your questions. That point concerns the endless allegations that a secret agreement was made with the Soviet Union respecting 70 missiles to be placed on submarines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 years old, that have not been off the coast of the United States since 1967.

On the face of it this charge should be too absurd to require any commentary. I dealt with it at great length in a press conference on June 24, 1974,[3] and June 26, 1974.[4] It concerned a highly technical issue:

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[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 183–199.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 199–209.

which missiles were eligible for retirement as part of those that had to be dismantled in order to shift from land-based to submarine missiles and whether and what kind of new missiles could be placed on submarines without being counted.

I refer you all to this press conference if you want to go into the technical complexities of this issue, except to say there was no secret agreement, that whatever there was in that interpretative statement was stated publicly by me at the press conference that I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agreement was signed on May 26, 1972.[5] It was repated in a discussion of the Verification Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, practically verbatim, in a note distributed to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it was testified to by Gerard Smith before the Jackson committee in July 1972.[6] There was no secret agreement.

Some overawed technocrats found what they thought was a loophole by which, if the Soviets wanted to design a missile that they didn't have anywhere for just that one category of diesel submarines that was 25 years old, they might conceivably place it on that submarine. We, of course, would never have accepted this.

When we raised this loophole with the Soviet Union, even though they thought it was—shall we put it kindly—a rather strained interpretation, they nevertheless closed the loophole, and despite some rather excited testimony last week, let me say flatly that no price was paid for closing a loophole that did not exist and that we would never have accepted and that ran counter to the whole record of the discussion.

I think I can stop at this point and take your questions on this or any other topic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to work out a new SALT agreement? And do you see a deadline beyond which it would be, because of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation; and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his decisions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of confidence in the country, but our recommendations are

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[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 207-217.

[6] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session*, pp. 362 ff.

not affected by the political situation. We are not operating against a deadline.

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Q. Yes, now on SALT—do you have any evidence today that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer, in your own words, a reasonable and serious counterproposal to the last American proposal that was made to the Russians?

Secretary Kissinger: The exchanges which we have had with the Soviet Union since November indicate that the Soviet Union realizes that no settlement is possible on the basis of its present proposal and that it is willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposition that it must modify its position and that we are then also prepared to look at our position. And it is on this basis that a trip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

Q. Are there plans for such a trip in the immediate future?

Secretary Kissinger: I would expect such a trip to take place within the next four weeks—

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: —four to five weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion earlier, you made some reference to the fact that at one point—as I recall, after the evidence had emerged that the Soviets were building a certain kind of silo—at one point the Soviets raised some questions about American practices that we, as I understood you, were not anxious to publicize. Could you tell us any more about what those practices might have been?

Secretary Kissinger: No, the basic point that I wanted to make is this: It was in our interest—we were interested, as long as there was no conclusive evidence, to keep the debate on the confidential level and to permit both sides to raise with each other technical issues in which they could raise questions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet Union raised did not in fact involve violations of the agreement by the United States, but from the point of view of Soviet photography, they might not have been self-evident. And it is therefore one of those issues where ambiguous evidence is produced in good faith that can be clarified by further exchanges.

There have been no American violations of the agreement, except in the technical sense that I have described.

Q. Are they satisfied with your response to that?

Secretary Kissinger: It is still being discussed, but I think we are making progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on the strongest issue,

which is a continuing one in Congress, which is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.

Secretary Kissinger: I said—

Q. You referred to the unilateral agreements—one of the issues which is a continuing one up there, of course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy missiles. Could you deal broadly with the question which you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those unilateral statements?

Secretary Kissinger: All right, let me first deal with another issue. One of the arguments that is being made is that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated—between myself and Dobrynin, usually—and that we are now suffering from the draftsmanship, from that draftsmanship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. But in any event, the text of the agreement was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that document that was drafted by any other group than the negotiating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the State Department—and indeed all interested agencies—and which was backstopped by a technical panel here.

So that the charge that documents were drafted in the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.

Now, the exchanges that took place between Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined to very few matters and usually concerned a question of principle, such as whether offensive weapons should be dealt with simultaneously with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with separately. That question, strange as it may seem today, took three months of exchanges to settle, and those of you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end of May 1971, it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel.[7] That did not require great technical knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and for the first time—in which for the first time they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count and proposed a procedure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other missiles.

I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 298, 305.

solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate—from Virginia, in case any of you have any question of whom I am talking about [laughter]—because he did not wish to build any additional nuclear submarines at that time.

This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the National Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific instructions were given how to work out the technicalities of it, and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki.

Those were the two areas in which I was most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles.

In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request—but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty—to the effect that the existing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization. This is the only legal requirement of the agreement; that is, if either side increased any of its silos by more than 15 percent it would be in violation of the agreement.

There is no charge that this has been done. In fact, it has not been done. The intelligence community agrees that the increase in silo dimensions in the modernization program of the Soviet Union does not exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another unilateral statement to the effect that if in these SS-11 holes a missile were placed which was significantly larger than the SS-11 that we—I don't know what phrase we used, at any rate, that we—

Q. "Significantly larger"?

Secretary Kissinger: "Significantly larger" was the phrase. I don't know whether we used the phrase, "We consider this a violation—"

Q. Substantially larger?

Secretary Kissinger: No, "significantly larger" is the phrase. But I don't know whether we said it's a violation or what we said, what the specific—incidentally, that statement was drafted by the delegation.

Q. But wasn't it on your instructions from–

Secretary Kissinger: That unilateral statement?

Q. That was issued by the delegation, as I recall, the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper.

Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute, let me make clear—I don't want to play a game.

I agreed with everything the delegation did. I think the delegation did a good job. Everything that the delegation did was finally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not drafted by me, but approved by me; and I am therefore fully behind it. I am simply trying to get the sequence straight.

Now, for about a year, our intelligence indicated that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed, the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than the ones that had existed in 1972.

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Fifteen to twenty percent—don't hold me to those precise figures, because I am doing it from memory. But it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement, by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel; and that raises a serious question.

We are attempting—the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the provision of the agreement, obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in '74; and the questions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole, the SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew and not toward the missiles that came along two years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are attempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations; and it is in that category, which Secretary Schlesinger has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its last known existing proposal? Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet proposal? And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement within the next three or four months?

Secretary Kissinger: If I go to Moscow—or the fact that I say that I will in all probability go to Moscow indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not insist on its last proposal, because otherwise there would be no point in going.

Q. But is there a new one in the works?

Secretary Kissinger: When that proposal will be surfaced—whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether it will be surfaced ahead of time—that remains for discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q. The second part: Is there a new proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, since I have stated that we will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new proposal, there will be no settlement. There is no possibility of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.

Now, what do I think the chances are? I believe that if both sides make a serious effort that the differences should be solved. The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, and we are prepared to make a serious effort. I am moderately optimistic.

Q. Well, even to be talking about going to Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would not go there just for the winter weather. Do you have a reason to believe that if you—

Secretary Kissinger: I said I had reason to believe that they will not insist on their last proposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the news reports in connection with Admiral Zumwalt's testimony carry the phrase here that the admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor"—and I am quoting from a news report, sir—"sprang from a personal and political commitment to the success of the détente policy" which made him, quote, "reluctant to report the actual facts." How do you react to that, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated how we have handled information, and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear that the admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, among the possible violations, Soviet interference with national means of inspection. Have they interfered with our—

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have listed that as a—

Q. A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, or are they now attempting to interfere, with our national means of inspection? And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the threshold test ban,[8] and what are the prospects in that agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: The question of interference with national means of detection: there has been a Soviet program from the middle—it dates back from the middle of the 1960's—to make photography and other means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the SALT agreement in that category. Several of those have been raised with the Soviet Union.

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[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227.

Some of those that have been raised have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally interfered with our national means of detection.

Q. Are they currently trying to interfere?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things before them at this moment. I have said that, up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of detection.

And the second question is: How are we doing on the test ban?

Q. And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe, coming up.

Secretary Kissinger: We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left, and therefore it can be settled any time, but it hasn't been settled yet.

Q. Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?

Secretary Kissinger: That's true. And so either they will be settled, or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed yourself here this afternoon is so complex that many of us—and probably most of the members of the public—are unable to understand the details that you are referring to. I wonder if—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they can understand the procedures to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.

Q. I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you would address yourself to the various political charges, or the various charges that you claim arise from political motives, and in simple language, categorically deny them, if that be the—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not saying all of them arise from political motives. Some do, some don't.

But I don't want to go into the question of motives. I think I have dealt with all the essential charges. The charge that information has been deliberately withheld is false. The charge that the President was not briefed is false. The charge that either I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President have refused to deal with compliance issues is false. The charge that there were secret agreements is essentially false.

And I think these are the major items; if there is anyone else who wants to ask or if I have left one out I will be glad to—

Q. If I may just follow up: Why do you say "essentially" false?

Secretary Kissinger: Because there was an interpretative statement that for some reason was not distributed to the bureaucracy, even though the essence of it was distributed to the bureaucracy, and even though the bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents. Why it was not distributed, I cannot for the life of me remember now. But the bureaucracy was told that such an interpretative statement would be negotiated, its content was distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not seen, but the content was known.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. On SALT Two—just so that I am clear—you said you would probably go to Moscow within four to five weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip you leave on, tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. And if so, what has happened? I think you left the impression you would go to Moscow before Christmas. Was there some slippage or some bureaucratic problem here or in the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed. And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process and to move at a pace that permitted a very detailed examination of all of the issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what-have-you; it's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?

Secretary Kissinger: This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union, and I simply want to explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues.

There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

Q. You listed one for them.

Secretary Kissinger: We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known; but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them. And I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka range is an ABM test range, then—supposing we

were satisfied about the characteristics of the radar—there would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is—since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

Q. Yes, I know you didn't—but I mean this obviously is a reply to them. Right?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not criticize the investigations.

Q. No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, then the question is whether it could have come out without some of the wild charges that were made.

But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no objection if you give some credit to them.

Q. Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be—

Secretary Kissinger: No, no, on the subpoena—the subpoena has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office—it has nothing to do with any recommendations I made—recommendations of a previous decade, to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercized executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected.

But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

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General Assembly Resolution 3462 (XXX): Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,[2] 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 [3] and 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 [4] on the question,

Deeply concerned that, despite the repeated requests by the General Assembly for the implementation of effective measures aimed at its cessation, the arms race, particularly of nuclear armaments, has continued to increase at an alarming speed, absorbing enormous material and human resources from the economic and social development of all countries and constituting a grave danger for world peace and security,

Noting that, since the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*,[5] new developments have taken place in the fields covered by the report that are of particular relevance in the present economic and political conditions of the world,

Considering that the ever-spiralling arms race is not compatible with the efforts aimed at establishing a new international economic order, as defined in the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolutions *3201 (S-VI)* and *3202 (S-VI)* of 1 May 1974,[6] in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974,[7] as well as in Assembly resolution 3362 (S-VII) of 16 September 1975,[8] and that these efforts imply more than ever the resolute action of all States

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[1] A/RES/3462 (XXX), Jan. 16, 1976. The draft resolution was introduced by Romania on Nov. 24 (see *ante*, pp. 664-668). An oral amendment for oper. par. 2 was proposed by Cyprus on Nov. 26 and withdrawn by it on Nov. 28, with the statement that it hoped that efforts would be made at the 31st G.A. to adopt a resolution linking international security and disarmament. Both the First Committee and the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by consensus. In the First Committee, the United States announced that it would have abstained if the draft resolution had been put to the vote (A/C.1/PV.2100, p. 27). The U.K., FRG, and France stated that their support for the draft did not change their position towards the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (*ibid.*, pp. 66-70).

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

[3] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 899-900.

[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 843-844.

[5] U.N. publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.26. Also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 644-686.

[6] General Assembly *Official Records: Sixth Special Session, Supp. No. 1*, pp. 3-12.

[7] *Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Supp. No. 31* (A/9631), pp. 50-55.

[8] *Ibid., Seventh Special Session, Supp. No. 1* (A/10301), pp. 3-9.

to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of effective measures of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field,

Conscious that, disarmament being a matter of grave concern to all States, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and understand the situation prevailing in the field of the arms race and disarmament, and that the United Nations has a central role in this connexion in keeping with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that in its resolution 3075 (XXVIII) the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to pursue the study of the consequences of the arms race, paying special attention to its effects on the economic and social development of nations, as well as on world peace and security, in order to enable him to submit, upon request by the Assembly, an up-to-date report on that matter, on the basis of the information released by Governments,[9]

1. *Calls again upon* all States, as well as the organs concerned with disarmament issues, to place at the centre of their preoccupations the adoption of effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and for the reduction of military budgets, particularly of the heavily armed countries, and to make sustained efforts with a view to achieving progress towards general and complete disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, covering the basic topics of that report and taking into account any new developments which he would consider necessary, and to transmit it to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the thirty-second session;

3. *Invites* all Governments to extend to the Secretary-General their support and full co-operation to ensure that the study will be carried out in the most effective way;

4. *Calls upon* non-governmental organizations and international institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security".

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 843-844.

General Assembly Resolution 3463 (XXX): Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3254 (XXIX): Reduction of Military Expenditures, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3254 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[2]

Noting with appreciation that the 1974 report of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets has been issued as a United Nations publication [3] and given wide distribution by the Secretary-General,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General [4] containing the views and suggestions of States regarding the matters covered in the report mentioned above,

Considering that the report of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, as well as the views and suggestions reflected in the report of the Secretary-General, indicates the need for further study of many of the complex questions identified therein,

Reaffirming its conviction of the urgent necessity that the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, carry out reductions in their military budgets,

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[1] A/RES/3463 (XXX), Jan. 16, 1976. The resolution was submitted by Mexico and Sweden on Nov. 20, 1975, and introduced by the former on Nov. 26 (*ante*, pp. 677–681). It was amended twice before its adoption by the First Committee. The G.A. adopted it by 108 votes to 2, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against— Albania, China.

Abstaining— Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, FRG, GDR, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Uganda, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR.

For the U.S. and USSR explanations of votes, see *ante*, pp. 738–739, 737–738.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 784–786.

[3] *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/9770/Rev.1). [U.N. Sales No. E. 75.I.10]

[4] A/10165, Aug. 1, 1975.

Reaffirming also its conviction that part of the resources thus released should be utilized for social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries,

Noting with concern that year after year world military expenditure continues to rise,

Convinced that international security could be maintained with far lower general levels of world military expenditures than at present,

1. *Appeals* to all States, in particular the States permanent members of the Security Council as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, to strive to reach agreed reductions in their military budgets;

2. *Urges* the two States with the highest levels of military expenditure in absolute terms, pending such agreement, to carry out reductions in their military budgets[5];

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, assisted by a group of qualified experts appointed by him after consultations with Member States, to prepare a report containing an in-depth analysis and examination in concrete terms of the various matters specified in paragraph 5 below, including conclusions and recommendations;

4. *Calls upon* all Governments to extend their full co-operation in providing all such assistance as may be required for the efficient preparation of this report;

5. *Decides* that the report shall give emphasis particularly to the following matters:

(*a*) The definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures, as well as the classification and structuring of expenditures within the military budgets, with the over-all aim of achieving generally acceptable and universally applicable delimitations and definitions and a standardized accounting system, so as to permit effective comparisons of the military budgets;

(*b*) The valuation of resources in the military sector, considering different economic systems and different structures of production within the military sector, with the purpose of examining methods concerning the relationships between resources and military output;

(*c*) The deflation for price change in military production in different countries, with the aim of examining methods of measuring real expenditure trends over a period of time, taking into account differences between countries in the rate of price change;

(*d*) The international value comparison and exchange rates relevant to military production, with the purpose of examining methods for accurate currency comparison of military expenditures;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

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[5] The words "in absolute terms" was inserted by the sponsors on Dec. 3 (A/C.1/PV.2104, p. 4; A/C.1/L.726/Corr.1).

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 3463 (XXX)".

General Assembly Resolution 3464 (XXX): Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the suffering of civilian populations and combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement can be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Mindful that positive results in this regard are likely to facilitate subsequent substantive disarmament negotiations with a view to the elimination of production, stockpiling and proliferation of the weapons in question, which should be an ultimate objective,

Recalling that the issue of prohibitions or restrictions for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons has been the subject of serious and substantive discussion at the level of government experts at the Conference of Government Experts, held at Lucerne, from 24 September to 18 October 1974, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of government representatives at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and in the General Assembly,

Aware that the discussions, as well as the proposals and suggestions which have been advanced, have regard not only to napalm and other incendiary weapons but to a number of other specific kinds of conventional weapons, such as various small-calibre projectiles, certain blast and fragmentation weapons, as well as some delayed action weapons and perfidious weapons,

Conscious of the need to continue discussion and for supplementary data to enable Governments to reach further conclusions and to seek broad agreement,

Noting with satisfaction that the issue will be before a second Conference of Government Experts, to be held under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross at Lugano from 28 January to 26 February 1976, with a view to focusing on such weapons as have been or might become the subject of proposed bans or restrictions and

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[1] A/RES/3464 (XXX), Jan. 19, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted by Austria, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Mexico, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia on Nov. 24, and introduced by Sweden on Nov. 25. It was subsequently sponsored also by Jordan, Kenya, and Zaire. It was adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the G.A. plenary.

to studying the possibility, contents and form of such proposed bans or restrictions and that, thereafter, the issue will come before the third session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, to be held at Geneva from 21 April to 11 June 1976,

Trusting that this further work will be inspired by a sense of urgency and a wish to attain concrete results,

1. *Takes note* of the reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts as regards the work of the Conference relevant to the present resolution[2];

2. *Invites* the Diplomatic Conference to continue its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and its search for agreement for humanitarian reasons on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, who has been invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference as an observer, to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on aspects of the work of the Diplomatic Conference and of the Conference of Government Experts, to be held at Lugano, relevant to the present resolution;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons".

General Assembly Resolution 3465 (XXX): Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,[2] 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,[3] 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,[4] 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,[5] 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,[6] 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 [7] and 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[8]

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[2] A/10195 and Corr. 1, A/10222.

[1] A/RES/3465 (XXX), Jan. 15, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, India, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia on Nov. 20. After its introduction by Poland (*ante*, pp. 649–652), it was also sponsored by Belgium, Cuba, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, and Tunisia. The G.A. adopted it by consensus. In the First Committee, France stated its reservation, *ante*, pp. 695–696.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 793–795.

[3] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 717–719.

[4] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 683–685.

[5] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 890–892.

[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 840–841.

[7] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 847–848.

[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 790–792.

Convinced that the process of international détente is conducive to the implementation of further disarmament measures and of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced also of the importance in this context of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical as well as bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Recalling that it has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,[9] and reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

Noting with satisfaction the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [10] and convinced that it constitutes an important step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States,

Recalling in that connexion the undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Stressing the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,[11]

Noting that drafts conventions on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction,[12] as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and constitute valuable contributions to the negotiation of an appropriate agreement,

Expressing concern over the lack of progress in negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States,

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[9] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[11] *Ante*, pp. 419–435.
[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 120–124; *ibid., 1974*, pp. 99–106; *ante*, p. 101.

Desiring to contribute to a successful conclusion of the negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

1. *Reaffirms* the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

2. *Urges again* all States to make every effort to facilitate early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority, taking into account the existing proposals, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction;

4. *Invites* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;

5. *Invites* all States that have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the First Committee relating to chemical weapons and chemical means of warfare;

7. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

General Assembly Resolution 3466 (XXX): Urgent Need for Cessation of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests and Conclusion of a Treaty Designed To Achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned that a number of States have engaged in underground nuclear weapon testing since the twenty-ninth session of the

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[1] A/RES/3466, Jan. 19, 1976. The draft resolution was introduced by Australia in the First Committee on Dec. 1 (see *ante*, pp. 711-715) and amended on Dec. 3, in accordance with a suggestion by Yugoslavia, (see *n.* 10 below). The G.A. adopted the draft resolution as a whole by 106 votes to 2, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

General Assembly, while welcoming the fact that there have been no atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the same period,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, the most recent being resolution 3257 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[2]

Recalling the stated aim of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water [3] to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Noting that[4]:

(*a*) The Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties

In favour— Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— Albania, China

Abstaining— Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, FRG, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S.

The U.S. and Soviet explanations of their votes are printed *ante*, pp. 730–731, 731–733.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 792–793.

[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[4] Preambular par. 4 in its entirety was adopted by 96 votes to 0 with 32 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, FRG, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire

Against— None

Abstaining— Algeria, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Comoros, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, GDR, Greece, Hungary, India, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR, United Rep. Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by consensus on 30 May 1975[5]:

(i) Expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race,

(ii) Expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will take the lead in reaching an early solution to the technical and political difficulties on this issue,

(iii) Appealed to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban,

(*b*) The final documentation of the Conference included a draft resolution and a draft additional protocol to the Treaty,[6] submitted by a considerable number of States which attended the Conference, concerning nuclear weapon tests, whereby the nuclear-weapon States depositaries to the Treaty would agree on a moratorium, which could in due course become a comprehensive test ban embracing all nuclear-weapon States,

(*c*) The desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should, as soon as possible, enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapon tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity at that time to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests,

Taking note of the section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the question of a comprehensive test ban agreement,[7]

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear weapon testing would be in the supreme interest of mankind, both as a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and to relieve the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radio-active contamination for the health of present and future generations,

1. *Condemns* all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted[8];

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[5] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.

[6] A/10027–DC/238, annex B, CCD/464.

[7] *Ante*, pp. 421–423.

[8] Oper. par. 1 was adopted by 88 votes to 5, with 37 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

2. *Deplores* the continued lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement;

3. *Emphasizes* the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban;

4. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement;

5. *Emphasizes* in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States which are parties to international agreements in which they have declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race[9];

6. *Calls upon* all States not yet parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to adhere to it forthwith;

Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Rep., Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— Albania, China, France, U.K., U.S.

Abstaining— Afghanistan, Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, FRG, Gabon, GDR, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

[9] This par. was adopted by 108 votes to 0 with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, GDR, Greece, Hungary, India, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.S. (Subsequently FRG advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.)

7. *Urges* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on the progress achieved [10];

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban".

General Assembly Resolution 3467 (XXX): Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3258 (XXIX): Concerning the Signature and Ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,[2] 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967,[3] 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,[4] 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,[5] 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,[6] 2935

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[10] The stipulation that the CCD give highest priority to conclusion of a CTB agreement was inserted by the sponsors on Dec. 3, when they accepted an oral amendment suggested by Yugoslavia (A/C.1/PV.2102, p. 6; A/C.1/PV.2104, pp. 6-7).

[1] A/RES/3467 (XXX), Jan. 16, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted by 21 Latin American states on Nov. 14 and introduced by Mexico on Nov. 24 (see *ante*, pp. 662-664 and *ibid.*, *n.* 4). It was adopted by 115 votes to 0, with 12 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FRG, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Senegal, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 628-629.
[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 620-621.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 799.
[5] *Ibid., 1970*, pp. 689-691.
[6] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 898-899.

(XXVII) of 29 November 1972,[7] 3079 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 [8] and 3258 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[9] seven of which contain appeals to the nuclear-weapon States regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),[10]

Reiterating its firm conviction that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

Recalling with particular satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France and the People's Republic of China are already parties to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

1. *Again urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

General Assembly Resolution 3468 (XXX): Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

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[7] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 847-848.
[8] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 852-853.
[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 793-795.
[10] For the Tlatelolco treaty and protocols, see *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69-83.

[1] A/RES/3468 (XXX), Jan. 20, 1976. The draft resolution was contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean which was introduced in the First Committee by the Chairman of the Committee, the representative of Sri Lanka, on Nov. 26 (see *ante*, pp. 686-691). It was adopted by 106 votes to 0, with 25 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, *Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,* Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mo-

contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,[2] and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972,[3] 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 [4] and 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[5]

Reaffirming its conviction that action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Calling attention to the provisions of resolution 3259 A (XXIX), especially paragraph 4, in which the General Assembly requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean,

1. *Notes* the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean,[6] in particular section II thereof concerning the consultations entered into by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuance of paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3259 A (XXIX);

2. *Notes further* that, as a result of these consultations, an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean has emerged among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean;

3. *Requests* the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, with particular attention to the following six points:

(*a*) Purposes of the conference;
(*b*) Date and duration;
(*c*) Venue;
(*d*) Provisional agenda;
(*e*) Participation;
(*f*) Level of participation;

4. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to submit to the General

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zambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, FRG, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 901–903.
[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 861–862.
[4] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 854–855.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 795–798.
[6] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 29* (A/10029).

Assembly at its thirty-first session a report on its work, including the results of the consultations referred to in paragraph 3 above;

5. *Invites* all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the preparation of summary records.

General Assembly Resolution 3469 (XXX): World Disarmament Conference, December 11, 1975 [7]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[8]

Noting the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,[9]

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 3260 (XXIX) in its entirety;

2. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and requests it to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

3. *Further requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to include in that report an analytical study of the conclusions contained in its report to the thirtieth session, as well as any observations and recommendations it may deem appropriate relating to its mandate;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

General Assembly Resolution 3470 (XXX): Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the mid-

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[7] A/RES/3469 (XXX), Jan. 19, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted on Dec. 4 by Algeria, Argentina, Burundi, Cuba, Cyprus, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. It was introduced in the First Committee on the same day by Argentina, and subsequently sponsored also by Bahrain and Oman. Both the First Committee and the G.A. plenary adopted it by consensus.

[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 797–798.

[9] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/10028).

[1] A/RES/3470 (XXX), Jan. 20, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted on Nov. 25 by Argentina, Brazil, Dahomey, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. It was subsequently sponsored also by Kenya, and introduced on Nov. 28 by Nigeria. Liberia submitted amendments on Dec. 3 but decided not to press for a vote on them. The draft resolution was adopted by both the First Committee and the

term review of the Disarmament Decade,[2] submitted pursuant to its resolution 3261 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[3]

Expressing deep concern at the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and the detrimental effects on world peace and economy of the continuing unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race,

Reaffirming the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade stipulated in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,[4]

Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,[5] in which it recognized that all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations,

Bearing in mind the agenda and agreed principles of disarmament negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Deeply convinced that implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade in the light of the prevailing improved international climate should be conducive to further measures in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

Mindful that disarmament is among the primary objectives of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* the central interest of the United Nations in all disarmament negotiations;

2. *Reaffirms* that disarmament and development foster a climate of international understanding and co-operation;

3. *Deplores* the wastage of resources, which could be used, *inter alia*, to increase assistance for the economic and social development of developing countries, in expenditures on armaments, particularly nuclear armaments;

4. *Calls upon* Member States and the Secretary-General to intensify their efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on the Disarmament Decade, so as to promote disarmament negotiations and to ensure that the human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to offer appropriate assistance and information to Member States that may require them in pursuance of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade;

G.A. plenary by consensus. In the First Committee, the U.S. expressed reservations (*ante*, pp. 733-734), as did the Netherlands, Japan, Denmark, Australia, U.K., and France. All except Japan, however, stated that they would have voted in favor if the draft resolution had been put to the vote. China stated that it would not have participated (A/C.1/PV.2107, pp. 11-15).

[2] A/10294 and Add. 1.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 800.

[4] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 712-713.

[5] *Ibid., 1961*, pp. 741-742.

6. *Invites* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to review the work done in the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade and in this light to reappraise its tasks and duties, as necessary, in order to accelerate the pace of its efforts to negotiate truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade".

General Assembly Resolution 3471 (XXX): Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Convinced that nuclear-weapon-free zones provide the best and easiest means whereby non-nuclear-weapon States can, by their own initiative and effort, ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories and enhance their mutual security,

Mindful of the fact that nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthen and promote the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

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[1] A/RES/3471 (XXX), Jan. 20, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted on Dec. 1 by 31 African states: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, and Zaire. It was subsequently sponsored also by the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia, and introduced by Nigeria on Dec. 3 (*ante*, pp. 724–728). It was adopted by 131 votes to 0:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FRG, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,[2] 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965[3] and 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[4] which called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, including the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Noting the solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,[5] adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Noting also that the aforementioned Declaration was endorsed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964,[6]

1. *Agrees* that implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, will be a significant measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, conducive to complete and general disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament;

2. *Reaffirms* its call upon all States to respect and abide by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

3. *Reaffirms further* its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, including the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. *Reiterates* its call upon all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on the African continent;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of the solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, in which the African Heads of State and Government announced their readiness to undertake, in an international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 647-648.
[3] *Ibid., 1965*, pp. 624-626.
[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 807-808.
[5] *Ibid., 1964*, pp. 294-295.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 445.

General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX): Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, December 11, 1975 [1]

A [2]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, by which it decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects,[3]

Having considered the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [4] containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects,[5]

Noting the comments made by States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the study,[6]

Convinced that the study will enhance further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Recognizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the security of members of such zones, to the prevention

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[1] A/RES/3472 (XXX), Jan. 21, 1976.

[2] Pt. A was submitted by Finland on Nov. 26. A revised version was introduced by Finland on Dec. 2, with the explanation that the revisions were purely technical in character. In the First Committee, India opposed a proposal for adoption by consensus and requested a separate vote on preambular par. 5 (see *n.* 7, below). The G.A. plenary adopted the resolution as a whole by 126 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FRG, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Greece, Uganda.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

[4] *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament* (A/10027/Add.1). See also *ante*, pp. 417–419.

[5] *Ibid.*, annex I.

[6] *Ibid.*, annex II.

of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goals of general and complete disarmament,[7]

Expressing the wish that the study will be of assistance to States interested in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. *Takes note* of the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones for the preparation of the study;

3. *Conveys its thanks* to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations for the assistance they have given for the preparation of the study;

4. *Commends* the special report to the attention of all Governments, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations;

5. *Invites* all Governments, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations concerned to transmit to the Secretary-General before 30 June 1976 such views, observations and suggestions on the special report as they may deem appropriate;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a report based on information received under paragraph 5 above and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the special report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible publicity in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

8. *Recommends* that all Governments give a wide distribution to the special report so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents, and

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[7] The First Committee adopted this par. by a separate vote: 106 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FRG, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against— None

Abstaining— India, Uganda, Zaire.

invites relevant international organizations to use their facilities to make the special report widely known;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects".

B [8]

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members and that, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, international relations should be governed, among other fundamental principles, by those relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force and to non-intervention,

Bearing in mind that nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to the elimination of the danger of a nuclear holocaust,

Reaffirming the principle defined in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, which established the necessity that there should be

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[8] Pt. B was submitted by six nations on Nov. 17 (*ante*, pp. 647-649) and introduced by Mexico on Nov. 25 (*ante*, pp. 669-674). It was revised by the sponsors on Dec. 3 (*ibid.*, *n.* 1), and adopted by the G.A. plenary by 82 votes to 10, with 36 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.

Abstaining— Australia, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Tanzania, USSR.

Subsequently the delegation of Greece advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

China stated in the First Committee that its positive vote related mainly to the second oper. section and that it was reserving its position on other matters contained in the resolution (A/C.1/PV.2108 [prov.], p. 31).

an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,[9]

Reaffirming also the request made in its resolution 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966 to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,[10]

Having examined the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects carried out under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Having examined also the comments made by States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding that study, the text of which is annexed to the special report in which the Conference transmitted the study to the General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that, without prejudice to the results that may be obtained through any further examination of this matter, from the analysis of the contents of the special report it is already possible at this time to draw certain incontrovertible conclusions,

Noting that from among those conclusions it would seem advisable to stress the necessity that the General Assembly define the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the scope of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards such zones and towards the States included therein,

Convinced that in so doing it will strengthen the new efforts recently undertaken and the realizations already achieved for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Solemnly adopts the following declaration:

I. *Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone*

1. A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(*a*) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

(*b*) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 532–534.
[10] *Ibid., 1966*, pp. 748–749.

II. *Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein*

2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclear-weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

(*a*) To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;

(*b*) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;

(*c*) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

III. *Scope of the definitions*

3. The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.

General Assembly Resolution 3473 (XXX): Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3262 (XXIX) Concerning the Signature and Ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 and 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition

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[1] A/RES/3473 (XXX), Jan. 19, 1976. The resolution was introduced in the First Committee by Mexico on behalf of 21 Latin American states (*ante*, pp. 662–664). It was adopted by the G.A. by a vote of 113 to 0, with 16 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, FRG, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) [2] and its Additional Protocol I,

Taking into account that certain territories lying within the zone of application of that Treaty which are not sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I to which the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

1. *Again urges* France and the United States of America to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as soon as possible, in order that the peoples of the territories in question may receive the benefits which derive from the Treaty and which consist mainly in removing the danger of nuclear attack and sparing the squandering of resources on the production of nuclear weapons;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the two States to which the above appeal is addressed and to inform the General Assembly at its thirty-second session of any measure adopted by those States;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Chad, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR.

[2] For the Tlatelolco treaty and its protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

General Assembly Resolution 3474 (XXX): Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,[2]

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly,[3] and the replies contained therein, on the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing, on the basis of the above-mentioned reports, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

Mindful of the prevailing political situation in the region and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

Taking note of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-

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[1] A/RES/3474 (XXX), Jan. 19, 1976. The draft resolution was introduced in the First Committee by Egypt and Iran (*ante*, pp. 716–718). It was later co-sponsored by Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia. As noted below, it was subsequently corrected, and the corrected subpar. (oper. par. 3a) was adopted by both the First Committee and the G.A. by separate votes. The corrected draft resolution was adopted by the G.A. by 125 votes to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FRG, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, U.K., United Rep. of Tanzania, U.S., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Israel, United Rep. of Cameroon.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 811–813.

[3] S/11778 and Adds. 1–4; A/10221 and Adds. 1 and 2.

weapon-free zones in all its aspects,[4] prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[5]

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968,[6] in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [7] by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,[8]

1. *Expresses the opinion* that the Member States with which the Secretary-General has consulted through his notes verbales of 10 March 1975 and 13 June 1975 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective [8];

3. *Recommends* that the Member States referred to in paragraph 1 above, pending the establishing of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:

(*a*) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices,[9] and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons, in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party;

(*b*) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition,[10] testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards [11];

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[4] *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament* (A/10027/Add.1).

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.

[6] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 431–432.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 461–465.

[8] At the request of India, separate votes were taken on preambular pars. 6 and 7. They were adopted together by the First Committee by 97 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions (A/C.1/PV.2106 [prov.], p. 68). For the voting in the G.A., see *n.* 11, below.

[9] The First Committee adopted the term "and nuclear explosive devices," in a separate vote, by 96 votes to 0, with 15 abstentions (A/C.1/PV.2106, p. 69). See also *n.* 11, below.

[10] The original draft resolution introduced in the First Committee contained the word "transit" between "acquisition" and "testing." "Transit" was subsequently deleted by the original sponsors (A/C.1/PV.2104 [prov.], p. 26; A/C.1/L.741/Corr. 1).

[11] The First Committee adopted this par. by a separate vote of 111 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions (Israel, United Rep. of Cameroon, Zaire). The G.A., however, treated preambular par. 7, oper. pars. 2, 3(a), and 3(b) as a unit, adopting them together in one separate vote of 109 votes to 0, with 15 absentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fin-

4. *Recommends* to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

General Assembly Resolution 3475 (XXX): Prohibition of Action To Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes, Which are Incompatible With the Maintenance of International Security, Human Well-being, and Health, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 3264 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military and other hostile purposes,[2]

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land, FRG, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against— None

Abstaining— Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Cuba, France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Zambia.

[1] A/RES/3475 (XXX), Jan. 19, 1976 and Corr. 1, Feb. 2, 1976. The draft resolution was submitted to the First Committee by 13 states on Nov. 28 and introduced by Finland (see *ante*, pp. 722–724). On Dec. 5, a revised draft resolution, with additional co-sponsors Australia, Czechoslovakia, Iran, and Mongolia, was introduced by Finland with the statement that the change was intended to make clear that a convention on environmental modification techniques should not affect the peaceful uses of such techniques (A/C.1/PV.2108, p. 32). The resolution was adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the General Assembly. In the First Committee, China and Albania stated that they would not participate in the voting (*ibid.*), and Brazil stated that it reserved its position (*ibid.*, p. 33).

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 814–816.

Convinced that the conclusion of such a convention would serve to spare mankind from the potential dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military and other hostile purposes, and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Convinced also that such a convention should not affect the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes, which should contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations,

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [3] as it relates to this question,

Noting with satisfaction that the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament identical drafts of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques [4] and that other delegations offered suggestions and preliminary observations regarding those drafts,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, bearing in mind existing proposals and suggestions as well as relevant discussion by the General Assembly, with a view to reaching early agreement, if possible during the Committee's 1976 session, on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and to submit a special report on the results achieved for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-first session;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of the item entitled "Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health";

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament".

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[3] *Ante*, pp. 419–435.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 385–388.

General Assembly Resolution 3476 (XXX): Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia, December 11, 1975 [1]

A [2]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3265 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[3] in which the General Assembly, while recognizing, *inter alia*, that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could promote the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, considered that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent,

Noting with appreciation the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects,[4] which has been prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Having considered the basic principle unanimously accepted by the experts that, wherever appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist, the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary,

Decides to give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after it has been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned.

B [5]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[6] in which it endorsed, in principle, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Noting the note by the Secretary-General,[7]

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[1] A/RES/3476 (XXX), Jan. 22, 1976.

[2] Pt. A was submitted to the First Committee on Nov. 26 and introduced on Dec. 2 by India. It was adopted by consensus by both the First Committee and the G.A. In the First Committee, the U.S. and China stated that they would have abstained if the draft resolution had been put to the vote (*ante*, p. 730 and A/C.1/PV.2105 (prov.), p. 61).

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 816–817.

[4] *Ante*, pp. 417–419.

[5] Pt. B was submitted on Nov. 26 and introduced on Dec. 2 by Pakistan. In both the First Committee and the G.A., pt. B was adopted by consensus. In the First Committee, the United States said that, had there been a vote, it would have abstained (*ante*, p. 730). China said that it would have voted in favor (A/C.1/PV.2105 (prov.), p. 61).

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 817–819.

[7] A/10325.

Further noting that, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General has urged the interested countries of the different regions to consult together with a view to the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones,[8]

1. *Urges* the States of South Asia to continue their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as recommended by the General Assembly in resolution 3265 B (XXIX);

2. *Further urges* those States to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

General Assembly Resolution 3477 (XXX): Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the South Pacific, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the urgent need for agreement on measures to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continuance of the nuclear arms race are among the greatest threats to world peace and the survival of mankind,

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[8] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1A* (A/10001/Add.1), p. 4.

[1] A/RES/3477 (XXX), Jan. 20, 1976. The resolution was submitted to the First Committee on Oct. 20 by Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea, and subsequently sponsored also by Chile, Ecuador, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, and Singapore. Preambular pars. 3, 4, and 5 were adopted in a single separate vote (see *n.* 3 below). The resolution as a whole was adopted by 110 votes to 0, with 20 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Noting that article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,[3]

Noting further the declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and could contribute significantly to the security of those States,[4]

Endorsing the declaration of the Review Conference that the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling, in particular, the Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa,[5] adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, and the notable progress achieved by the Latin American States towards the denuclearization of their region,

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Against— None

Abstaining— Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, FRG, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Poland, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, U.S., USSR.

For U.S. and Soviet explanation of their votes, see *ante*, pp. 701-702.

[2] For the text of the non-proliferation treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

[3] This par. and the next two were adopted in a single separate vote of 108 to none, with 16 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, FRG, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against— None

Abstaining— Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, France, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Spain, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Rep. of Tanzania, U.S., Zambia.

[4] *Ante*, pp. 146-157.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 294-295.

Noting, in addition, that the Heads of Government of the independent or self-governing States members of the South Pacific Forum emphasized in their communiqué of 3 July 1975 [6] the importance of keeping the South Pacific region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim,

1. *Endorses* the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific;

2. *Invites* the countries concerned to carry forward consultations about ways and means of realizing this objective;

3. *Expresses the hope* that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will co-operate fully in achieving the objectives of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the States of the region in giving effect to the purpose of the present resolution.

General Assembly Resolution 3478 (XXX): Conclusion of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

Expressing its deep concern over the fact that an international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests of all kinds has not yet been reached,

Convinced that the cessation of such tests would contribute to the reduction of the nuclear arms race as well as to the further relaxation of international tension,

Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-

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[6] *Ante*, pp. 228–229.

[1] A/RES/3478 (XXX), Jan. 20, 1976. The resolution with annexed treaty was originally submitted to the First Committee by the Soviet Union on Sept. 23, *ante*, pp. 486–490. On Dec. 1, a revised version, also with annexed treaty, was submitted by the Soviet Union and 11 cosponsors, see *ante*, pp. 710–711, *n.* 1. The version adopted by the First Committee on Dec. 5 was a further revised version submitted by the same sponsors on Dec. 3. Preambular par. 4 was adopted by both the First Committee and the G.A. plenary by separate votes, see *n.* 3, below. The resolution as a whole was adopted by the G.A. by a vote of 94 to 2, with 34 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Grenada, Guate-

nuclear States, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons,[2] in such a way as to exclude any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,[3]

Also convinced of the need again to exert every effort for the early cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests,

1. *Takes note* of the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Calls upon* all nuclear weapon States to enter into negotiations, not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and invites

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mala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against— Albania, China.

Abstaining— Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, U.K., U.S.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

[3] This par. was adopted in a separate vote of 103 to 2, with 25 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, GDR, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against— Albania, China.

Abstaining— Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Chile, France, FRG, Gabon, Greece, India, Israel, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uganda, United Rep. of Tanzania, U.S., Zambia.

twenty-five to thirty non-nuclear-weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the Assembly, at its thirty-first session, of the results of the negotiations;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and to transmit to the group referred to in paragraph 2 above all documents relating to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of agenda items 37 and 122[4];

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

ANNEX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Proclaiming their intention to bring about, as speedily as possible, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the adoption of effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Taking into account the appeals by the General Assembly of the United Nations to put an end to nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Noting that the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests would be in the interests of strengthening peace and slowing the arms race and would be a contribution to the process of international détente,

Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [5] and of the present Treaty,

Noting the great positive significance of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,[6]

Stressing the importance of strict compliance with the above-mentioned Treaty up to the time of the entry into force of this Treaty,

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[4] I.e., "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" and "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests."

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[6] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

Seeking to achieve the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States,

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and to refrain from carrying out any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere under its jurisdiction or control in all environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to refrain from encouraging, inciting, or in any way participating in the carrying out of nuclear explosions prohibited by paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

1. Control over compliance with this Treaty shall be conducted by the States Parties, through their own national technical means of control, in accordance with the generally recognized rules of international law.

2. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty shall co-operate in an international exchange of seismic data.

3. In order to promote the objectives of and to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall, when necessary, consult one another, make inquiries and receive appropriate information in connexion with such inquiries.

4. Any State Party to this Treaty which ascertains that any other State Party is acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Treaty may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint must contain all possible evidence confirming its validity and a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Treaty of the results of its consideration.

ARTICLE III

1. The provisions of article I shall not apply to any underground nuclear explosions conducted by nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes on the territory under their jurisdiction and in compliance with the agreements under which, in accordance with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States are to benefit from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. The explosions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be conducted as follows:

(*a*) In the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(*b*) In the case of nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with a procedure to be established under a special agreement concerning which the nuclear-weapon States will conduct negotiations with due regard for the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the subject and which will be concluded as speedily as possible.

ARTICLE IV

The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect obligations assumed by the States Parties to the Treaty under other international agreements.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, for the purpose of considering such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party depositing its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ————, which are hereby designated the depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ———— Governments, including the Governments of all nuclear-weapon States.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of

each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference of Parties to the Treaty or of other notifications.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in the exercise of its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, connected with the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give three months' notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary circumstances which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in ———— copies, at ———— on the ———— day of ————, ————.

General Assembly Resolution 3479 (XXX): Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons, December 11, 1975 [1]

The General Assembly,

Striving to strengthen international peace and security,

Conscious of the interest of nations in continuing efforts to save mankind from the danger of the use of new means of mass destruction, to limit the arms race and to bring about disarmament,

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[1] A/RES/3479 (XXX), Jan. 22, 1976. The draft resolution, with a draft agreement annexed to it, was submitted to the First Committee on Sept. 30 (*ante*, p. 495), reissued on Oct. 2 for technical reasons, and introduced by the Soviet Union on Oct. 30 (*ante*, pp. 661-677). A revised version introduced by the Soviet Union on Dec. 2 added "with the assistance of qualified governmental experts" to oper. par. 3 (*ante*, p. 720). The G.A. plenary adopted this version by 112 votes to 1, with 15 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangla-

Bearing in mind that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Convinced that the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction would serve the goal of strengthening peace and preventing the threat of war,

1. *Considers it necessary* to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international treaty or agreement, for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

2. *Takes note* of the draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, as well as points of view and suggestions put forward during the discussion of this question;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to work out the text of such an agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons";

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manu-

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desh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against— Albania.

Abstaining— Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, Uganda, U.K., U.S.

facture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

ANNEX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Desiring to contribute to saving mankind from the danger of the use of new means of warfare, to limiting the arms race and to bringing about disarmament,

Recognizing that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Conscious that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements concerning limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including those related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to prevent the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and manufacture of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to promote the strengthening of confidence among nations and the further improvement of the international situation,

Seeking to contribute to the realization of the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons, including those utilizing the latest achievements of modern science and technology. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons shall include: (to be specified through negotiations on the subject).

2. In the event that new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by this Agreement emerge after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall conduct negotiations with a view to extending the

prohibition provided for in this Agreement to cover such potential new types and systems of weapons.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any other State, group of States or international organizations to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take the necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activities contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, within the territory of such State or in any territory under its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it may be.

ARTICLE III

1. In the event that any State Party to this Agreement has any suspicions that another State Party has violated the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties concerned undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving the problems which arise.

2. If the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article fail to produce results mutually acceptable to the Parties concerned, the State which has such suspicions may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such complaint must include evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Agreement of the results of the investigation..

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party to the Agreement which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the States Parties to the Agreement to develop and use scientific research and discoveries exclusively for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

2. The States Parties to this Agreement undertake to facilitate scientific and technological co-operation in the use of the latest achievements and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to limit the arms race in all its forms and put an end to it, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Governments and circulated by them to all Parties to the Agreement, which shall inform the depositary Governments of acceptance or rejection as soon as possible after its receipt.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment upon its acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement, including the depositary Governments, and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of its acceptance of the amendment.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party to this Agreement shall, in the exercise of its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Agreement if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, related to the subject-matter of the Agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Agreement and to the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. *Such notice shall include a statement of the* extraordinary circumstances it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory *States. Instruments of ratification and accession* shall be deposited with the Governments of ————, which are hereby designated the depositary Governments.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by —— Governments, including the Governments designated the depositary Governments of the Agreement.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall

enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Agreement, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Agreement shall be registered by the depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Agreement shall be transmitted by the depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in ———— copies, at ———— on the ———— day of ————, ————.

General Assembly Resolution 3484 (XXX): General and Complete Disarmament, December 12, 1975 [1]

A [2]

The General Assembly,

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[1] A/RES/3484 (XXX), Jan. 6, 1976.

[2] Pt. A was introduced by the Netherlands in the First Committee (*ante*, pp. 615-617). Amendments introduced by Mexico (*ante*, pp. 677-678) were withdrawn on Dec. 3, when the sponsors of the draft resolution together with Austria and Ecuador, submitted a revised version reflecting the main points of the proposed amendments. On Dec. 4, the sponsors orally amended oper. par. 8 by adding "in its consideration . . . of a comprehensive ban treaty," after the word "review." The G.A. plenary adopted pt. A by 97 votes to 5, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, FRG, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire

Recalling its resolutions 3261 D (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 [3] and 3386 (XXX) of 12 November 1975,[4]

Convinced of the urgent necessity that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, take effective measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race,

Recalling also its resolutions on the urgent need for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and for an effective comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban,

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proved possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and that, consequently, it is not possible at present to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes without at the same time acquiring a nuclear weapon capability,

Conscious of the fact that the testing and application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes can have significant arms control implications both for the spread of nuclear weapons and their technology to States which do not already have them and, in the context of limitations of nuclear weapon testing, for the refinement of the arsenals of existing nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of ensuring the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology and nuclear materials for the economic and social benefit of mankind without increasing the risk of diversion to military purposes and the consequent danger to world peace and security,

Noting that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [5] have the right to obtain the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, pursuant to a special international agreement, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, as contemplated in article V of the Treaty,

Noting further that the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and con-

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Against— Albania, Bhutan, China, India, Malawi

Abstaining— Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, GDR, Hungary, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, U.S., USSR, Yugoslavia.

Explanations of votes were made by the USSR (*ante*, pp. 741-742) and the U.S. (*ante*, pp. 742-744).

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 803-806.
[4] *Ante*, pp. 614-615.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

ducted under the appropriate international observation and appropriate international procedures called for in article V of the Treaty and in accordance with other applicable international obligations,

Recalling once again the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee, on 31 May 1968, by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America concerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which relate to the conclusion of a special international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,[6]

Convinced of the need for the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in respect of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions,

1. *Appeals once again* to all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with appreciation:*

(*a*) The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning its studies of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, which comprises information regarding the establishment by the Agency of the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes; [7]

(*b*) The section of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of a comprehensive test ban; [8]

(*c*) The consideration given by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the role of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as provided for in that Treaty; [9]

(*d*) The observations of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session; [10]

3. *Notes* the conclusions of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with respect

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 409-414, 415-422.
[7] A/10168 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1. See also *ante*, pp. 188-190.
[8] *Ante*, pp. 419-435.
[9] A/10215.
[10] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1A* (A/10001/Add.1), pp. 3-5.

to article V of the Treaty, contained in the Final Declaration of the Conference, adopted by consensus in May 1975; [11]

4. *Notes also* that the final documentation of the Conference included a draft resolution submitted by eight States which attended the Conference,[12] which urged the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to initiate immediate consultations with all of the other States parties to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the most appropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the parties in order to conclude the special basic international agreement contemplated in article V of the Treaty;

5. *Notes* in this connexion that, according to information provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in response to the invitation addressed to them in General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX), no consultations have yet taken place for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as envisaged in article V of that Treaty;

6. *Invites* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to provide information on such consultations as they may have entered into or may intend to enter into for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session through the Secretary-General;

7. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency, within its sphere of competence, to continue its present examination of the aspects of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions, which the Board of Governors of the Agency has authorized under its resolution adopted on 11 June 1975,[13] and to report on progress in all these areas to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

8. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to keep under review, in its consideration of an elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons;

9. *Stresses* the need to ensure, particularly in the context of a comprehensive test ban, that any testing or application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the testing or refinement of the nuclear weapon arsenals of nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability by other States;

10. *Calls upon* all Member States to support and assist in the fulfilment of these tasks.

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[11] *Ante*, pp. 146–157.
[12] A/10215, pp. 3–4.
[13] *Ante*, pp. 188–190.

B [14]

The General Assembly,

Recalling that disarmament is one of the fundamental objectives of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned that the arms race has continued unabated and that the world expenditure on armaments is increasing,

Recalling that in its resolution 3261 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 it requested the Secretary-General and Governments to report on the action and steps which they had taken to publicize the Disarmament Decade in order to acquaint the general public with its purposes and objectives, and noting the report of the Secretary-General in this regard,[15]

Regretting that in recent years no significant progress has been made in the field of disarmament,

Recognizing, therefore, the need to pursue negotiations on disarmament in existing negotiating forums,

Conscious of the need to utilize the resources spent in the arms race for economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries,

Reaffirming its conviction that the entire international community has a vital interest and a common responsibility in making every effort

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[14] Pt. B was submitted by six nations and introduced in the First Committee on the same day by Sweden (*ante*, pp. 681-683). On Dec. 4, a revised version affecting oper. par. 5 was submitted by the original sponsors together with Austria, Grenada, and the Philippines. Originally the par. read: "Requests the *ad hoc* committee to complete its work in time for submission of its report, including findings and proposals, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session." The revised draft resolution was adopted by 108 votes *to 2 with 14 abstentions:*

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against— Poland, USSR

Abstaining— Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, FRG, GDR, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Pakistan, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, U.S.

Subsequently, Luxembourg advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour, Poland and the USSR that they had intended to abstain.

[15] For text of the resolution, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, p. 800. For the Secretary-General's report, see A/10294 and Add. 1.

towards achieving progress in the search for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting therefore the declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, calling for new initiatives on a universal basis in order to promote progress in disarmament,[16]

Considering that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is far from adequate in comparison with existing needs,

Recognizing the need for additional and improved information about relevant developments, progress and results in the field of disarmament to be provided to all Member States,

Noting the increased responsibilities that have been placed upon the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Secretariat in servicing meetings and conferences on disarmament, as well as in implementing the decisions adopted by the General Assembly, including requests for information, studies and reports on matters related to disarmament,

Noting the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly [17] that a basic review be carried out of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

1. *Invites* all States to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 May 1976, their views and suggestions on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

2. *Decides* to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, which shall be a committee of the General Assembly, open to the participation of all Member States, to carry out a basic review of the role of the United Nations in that field;

3. *Decides* that the review should, *inter alia*, focus on the following objectives:

(*a*) Possible new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work in the field of disarmament, thereby enabling the United Nations to exercise its full role in multilateral disarmament efforts;

(*b*) Ways and means of improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament;

(*c*) Ways and means to enable the Secretariat to assist, on request, States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including appropriate periodic reviews;

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[16] *Ante*, pp. 435–438.

[17] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supp. No. 1A* (A/10001/Add.1), p. 4, col. 1.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all possible assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including preparation of summary records;

5. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to meet for a short organizational session of not longer than one week in January 1976 and for substantive sessions of two weeks in June/July 1976 and of one week in September 1976 and to submit its report, including findings and proposals, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session an item entitled "Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament".

C [18]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 relating to the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems,[19]

Reaffirming its resolutions 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,[20] 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973 [21] and 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,[22]

Bearing in mind that the above-mentioned Governments agreed on 21 June 1973 to make serious efforts to work out and sign in 1974 the

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[18] The draft resolution was submitted to the First Committee on Dec. 1 by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. It was introduced by Mexico on Dec. 3. On Dec. 5 it was amended orally by the sponsors, who changed the first word in oper. par. 1 from "deplores" to "regrets." Pt. C, as amended, was adopted by 102 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against— Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.S.

Abstaining— Belgium, Cuba, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Turkey, U.K., United Rep. of Tanzania

[19] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 710–711.
[20] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 839–840.
[21] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 901–902, 903–904.
[22] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 801–803.

agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms called for in the interim agreement of 26 May 1972,[23] and that on the same occasion they expressed their intention to carry out the subsequent reduction of such arms,[24]

Noting that, as a result of the discussions held at the highest level in November 1974 also between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, both sides reaffirmed their intention to conclude an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms to last until 31 December 1985 inclusive and declared that they would make an effort to complete such an agreement in the course of 1975,[25]

Noting also that at the same meeting it was agreed to set ceilings both on the strategic offensive nuclear delivery vehicles as well as on such of those vehicles that may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads, and that both sides stated that favourable prospects existed for completing the work on the new agreement in 1975 and stressed that it would include provisions for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985,[26]

Sharing fully the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General to the effect that disarmament negotiations move very slowly in comparison to the obvious perils posed by the enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons,

1. *Regrets* the absence of positive results during the last two years of the bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems;

2. *Expresses its concern* for the very high ceilings of nuclear arms set for themselves by both States, for the total absence of qualitative limitations of such arms, for the protracted time-table contemplated for the negotiation of further limitations and possible reductions of the nuclear arsenals and for the situation thus created;

3. *Urges anew* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their strategic nuclear arms limitation talks, and stresses once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament;

4. *Reiterates its previous invitation* to both Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the progress and results of their negotiations.

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[23] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 202-204.
[24] *Ibid., 1973*, pp. 271-273.
[25] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746-747.
[26] *Ibid.*

D [27]

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the increased responsibilities that have been placed upon the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Secretariat in servicing meetings and conferences on disarmament, as well as in implementing the decisions adopted by the General Assembly, including requests for information, studies and reports on matters related to disarmament,

Noting, in particular, that the number of meetings to be serviced and the amount of documentation to be prepared by the Disarmament Affairs Division has doubled within the last four years;

Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps for the strengthening of the Disarmament Affairs Division, including the addition of staff necessary for the effective carrying out of its increased responsibilities.

E [28]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nu-

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[27] Pt. D was submitted to the First Committee on Dec. 4 by Austria, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sri Lanka, and Sweden. It was introduced by Austria on the same day and was subsequently sponsored also by Finland, Iran, Mauritius, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The G.A. plenary adopted it by 115 votes to 0, with 13 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, FRG, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, U.K., U.S.

[28] Pt. E was submitted to the First Committee on Dec. 4 by Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Romania, and Yugoslavia, and introduced by Denmark on the same day. Subsequently it was sponsored also by Sweden. It was adopted by G.A. plenary by 126 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions:

In favour— Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chad, Chile,

clear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,[29]

Noting that article VII of the Treaty provides:

> Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened,[30]

Bearing in mind that the Treaty will have been in force for five years on 18 May 1977 and expecting that the review conference called for in the Treaty will take place soon after that date,

1. *Notes* that after appropriate consultation a preparatory committee of parties to the Treaty is to be arranged;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the review conference and its preparation;

3. *Recalls* its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, FRG, Gambia, GDR, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Rep., Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.K., Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Cameroon, United Rep. of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, U.S., USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against— None

Abstaining— Cuba, France.

In the First Committee, China gave its reason for not participating in the vote (A/C.1/PV.2108 [prov.], p. 91).

[29] *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 680-681.

[30] For text of the treaty, see *ibid., 1971*, pp. 7-11.

Television Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger: Nuclear Weapons in Europe [Extract], December 12, 1975 [31]

. . . . . .

Q. The NATO states will make the offer in Vienna also to withdraw nuclear weapons from Western Europe. Isn't this a dangerous concession?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain it in English. I do not believe that it goes too far, because we will be offering a category of weapons of which, due to modernization, some have become dispensable, in return for withdrawal of substantial Soviet ground forces. But the United States remains firmly committed to a strong local defense in Europe, and the United States will under no circumstances participate in anything that will lead to the denuclearization either of Europe or of any part of Europe.

. . . . . .

Senate Resolution on International Safeguards on Nuclear Materials, December 12, 1975 [1]

Resolved, That the President seek the immediate international consideration of strengthening the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities [2] and seek intensified cooperation with other nuclear suppliers to insure that most stringent safeguard conditions are applied to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

Whereas the Senate of the United States ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [3] in recognition of the devastation associated with a nuclear war and of the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war.

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[31] *Department of State Bulletin,* January 12, 1976, p. 53.

[1] S. Res. 221, 94th Congress, 1st Session. *Congressional Record,* December 12, 1975, p. S21961.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961,* pp. 21–34; *ibid., 1965,* pp. 446–460; *ibid., 1971,* pp. 218–244; *ibid., 1973,* pp. 116–158.

[3] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

Whereas the parties to the treaty expressed a common belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war;

Whereas the United States and other parties to the treaty pledged to accept specified safeguards regarding the transfer to nonnuclear-weapon states of special nuclear materials and facilities for the processing, use, or production of such materials;

Whereas recent events, including the explosion of nuclear devices, the development of uranium enrichment facilities, and the proposed transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to nonnuclear-weapon states, emphasize the imperative need to increase the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be no further proliferation of nuclear weapon capability;

Whereas the Senate of the United States is particularly concerned about the consequences of transactions without effective safeguards that could lead to the production of plutonium and other special nuclear materials by nonnuclear-weapon states throughout the world; and

Whereas the Senate is particularly concerned about the proliferation threat posed by the possibility of the development in the near future of a large number of independent national enrichment and reprocessing facilities and therefore believes that the United States should take the lead in securing agreement for the development of regional multinational, rather than national, centers to undertake enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to minimize the spread of technology which could be used to develop nuclear explosives: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States strongly requests and urges the President to seek through the highest level of consultation in the United Nations and with the other leaders of the world community, an intensive cooperative international effort to strengthen and improve both the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of the international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be a substantial and immediate reduction in the risk of diversion or theft of plutonium and other special nuclear materials to military or other uses that would jeopardize world peace and security; be it further

Resolved, That the President seek, through consultation with suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology, their restraint in the transfer of nuclear technology and their cooperation in assuring that such equipment and technology only is transferred to other nations under the most rigorous, prudent, and safeguarded conditions designed to assure that the technology itself is not employed for the production of nuclear explosives; and be it further

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State.

North Atlantic Council Communiqué, December 12, 1975 [1]

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 11 and 12 December, 1975.

2. Ministers noted that there had been encouraging features in the development of East-West relations during recent months. They reaffirmed their determination to persevere in their efforts to place relations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries on a more stable basis.

At the same time they noted that the beneficial effects of détente can develop only in so far as all the countries concerned do their best to reduce the risk of confrontation in both the political and military fields.

In the political sphere, détente requires tolerance and mutual understanding, and accordingly demands that the natural contest of political and social ideas should not be conducted in a manner incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Final Act of Helsinki. Furthermore, Ministers considered that attempts to take advantage of tension in any part of the world could have a negative impact on détente.

In the military sphere, Ministers viewed with concern, as on previous occasions, the continued rapid growth of the power of the land, air and naval forces of the Warsaw Pact, which exceeds its apparent defensive needs. They emphasized that détente and security are closely linked. In these circumstances they stressed the need to preserve the defensive strength of the Alliance which is important as a deterrent not only against military aggression but also against political pressure.

Ministers reaffirmed that the solidarity of the Alliance and the security which it provides are essential conditions for the improvement of East-West relations, and they restated the determination of their Governments, expressed in the Ottawa Declaration, to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces.[2]

3. Ministers welcomed the adoption of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which provides guidelines for an evolution of relations between the participating states and between their peoples towards greater understanding and cooperation.[3] They noted the fact that the results of the Conference apply throughout Europe, including, subject to Quadripartite rights and responsibilities, Berlin. The Allies attach high priority to the full implementation of the Final Act by all signatories in improving relations between states, in applying confidence building measures, in encouraging closer economic cooperation, and in lowering barriers between people. Noting that only a short time had elapsed since Helsinki, Ministers hoped that substantial progress would be seen during the coming months.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act, the Allies concerned have already notified all CSCE participants of a number of military maneuvers and have invited observers. The Allies look for the

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 12, 1976, pp. 57-58.
[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1974, pp. 42-44.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 304-308.

implementation of such measures also by the members of the Warsaw Pact.

4. Ministers heard a report from the United States Secretary of State on the continuing U.S. efforts towards the further limitation of strategic offensive arms. The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the substantial progress made since the Vladivostok Summit [4] towards a SALT II Agreement. They expressed the hope that further efforts would lead to the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement. The Ministers also expressed appreciation for continuing consultations within the Alliance with respect to strategic arms limitation.

5. Ministers of the participating countries reviewed the state of the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. They recalled that it is the aim of these negotiations to contribute to a more stable relationship and to strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

These Ministers stressed again that the existing disparities in ground force manpower and tanks are the most destabilizing factor in Central Europe and that any agreement must deal adequately with these disparities. They reconfirmed, therefore, the Allied proposal to establish in the area of reductions approximate parity in ground forces in the form of a common collective ceiling for ground force manpower on each side. A first phase reductions agreement concerning United States and Soviet ground forces as proposed by the participating Allies would be an important and practical step towards this goal.

With a view to achieving these objectives, they approved important additional proposals and authorized their presentation at the appropriate moment in Vienna.

These Ministers reiterated their resolve to pursue vigorously all the Allied objectives in order to assure undiminished security for all parties. They proceed on the premise that the additional proposals will lead to the achievement of these objectives.

These Ministers noted with satisfaction that Allied solidarity has continued to prove itself in these negotiations. They reaffirmed the principle that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions agreement with the East.

6. The Ministers took note of the Declaration made by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 October, 1975, that the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded by the USSR and the GDR on the 7 October, 1975. They shared the view of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that its policy to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination, is fully consistent with the Final Act of Helsinki.

Ministers underlined the essential connection between the situa-

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–750.

tion relating to Berlin and détente, security and cooperation throughout Europe.

They emphasized in particular, that traffic and ties between Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany and the representation abroad of the interests of those sectors by the Federal Republic of Germany continue to be important elements of the viability of the city.

7. Ministers reviewed developments in the Mediterranean area since their last meeting. They expressed concern at the possible dangers of new tensions that could affect the balance of forces in this region. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to the continuation of efforts designed to achieve an overall settlement resulting in a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. They requested the Council to keep this question under review and to report back to them again at the next meeting.

8. The issue of the present fisheries dispute between Iceland and the United Kingdom was raised and discussed.

9. Ministers discussed various aspects of problems related to armaments and standardization with the aim of improving the military capability of the Alliance and of making more effective use of available resources, especially in view of the increasing pressures in national budgets. They agreed that the examination of these questions would be pursued by the Council and the other competent bodies of the Alliance in accordance with established procedures. They agreed to form for a limited time an *ad hoc* committee under the Council to prepare a specific program of action covering the interoperability of military equipment.

10. Ministers took note of the progress achieved by the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). They endorsed resolutions on coastal water pollution and oil spills, noting the determination of the member countries to continue to combat pollution of the seas and to enhance the quality of the marine environment. Ministers noted and endorsed the initiation of a pilot study open to interested nations on the relationship between food and health, and the continuation of other studies relating to the environment and to energy. They noted the important contribution of the CCMS to effective international cooperation in areas of major concern to our societies.

11. Ministers reaffirmed the attachment of their nations to the democratic principles on which their free institutions are founded. They expressed their confidence in the ability of their countries to surmount the problems of our time. They considered the cohesion and vitality of the Alliance to be a sure source of mutual support and solidarity.

12. The next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Oslo on 20 and 21 May, 1976.

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[1] Text identical with *15th Annual Report to Congress,* but lacks section on research, depository libraries, General Advisory Committee.

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[3] Text identical with that of *Arms Control Report* but contains sections on research, depository libraries, General Advisory Committee. For the *14th Annual Report,* see below, under Congressional publications.

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[4] For text, see *ante,* pp. 706-710.
[5] Printed *ante,* pp. 161-187.
[6] Excerpts printed *ante,* pp. 617-626.
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United Nations Materials

General

The activities, proceedings, and decisions of United Nations organs, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the specialized agencies are reviewed annually, monthly, and daily in the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, the *UN Monthly Chronicle*, and the *Journal of the United Nations*, respectively. The most recent *Yearbook* is that for 1973 (Sales No. E.75.I.1). It provides a fully indexed, comprehensive account of the many discussions, decisions, and activities of the United Nations and its related intergovernmental organizations. The *Journal*, which is supplemented by a daily list of the documents distributed, provides useful current information on schedules and agenda of meetings of the General Assembly and its committees. The *Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1975* (Sales No. E.76.I.11) offers a bibliographical guide to the proceedings and documentation of the 29th session (closing meeting), the 7th special session, and the 30th session of the General Assembly and of its committees. For each session there is included the agenda, subject index, index to speeches, numerical list of documents, and a voting chart of resolutions adopted by recorded or roll-call vote. The *United Nations and Disarmament, 1970–1975*, another publication of interest, was prepared in response to a decision taken by the 29th General Assembly to provide a supplement to the *United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1970.*

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been published as General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 29* (A/10029). The report describes the consultations that were held pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 3259

A (XXIX) [10] and the views of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean with respect to six points pertinent to the question of holding a conference on the Indian Ocean. In addition, the report contains the text of a draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee.[11]

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been published as General Assembly *Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/10028). Prepared in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3260 (XXIX), the report contains an account of the views of states on the objectives of a world disarmament conference, comments by states on other aspects of such a conference, and a recommendation that the General Assembly examine the advisability of the continuation of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Comments by States on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference and related matters are included in an annex.

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(formerly Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee)

Verbatim records of meetings of the plenary committee, the Committee of the Whole, and the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee exist in mimeographed form. Documents and verbatim records of meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), dating from 26 August 1969, also exist in mimeographed form. The 1975 CCD Report to the United Nations General Assembly has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/10027).[12] The CCD special report on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones that was undertaken in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3261 F (XXIX) [13] has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27A* (A/10027/Add.1).[14] It has also been issued as *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects* (Sales No. E.76.I.7).

Disarmament Commission

Verbatim records of meetings of the commission exist in mimeographed form. The most recent records are those for April 21–June 16, 1965.

Economic and Social Council

Summary records of meetings are published in the *Economic and Social Council Official Records*. A bibliographical guide to the proceedings and documentation of 59th Council Session (2–31 July, 29 Aug.–10 Nov. 1975) and of its sessional committees may be found in the *Index to Proceedings of the Economic and Social Council, Fifty-ninth Session—1975* (Sales No. E.76.I.5). Resolutions and Decisions of the Council adopted at the resumed 59th Session (29 Aug.–10 Nov. 1975) have been published in *Economic and Social Council Official Records, Resumed Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 1A*.

General Assembly

Verbatim records of plenary and First Committee meetings are published in the *General Assembly Official Records*. Thirtieth session agenda items of interest are 31, 33–50, 115, 120, 122, 124, 126. The texts of the resolutions adopted by the 30th General Assembly appear in *General Assembly Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 34*.

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[10] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 795–796.
[11] For text, see *ante*, pp. 774–776.
[12] For text of the report, without documentary annexes, see *ante*, pp. 419–435.
[13] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 808–809.
[14] For text, without documentary annexes, see *ante*, pp. 321–349.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency include the application of safeguards. In this connection, the IAEA held an International Symposium on the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, in Vienna, 20–24 October 1975. A brief account of the proceedings and the papers presented at the Symposium is given in the Dec. 1975 issue of the *International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin*, which is issued six times a year by the Public Information Section, Division of External Relations at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Reports on other activities during 1975, such as the safeguarding of peaceful nuclear activities and meetings of the Technical Committee on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions are included in the Agency's *Annual Report, 1 July 1974–30 June 1975* (GC (XIX)/544).

International Court of Justice

A recently published pamphlet entitled *The International Court of Justice* (Sales No. E.75.I.11) gives a short account of the organization of the Court, its jurisdiction, the manner in which it functions, and the judgments and advisory opinions delivered since its creation.

Secretary-General

The Secretary-General's report on the work of the organization for the period 16 June 1974–15 June 1975 and his introduction to the report has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/10001) and Supplement No. 1A (A/10001/Add.1), respectively. His report on the reduction of military budgets prepared in response to General Assembly Resolution 3093 B (XXVIII),[15] issued as A/9770/Rev.1, has been published as *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (Sales No. E.75.I.10).

Security Council

The *Index to Proceedings of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year—1975* (Sales No. E.76.I.8) includes a bibliographical guide to proceedings and documentation of the Council and of its committees or *ad hoc* committees that met during 1975, as well as the agenda, a subject index, an index to speeches, and a numerical list of documents.

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AGRONSKY, MARTIN. Radio-televison news analyst.
ALBERT, CARL. U.S. Congressman (Dem., Okla.), 1947–1977; Speaker of the House of Representatives.
ALLEN, MARK E. U.K. Ambassador, alternate leader of the delegation to the CCD; member of the delegation to the United Nations.
ALLON, YIGAL. Israeli Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, 1974–.
AMERASINGHE, HAMILTON S. Ceylonese Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Chairman of the Ceylonese delegation, 1967–.
BJÖRNERSTEDT, ROLF. Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General to the CCD, 1973–1974; Acting Representative, 1975–.
BREZHNEV, LEONID I. General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964–.
BRODER, DAVID. Journalist, author.
BROOKE, EDWARD W. U.S. Senator (Rep., Mass.), 1967–.
BROWN, GEORGE S. General, USAF. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1974–.
CALLAGHAN, JAMES. U.K. Foreign Secretary, 1974–1976; Prime Minister, April 1976–.
CHIAO, KUAN-hua. Chairman, PRC delegation to the United Nations, 1971–1974; Foreign Minister, 1974–1976.
CHOU, NAN. Counsellor, PRC permanent mission to the United Nations.
CHUANG, YEN. PRC Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
CLARK, B. AKPORODE. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1974–.
CLEMENTS, WILLIAM P., Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1972–1976.
COLBY, WILLIAM. Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1973–1975.
CURRIE, MALCOLM R. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1973–.
DE VOS, WILLEM JAN. Netherlands representative at the MBFR talks, 1975–.
DI BERNARDO, NICOLO. Ambassador, leader of the Italian delegation to the CCD, 1973–; member, U.N. delegation.
DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F. Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1961–.
DUKE, PAUL W. Journalist; Washington correspondent, public television, 1974–.
EKLUND, DR. SIGVARD. Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1961–.
EL-ERIAN, ABDULLAH. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1974–1975.
ELIAS, DON ANTONIO. Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations; Rapporteur, *Ad Hoc* Committee for a World Disarmament Conference, 1974, 1975.
ENE, CONSTANTIN. Ambassador, leader of the Romanian delegation to the CCD, 1972–.
ERELL, MOSHE. Israeli Ambassador; member, U.N. delegation.
FORD, GERALD R. U.S. Congressman (Rep., Mich.), 1948–1973; Minority Leader, 1965–1973; Vice President of the United States, 1973–1974; President, 1974–1977.
GARCÍA ROBLES, ALFONSO. Mexican Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1964–; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1965–; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1969–.
GISCARD D'ESTAING, VALERY. French President, 1974–.
GROMYKO, ANDREI A. Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1957–.
HOFFMAN, MARTIN R. Secretary of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense, July 1975–1977.
HOVEYDA, FEREYDOUN. Iranian Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for a World Disarmament Conference, 1974, 1975.
HUANG, HUA. PRC Ambassador to Mexico, 1966; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1971–1976; Foreign Minister, Dec. 1976–.
IKLÉ, FRED C. Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964–1967; Head, Social Science Dept., Rand Corporation, 1968–1973; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–1977.
ISSRAELYAN, VICTOR LEVONOVICH. Chief, International Organizations Bureau,

Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Alternate Representative, U.N. delegation; member, Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

JACKSON, HENRY M. U.S. Congressman (Dem., Wash.), 1940–1952; Senator, 1952–.

JOHNSON, OSWALD. Reporter, *Washington Star Newspaper.*

JOHNSON, U. ALEXIS. U.S. Foreign Service Officer; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1969–1973; Ambassador at Large, 1973–; Chief, U.S. SALT delegation, 1973–1977.

KAUFMANN, J. Dutch Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

KEATLEY, ROBERT. Staff reporter, *Wall Street Journal.*

KEVIN, A. C. Member, Australian Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. Consultant, Weapons Evaluation Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1959–1960, National Security Council, 1961–1962, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961–1968, Department of State, 1965–1968; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1969–1975; Secretary of State, 1973–1977.

KLEIN, DAVID. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, Assistant Director for International Relations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975; alternate representative to NPT Review Conference, 1975.

KORHONEN, KEIJO. Finnish professor; Chairman *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 1975.

KRATZER, MYRON B. Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1975–; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and Technology Affairs, 1975–.

LAIRD, MELVIN R. U.S. Congressman (Rep., Wis.), 1953–1969; Secretary of Defense, 1969–1972; Special Assistant to the President, 1973–1974.

MALIK, YAKOV A. Soviet Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1968–1977.

MARTIN, JOSEPH, JR. General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, 1970–1971; Special Assistant to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and representative to the CCD, 1971–1976; member, ACDA General Advisory Committee, 1974–1976.

McCLELLAN, JOHN L. U.S. Senator (Dem., Ark.), 1942–; Chairman, Committee on Appropriations.

MEERBURG, A. J. Deputy leader, Netherlands delegation to the CCD, 1975–.

MISHRA, B. C. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1974–.

MISTRAL, ANDRÉ. Adviser, French delegation to the United Nations.

MIYAZAWA, KIICHI. Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1974–Sept. 1976.

MOYERS, BILL D. Journalist; host, public affairs programs on public television, 1970–.

NISIBORI, MASAHIRO. Ambassador, leader of the Japanese delegation to the CCD, 1972–1975.

PALME, OLAF. Swedish Prime Minister, 1969–1976.

PASTINEN, ILKKA. Finnish Ambassador; Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General to the CCD, 1971–1974; Secretary-General of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975.

PELL, CLAIBORNE. U.S. Senator (Dem., R.I.), 1960–.

RAJAKOSKI, ESKO. Counsellor, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. delegation, 1975.

ROSHCHIN, ALEXEY A. Member, Soviet delegation to the ENDC, 1962; Ambassador and leader of the Soviet delegation to the ENDC and CCD, 1966–1976.

ROWE, ALAN D. Alternate Representative, Canadian delegation to the CCD, 1973–; member, U.N. delegation.

SCALABRE, GUY. Counselor, French Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

SCHLAICH, GEORG J. FRG Ambassador, leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1975–.

SCHLESINGER, JAMES R. Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971–1973; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Feb.–July 1973; Secretary of Defense, 1973–1975.

SCHMIDT, HELMUT. Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, 1974–.

SEMENOV, VLADIMIR S. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister; leader, SALT delegation, 1969–.

SIKIVOU, S. K. Permanent Representative of Fiji to the United Nations.

SISCO, JOSEPH J. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1965–1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, 1969–1974; Under Secretary for Political-Economic Affairs, 1974; Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, 1974–1976.

SMITH, GERARD C. Assistant Secretary of State, Director of the Policy Planning Staff,

1957–1961; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969–1973; head of U.S. SALT delegation, 1969–1972.

SPARKMAN, JOHN J. U.S. Senator (Dem., Ala.), 1946–; member, Foreign Relations Committee.

SPIVAK, LAWRENCE E. Television-radio producer.

STASHEVSKY, GENNADIY STEPANOVICH. Deputy Head of Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. delegation.

STRULAK, TADEUSZ. Polish representative at the MBFR talks.

SYMINGTON, STUART. U.S. Senator (Dem., Mo.), 1952–1977; member, Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Armed Services.

TAITTINGER, PIERRE CHRISTIAN. French Senator; member, French delegation to the United Nations.

TEMPLETON, M. J. C. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations.

THORSSON, INGA. Swedish Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1974–.

WALDHEIM, KURT. Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1971–.

WILL, GEORGE. Editor, political columnist.

WILSON, HAROLD. British Prime Minister, 1964–1970; 1974–1976.

WYZNER, EUGENIUSZ. Polish Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva; leader of the delegation to the CCD, Aug. 1973–.

YOUNG, MILTON R. U.S. Senator (Rep., N.D.), 1945–.

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
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